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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
FROM HOBBES TO HABERMAS: 
THE ANTI-CULTURAL TURN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
 
The theme of this dissertation is the anti-cultural turn of Western Political Thought 
that has emerged out of Enlightenment thinking and was first turned into a comprehensive 
political idea by Thomas Hobbes. The Hobbesian worldview makes the case that human 
sociability and ultimately culture are the main drivers of conflict, and that the prescriptions 
of any political philosophy should aim to replace sociability with individuality. 
Beginning with an overview of psychological research into the phenomenon of 
culture I put forward the argument that human beings are by nature social and 
individualistic, but that they oscillate between their ability to put group-interests before 
individual interests and vice versa. Culture is the main mechanism that influences which 
interest we give priority. This mechanism work through emotional attachments that create 
intuitions about what is morally right and wrong, thereby influencing final behavioral 
outcomes. 
The Enlightenment and Thomas Hobbes viewed these emotional attachments as an 
insufficient or dangerous fundament for social action, leading to a philosophical approach 
that put rational individualism at the center of its moral matrix, diminishing the importance 
of the emotional attachments created by culture. These attachments are crucial for the 
emergence of communities and the ability to engage in collective action. Contrary to the 
idea of a community formation driven purely by rationality, I propose that it is the 
emotional part of the human psyche that enables us to create family like bonds based onb 
culture. 
 
 
In my dissertation I investigate the consequences of this reductionist view on 
culture, and what it can mean for societies and institutions.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Death and Rebirth of Culture 
The concept of culture in the discipline of political science has been a particular 
knotty category for political scientists and even political theorists.  This knottiness stems 
not only from its real or seeming contestability, but also because of its relationships with 
other disciplines and because of its conceptualization within the political science 
community itself. This dissertation seeks to grapple with the notion of culture as an 
interdisciplinary term and its relationships with psychology, political theory, and 
institutionalism. In order to accomplish this task, I will explore a number of sub-literatures, 
some of which are familiar to comparativists and international relations scholars, while 
others remain unfamiliar or opaque to writing and research by mainstream political 
scientists and are drawn from other disciplines amounting to a fugitive literature within the 
political science community.  The hope is that drawing upon these unexplored or 
marginalized bodies of works, this dissertation will contribute to a richer and more nuanced 
understanding of culture and its place within a more interdisciplinary and global 
appreciation of its multi-layered character. 
 We will begin with the psychology, political theory, and the evolutionary history 
of culture. Every type of political theory starts with an assumption about the character of 
human nature to explain why human beings behave in a certain way and which political 
institutions should be built in order to incentivize behavior that is beneficial for natural 
ourselves and the requirements of civil or political society. Building on a theory of human 
nature, political theories attempt to create a blueprint for institution building, thereby 
bridging the theoretical and the applied aspects of political science.  
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Regardless of whether one considers oneself religious or secular, liberal or 
conservative, right-wing or left-wing, each  is built upon  underlying theory about what the 
ideal institutional setup is supposed to look like. What many of these theories share is their 
supposed universal assumption that human beings do not differ significantly in the way 
they view the world and what they value.  This means that once the right theory has been 
discovered it should be applicable to all humankind. Of course, even the staunchest 
ideologues have been befuddled by the stubbornness with which human beings have been 
refused to accept universal designs. The Enlightenment has provided us with a possible 
answer for this dilemma, pointing to the self-imposed intellectual immaturity of pre-
enlightened times and the reliance on tradition and convention, which was just another way 
of having somebody else do the thinking for us (as argued by Kant 1784). Once we all 
started to use our capacity for reason, it was assumed, views of the world and people’s 
values would inevitably converge.  
The disappearance of fundamental differences would over time allow for a world 
governed by a single set of principles. And true enough, we are indeed able to identify 
certain human goals and aspirations that seem to be universal in general, but then begin to 
differ widely in the particular. For example, to know that all human beings have a desire 
for recognition does not mean that all forms of recognition have the same source.1 In a 
warrior culture there are different means to acquire recognition compared with a society 
made up of Quakers. Unfortunately, it seems as if the universal is contained in the 
 
1 This has been the most enduring problem for theories like Francis Fukuyama’s End of History 
thesis (Fukuyama 2006) that have been largely accurate in their analysis of universals (e.g. the desire for 
recognition) but neglected the possible variation in the particulars (the different ways in which the desire for 
recognition can be satisfied). In defense of Fukuyama, he has conceded this pointed and tried to address this 
shortcoming in later publications (Fukuyama 2012a, 2018).  
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particular: while there are only small differences in the general physiological setup of 
human beings, there is room for variation in other aspects. This applies particularly to the 
realm of psychology, where we are equipped with the necessary parts of the brain and 
hormonal glands to experience feelings and emotions. Still, psychological studies suggest 
that variation exists in the specific triggers that activate areas of the brain and influence the 
release of certain hormones. Killing many enemies in battle will cause a sense of 
exhilaration and pride in the member of a warrior culture but lead to shock and horror for 
the previously mentioned member of the Quakers. Despite their similarity as member of 
the species, homo sapiens, their bodies react differently to the same external stimulus. This 
difference derives from the ability of culture to shape a new combination of stimulus and 
physiological reactions.  
The human psyche has been uniquely designed to enable social behavior and 
cooperation in a variety of ways, involving the whole range of cognitive and emotional 
abilities to create complex ways of arranging social structures.2 In the modern world we 
take many of these structures for granted, for example the existence of communities that 
go beyond the level of kin and tribe, and thereby underestimate the many processes that 
allow large societies to emerge and sustain themselves. Human societies throughout history 
have experimented widely with ideas and visions of how to best organize their 
communities, sometimes with great success and other times leading to disaster. A crucial 
part of these different ideas was that they created different worldviews and values that were 
fiercely defended and believed in by their communities. These worldviews and values had 
 
2 To avoid any confusion – the distinction between cognitive and emotional is based on the 
assumption that the emotional is intuitive and the cognitive is the conscious and reflexive. 
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a crucial impact on the organization of interpersonal relations, defining who belongs to a 
certain group and what kind of commitments are expected from members of society. From 
different forms of prayer to different gods through dress codes and dietary restrictions, 
societies have developed symbols and traditions that were invested with distinctive values 
and served as pointers for collective and individual morality.  
Without regard at the moment to its origins, morality should be seen as lying at the 
heart of every discussion about culture, since it is the realm of morals that deals with the 
question of what constitutes good and bad behavior and tries to provide us with an answer 
to what behavior or actions are right and wrong. Morality emerges around culture as an 
element to enable and organize communal living. In many instances, different cultures 
developed similar answers to moral questions; sometimes, however, they led to quite 
different ones. Once again, we are faced with a universal human quality that nonetheless 
does not allow us to precisely determine the particular. We find moral ideas in all known 
societies, but apart from similarities at the meta-level (i.e., the overall question of good vs. 
bad that is at the core of moral thinking), actual moral practices can differ widely among 
societies.  
Therefore, we must start with a deeper investigation of human psychology in order 
to identify what causes the variation of worldviews and values among societies, and what 
the existence of such a variation means. Growing evidence strongly suggests that 
fundamental differences exist in the way people experience the world and social 
relationships, some even valuing and treasuring materials and practices that for others 
might be regarded as completely worthless or abhorrent. Cultural psychologists, like 
Richard Shweder, have demonstrated in  cross-cultural studies that people can inhabit 
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different moral worlds consisting of unique value structures that inform human behavior 
(Shweder 1990). Being the consequence of social and historical evolution, these different 
moral worlds are not just steppingstones towards one future set of shared global values, but 
are deeply-held beliefs that inform the daily lives of those who hold them. 
There has been a trend in the social sciences over the last couple of decades to 
extrapolate and generalize behavior based on a specific subset of the global population. 
Searching for participants in psychological studies, researchers often have relied on the 
student population at their research institutions, making the psychology of American 
undergraduate students a deeply researched area. But is it really the case that the behavior 
of this unique group can be applied to all other societies? Or is it more likely that these 
studies tell a story about the behavior of an educated age group imbedded in a particular 
cultural background? The latter seems significantly more likely and explains why the 
replication of psychological experiments often leads to different outcomes when non-US 
subjects are chosen (Collaboration 2015).  
The fitting acronym for this subset is WEIRD – meaning those from “Western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic” backgrounds. Relying on studies conducted 
with participants from this cultural background unintentionally tended to valorize and 
generalize a standard of behavior that supposedly was rational and “essential” human 
behavior, even though it only applied to the kind of people that actually participated in 
those studies. The problem remains that many people around the world have different 
backgrounds and therefore show different behavioral patterns; and this makes the reliability 
of many behavioral studies highly questionable (Arnett 2008; Henrich, Heine, and 
Norenzayan 2010a, 2010b). The emergence of the “WEIRD” standard is another 
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demonstration of how the neglect of cultural differences can create blind spots in our 
understanding of human behavior. 
For the purpose of my research, the most important variation is in the area of moral 
values, and this is where I will anchor my discussion of culture. One of the reasons why 
the emergence of a single moral standard seems currently impossible is the emotional 
attachment human beings develop towards different rules and practices. I will argue that in 
its most basic form these attachments constitute what I mean by the concept of culture: a 
set of values that are strongly- and emotionally-held by groups and individuals.  
I am especially interested in the moral content of these values, since the moral 
values we hold will have a profound impact on the way we treat ourselves and others. These 
differences make objective judgments often difficult, but without an attempt at objectivity 
one can easily fall into the trap of cultural and moral relativism. Is the practice of female 
circumcision, for example, a means of suppressing women or an integral part of being a 
member of one’s society and therefore perceived as something positive not just by 
supposed male oppressors but by women themselves? (That is the argument of Shweder 
2000.) It is without a doubt an interference with the bodily autonomy of the female body, 
causing suspicion among the members of a culture whose morality is strongly centered 
around the value of individualism. But is sacrificing part of the autonomy over one’s body 
to strengthen one’s group membership really morally worse than not doing so? A similar 
dilemma, by the way, informs a large part of the discussion regarding abortion in the United 
States.  There, both sides of the argument have competing moral values: one valuing the 
autonomy of the potential mother over her body, while the other side holding fast to its 
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embrace of the responsibility of the community to protect what is viewed as an independent 
life. 
Moral disagreements are part of the realm of culture, and taking culture seriously 
must include taking moral differences seriously. To avoid the trap of relativism or nihilism 
from the outset, I will take the position that some things can be objectively the same in one 
respect and objectively differ in another. For example, let us assume that there are two 
different cultures, with one culture valuing celibacy over everything else and the other 
culture having a strong procreation stance. If the members of both cultures emotionally and 
voluntarily hold these opposing positions, it is impossible to claim objectively that one 
culture is morally superior to the other. We can, however, assume that after a few 
generations the culture celebrating celibacy will have significantly lower numbers than 
their sexually active competitors. In other words, we can objectively look at the 
consequences of culturally created values without doubting the sincerity of those who hold 
these values. As I mentioned before, human societies have been experimenting with 
different values and there is no guarantee that all of them will lead to the best possible 
outcome.  
This discussion is of crucial importance to the central arguments in this dissertation, 
since contrary to the idea that morality is some form of learned behavior that serves the 
purpose of enabling collective action, recent research evidences--and I hold--that basic 
moral thinking is most likely innate to human beings (Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett 2005) 
and not acquired exclusively via experience or the consequence of rational calculations. 
This innate predisposition to morality is physiologically connected to our emotional 
centers, which means that moral behavior always comes with an emotional component that 
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creates the known feelings we experience in connection with morality, like shame for 
breaking moral rules or pride in upholding them. But this innate inclination to think in 
moral terms does not include a precise prescription of the substance of morals. For 
example, as a species, we care among other things about justice and fairness, but we do not 
all agree on the same definition of constitutes just and fair dealings. If we assume that 
morality is a key factor in creating social order but works not solely through our rational 
faculties but has a considerable emotional component, this could mean that any vision of a 
purely rational society is an illusion or pipedream. It further means if culture is defined by 
the emotional attachment to moral values and moral values are a key ingredient for social 
stability, we probably cannot have any theory of social order that excludes culture.  
As we will see, thinking in moral terms is a complex process that includes our 
cognitive as well as our emotional and intuitive abilities, enabling us not only to define 
behavior as either good or bad, but also to physiologically experience emotions such as 
shame, pride, disgust, or elevation when confronted with particular triggers that can consist 
of objects like food but also and more importantly the observed behavior of others’ 
behaviors. What these definitions are and what emotions they are triggering are deeply 
influenced by cultural learning and the cultural surroundings in which individuals interact. 
It is around this connection of the cognitive and the emotional that we must approach the 
concept of culture. In the past, the term has been so ubiquitous that it now includes 
everything from favorite foods to the ways people dress, thereby diluting the deeper 
meaning of culture. To be clear, as anthropologists have shown (e.g., Claude Levi-Strauss), 
both food and dress codes can be part of culture, but they do not have to be. For example, 
if I should be forbidden to wear baseball caps, my emotional reaction would hardly be 
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detectable, while banning headscarves for Muslims or yarmulkes for Jews wiould most 
likely cause more of an emotional issue for these groups.  
But not only religious communities show these kinds of emotional attachments: 
Despite the claims in many Western societies that politics should be conducted objectively 
and technocratically, public discourse is full of emotional content. Positions on abortion, 
migration, the environment, or economic policies are not so often contentious because one 
side has knowledge the other does not, but because the issues create different emotional 
reactions (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Hersh 2001). Cultural similarities 
and cultural differences do not follow national borders, and cultural gaps can easily open 
up within a country just as they can become narrower between the populations of different 
countries. To use but one example, a devout German and Chinese Catholic will probably 
find more familiarity with each other than a German atheist and a German convert to Islam. 
National cultures are cultures as long as national identity is also an emotional experience; 
thus, if the emotional attachment breaks away, it will become more difficult to keep the 
community together. None of this, by the way, trades away the human ability for 
rationality. It is a mistake to constantly see the emotional and the rational as stark opposites. 
They can pull in different directions, but also support each other. The abolition of slavery, 
for example, was grounded in sound and rational arguments, but no one should doubt the 
emotional commitment coming from the abolitionists.  
Both the cognitive and the emotional quality of human beings need to be taken 
seriously as equally important elements of enabling social life. While the rediscovered 
scrutiny regarding the cognitive-rationalist model is welcome, we should not make the 
mistake to move so far in the other direction that every action is now viewed as the result 
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of underlying emotional commitments and every claim to rationality is a mere illusion of 
the mind. David Hume’s statement that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 
2011, 174) has become a popular one-liner among the critics of rationalism (e.g. Haidt 
2013, 29, 79, 381; Simler and Hanson 2018, 91); and for some, it  purportedly demonstrates 
how we are in the end all servants of our sub- and unconsciousness. Interestingly enough, 
however, Hume himself does not come to this conclusion. For him, passion and reason can 
sometimes  stand in contradiction with one other, but it does not have to be so in every case 
(Hume 2011, 175) – which is the same argument I am making. The  important question 
David Hume and later Adam Smith are asking is not whether passions are more important 
than reason, but what causes passion for one thing but not another. Far from exchanging 
one for the other, Hume and others have sought to identify the best possible means of 
cooperation between passion and reason, captured explicitly in Adam Smith’s dictum that 
“the great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects” (Smith 1982, 259).  
Even if we were to accept it as factual that passion comes first and reason second, 
the question of what we are passionate about still remains unanswered. Culture can provide 
an answer here, because creating triggers for specific passions is exactly what culture does. 
And it is the variation in these triggers that we mean when we talk about cultural, moral, 
or psychological pluralism. The universal capacity for experiencing emotions but the 
potential differences in what triggers them is at the heart of the previously mentioned 
experiments in society building. Aristotle pointed to the importance of this when and 
explained that the right triggers for emotions are key to a virtuous society: “to feel them at 
the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
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motive, and in the right way” (Aristotle 2009, 30). Not coincidentally, Aristotle and Smith 
sound very similar, for both realized that the idea of a dispassionate society is impossible, 
and that what is needed is not  abandoning passion, but directing it towards proper objects.  
If the guidance of human passions is so important and culture plays such a key role 
in its stwardship, why does it seem that the question of culture has fallen out of fashion in 
most of the social sciences. I argue that there has been a continuing thread throughout 
modern and post-modern Western philosophy that has created the impression that a 
universalist political theory is possible under the exclusion of culture. The reason for this, 
however, was not that culture was seen as unimportant – on the contrary, it was seen as a 
major threat to a stable political order due to its emphasis and an appeal to human emotions. 
Hobbes and others correctly pointed out that if we did not care so much for the actions of 
others, the world would be a much more peaceful place. But what if the lives of others in 
both positive and negative ways mean so much to us because it is hardwired into our 
psyche? The aforementioned innate quality of moral thinking is strong evidence that we 
are by design made to care about the actions of others. This is further supported by the 
research into our closest animal relatives, namely chimpanzees and other primates, that 
have a less developed but nonetheless existing moral sense that in turn allows them to build 
social structures (F. B. M. de Waal 2007; Frans B. M. de Waal 1997). Looking at human 
evolution, society seems to be much more natural to us than modern theories of 
individualism would allow us to suspect. Which brings us to another key question: What 
comes first, community (and later society) or the individual? 
This is the question we have to ask, because from Hobbes to the key thinkers of the 
Enlightenment society and community were no longer seen as ends in themselves, but were  
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reduced to a functionalist purpose in order to ensure the survival and well-being of the 
individual.3 This was a cultural shift that occurred as a consequence of the Enlightenment 
and left Western society with a definition of morality that almost exclusively rested on the 
relationship between individuals, pushing the autonomous value of community out of the 
picture (Graham et al. 2013, 6; Shweder 1990; Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller 1987). The 
view of community that derived from a functionalist and utilitarian perspective marks the 
anti-cultural turn of Western political thinking. It is anti-cultural in the sense that the idea 
of commonly-held values was replaced by the value of individual liberation under the sole 
condition that the liberty of one must not infringe on the liberty of another. This in itself is 
more a change than an abandonment of culture, but I prefer the term anti-cultural because 
it captures better how the Western tradition perceived this shift. It was not viewed as 
cultural change, but as its replacement with reason and rationality. The turn towards reason 
explicitly rejected the idea of emotional attachments to group values.  
Before I continue, it is important to mention that the aim of my argument is not to 
reject this new culture of individualism and individualistic reason, but to realize that it is a 
culture in its own right with its own moral core. Contrary to some of the most vocal critics 
of modern liberalism (e.g. Deneen 2018), the point is not to re-erect the specter of some 
imaginary pre-Enlightenment period, but to build a solid defense of liberal society through 
the recognition of its cultural character. Once it becomes clear that Western liberalism 
inhabits its own moral and therefore cultural world, it should help us to better understand 
the relationship between Western and non-Western cultures. In fact, the anti-cultural turn 
 
3 That is the truly revolutionary content of social contract theory: Community becomes fully justified 
by its utility for individual members, but community as such ceases to be an end in itself.  
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in the West is strong evidence for the role of culture in influencing the relationship between 
the cognitive and the emotional. The ability to use our natural inclination towards 
community and build a society based on an emotional commitment to the principle of 
individualism and individual autonomy is truly astounding. I will return to this topic later 
when we discuss how culture not only creates communities, but also breaks them – 
especially the more instinct-based bonds between family members.  
The rejection of culture that was built into the thinking of Hobbes and others (e.g., 
Bernard Mandeville) was also a linked to the increasingly important role of commerce, 
since the benefits of trade and economic prosperity were supposed to replace the downsides 
of culture. Economics was imagined as the means through which individualism and 
materialism would become our primary concern, thereby breaking the bonds of culture and 
the emotional baggage it makes us carry.4 If we focus most of our energy on our 
endowment with material goods, peace will become more beneficial than war, and 
cooperation will be more valuable than old antagonisms. We will also see, however, that 
this idea caused discernable unease for figures like Adam Smith and David Hume, who 
realized that the emphasis on materialism leaves out important aspects of what it means to 
be human. Smith especially would be surprised that the average undergraduate student at 
a Western university is more likely to know his Wealth of Nations (Smith 2005) than The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1982), which he continued to revise and update until 
his death and which puts so much emphasis on the importance of human beings as social 
 
4 It is no coincidence that historical materialists and Marxists always had an uneasy relationship 
with culture and viewed it is part of the superstructure, since they fall squarely on the anti-cultural side of 
Western political thought. 
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creatures (Macfie 1959, 223–24).5 While Smith hints at the potential cultural emptiness of 
a purely materialistic world created by capitalism, Joseph Schumpeter fully expanded on 
the idea in a way that is helpful for our discussion of culture. The capitalist system enables 
tremendous economic growth through the liberation of the individual and the permission 
to own and sell labor as well as private property. Yet despite this economic expansion and 
its benefits, social relationships start to change with growing inequality and the different 
abilities that people can sell at different prices in the marketplace. If we were be truly self-
centered individuals, the poverty or wealth of others would not bother us, but since we are 
psychologically hard-wired to care about others, the rising inequality emerging from the 
overall success of the capitalist system causes us unease. Schumpeter fears that this unease 
will make people turn against capitalism and usher in some form of socialism (Schumpeter 
1994).  
     I would argue though that Schumpeter only got it half-right: It is less the 
economic system that causes the psychological unease than the individualism that underlies 
it. This is, however, mostly a cultural and not an economic problem. To return to Adam 
Smith, the reason why he separated his work into a volume on economics and a volume on 
sentiments was that he explicitly distinguished between the benefits of individualism in the 
market and its downsides in other areas of life. The success of the capitalist system has 
motivated social theorists to apply its underlying principles to the entirety of human 
experiences, hoping to be able to explain all human behavior based on the desire for 
 
5 Smith is not the only economist whose writings against the utility-maximizing approach have been 
largely ignored in modern times despite being popular names in economic departments. Joseph Schumpeter 
and Alfred Marshall among others are also read mostly in a selective fashion these days, ignoring the 
significant attention they paid to the non-rational side of human beings.  
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material gain we see in the marketplace.6 The concept of individualism has become so 
persuasive that most of capitalism’s sharpest critics cannot detach themselves from it. The 
argument that modern capitalism has been destroying authentic communal life assumes 
that this authentic community was the consequence of individual choice, and it was only 
the capitalist mode of production that deprived people of autonomous decision making and 
forced them into a life of anonymous wage labor. This argument, however, puts reality 
upside down: the reason why communal life seemed more authentic in pre-capitalist times 
is because without it, people would have had a hard time surviving.  
The often-floated idea that capitalism creates greed or egoism seems doubtful and 
it is more likely that the productive success of the capitalist system made egoism an option 
that was not available before. Even the biggest egocentric individual needed community to 
survive, so he or she did not really have a choice in the matter.  
This is why it is so important for this dissertation to include a discussion of the 
social evolution of humankind, in order to show that in the beginning community was not 
a choice, but a necessity for survival. In other words, the idea that individualism is at the 
core of human behavior and all other behaviors can be reduced to it stands in stark contrast 
to what was necessary for our species to survive. To a certain degree, most theories of the 
contemporary social sciences resemble a materialist interpretation of history based on 
utility maximization (Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). Culture remains a contested issue in 
the discipline of political science because it clashes with some of its core assumptions—
 
6 This is not only true for the social sciences. As I will explain in a later chapter, the criticism of 
group-selection in evolutionary theory or the reduction of behavior to the actions of “selfish genes” (e.g. 
Dawkins 2016) is often nothing more than the application of the neoclassical economic approach in the 
natural sciences.  
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primarily, the concepts of utility and rationality. The scientific revolution and its methods 
that drove and were driven by the Enlightenment undercut and contradicted the concept of 
culture, since a part of cultural behavior is the acceptance and emulation of behavior for 
reasons that cannot be explained by individual utility or rationality (or at least not without 
turning them into tautological concepts). Pure methodological individualism could 
theoretically do without culture, for culture is facilitating and depending on community. In 
a society of completely autonomous individuals, there would be no need for culture. In the 
worst case, culture with its moral codes and ideas can be an obstacle for the good of society, 
since it blinds us to the best possible options due to our emotional commitment to culture. 
The completely autonomous individual, however, should increasingly be understood as the 
consequence and not the starting point of culture. It was due to changes in institutions and 
the economic modes of production that individualism became an option and an actual 
culture of individualism could emerge.  
The mistaken assumption that individualism is our true nature caused Western 
thinkers from Hobbes to Freud to the contemporary social sciences, to argue that there is a 
“struggle between nature and culture” (Kaye 1991, 90). These critics of culture claim that 
our true instincts, which are supposedly individualistic and materialistic, clash with the 
requirements of community thereby creating a constant state of anxiousness and even 
neurosis for human beings. One way to resolve this anxiety would be for us to get rid of 
culture altogether and remain solitary, coming together only under the umbrella of a social 
contract and only when it is necessary to further individual wealth and well-being.  
The idea that community as such provides pleasure or could be seen as an end in 
itself regardless of its materialistic consequences is today a minority view in the social 
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sciences. Modern Western institutions have been so successful in liberating the 
autonomous individual that philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau took a cultural 
achievement – the concept of individualism – and conceived it as the natural state of affairs 
(Fukuyama 2012a, 29; Greif 2006, 26). Considering the dark and violent times the early 
Enlightenment thinkers had to endure while formulating their theories, their suspicion of 
human passions beyond the desire for material possession can be well understood.7  
The final part of the dissertation will engage the question of institutions and 
institution building. There are growing concerns from multiple scholars that the political 
and social institutions in the West are fracturing and decaying (Ferguson 2013; Fukuyama 
2000, 2013, 2014, 2016; Haidt 2013; Murray 2012; Putnam 1995, 2016; Skocpol 2004; 
Wolfe 1999).  I believe that culture could help provide us with part of the answer to what 
is going on. To be clear once again, those who expect an argument lamenting the loss of 
culture and how modernity has turned us into philistines who are staggering towards a 
societal abyss will be disappointed. There is no lack of culture in the West, but there is a 
lack of understanding what our culture is. The struggle between individualism and 
collectivism has been dealt with in the realms of theory since the days of the Enlightenment, 
and the gradual triumph of individualism had many positive consequences, reaching from 
equality before the law, equal participation in politics, and the right to private property to 
the right for individual recognition in ever more areas of life, including religious, ethnic, 
and sexual orientation. Yet none of this would have been possible without the emotional 
and therefore cultural attachment to the value of individualism. In the final part of the 
 
7 Both Hobbes and Locke, for example, lived during the Thirty Years War and the English Civil 
War. 
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dissertation, I will continue to argue that modern individualism is a cultural phenomenon, 
and not simply the consequence of the overcoming of culture through reason and 
rationality. However, both reason and rationality provide us with the tools necessary to 
understand their cultural underpinning.  
Institutions represent formalized rules and practices of a society, but the legitimacy 
of these institutions and the will of people to follow the rules and practices depends strongly 
on the emotional attitude people hold towards them. Aoki (Aoki 2001) and Boettke et al. 
(Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson 2008, 334) emphasize “the importance of informal 
complementary institutions that allow formal institutions to function in the desired 
manner.” Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point, arguing for the necessary distinction 
between formal institutions like constitutions and legal systems, and “informal norms that 
fall into the realm of culture” (Fukuyama 2012b, 531). Niall Ferguson, who champions the 
institutional approach as a historian and regularly issues “health warnings” (Ferguson 
2013, 27) with regard to cultural interpretations, admits that “institutions are, of course, in 
some sense the products of culture” (Ferguson 2011, 10). Institutions and culture, therefore, 
are corresponding concepts. Institutions are created in order to constrain and shape 
individual behavior via mechanics of reward and punishment, but also by creating social 
norms that define actions that are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995). The content of these norms, however, varies from culture to culture (Ostrom 
2000, 144). 
The neoinstitutional economist Avner Greif argues that Western institutions “may 
have undermined themselves in the long run by creating excessive individualism and 
materialism” (Greif 2006, 26). Maybe, but I believe that the bigger problem is that 
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individualism is still perceived as an objective norm, and people who are trying to act 
rationally might feel a temptation to act individualistically, if not egoistically. The 
realization that the sustainability of existing political institutions rests on our collective 
emotional attachment to certain values could be an important step to maintain the 
achievements of individualism and prepare it for future challenges. 
In short, this dissertation will tell three stories: The first story is about how nature 
has designed us not only social but cultural beings; the second story is about how a large 
part of Western political philosophy has tried to overcome our culturability (to coin a 
neologism); and the third story is about how the interaction of the first two is influencing 
contemporary political and social institutions.  
To tell these stories in an historical-theoretical and interdisciplinary mode, I will 
explore what I term the “psychology, biology, anthropology, and history of culture.” 
Culture has been treated as a subject in many disciplines, and my attempt is to sew some 
of these threads together to form a non-contradictory whole. The first step in this endeavor 
is to take a close examine on what biological and psychological basis culture can emerge 
at all, and how these fundamentals have evolved and played out through the known history 
of our species. The methodological approach of this dissertation is largely theoretical, so it 
is a justified question what new kinds of knowledge or insights will be produced by it. The 
ultimate attempt is to demonstrate two things: First, that emotions as the main element of 
culture are a necessary element of political life and social order, but that at the same time 
this element does not always cause outcomes that we would evaluate as good in a moral 
sense. My argument is that emotional ties to a community are a necessity to enable social 
life and that these ties can be sources of strength as well as sources weakness, but that 
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without them we would hardly observe any social life at all. Secondly, I put forward an 
argument that this has been realized by numerous thinkers up to modernity, but that authors 
like Hobbes and Locke viewed the ability to culture as a mostly destructive force, which is 
why they proposed to replace emotional ties to society with commercial interests. It was 
only later with the rise of economics that what they proposed as a prescriptive idea turned 
into a descriptive conceptualization of human nature. In other words, homo economicus 
was the goal of Hobbes and Locke, but not the starting point as in many of today’s social 
sciences.  
My argument, however, is novel in the sense that I am looking for evidence in the 
natural sciences before I engage with the points made by political theory. It is only through 
the establishment of some basic facts of human existence as a biological reality that I move 
to the idea of social life as a cultural reality.  
1.2 Method and Chapter Outline 
The attempt to find a common methodological approach for history and political 
theory is a challenging undertaking. Historians like J.G.A. Pocock reason that philosophers 
and historians “fancy that they wisely kept out of each other’s way” (Pocock 2009, 124), 
including the often mentioned fact that Socrates and Thucydides lived at the same time, 
yet there is no proof that they ever interacted with one another. In my dissertation, I try to 
bridge this divide because theory can only be politically relevant if it interprets existing 
facts without an overreliance on potentially unrealistic assumptions. Political theorists have 
often been “silent on the question of method and approach” (Leopold and Stears 2008, 
Kindle Location 68). While there are some exceptions (for an example, see: Skinner 2002), 
methods remain a contested concept in political theory. The approach of my dissertation 
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seeks to emulate elements of Charles Taylor’s and Jürgen Habermas’ way of reasoning as 
a productive dialectic between history and political theory and between the real and the 
ideal. A work in political theory and philosophy can hardly be without a normative 
component, for the normative element is the standard against which the theorizing of reality 
takes place.  
 
Combining theory and historical analysis, I attempt to formulate a genealogy of the 
relationship between political science and culture since Thomas Hobbes. At the center of 
my genealogy is the attempt to isolate the way in which the perception of culture for 
political theorists has changed over time.  
In addition to thus genealogical approach, I attempt to contrast political theories 
and their treatment of culture with the approaches taken by psychology. The guiding idea 
here is to find a means of conceptual and vertical integration, striving to achieve some 
consistency between psychology and political theory. The walls between the natural and 
the social sciences seem often impenetrable due to the “inglorious isolation” that persists 
between the fields of behavioral and social sciences as well as the natural sciences 
themselves (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995, KL 77). From an epistemological 
viewpoint such isolation is a substantial hindrance to coming close to identifying the true 
causes of political phenomena. The inclusion of psychology in any theory of human 
interaction is necessary, since “a social science theory that is incompatible with known 
psychology is as dubious as a neurophysiological theory that requires an impossible 
biochemistry” (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby 1995, KL 83). The understanding of certain 
psychological processes creates opportunities to understand and evaluate not only the basic 
 
22 
 
assumptions but also the more normative quality of political theories. The findings in the 
field of social psychology, for example, have provided new insights into the dichotomy of 
human beings as both social and individualistic beings and how these different traits can 
be activated (Kluver, Frazier, and Haidt 2014). Therefore, any social theory that, for 
example, defines the true self of an individual solely as being part of a socioeconomic class 
(a Marxian fallacy) or being almost exclusively individualistic (a libertarian fallacy) falls 
short of the actual reality of human behavior. This observation bears good news, for it is a 
rejection of any form of monocausal determinism. Different factors are mutually interplay 
and influence each other, some of them of a biological and genetic nature, others of a social 
nature. Human behavior cannot be reduced to social or biological factors but should be 
viewed through a lens of neuroplasticity, the idea that brain structure influences our ability 
for social interaction, but this interaction also influences the brain structure. This is an 
especially helpful approach, I believe, for it cautions us against one-directional or 
monocausal reasoning. It is the interplay of social and biological factors that lead to 
different outcomes (Cacioppo and Berntson 2004; Holmes 2013). 
One can only agree with the conclusion that “the whole incoherent opposition 
between socially determined (or culturally determined) phenomena and biologically 
determined (or genetically determined) phenomena should be consigned to the dustbin of 
history, along with the search for a biology-free social science” (Barkow, Cosmides, and 
Tooby 1995, KL 781-782). The most fruitful engagement with culture is to assume “a 
universal human nature, but that this universality exists primarily at the level of evolved 
psychological mechanisms, not of expressed cultural behaviors” (Barkow, Cosmides, and 
Tooby 1995, KL 87). 
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In the first two chapters and their subchapters I will establish the connection 
between culture and psychology, successfully demonstrating (I hope) that culture is not 
simply an acquired or learned behavior, but based on an innate drive to cultural activity 
based on biological factors. I try to further highlight this innate character of culture by a 
close look at the anthropological record, showing that while culture is universal, cultural 
uniformity does not exist. Culture can be an important element in supporting the adaption 
of groups and their social behavior to a changing environment, but it can also lead to 
maladaptation, where social practices counteract the sustainability of communities. 
In chapter three I begin to engage with the ways in which culture tends to be 
misinterpreted in the contemporary social sciences. All too often, I argue, cultures gets 
equated with ethnicity or other physiological factors that can overlap with culture, but does 
not constitute a cultural phenomenon in itself. Following a clarification of how this 
dissertation defines culture, I turn towards the school of thought that probably had the 
largest influence in the sidelining of culture, namely rational choice theory and the science 
of economics. 
Chapter four will attempt to demonstrate that economic and rational-choice 
thinking are themselves the product of a cultural evolution, and that we have to pay 
particular attention to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who was the first thinker in the 
Western philosophical canon to turn against culture. Hobbes did not do so, because he 
viewed culture as unimportant, but because he saw it as a main source of conflict and 
consequently violence. It is with Hobbes that homo economicus emerges as a normative 
proposal that later becomes the supposedly objective fundament of modern economic and 
rational thinking.  
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Chapter five engages with some of the most influential thinkers of modernity and 
culture, particularly Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, and the critical analysis of their 
respective theories serve as a backdrop for my argument that even those who try taking 
culture seriously often get stuck in a Hobbesian mode of thinking where culture ultimately 
is more of an option than a necessity. 
The dissertation closes with a final chapter offering an outlook and an argument 
that seeks to demonstrate that we cannot fully understand the functioning of institutions 
without taking culture into account, since the belief systems and emotional commitments 
people are holding influence not only their behavior, but the very legitimacy of existing 
institutions in the first place.  
CHAPTER II: THE PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGY, AND ANTHROPOLOGY OF CULTURE  
2.1 The Culture-Psychology Connection 
According to Raymond Williams, “Culture is one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English language” and by definition an essentially contested 
concept, and the question of what actually constitutes “culture” can neither be settled 
conclusively by empirical methods  nor is there some form of general agreement in 
theoretical terms (Clegg and Haugaard 2009, 3). Similarly to the concept of art, it is hard 
to argue about the essence of culture because the term invites endless disputes about their 
proper uses on the part of their users” (Gallie 1955, 167, 169). Culture, of course is not the 
only essentially contested concept in political science, and some even argue that politics 
itself is an essentially contested concept (Connolly 1974). It is for this reason, that I need 
to provide a clear understanding as to how the term culture is used in the context of this 
dissertation.  
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The description of culture as referring to “the overall way of life of a people,” 
(Huntington 2002, KL 648) is too universal a formulation to allow for the effective 
operationalization of the term. The confusion is so widespread that Clifford Geertz 
provides us with 11 definitions of culture, while an interdisciplinary survey produces no 
less than 160 definitions of culture across the fields of anthropology, sociology, and 
psychology among others (Fukuyama 1996, 33; Geertz 1993, 4–5). So one of the 
difficulties with defining culture is that we are having a hard time recognizing it when we 
see it. While it is true that there are all kinds of definitions, they do share one thing: They 
all deal with the relationship between the individual and community.  
In order to fully develop a theory of culture in political science, the first step is to 
realize that culture operates on a cognitive as well as an emotional level. It is important to 
remember that the separation of the spheres of the natural and social world was an 
intellectual decision, but in reality these two things do not exist independently from each 
other. In the following chapters, we will explore this complex relationship. In his work on 
the structure of behavior, Merleau-Ponty points out that we have to understand the human 
body as a whole that integrates mind and matter (Merleau-Ponty 1967). This duality is 
important because my discussion of the role of emotions and culture is a critique of “the 
prevalent scientific reduction of human behavior to material conditions alone” (Low 2004, 
412).  My approach, however, it does not attempt to claim that material considerations are 
irrelevant. My criticism instead aims at a more nuanced appreciation and understanding of 
human nature and the individual, claiming that we can identify different behavioral patterns 
based on the cultural surroundings. The ability to reason and the ability to express passion 
are two integral aspects of what it means to be human, and both fulfill evolutionary 
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purposes. For good reason culture has fallen into disrepute in the West since, beginning 
with Hobbes, the passions have been under suspicion as the cause of violent conflict. While 
Hobbes and others offer a strong case that we will explore in more detail in part two of this 
dissertation, we have to ask whether a world without passions is even possible.  
In the beginning, we will take a close look at the biological underpinnings that make 
culture possible in the first place, then turn to the history of why Western political theory 
has turned its back on culture. Without giving too much away, let it be said that the rejection 
of culture as a fundamental part of the political is in itself a cultural phenomenon. Driven 
by their historical experiences, some of the early key figures of modern political thought 
deliberately attempted to purge culture from politics. They, of course, did not call it culture 
then but referred to the problem of the human passions. In the 17th century Hugo Grotius 
identified in his attempt to formulate a legal and moral framework for war and peace that 
the human desire for both individualism and community is responsible for the impossibility 
of erecting a truly peaceful and harmonious society (Hunter and Nedelisky 2018, 38). Just 
as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke realized after him that the emotional bonds of loyalty 
that tie us to communities and their members, as well as the symbols, institutions, values, 
and traditions that characterize the community, are in the way for a society based solely on 
individualistic reason. They proposed different remedies for this problem: Hobbes 
suggested what amounts to a form radical individualism that is maintained by the all-
powerful Leviathan while Locke planned to redirect and transform the desire for 
community into a desire for economic success. The Enlightenment in both its Anglo-Saxon 
and continental variations continued and refined this approach, arguing that these 
emotional bonds can be made superfluous and replaced with the growing access of 
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individuals to the faculties of reason. Loyalty was supposed to be no longer based on 
emotions, but had to be justifiable in the name of reason, which was soon interpreted to 
mean that the most reasonable community is the one that best serves the materialistic and 
utilitarian needs of the individual. It did not take long for this view to encounter its backlash 
in form of the Counter-Enlightenment and German idealism. A lot of ink has been spilled 
describing the differences between the Scottish and the French Enlightenment, whether 
Rousseau was more a figure of the Enlightenment or of the Counter-Enlightenment, and if 
German idealism in its most pessimistic form was the first step on the road to Auschwitz 
(S. B. Smith 2016; Sternhell, Sznajder, and Ašerî 1994; Strong 2012). These debates all 
have value on their own, but I believe that there is an underlying meta-theme that informs 
both the Enlightenment and its enemies, and that is the uneasy tension between community 
and modernity. The Enlightenment correctly anticipated the unprecedented possibilities for 
human individualism that would result from the shedding of traditions. Still, it 
underestimated that communities and their traditions were not just a necessary evil but 
were fulfilling an important role in human life. The Counter-Enlightenment, on the other 
hand, was terrified by this individualism and tried to rescue an idea of community that most 
likely never fully existed and even if were possible, would have had a hard time 
withstanding modernity.  
Not surprisingly, both sides of the debate have not yet delivered on their core 
promise.  Neither the Enlightenment has not succeeded in freeing us from our passions and 
deliver us to the guidance of reason, and the Counter-Enlightenment has failed in its 
attempts to save authentic communities from the onslaught of modernity and the 
rationalization of everyday life. The question of how society emerges and how individuals 
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become part of it has been core questions of philosophy and the social sciences since Plato, 
but it is a characteristic of modernity to try to answer this question without referring to 
culture. The idea that society emerges as the result of a voluntary social contract or is the 
consequence of enlightened individuals realizing that they will be better off if they work 
together gives too much credit to our ability for rational thought while ignoring other 
elements that contribute to being human. As we will see later in this chapter, it is impossible 
to understand the phenomenon of culture without reference to emotions, and in the course 
of this discussion it will become clear why culture is so problematic for the modern, 
enlightened mind that wishes to base all decision making on rationality. The truly rational 
mind has no need for emotions which ultimately also means that there is no need for 
culture. Even postmodernity, which takes a more critical stance towards Enlightenment 
rationality ultimately comes down on the anti-cultural side.  
In one of the defining works of postmodernism by Francois Lyotard it is explained 
that postmodernity is built on the assumption of the “obsolescence of the metanarratives 
apparatus of legitimation,” the “incredulity towards metanarratives” and the “narrative 
function losing its functor, its great hero, its great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal” 
(Lyotard 1984, xxiv). These metanarratives – whether in form of traditions, religions, or 
ideologies – are of course a central part of culture. Discarding them ultimately means to 
impoverish the idea of culture as a crucial element of the human condition.  
The better we understand our species, however, the more unlikely it seems that this 
vision of a society comprised solely of individuals and without a shared culture will find 
fulfillment. As the 20th century has shown, we are nowhere near to becoming the 
dispassionate, calculating individuals that out of pure rationality can and will create a state 
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of perpetual peace. But we are also not in a position to turn back the clock to the imagined 
world of authentic communities that the Counter-Enlightenment so desired. Since neither 
of those two will be achievable in their purest form, we need to ask the question: what at 
best is possible? Despite the singular and distinctive claims of each side, both the 
Enlightenment’s individualism and the Counter-Enlightenment’s emphasis on community 
appeal to our human nature. In other words, we are uniquely capable of simultaneously 
desiring individual freedom and autonomy and desiring community and recognition by 
others. Culture is a mediator between those two poles, creating the environment and the 
psychological triggers that activate either our individualistic or our communitarian side. 
The main mechanism for this is the human ability to feel emotions that influence our 
behavior. Therefore, it is the emotions to which we must turn first when we discuss the 
phenomenon of culture.  
 
2.1.1 Culture as an Emotional Phenomenon 
There is a scene in the black comedy film, “American Psycho,” that seems to 
capture an essential part of how culture works. In one scene in this film,  various characters 
compare their business cards. With the exception of the name, each business card contains 
identical information since everyone works at the same Wall Street company as a vice 
president without any specified portfolio. The information is what one would expect to 
find: the name and position of the employee, the company’s name, and some contact 
information. There is nothing particularly special about any of them; the simple utility of 
business cards is intended to facilitate the exchange of contact information. Yet the main 
character almost experiences a nervous breakdown when he glimpses the business cards of 
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his co-workers. He believes that their cards have more exquisite coloring, lettering, and 
paper, causing him to start perspiring uncontrollably. As it turns out, business cards are the 
main indicator of status in this company, so even though there is no difference in the 
material utility between a cheap and an expensive card, there is an additional psychological 
cost for being seen with a cheaper card than others. The physiological reaction of our 
character, his uncontrolled sweating and shaking, is an emotional reaction triggered by an 
environment that was created through culture. There is nothing innate about the character’s 
reaction to being exposed to his partners’ business cards, but his body is instinctively 
exhibiting a physiological reaction beyond his control. The movie was of course creating 
an exaggerated caricature of the 90s’ Wall Street investment banker, but the audience 
immediately gets the pun--that even though the main character has a life free of material 
worries, a small thing like a business card triggers a profound emotional reaction that seems 
entirely disproportionate.  
What we see in this movie occurs on an almost daily basis in real life as well; people 
tend to react emotionally to things that have no direct influence on their material well-being 
or physical security but impinge on what is perceived as culturally relevant. The emotions 
we observe in everyday life are not separate from the dominant cultural frame in which 
specific social situations are constructed and, therefore, cannot be separated from culture-
specific patterns of thinking, acting, and interacting (Kitayama and Markus 1994, 4). 
Culture not only creates the connection between what kind of physiological reaction 
occurs, but also influences whether a reaction occurs at all. If I am not aware of the cultural 
importance of business cards in the film’s fictional company, I would not feel any shame 
in having a cheap card or  pride for having an expensive one or envy towards someone who 
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has the most exquisite business card. It simply would not matter. Yet once we have 
internalized the cultural framework that organizes our emotional triggers, it can be difficult 
to turn them off.or hold them at bay. 
Jonathan Haidt describes a related phenomenon in his research about moral 
dumbfounding. Moral dumbfounding describes the strong moral intuition that makes us 
perceive something as wrongin the absence of having reasons to support that intuition 
(Haidt 2003, 280). In Haidt’s experimental setup to study moral dumbfounding, the 
researcher confronts his subjects with stories about incest (is it ok to have sex with a 
sibling?), food (is it ok to eat your dog?), and other provocative scenarios (e.g., having 
intercourse with a ready-to-cook chicken?). All these stories make clear that no one is 
harmed by the actions described, all actions are consensual, and there are no negative long-
term consequences (Haidt 2001; Haidt and Hersh 2001; Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993). 
Nonetheless, many sujects condemned these actions and tried to justify their judgment by 
presenting illogical reasons like the idea that fully-cooked dog meat will make a person 
sick (Haidt 2003, 280). Many of the participants in Haidt’s et al. studies were judging the 
actions based on their moral intuition, that upon hearing one of the stories caused them to 
have an emotional reaction like a feeling of disgust, without having a rational explanation 
for it. Only after they experienced these emotions did test participants try to justify them 
on rational grounds. Haidt’s work demonstrated that the long held assumption that moral 
judgments are the result of rational learning and evaluation is at least partially wrong. 
In the early stages of moral psychology a popular idea was that as we grow up, we 
learn and refine our autonomous understanding of moral behavior with limited or no 
influence from society (see, for example: Kohlberg 1969; Piaget and Inhelder 1969). This 
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view was based on the observation that children change their moral reasoning as they grow 
up, which was interpreted as  the maturation of their brains, the approach towards questions 
of morality becomes also increasingly the subject of reasoned evaluation. To put it 
differently, small children might be annoyed when you try to cheat at a game of marbles, 
but it will not be until a later stage of their development that they will be capable explaining 
to another person why it is morally wrong (for an excellent overview and critique of 
Kohlberg and Piaget see: Haidt 2013, chap. 1). As humans grow up, however, they come 
to inhabit the moral domain and increasingly are able to rationally grasp why there is a 
moral dimension to appropriate and inappropriate behaviour.  
The problem with this assumption is that the subject-children grew up in the same 
cultural environment as their observers, so there is the risk that what was perceived as 
growing rationality was in fact just the subject-children increasingly adopting to their 
cultural environment. It is important to add that Kohlberg nowhere claims that there is one 
objective morality based on pure reason; his argument is limited to the development of 
moral reasoning independent of its content. As Reid and Yanarella point out,  
two subjects may reach diametrically opposed conclusions 
concerning a particular moral dilemma and yet be situated in the same stage 
of moral development by virtue of the parallel modes of reasoning 
employed” (Reid and Yanarella 1977, 507).  
 
The issue with Kohlberg’s approach is that it places all the emphasis of moral 
development on the human faculty for reason neglecting the role of emotions. The theories 
of Piaget, Kohlberg and other psychological rationalists, on my view, underestimate or 
downplay the role of moral intuition and how we physiologically react to moral phenomena 
without knowing exactly why. Haidt’s approach of moral dumbfounding has demonstrated 
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not just the important role of intuition, but also that there is no universality to moral 
intuition across different societies.  
These studies revealed an important insight that is highly relevant for the question 
of culture: Not all people reacted the same way, and there were differences between 
Westerners and non-Westerners but also among Westerners who identify as either 
conservative, liberal, or libertarian. It turned out that in these studies liberals and 
libertarians exhibit a higher tolerance towards the actions described above, but the reason 
is not that they are quicker in coming up with a rational answer. As Haidt points out, for 
these groups individual autonomy is of high emotional value; therefore, the approval to do 
what some others see as a taboo violation comes easier (Haidt 2013, 110). The fact that the 
same action can lead to different emotional reactions that we nonetheless try to justify 
rationally, tells us a lot about the role of culture. People learn through culture how to 
interact emotionally with their environment. While the used intuitive systems (i.e. the 
variety of emotions that exist) are universal, cultures build upon them differently, creating 
frames of meaning that connect emotions to actions in ways other cultures do not (J. 
Graham et al. 2013).  
It turns out that homo sapiens is not only a thinking species but also a feeling 
species, and the relationship between those two is not always clear. Culture plays an 
important role in linking them, and we will see that the artificial dichotomy between 
rational and emotional behavior no longer captures enough of the complexity of human 
beings’ actions. One of the most puzzling aspects is that the human species, on the one 
hand, has evolved too far in its cognitive abilities to be purely instinct driven, but, on the 
other hand, is still such an emotional creature that we occasionally lose the ability to use 
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our cognitive abilities. There is a tendency to value one faculty more than the other, but 
both aspects serve evolutionary purposes, and the human species would have been at a 
disadvantage if it would have had to rely exclusively on one. None other than Charles 
Darwin made the point that intellect and social instincts condition one another, and that 
cognitive acts can lead to the creation of emotionally-binding institutions (Thompson 1995, 
7). Culture can serve as a bridging device between the cognitive and the emotional through 
the formation of group and individual identities. The reason, for example, why people join 
a community can be purely cognitive and driven by rational self-interest. The decision to 
stay with a community when it comes under stress, however, can be based on the loyalty 
and obligation one feels towards it, making it an emotional decision. As Richard Sosis and 
others have demonstrated, one of the reasons why religious institutions show more 
longevity than comparable secular institutions is because the former fosters emotional ties 
between the community and the individual that go beyond mere self-interest (Sosis and 
Alcorta 2003; Sosis and Bressler 2003). Such institutions have demonstrated a strong 
ability to infuse its symbols and social codes with intrinsic value and provide a framework 
of meaning for the individual. Membership ceases to be a purely cognitive desire based on 
some cost-benefit analysis, but turns into an emotional bond between group and individual. 
This means that individuals want to be part of the community, even if it comes at economic 
costs or potential psychological distress.8 Culture in its most basic interpretation then is the 
creation of such frameworks of meaning and their infusion with intrinsic value and 
 
8 This last point is especially important: The utilitarian argument would claim that it makes no 
difference if we join a community for psychological or economic benefit. If that would be so, than why do 
people often experience significant psychological suffering and trauma and not just leave the community if 
it no longer satisfies utility (On collective trauma see: J. Alexander 2012; Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. 2004). 
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emotional commitment, which then supports the creation of the kind of moral intuition we 
have discussed.  
To fully grasp the significance of culture we need to distinguish between knowing 
cultural cues and symbols and experiencing them. Knowledge of culture does not require 
any use of our emotional abilities; experiencing culture does. We might know that Judaism 
has specific dietary restrictions, but this is not the same as experiencing the emotional 
distress members of this faith feel if they should violate these restrictions. The very 
introduction of limitations or outright bans on the consumption of pork in Islam and 
Judaism was most likely based on quite rational grounds (Redding 2015), but what made 
the ban effective was its connection to religion, which automatically created an emotional 
bond to the new rule. This is also the reason why such practices are difficult to give up 
once the rational reason for their implementation has disappeared and people follow them 
out of moral intuition.  
This is not a trivial point and is politically highly relevant: when Germany tries to 
integrate migrants through teaching German laws and customs, newcomers will know the 
important elements of German culture, but experiencing them would mean to have the 
same emotional reaction to the violation of said laws and customs. By the same token I 
might know that visual depictions of the prophet Muhammed anger a devout Muslim but 
experiencing it would mean to actually feel a flash of anger as an emotional reaction. The 
assumption that knowing and understanding expected behavior is the same as experiencing 
it and making it part of one’s identity is optimistic at best and dangerously wrong at worst. 
If I don’t feel any emotional attachment to a particular culture, my willingness to violate 
its customs if it benefits me will be much higher compared to a situation where such a 
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violation will elicit a psychological toll on me in the form of emotions like shame or 
embarrassment.  
The Kantian researcher’s dream basing social relationships on the categorical 
imperative assumes that emotional ties (or a moral intuition) will become unnecessary once 
we are able to discern the benefits of a rational order through reason. Why, for example, 
do I need to attach an emotional reaction to determine that murder is bad, something that 
should be understandable even without emotions? The answer is: because knowing that 
murder is bad does unfortunately not mean that every culture has an equal definition of 
what constitutes murder. From honor killings and apostasy laws to the debate about 
abortion, the death penalty, and euthanasia, there is cultural variance regarding what kind 
of violent act that results in another person’s death is interpreted as murder (Eisner and 
Ghuneim 2013; Lowe et al. 2018).9 The anthropologist Edward Westermarck has spent 
most of his rprofessional life engaging in research seeking to demonstrate how seemingly 
universal emotions can lead to particularistic behavior in different communities in order to 
support the hypothesis that there is a difference between universal principles and the way 
in which they are applied. As it turns out, “the same universal human moral emotions could 
lead to widely diverse behaviors” (Hunter and Nedelisky 2018, 68). In one of his 
observations, Westermarck describes how one expression of filial affection among the 
native Fijians is to put an aged parent to death. What might be considered murder elsewhere 
is regarded as affection in this context due to the strong belief among the observed Fijians 
that “persons enter upon the delights of the future life with the same faculties, mental and 
 
9 For poll data on whether the death penalty is appropriate for leaving Islam see: 
https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-about-sharia/ 
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physical, as they possess at the hour of death, and that the spiritual life thus commences 
where the corporeal existence terminates” (Westermarck 2017, KL 8928). So while it is a 
moral universal to view murder as something negative, what actually constitutes murder is 
culturally variable.  
That different cultures create different reactions to similar events was not a novel 
observation by Western anthropologists. Around 440 BC, the ancient Greek historian 
Herodotus describes the following scene, which supposedly took place at the court of the 
Persian king Darius a hundred years earlier: 
Take, for example, this story from the reign of Darius. He called 
together some Greeks who were present and asked them how much money 
they would wish to be paid to devour the corpses of their fathers – to which 
the Greeks replied that no amount of money would suffice for that. Next, 
Darius summoned some Indians called Callantians, who do eat their parents, 
and asked them in the presence of the Greeks (who were able to follow what 
was being said by means of an interpreter) how much money it would take 
to buy their consent to the cremation of their dead fathers – at which the 
Callantians cried out in horror and told him that his words were a 
desecration of silence. Such, then, is how custom operates; and how right 
Pindar is, it seems to me, when he declares in his poetry that ‘Custom is the 
King of all’ (Herodotus 2015, 207). 
 
Custom might not be king of all, but it has a stronger impact on our actions then we 
often care to admit. Both the Greeks and the Callantians share the universal value among 
human societies to honor their dead, but how they do it differs not only in practice but is 
diametrically opposed emotionally. What is perceived as honoring by one is perceived as 
desecration by the other and vice-versa, and the story gives us a glimpse into a world that 
already two-and-a-half millennia ago was wrestling with the question of multiculturalism. 
As I will discuss in more detail in a later chapter, this is the essence of true 
multiculturalism and why it is such a challenge: When people feel strongly yet differently 
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about the same objective facts, how can one reconcile these opposing attitudes within the 
same society? Discussions about diversity and multiculturalism in the past have taken the 
easy way out by declaring these differences to be part of one’s private life and irrelevant 
for the public sphere (see, for example: Kymlicka 1996), or attempted to pick and choose 
aspects from certain cultures and ignoring others (see, for example: Habermas 2005). 
While these discussions are worthwhile and well-intended, they more or less openly 
assume that in the end there is an underlying cultural uniformity that gives the highest value 
to tolerance and individual autonomy and thereby makes a multicultural society possible. 
In other words, what we have here is a monocultural answer to the problem of 
multiculturalism.  
The hope, of course, to resolve this conundrum brings us back to the question of 
rationality and the possible abandonment of culture (at least as an emotional factor). 
Emotionless rationality would align subjective and objective reality and elicit the 
“appropriate” feelings and reactions that would lead to the most beneficial outcome for 
those involved. Unfortunately, from what we have learned so far from evolutionary and 
social psychology the likelihood of such a universal rationality to emerge seems rather low 
at the moment, and it is doubtful whether it would suffice to hold communities together.  
Richard Shweder and others have pointed out that there is something like 
psychological pluralism, meaning that the same objective reality can be met by different 
psychological (i.e. emotional) reactions. These can be triggered so automatically and un-
self-consciously that they are hard to distinguish from raw experiences like fear when 
encountering a bear (Shweder et al. 2010, 409–10). A more colloquial way to describe such 
reactions would be as a “gut-feeling” that leads us to immediately judge something as good 
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or bad and that elicits an emotional reaction even before we are able to reflect upon it.10 
Culture plays a key role in what kind of emotions are activated when we encounter social 
or environmental triggers. Culture in this context can be defined as  
the subset of humanly possible or available meanings that, by virtue 
of enculturation (informal or formal, implicit or explicit, unintended or 
intended), has become valued and active in giving shape to the 
psychological processes of the individuals in a particular norm-sensitive 
group (Shweder et al. 2010, 409).  
 
As these authors point out, culture is symbolic and behavioral at the same time: 
culture is a way a society expresses its definition of what is: 
true, good, beautiful, and efficient” through symbolic acts like 
speech, laws, and customary practices. It is, however, also behavioral since 
the meaning attached to these symbols creates emotional ties that 
incentivize us to behave in a certain way in order to avoid psychological 
punishment or achieve psychological rewards in the form of positive or 
negative emotions like shame or pride (Shweder 1999, 67).  
 
In order to avoid any confusion from the outset, we must not confuse this 
psychological reward with the concept of pleasure: doing something that elicits a feeling 
of pride does not necessarily correspond with the more hedonistic feeling of pleasure. The 
attempt to equate the two is one of the biggest weaknesses of Benthamite Utilitarianism, a 
problem with which we will engage in more detail a little later. The reduction of the variety 
of existing human emotions to the simple dichotomy of pain and pleasure remains one of 
the least helpful concepts that originated with the Utilitarian thinkers and that keeps 
befuddling theories of society ever since. 
 
10 New forms of interaction through social media demonstrate this on an almost daily basis. The 
routine of an emotional tweet to be followed by a retraction or deletion shows how quick we can be to judge 
a situation without conscious reflection.  
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This, in essence, is what Sigmund Freud outlines in his Civilization and its 
Discontents, describing how the demands of communal life can be in contradiction with 
the demands of individual pleasure (Freud 1961) and thereby throwing us into a quasi-
neurotic state of being. Supposedly, this would mean that it is only through our rationality 
that we can resist the temptations to give in to seeking out whatever individual pleasure is 
available, putting rationality and emotions into constant conflict. Yet such a view is based 
on a very limited understanding of human emotions. Certainly, if positive emotions would 
only arise from individual pleasures, sacrificing them for the good of the community would 
be a difficult step, and having to repeat it continuously could indeed mean that the basis 
for civilization is a voluntarily chosen neurosis. Luckily, however, this is most likely not 
the case since positive emotions are not only elicited by purely hedonistic pleasures but 
can be founded on various triggers.  
Even the field in which rationality supposedly holds strongest sway cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account the connection of culture and emotions. Economic 
progress as the result of competition is not just the result of systemic rationality, but in 
large part also driven by the desire of entrepreneurs to build their own economic empires 
and dynasties. The economist Joseph Schumpeter points out that the entrepreneur in his or 
her quest for economic success is not driven by a hedonistic desire to consume goods, 
which makes them appear “irrational” under a purely materialistic viewpoint (Schumpeter 
2017, 92). It is the emotional side of human nature that drives entrepreneurs, and even 
though they might seemingly employ full rationality in the running of their company, the 
initial motivation comes from somewhere else. These ideas have been picked up again by 
economists and psychologists, who discuss them in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic 
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motivation (Benabou and Tirole 2003; Vallerand 1997). Extrinsic motivation is motivation 
by monetary and materialist incentives, while intrinsic motivation is motivation by way of 
appeals to one’s identity and values. In reality, both forms overlap, since even the most 
intrinsically motivated individual still needs materials in order to survive. Nonetheless, one 
of the main reasons why the entrepreneurial revolution of the 18th century could take place, 
was a significant change in the way entrepreneurial activity was perceived. The shift from 
political empires and dynasties to Schumpeter’s economic dynasties was possible because 
being an entrepreneur became a source of recognized pride and virtue, and thereby made 
economic success not just materialistically but intrinsically valuable, (For a detailed 
overview how the attitude towards economic activity changed, see: McCloskey 2007, 
2010, 2017.)11 Underlying this shift was a cultural change that altered the emotions that 
were connected with various aspects of economic activity. It is worth remembering that the 
pillars of a modern economy--including private property and financing via interest-
carrying loans--were not always viewed approvingly and the subject of fierce debates 
among religious scholars of all backgrounds for many centuries. What holds true in the 
economic sphere also applies to other areas including politics, and a growing understanding 
of how cultural change influenced the evolution of social structures through the rewiring 
and redefining of emotional triggers should help us to better understand how past and 
contemporary societies are organized. 
As we will see, there is a complex interplay between the cognitive and emotional 
faculties possessed by humans and how this effects actual behavior. The goal of this chapter 
 
11 Schumpeter goes on to argue that ultimately this shift will be reversed and capitalist societies will 
start to reject the entrepreneur, leading to the replacement of capitalism with socialism (Schumpeter 1994). 
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is to demonstrate that this interplay is a key factor in the human ability to create social 
structures, and that our cognitive abilities, on the one hand, and our emotional abilities, on 
the other, are not contradictory, but complement each other.  
 
2.1.1.1 Different Types of Emotions 
One of the reasons why the study of emotions has been underappreciated can be 
found in the way it has been treated in its original field, psychology. For the most part, the 
study of emotions has been focused on negative emotions like fear, anger, sadness, shame, 
and disgust, while positive emotions like joy, contentment, interest, and love have only 
played a marginal role (Fredrickson and Branigan 2001, 123). This is partially 
understandable, since negative emotions like depression, phobia, and anxiety disorders can 
cause a wide array of grave problems for individuals and society, therefore justifying a 
stronger focus. The downside of this, however, was that positive emotional experiences 
became increasingly reduced to simple sensual and material pleasures. Even fundamental 
inter-personal emotions such as love became just an evolutionary tool to facilitate 
reproduction, ignoring the additional effects the experience of such emotions can have. 
Fredrickson and Branigan point to numerous studies that have demonstrated that positive 
emotions widen the array of thoughts and actions that come to people’s minds, makes them 
more approachable and willing to approach others (e.g. the desire one has to share positive 
news with others), and has overall positive effects on social cohesion and cooperation, 
making them most likely “evolutionary adaptive for the individual, its species, or both” 
(Fredrickson and Branigan 2001, 133).  
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It turns out that the more we know of human beings, the less realistic the idea of 
the rational, utility-maximizing individual that joins communities for their own benefit 
becomes. On the contrary, it is increasingly observable that the human emotional 
framework was not just built for the “fight and flight” reflex when encountering the 
proverbial bear but evolved as a key component to enable complex social living. It is not 
cool rationality that makes us into members of a community, but the positive emotions and 
the increase of dopamine and serotonin in the human brain that can be caused through the 
recognition by others. The success of social media networks and their effects is a much 
smaller surprise when we take the intersubjectivity of human beings into account. In fact, 
one could make the argument that social media networks have enabled something akin to 
“overdosing” on social interaction and thereby causing withdrawal symptoms, if one is cut 
off from it for too long (Twenge 2017).  
While some emotions can be felt instinctively and are hard wired into the human 
psyche (like the fight or flight instinct), others depend on social constructs that tie certain 
behavior to specific emotions. Which behavior is supposed to be met with shame compared 
to joy is not a natural instinct but often the consequence of behavioral patterns that have 
been repeated and reinforced over longer periods of time.  
Jonathan Haidt and others address this question and distinguish between primordial 
and elaborated emotions (Keltner and Haidt 2001). Primordial emotions play a key role in 
solving the problem of physical survival and support our ability to avoid death by 
predation, violence, and disease. Keltner and Haidt describe how primordial emotions like 
fear and disgust influence our “fight-flight” or “food-selection” system. Evolved over a 
long period of time, the human brain scans incoming information for patterns associated 
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with danger, triggering the release of stress hormones into the bloodstream. Similarly, 
potential food sources elicit the emotion of disgust if they resemble powerful elicitors of 
disgust, such as feces and decaying animal bodies (Keltner and Haidt 2001, 196). While 
primordial emotions play a key role in the survival mechanisms of individuals, elaborated 
emotions have developed to support our functioning as groups. Keltner and Haidt draw on 
existing literature to provide us with a summary that explains how emotions and culture 
interact: 
Impressed by how culture and language give humans flexibility and 
creativity in designing their lives and societies, social constructivists 
concern themselves with the total package of meanings, social practices, 
norms, and institutions that are built up around emotions in human societies 
[…]. We refer to these complex meanings as elaborated emotions. 
Elaborated emotions are shaped by social discourse and interaction, and by 
concepts of the self, morality, and social order […]. Elaborated emotions 
vary across cultures, they cannot be experienced by infants, and they can 
last for years or centuries. For example, the hatred felt towards an historical 
enemy, although at any one moment in time comprised of brief emotional 
experiences, is made up of values, beliefs, images, action tendencies, and 
affective dispositions or sentiments that can pass from one generation to the 
next and last for extended periods of time” (Keltner and Haidt 2001, 199).  
 
The distinction between primordial and elaborated emotions allows us to 
distinguish between the physiological setup of human beings that hardwires us for the 
experience of emotions (the former) and our ability to alter the triggers for emotional 
processes through culture (the latter). The connection between actions and the emotional 
reaction it causes for those who execute them, those who observe them, and those who are 
affected by it can differ based on the cultural environment. Depending on the cultural 
environment, different actions will elicit different emotional reactions. To reiterate the 
example of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur: the entrepreneur in her emotional desire is not 
unlike a medieval warrior who seeks status and recognition through prowess in battle. The 
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difference is that a modern society bestows higher recognition on someone who runs a 
successful business than on someone who slaughters others on the field of battle. The 
constantly present ability to experience emotions is not the same as the actual emotions, 
since we need to recognize what actually triggers them. Contrary to the assumption that 
human beings are born with either a “blank slate” or have most behavioral patterns pre-
uploaded via genetics, the human brain comes with an array of building blocks that 
combine the cognitive and the physiological: 
Rather the components may be combined and afforded their 
divergent functions and forms through social and cultural process …. 
Through [the] pursuit of adaptation and adjustment to one’s cultural and 
social environment, the [physiological] component processes are organized 
and enabled to become emotions” (Kitayama and Markus 1994, 1–2). 
 
This makes clear that there actually is something like cross-cultural emotional 
diversity that brings us back to something we discussed earlier in this chapter: There is a 
difference between knowing and experiencing culture, with the latter including emotions 
while the former does not. This gets us closer to what is meant by culture, since it allows 
us to distinguish between the “active” parts (i.e. those to which we feel an emotional 
attachment) and the “inactive” parts (something that might be part of a tradition, but no 
longer elicits emotional reactions) of a society’s culture. The reason why a caricature of 
the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper offends more people in the Muslim world 
than similar drawings of Jesus or Christians do in Western Europe is because Europe’s 
emotional ties to Christianity are not as strong as the emotional ties between Islam and the 
Muslim world.  
Emotions, however, are not just a means; they can also be an end in themselves. 
Sometimes our emotions drive us to do something, but sometimes we also do something in 
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order to elicit an emotional reaction. For example, if we recoil due to the smell of something 
decaying, our emotion of disgust will make us turn away or pinch our nose. But if we fast 
during Lent, we accept physiological discomfort in anticipation of the emotional reward of 
having endured something difficult. Culture operates on both these levels, building 
connections that allow for immediate emotional responses as well as creating the 
environment in which people are willing to endure hardships in the hope for an emotional 
reward. In other words, we are not just passive emotional responders but also have a 
tendency to engage in activities that intensify or weaken emotional experiences – whether 
it is the adrenalin rush sought through skydiving or learning relaxation techniques to avoid 
the emotions associated with stress (Tracy Mayne 2001, 366–67). Culture not only creates 
the psychological tendencies to experience certain emotions, but emotions follow that 
reinforce and promoted culturally important concerns (Mesquita 2001, 240).  
There is yet another crucial factor that distinguishes primordial from elaborated 
emotions. The latter creates moral imagination and the foundation for morality as such, 
which of course is quite different from emotional reactions that serve immediate protection 
from physical harm. While both operate within the same “machine,” morality plays the 
additional role of supporting the creation and maintenance of communities. Morality 
expresses itself in the emotional attachment to actions we perceive as right or wrong, and 
is once again involves the interplay of cognitive and physiological abilities that shapes 
behavior. Even if a society agrees on certain moral rules, a strong emotional attachment to 
them will ensure that people obey them even if they are not under constant supervision. 
That these moral rules are often additionally underpinned with a supernatural or 
metaphysical component (i.e. behaving according to these rules serves God, the nation, 
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etc.) helps to elicit an even stronger commitment from the members of the community, 
since there is now a higher purpose that justifies one’s moral values.  
2.1.2 Culture and Morality 
The question of morality is a particularly tricky one, because it is very closely 
related to the concept of culture. The Enlightenment strove to base morality on a universal 
set of moral principles, primarily the rights of individuals as part of the natural law 
tradition. This tradition was explicitly based on the idea that there are universal moral 
guidelines independent of culture and tradition. (For a book length discussion of this issue,  
see: Hunter and Nedelisky 2018.) The problem, however, is that the very idea of individual 
rights has a cultural core. As Clifford Geertz points out: 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more 
or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of 
awareness, emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive 
whole and set contrastively both against other such wholes and against its 
social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a 
rather peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures (Geertz 1974, 
31). 
 
What Geertz describes are the basic ingredients for a society based on the value of 
individualism, but it might not be the right starting point for a universal morality, since 
many societies do not share these basics.  
Following the studies of Shweder and Bourne, the fundamental moral dilemma 
societies have to solve is the organization of the relationship between group and individual 
(Shweder and Bourne 1984). According to them, most societies have opted for a 
sociocentric answer to this question, while societies that went through the Enlightenment 
have a much stronger tendency towards egocentric or individualistic societal models (Haidt 
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2013, 14; Shweder and Bourne 1984). The dichotomous distinction between collective and 
individualistic cultures is not necessarily new (Greif 1994), but once again we have to drill 
down to the details.  
I think the best way to understand the complex interplay of culture and morality is 
Jonathan Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory MFT, since this theory was explicitly 
developed to describe moral differences across cultures (Haidt and Joseph 2004). Their 
main argument is that “cultures build incommensurable moralities on top of a foundation 
of shared intuitions” (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 56). These intuitions are defined as “feelings 
of approval or disapproval [that] pop into awareness as we see or hear about something 
someone did, or as we consider choices for ourselves” (Haidt and Joseph 2004, 56). Before 
looking at what triggers these feelings, let us look at three of the cornerstones of Moral 
Foundations Theory, some of which we have already touched upon previously in this 
chapter. (Unless mentioned otherwise, this summary is based on: Graham et al. 2013.) 
 
2.1.2.1 The Nativism of Morality  
In his book Just Babies: The Origins of Good and Evil, Paul Bloom (2013) uses 
experiments that seem to demonstrate that we are actually born with a sense of morality.  
Observing the behavior of infants between the age of six and ten months, it turned out that 
when shown a puppet that tries to climb a hill, where in one case second puppet tries to 
stop it and a third puppet seeks to help, the babies afterwards almost uniformly picked the 
nice puppet. In a similar experiment where twenty-month-old toddlers could reward the 
nice puppet with candy and punish the bad puppet with taking candy away, most of them 
rewarded the former (P. Bloom 2013, 23–29).  
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These toddlers all have the genetic blueprint to experience morality, yet their moral 
sense does not remain unmalleable as they grow up. The toddlers show an emotional 
reaction to perceived unfair behavior, but as we get older and develop a refined sense of 
abstraction and are exposed increasingly to the shaping effect of our cultural environment, 
the trigger-reaction relationship also starts to change. The existence of a basic moral sense 
is evolutionary advantageous, since it supports group cooperation through the desire to 
punish rule breakers and the triggering feelings of guilt for those who break rules. In its 
simplest form, morality is a problem-solving mechanism for groups. With the social 
evolution of societal structures and the emergence of more complex types of social 
organization, this mechanism also adapted, and its main way of doing so is culture:  
in humans, culture loosens the linkages between emotions and 
problems so that cultures find new ways to solve the problems for which 
emotions evolved, and cultures find new ways of using emotions (Keltner 
and Haidt 2001, 192).  
 
For example, loyalty to one’s family is natural for both humans and chimpanzees, 
while loyalty to one’s ideology (religious or secular) is specifically human even though it 
is built on the existing emotional capability of being loyal to a group. The previously 
mentioned toddlers did most likely not reason their way towards their reactions but acted 
on emotions that arose as a consequence of what they perceived as rule or norm breaking. 
While there is no genetic basis for the content of the rules, we are genetically hardwired to 
follow norms, especially if they are invested with transcendental and intrinsic values like 
religious norms.  In other words, moral thinking is innate and organized in advance of 
experience. Our neural tissue includes a first draft of morality, which is then revised 
through cultural learning and experience. 
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MFT is thus an active attempt to integrate evolutionary and cultural explanations 
of human behavior, which makes it such an interesting candidate for the conceptual 
integration between the social and the natural sciences. Drawing on studies conducted with 
primates has revealed that young rhesus monkeys, without any prior fear of snakes—
including plastic snakes—watched a video of an adult monkey reacting fearfully (or not) 
to a plastic snake (or to plastic flowers). The monkeys learned from a single exposure to 
snake-fearing monkey to be afraid of the plastic snake, but a single exposure to a flower-
fearing monkey did nothing (Seligman 1971). 
This lends 50redence to the idea that evolution has made it easier for us to learn 
fear of snakes compared to fear of flowers, a good case of an innate case of a primordial 
emotion. Haidt and his co-authors then apply this observation on the moral realm and more 
elaborated emotions, describing how 
It’s probably quite easy to teach kids to want revenge just by 
exposing them to role models who become angry and vengeful when treated 
unfairly, but it is probably much more difficult to teach children to love their 
enemies just by exposing them, every Sunday for 20 years, to stories about 
a role model who loved his enemies. We are prepared to learn vengefulness, 
in a way that we are not prepared to learn to offer our left cheek to those 
who smite us on our right cheek” (J. Graham et al. 2013, 63).  
 
Following Haidt’s reasoning here furthers the argument we made before that culture 
helps to bridge the cognitive and the emotional—i.e., it takes a cognitive effort supported 
by a cultural belief system to suppress the more intuitive desire for vengeance. The 
existence of innate moral thinking is a hotly-contested topic among evolutionary 
psychologists, and a very fruitful answer seems to come from the concept of gene-culture 
co-evolution. It seems logical that our species has faced recurrent problems for a long 
period of time that generate support for the creation of domain- specific cognitive 
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adaptations in order to respond rapidly and effectively (Pinker 2009; Tooby and Cosmides 
1995). A proposed and valuable comparison is made with the human sense for taste: we 
are born with an innate preference for sweetness against bitterness, and just as  the interplay 
of tongue and brain can elicit a feeling of pleasure when exposed to the right taste, it is 
possible that the brain reacts similarly when just interactions occur, and irritation when one 
detects cheaters (Tooby, Cosmides, and Barrett 2005). 
The growing evidence that morality is based on an innate blueprint deals a huge 
blow to any theory that starts from the heuristic assumption that we are born exclusively 
as self-centered autonomous individuals. We are genetically hard-wired to care about the 
behavior of others, but this does not mean that we are hard-wired to either like or dislike 
others. It does mean however that we are not indifferent to the actions of those around us, 
even if they should not directly affect us personally. The social evolution of human beings 
must increasingly be understood as a way of coping with external challenges through 
combinations of both our individualism and our sociability. Just as in the realm of biology, 
there has been a lot of tinkering regarding possible social structures and some of them 
solved social problems (like the sharing of resources) better than others. The human mind 
has not as elegantly evolved as one would hope, and the contention by Cosmides and Tooby 
that “evolutionary biology suggests that there is no principled reason for parsimony to be 
a design criterion for the mind” (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 91) should not be seen as a 
weakness, but as an evolutionary advantage. Despite the ongoing evolution of the human 
mind it always builds on the preexisting blueprints that make it more complex and does not 
provide a mono-linear functionality for which there is one solution for every challenge 
(Marcus 2009). Culture is a direct result of this tinkering with possible solutions, creating 
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its own path dependencies that in turn influence the continued social evolution of human 
beings.  
 
 
 
2.1.2.2 Culture, Psyche, and Morality make 
each other up 
In the words of Richard Shweder, “Culture and psyche make each other up” 
(Shweder 1990b, 24). The innateness of morality is also setting certain limits to what is 
feasible when it comes to the creation of moral values. Just as we cannot make broccoli 
taste sweet through education, it is not possible to just learn any kind of moral idea equally.  
On the other hand, if cultural learning was to play no role at all, we would not be 
able to see variation across different cultures. Haidt and his collaborators suggest that there 
are five moral foundations on which cultures build their morality. They compare these 
foundations to the taste buds that exist on everyone’s tongue, and although they cannot be 
changed, different cultures can create cuisines that appeal differently to individual taste 
buds. Some cultures might value sweet more than spicy or tart over bland;  this variation 
demonstrates that despite the equal biological make up of our tongues, we can have 
different tastes.  
The argument regarding the “moral taste buds” is that there are emotional triggers 
that have evolved as answers to environmental and social challenges, and these triggers act 
on our moral senses in the way sugar or salt would on our tongue. MFT proponents are 
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open to evidence and arguments that there are more than five, but as a starting point their 
ideas are very helpful independently of how many moral foundations exist. What  interests 
us is that if different building blocks of morality exist and if they can be put together to 
build unique moral imaginations that vary across cultures, moral pluralism as a result of 
culture exists. The moral foundations describe the meta-answers to what seems to be the 
most common challenges to social living. Although often expressed and combined 
differently across cultures, they are a first step to define the fundament on which all cultures 
are built upon.  
The basic five for now are (quoted from Haidt 2013, 153–54): 
• The Care/harm foundation evolved in response to the 
adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children. It makes us 
sensitive to signs of suffering and need; it makes us despise cruelty and 
want to care for those who are suffering.  
 
• The Fairness/cheating foundation evolved in response to the 
adaptive challenge of reaping the rewards of cooperation without 
getting exploited. It makes us sensitive to indications that another 
person is likely to be a good (or bad) partner for collaboration and 
reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish cheaters. 
 
• The Loyalty/betrayal foundation evolved in response to the 
adaptive challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions. It makes us 
sensitive to signs that another person is (or is not) a team player. It 
makes us trust and reward such people, and it makes us want to hurt, 
ostracize, or even kill those who betray us or our group. 
 
• The Authority/subversion foundation evolved in response to 
the adaptive challenge of forging relationships that will benefit us within 
social hierarchies. It makes us sensitive to signs of rank or status, and to 
signs that other people are (or are not) behaving properly, given their 
position.  
 
• The Sanctity/degradation foundation evolved initially in 
response to the adaptive challenge of the omnivore’s dilemma, and then 
to the broader challenge of living in a world of pathogens and parasites. 
It includes the behavioral immune system, which can make us wary of 
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a diverse array of symbolic objects and threats. It makes it possible for 
people to invest objects with irrational and extreme values—both 
positive and negative—which are important for binding groups 
together. 
 
These five foundations are in themselves not the same as morality, but they are 
foundations that can be found in different compositions in all known cultures. What makes 
them very helpful is that they allow us to approach the topic of culture on more of a meta- 
level and identify the cultural content of supposedly anti-cultural ideas and ideologues. For 
example, from a moral foundations viewpoint it makes no differences if I accept the 
authority of a king or the authority of a pope – the underlying moral mechanisms that enable 
my following are the same.  
Another important point is that not all cultures draw from these five foundations to 
the same extent, meaning that in some cultures the harm/care foundation might be more 
important than the sanctity/degradation foundation or the other way round (J. Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt and Hersh 2001). A good example here is Western 
individualism compared to Islam or Judaism. While the latter two have extensive rules 
regarding bodily hygiene and dietary restrictions, the Western approach is mostly based on 
the question of whether my regard to hygiene and food has a harmful impact on others. If 
it does not, restrictions are usually lifted or are non-existent. To be clear once again: there 
is no perfect combination of the moral foundations that in turn allows a perfect morality to 
emerge. From an evolutionary viewpoint, these building blocks are combined in order to 
enable collective action and strengthen social cohesion. 
The five foundations lay the groundwork for the relationship between triggers and 
emotional reactions and, depending on the weight that a foundation carries, the stronger 
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the reaction will be if it appears to be violated. As Haidt has pointed out, the differences 
between liberals and conservatives in the United States can be explained by looking at 
these different moral building blocks. Both conservatives and liberals inhabit a moral 
matrix, but while for liberal morality harm and fairness are the most important criteria of 
morality, conservatives tend to attach more importance to the aspects of authority and 
sanctity (J. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt 2013, pt. 2). 
.  
If members of these groups see their dominant moral foundations violated, they 
have an intuitive negative reaction, and it is only after this intuition that moral reasoning 
(meaning the rationalization of the initial intuition begins). What moral foundations matter 
to what degree is not predetermined, but depends on the cultural framework that arranges 
them. A deeply religious-collectivist society will most likely value authority and loyalty 
more than a secular-individualistic society. The key point to take away from Haidt’s 
approach is that while morality is universal, it is not uniform. And I think the same 
argument applies to culture as well. We find culture among any community of people, but 
cultural universalism is not the same as cultural uniformity.  
 
 
 
2.1.2.3 Moral Intuitions Come First – 
Strategic Reasoning Second 
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One of the most important paradigmatic shifts in social psychology was the so-
called “automatic revolution” of the 1990s: 
most of a person's everyday life is determined not by their conscious 
intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into 
motion by features of the environment that operate outside of conscious 
awareness and guidance” (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, 462).  
 
Especially when exposed to new things, it might be that what we think we are doing 
while consciously deliberating in actuality has no effect on the outcome of the judgment, 
as it has already been made through relatively immediate, automatic means” (Bargh and 
Chartrand 1999, 475). 
Drawing on a wide body of experimental literature, Haidt formulated the 
Social Intuitionist Model (SIM), which he defined as “the sudden 
appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an 
evaluative feeling (like—dislike, good—bad) about the character or actions 
of a person, without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps 
of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt and 
Bjorklund 2008, 188). 
 
This does not mean, however, that the human psyche can be reduced to our 
intuitions. This kind of effortless, associative, and heuristic processing is referred to as 
System 1 thinking, more an aesthetic reaction coming from the gut than the consequence 
of significant deliberation (Kahneman 2013). This does not mean, however, that 
deliberative reasoning – also known as System 2 thinking – does not take place. On the 
contrary, we are often forced to justify our initial feelings and judgments, especially when 
called upon by others, so that we actually see cognitive and automated processes working 
together. 
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According to Graham, the automated processes “were shaped by development 
within a cultural context, and their output can be edited or channeled by subsequent 
reasoning and self-presentational concerns” (J. Graham et al. 2013, 65). In other words, 
they can be changed over time or adapt to new kinds of triggers. Given the complex 
interplay of cognitive and automated processes we should not be surprised that there is a 
broad variety when it comes to cultures and their moral imaginations.  
The combination of moral foundations creates a core of sacred values, defined as 
the core issues around which debate and negotiation becomes very difficult. As we have 
pointed out before, although our intuitions do not prevent System 2 thinking, it most likely 
does bias it and motivates us to find arguments in support of our initial feelings (Ditto, 
Pizarro, and Tannenbaum 2009; Epley and Gilovich 2016; Gino, Norton, and Weber 2016).  
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2.1.2.4 The Sacred and How it Binds and 
Blinds Us 
These biases do not necessarily prevent discourse over sacred issues, though 
finding common ground will become more difficult. A convinced atheist and a strong 
believer might have different moral matrices built around different sacred cores, still, if 
there is sufficient overlap they do not have to be mortal enemies.12 This, by the way, is 
probably the most important legacy of the Enlightenment to which we will return 1 several 
times: at the core of the Enlightenment movement was its tremendous dedication to open 
and unbounded debate, something that manifested itself in the “Republic of Letters” 
(Fumaroli 2018; Goodman 1996), the Federalist Papers (Kramnick 1987), and the overall 
Enlightenment movement itself (Gay 1966, 1969, 1973; McMahon 2002). Contrary to what 
is often claimed, the Enlightenment was not so much the triumph of rationality as the 
creation of a cultural core around the value of open debate and persuasion, with all its 
positive consequences for progress and innovation. To put it simply, if the cultural core 
that influences my intuitions such that I prefer to debate rather than kill my opponent, it is 
not rationality alone that causes me to abstain from violence. So even the Enlightenment 
with its rejection of religion ended up creating a sacred core around which a very specific 
morality was created.  
The reason why I am using the term sacred is because it underscores the act of 
valuing of something for its own sake, regardless of its utility – not because it involves a 
 
12 A great example for this are the debates between Richard Dawkins (an atheist) and John Lennox 
(a Christian apologist), one of them can be found under https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zF5bPI92-5o, or 
Cornel West (an African-American Progressive) and Robert P. George (a white conservative) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n5dVnAIcYrU 
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supernatural element. The human ability to organize around ideas and symbols that have 
been invested with intrinsic value and led to the emergence of moral matrices around them, 
regardless of their materialistic utility, is not an evolutionary relic of prehistoric times. 
Rather, it plays a central role in the structuring of social institutions. Additionally, it is not 
only the ideas and symbols alone that we value, but the fact that we do it together with 
others and that they often provide us with a map of how to behave to be accepted in society. 
Culture does not create a social glue that ties the individual to the community on a rational, 
but instead on an emotional, level. A convinced nationalist loves his country not only for 
his own psychological benefit, but at the same time strives to demonstrate his membership 
in the national community through investing the idea of the nation and those who belong 
to it with intrinsic value. The same mechanisms are at work in any ideological or religious 
community, which explains why all communities have a difficult time finding flaws among 
their members or the community as such. Unfortunately, it goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to argue whether or not there is a single and objective moral truth. I can only 
offer my definition of a subjective moral truth that emerges at the intersection of culture 
and emotions. If I judge something as morally wrong because it elicits a strong emotional 
and thereby, a physiological reaction, I am experiencing my own intuitive moral truth. I 
might be able to change it over time, but at the moment I experience it, it is a subjective 
reality.  
So in order to clarify the discussion about moral matrices at this point is not guided 
by the desire to find an objective moral standard. What we are interested in is the role and 
emergence of morality independent of its content. We will engage in this discussion later, 
but for now it is important to understand how morality and culture interact and how they 
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influence the creation of communities. Morality has a large effect on the creation of social 
cohesion, because people who share moral values can rely on the assumption that others 
feel about the world as they do, so they can assume that certain actions will elicit the same 
emotional reaction with every member of the community. This shared feeling in turn makes 
it easier to build trust with low costs of enforcement. To return to a much-used example, 
the shared observance of dietary restrictions or dress codes has less to do with the substance 
of these rules than the positive experience of behaving morally together.  
Religion, as Jonathan Haidt reminds us, is essentially a “team sport” (See: Haidt 
2013, chap. 11). But what applies to religion is also true for culture in a broader sense. The 
entire concept of culture, consisting of shared habits, symbols, and rituals, is built on the 
assumption of human beings as social and political animals. Over time a habit has 
developed intended to dilute the concept of culture by its mixing with religion. Religion is 
in itself a cultural phenomenon, but it is not culture per se. A society held together by a 
shared belief in the nation or socialism or any other sacred value is fulfilling the conditions 
of culture.13 The human ability to create culture is an expression of our sociability; and, 
although historically the most common form of this expression was of a religious nature, 
we should not view it as an exclusive expression. Not only religion, but culture itself is a 
“team sport” and cannot exist in isolation. Cultures form around sacred cores that are given 
significance through the development of rituals and symbols and the respect that members 
of a community lend to them. 
 
13 One reason for this dilution is the use of religious terms like “sacred” when discussing culture, a 
habit I continue here as well.  
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Such cores can be of a secular as well as a religious nature, and human beings can 
be members of multiple communities with different sacred cores simultaneously. 
Differences in sacred cores need not always lead to unavoidable conflict, but there is a 
strong likelihood that people join groups with whom they share more of their central values. 
A simple example would be the membership in the fan club for a specific sports team. We 
can assume that the members of the club share an emotional commitment to their team, 
feeling pain with every lost game and joy with every victory. A New York Yankees fan 
might have a hard time in a Boston Red Sox club trying to convince the other members 
that they should actually cheer for New York. At the same time, however, both types of 
fans can be equally committed to worshipping the American flag and conceive of 
themselves as members of the same community of US citizens. We encounter cultural 
differences on a daily basis, but the reason why they do not always result in conflict is 
because there are degrees of commitment and dedication people hold to the sacred cores of 
their communities. It is unlikely, for example, that a sports team can draft its fans into a 
war the same way a state or religious community can – although we have seen occasional 
violent outbreaks at sports events that can put that distinction in doubt. In general, however, 
my neighbor’s following of a rival sports team might foster a field of tension, but if I see 
more that connects us, like our shared passion for team sports and what it symbolizes as 
part of an even larger cultural context where sport symbolizes national pride, the value 
differences that can generatee tensions will start to become less salient. This also 
demonstrates that once we find commonalities in our differences, cultural conflict can 
become less likely.  
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Once again, such differences are not defined or limited by geographical borders 
that define a country. As several studies have shown, different combinations of the moral 
foundations can run through subcultures within nations as well as between nations. This is 
something that has befuddled cross-cultural studies in the past, because there is the strong 
assumption that people with different passports also hold different values. Studies 
examining moral foundations have discovered, however, that groups within countries can 
hold widely different values. Regarding the authority/subversion foundation we see, for 
example, that while social conservatives see obedience as a virtue, social liberals tend to 
see it as either neutral or as a vice in others (Frimer et al. 2013; J. Graham, Haidt, and 
Nosek 2009). 
There are other complex issues as well: whether a society holds freedom of speech 
sacred, regardless of the content of speech (or with only minor limitations like incitement) 
or believes that not being exposed to potentially emotional harmful speech is the true value, 
can have a huge impact on the inner workings of a society. As MFT demonstrates, cultures 
can attach different weight to the value of individual foundations, which can cause different 
reactions among groups who see them violated. If my values are primarily based on the 
harm/care foundation, I will react more sensitively to hurtful speech compared to someone 
who views the sanctity of the principle of free speech as more important, because her 
cultural values in this case are more strongly grounded in the sanctity/degradation 
foundation. But even cultures that build on the same foundations trigger them differently. 
This is what we see, for example, in the abortion debate, where for both sides the harm/care 
foundation plays an important role, but one side applies it more to the potential mother and 
the other to the potential newborn. To come to an objective truth in moral questions is 
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difficult, so without being relativistic we should open our mind to the possibility that moral 
pluralism also encompasses the topics we within our own cultural horizon care about most.  
 
2.1.2.5 Moral Intuitions and Moral 
Reasoning Affect Us All 
It is crucial, I believe, to emphasize the difficulty created by the concept of moral 
pluralism and to point out that even the author of this dissertation does not escape it. Moral 
pluralism is not the same as moral nihilism, because it increasingly looks as if the latter is 
biologically impossible. Our genetic setup is designed for the experience of morality, so 
even the supposed moral nihilist will have some moral matrix that triggers his or her 
emotional centers. It is equally important to emphasize that acceptance of moral pluralism 
does not mean one simply shrugs her shoulders and tolerates whatever moral imagination 
happens to come along. The story of human social evolution has been one of cultural/moral 
competition as much as economic and military competition and its continuation is a 
precondition for further evolution. Therefore, it is worth repeating that we are truly faced 
with an emotional and cognitive phenomenon that creates a space in which debates about 
morality can take place and even lead to change through persuasion. I want to use this 
section to highlight something that should not escape our attention. Culture also permeates 
the activity of the social scientist and that I believe it is helpful to reflect on our own 
culturally created moral matrices before we move forward.  
The Enlightenment ideal, which we will discuss in more detail in the second part 
of this dissertation, put a huge emphasis on education and the ability to overcome the 
emotional with the rational. What happened, however, was that the field of education 
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became its own moral world, where the claim of rationality is often used to justify positions 
that are at least equally lodged in the moral and emotional. None of this is per-se bad, but 
the lack of self-awareness of our own emotional commitments exacerbates what we see in 
others, creating the temptation to ascribe purely emotional motives to their positions. I 
think this point is particularly important because there is now compelling evidence that 
higher levels of education also lead to a higher “moral binding and blinding” within the 
community of the higher educated that tends to isolate them from the rest of the country 
(Murray 2012; Putnam 2016). This group of people is overrepresented in opinion-shaping 
institutions like media and politics, so this group’s moral universe matters also for those 
who do not share it. Thus, we should be curious what some of elements of this moral 
universe are. As it turns out, this group of people is more partisan in political and cultural 
issues than other members of society (Ripley, Tenjarla, and He 2019), and their view on 
opposing positions is not one of debate and persuasion but spills over into outright hatred. 
In political terms, 15 percent of Republicans and 20 percent of Democrats share the view 
that the United States would be “better off if large numbers of opposing partisans in the 
public today ‘just died’” (Kalmoe and Mason 2018, 22) – and a majority of these 15 and 
20 percent factions have been through higher education.  
What exacerbates this problematic is that we often tend to attribute the worst 
motives to those who do not share our moral consciousness: The “More in Common” 
initiative takes a regular look at how Americans view each other and their differences, and 
it turns out that each side sees the other one as much more radical and morally malignant 
than each actually is (The Perception Gap 2019). What makes the study even more salient 
is the following finding: “the most partisan, politically-active Americans – a group we call 
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the ‘Wings’ – have deeply distorted perceptions of the other side.” while “politically 
disengaged” Americans were “fully three times more accurate in their estimates of political 
opponents” than those on the right and left edges of American politics. Other studies come 
to similar conclusions (e.g. Ahler and Sood 2018). 
What came as a surprise to the study’s authors should not surprise those of us who 
cognizant of the interplay of culture and morality. If somebody creates his or her sacred 
core around specific political views and a political community, the kind of emotional bonds 
that we have discussed will emerge, with all the consequences for our intuitions and moral 
reasoning. Our political beliefs in such a scenario become more akin to religious believers, 
and any transgression against them is perceived as a transgression against ourselves and 
the values that make up our identity. The moral certainty of the political ideologue is 
emotionally not much different from the moral certainty of the religious fundamentalist – 
and even though they might be miles apart regarding the substance of their beliefs, the 
psychological processes are very much alike.  
Jonathan Haidt describes this very aptly as the phenomenon of morality “binding 
and blinding” members of a community (Haidt 2013, pt. III). Our shared values bind us 
together, but they also blind us to the possibility that there are either weaknesses within our 
own values or to accept that there are people out there that hold their own values just as 
strongly as we do. Culture is a double-edged sword, and the more we believe in the values 
of our own culture and thereby become cohesive as a group the more difficult it becomes 
to see that the members of other cultures hold their beliefs with equal commitment.  
This does not mean that change is not possible, but it is important to realize the 
strong emotional and intuitive ties we can establish with certain ideas. Finding and trying 
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to understand the sacred cores of others’ ideas is an important element in bridging cultural 
divides and build spaces of mutual understanding. It is important to keep in mind the point 
we made earlier about the human species being both an emotional as well as a cognitive 
being, and members of the scientific community are as affected by the emotional triggers 
they have culturally acquired like anyone else. We can grasp these issues scientifically – 
which is demonstrated by the existence of the multiple studies that have investigated them 
– but I doubt that we can easily or fully emancipate ourselves from them.  
Understanding that we are also part of the phenomenon we are inquiring is crucial, 
because it shields us from the mistaken belief that those with different moral values are just 
servants of their emotions while we have found true and detached objectivity. And to a 
certain extent we might be in favor of having morals operate on the emotional level. The 
effect of System 1 thinking (immediate intuitive judgement) is to ground communities in 
some basic attitudes towards social phenomena. As noted earlier, we are still capable of 
reflecting on these attitudes (this is where system 2 thinking comes into play), but shared 
intuitions are an effective way to bind individuals together. 
Once again, it is crucial to maintain the distinction that knowing is not the same as 
feeling, and to create a cultural space in which there is more that ties us morally together 
than drives us apart is a difficult process for every society. Despite its interesting 
philosophical and theoretical implications, social contract theory and similar rational 
choice approaches have almost completely submerged or discounted the emotional 
element. According to these approaches, communities exist solely as an expression of 
individualized self-interest, and the realization of individual benefits from being a member 
of a group is creating enough social cohesion to maintain it. Such an argument rests at least 
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implicitly on the assumption that our moral sense is something like the appendix, it has 
once been useful, but evolution made it redundant. Similarly, the discovery of reason and 
rationality supposedly provides more stable ground for community building than emotional 
and moral ties.  
For a mind trained in Western rationalism, any emphasis on sentimentalism might 
be irritating, but ignoring it is tantamount to neglecting a fundamental quality of what it 
means to be human. Additionally, the unease created by highlighting the role of emotions 
is in itself a culturally-acquired intuition along the lines we have discussed—that is, even 
the scientific community operates around a core of sacred values, particularly the idea of 
objectivity, a facts-based approach, and the goal of discovering  truth. Unfortunately, even 
those exposed most regularly to these values unable to escape their “binding and blinding” 
powers. That universities create their own moral universe is by now a well-established 
observation (Campbell and Manning 2014, 2016), and while this in itself is not a bad thing, 
we need to look at possible consequences.  
The Perception Gap Study has revealed that partisan affiliation and high levels of 
education make one understand the other side on political and cultural issues even less. 
That higher levels of education can increase partisanship is not a new finding (Lukianoff 
and Haidt 2018), and it can be argued that those who understand the world better thanks to 
their education hold their beliefs more passionately because they are based in fact and 
reason. The picture that emerges now, however, is that the more time one spends at an 
institution of higher learning, the less one understands people on the other side of the 
political divide. To avoid confusion, my point here is not that they do not share the views 
of others, but that those with higher degrees attribute wrong and often more sinister motives 
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to those on the other side. This strengthens one’s own moral community, but 
simultaneously decreases bonds to the other side.  
In other words, education is potentially becoming a factor that deepens, instead of  
bridges cultural gaps within society. The Enlightenment ideal that education will replace 
passion with reason and knowledge is very hard to fulfill, since unsurprisingly universities 
themselves developed their own unique cultures with their own moral matrices and moral 
intuitions. Just like the fictional company of our investment banker, universities consist of 
communities tied together by moral imaginations. The emotional power that culture can 
command is an underappreciated phenomenon, especially since it is often difficult for us 
to distinguish between emotionally and cognitively held positions. What further 
complicates things is that neither of the two options has a higher claim to truth and that 
they are not mutually exclusive. For example, two people can be equally convinced of 
climate change but for one of them it is also an emotional issue while the other person takes 
it seriously but without significant emotional attachment. Both people hold the same 
position, and objective evidence might support their stance, but most likely they will react 
quite differently if they encounter someone who holds a contrarian position on the issue. 
Because it is not only a disagreement about the interpretation of facts, but seen as an act of 
transgression against a sacred value.  
This makes communication and understanding much more difficult, because now 
there is room for feeling emotionally repelled by the other person. The realization and 
reflection that we hold positions not only because we think they are true but also because 
they mean something to us emotionally is not always easily accomplished, although it 
happens regularly. With the exception of people suffering from specific medical conditions 
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that affect their brain function, we rely heavily on our emotional intuitions since they help 
us to navigate our physical and social environment.  
 
2.1.3 Shared Mental Models 
For (Haidt 2013, 314), “moral thinking is for social doing,” but depending on the 
content of the prevailing morals, such thinking can either be a source of conflict or of 
cooperation and a basis for mutual trust that enables collective action (Fukuyama 1996). 
The establishment of moral relations play a key role in the formation of organizations like 
large-scale companies or state-like structures. The discussion about cultural differences 
often circulates around the symbols of culture like foods and dress codes. This tends to 
make us overlook what the underlying cause of these symbols is and how strong individuals 
are morally tied to it. For example, the fact that most Western countries celebrate Christmas 
is not a reliable indicator for the degree to which these societies maintain what one might 
call traditional Christian values. Cultural symbols can have different degrees of meaning 
to people, which is why culture tends to remain such an ambiguous concept. In dealing 
earlier with the importance of emotional ties, we were anticipating Haidt’s adage about 
moral thinking and social doing just cited above. 
The argument put forward by Freud and others that our moral side creates a form 
of anxiety is not wrong – violating moral rules or even having the temptation to do so can 
cause negative emotions like shame or the fear of being ostracized by the group. By the 
same token, however, pride in following rules and being valued by one’s group can cause 
positive emotions like a feeling of elevation and pride. Emotions that emerge in our relation 
with others therefore have an effect on our behavior, and depending on the moral rules of 
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a culture there are different triggers for different emotions (Haidt 2001; Keltner and Haidt 
2001; Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2004). Complex systems of moral rules like 
religions or ideologies create a sophisticated web of emotional triggers that incentivize 
behavior that ideally leads to more cooperation and collective action.14  
Many of the things we associate with civilization would have been impossible 
without an improved capability to engage in collective action based on shared intuitions. 
This view continues to have a difficult stance in the social sciences, since it directly 
contradicts the concept and assumptions of methodological individualism. It still maintains 
the idea that any kind of behavior should be reducible to the interests of individual agents 
and that authentic group agency is impossible. Further, it claims that all phenomena we 
perceive as alleged group agency is merely an expression of individual interests within a 
group. 
The problem with this view, however, is that it is not borne out by social reality 
(List and Pettit 2013; Searle 1995; Tuomela 2016). It is not only the emotions that get 
triggered within an individual, but also what one expects somebody else to feel if they are 
exposed to certain triggers. Anticipating the emotional reaction of others is another way of 
influencing our own behavior. Emotional ties to otherwise non-human institutions has an 
impact, because we know that the way we talk or act regarding an institution influences 
those who have invested it with intrinsic value. A company or a state are ideational or 
inanimate objects, but through the actions of those who ascribe higher meaning to it, 
individualism is being reduced and replaced with agency on behalf of the institution. 
 
14 As I will demonstrate with a few examples later in this chapter, these webs can also have the 
opposite effect and thereby cause a reduction in cooperation and collective action. 
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Working on behalf of a group and the desire to further its interests and sustainability can 
come at the expense of individual interests, but there are situations when individuals see 
the well-being of the community as equal or more important than their own individual 
situation. The question we are interested in is: how can situations be created where 
community takes such a prominent position? 
Historically, we can observe three basic kinds of incentives for cooperation with 
varying degrees of complexity. They are not mutually exclusive, but it is important to take 
note that there is a basic human inclination towards cooperation and how this inclination 
can be culturally adapted:  
1.) Cooperation among close kin and family members, something that most 
likely also has a genetic component to it (Hamilton 1964). Even here, however, we 
need to carefully distinguish between consanguine (directly related by blood, i.e. 
genetically) and affinal (related by marriage, adoption, or similar arrangements) 
relationships, since the latter already has a cultural component to it. There is an 
ongoing discussion as to whether acting cooperatively or even altruistically towards 
affinal family members is a conscious cultural or subconscious genetic 
phenomenon.15  
2.) Forms of reciprocal altruism and tit-for-tat behavior, where cooperation 
is continued based on previously observed cooperative behavior (Axelrod 2006; 
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Trivers 1971). This would be the kind of 
cooperation at the core of rational choice theories and the dominant interaction as 
it appears market relationships. 
3.) Cooperation that is driven by a shared belief system or shared mental 
models (SMM) that creates a common goal and a collectively held identity for the 
group. This form of cooperation is the one most closely connected with culture, 
since it combines the cognitive (the creation of a belief system) and intuitive 
(emotional ties to this belief system) elements of human nature.  
 
That being said, in all three forms of cooperation, there can be an incentive for 
individuals to free-ride at the expense of other members of the group. Neither culture nor 
 
15 Haidt and others outright dispute the clear connection between gene-affinity and cooperation 
(Haidt 2013, 197 footnote 27; Hill et al. 2011) 
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genes have been able to turn human beings into completely non-selfish individuals. Types 
1 and 2 work among smaller communities, but become more difficult as soon as the level 
of kin becomes more removed or if behavior can no longer be as easily observed in order 
to establish a tit-for-tat strategy. A community that inhabits a small territory will have 
significantly more personal interaction and thereby better means to establish direct and 
social control. Political entities that stretch over wider terrains and try to exert control over 
a diverse group of people cannot not rely on kin and reciprocal altruism alone. The growing 
anonymity between group members needs to be bridged. Theoretically, the ability of 
collective action tends to break down once the group size no longer allows direct and 
personal relationships between its members and thereby creates the possibility for free-
riding and other opportunistic behavior (Olson 2003). One way to solve this collective 
action problem is to create shared mental models, describing the process of people viewing 
the world in similar ways and thereby creating bonds among them. Cultures are built upon 
such cognitive models, and they expand on them with emotional components like 
surrounding rituals and codes of behavior. 
The term “shared mental models” was coined by the economists Denzau and North 
(Denzau and North 1994) but in many ways they fail to acknowledge the culture 
connection, because it would open the door to the emotional component that ultimately 
conflicts with some of the basic assumptions of their economic model. The authors do 
distinguish between ideologies and traditional cultures, which is why they developed the 
concept of shared mental models. This distinction, however, is not so much driven by a 
clearly delimited definition than by the assumption that ideologies are more rational than 
religions and other traditional cultures, therefore necessitating such a distinction. Whether 
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this is truly helpful remains an open question, because it creates the impression that 
believing in an ideology is a separate phenomenon compared to religious belief. But before 
we look at the content of any belief system, we need to come to terms with the facts that 
are “built” for believing.  
Shared mental models involve creating a subjective reality that organizes 
experiences with the world around us into a processable causal model. It helps us 
understand what is going on around us; unfortunately. It offers no  guarantee that our way 
of understanding is the correct one. An ideal mental model would approach reality as much 
as possible, for the closer the subjectively defined cause-effect relations are to the objective 
cause-effect relations, the more capable the model will be to adapt to the environment. This 
is one of the reasons why science and culture are not opposites. 
Not everyone in a Western secular society is a trained scientist, but Western-shared 
mental models put a premium on explanations that are grounded in science and not religion 
or ideology. Such a mental model is closer to objective reality, but it is still a mental model.  
Even the science-based model is not without its emotional component – most Westerners 
will intuitively lend greater credibility to an argument based on an article published in an 
academic journal compared to a passage from scripture. This is not necessarily a bad thing, 
since one of the purposes of shared mental models is the ability to navigate through the 
world by intuition and therefore save cognitive resources for other activities.  
We even know cases where mental models created incorrect cause-and-effect 
relationships, but the intuition they incentivized still led to positive outcomes. To give an 
example, in medieval times Jews and Muslims had lower disease and death rates due to the 
strict teachings their respective religions had regarding bodily hygiene (Landes 1998, KL 
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219). In their subjective interpretations, taking care of one’s body pleased god and led to 
the reward of a longer, healthier life. While god might indeed be pleased, the objective 
causal relationship is that hygiene reduces the risk of contracting infectious diseases.16 
Another example is the previously mentioned shift in attitude towards wealth advanced, 
according to Weber, by Calvin’s theology (the idea of a calling and the doctrine of 
predestination and their impact on wealth and work) during the Protestant Reformation. 
Religion has provided many societies throughout history with many shared mental models, 
but once again we need to realize that religion was only building on the existing 
psychological preconditions shared by almost all human beings.  
Human beings are thus hard-wired not simply for religion per-se, but for holding 
religious-like beliefs--meaning that a theological underpinning of an idea is not required to 
create a shared mental model, although historically models that have included an element 
of the supernatural have shown significant endurance. It is probably no coincidence that 
currently the Catholic church is the longest continuously existing institution. Critics of 
religion like to argue that without the belief in god human affairs would be more peaceful 
and rational, two claims that do not withstand close scrutiny. There can be no doubt that 
religious beliefs have been responsible for a great deal of violence and human suffering, 
but the dichotomy claiming that  religion is  inherently violent and secularism is inherently 
peaceful is most likely wrong (Armstrong 2014; Cavanaugh 2009). If religion were the 
main source of violence, we should have seen an increase in violent behavior as a 
consequence of religion proliferating and becoming more complex and organized. In fact, 
 
16 Unfortunately, another widespread shared mental model was that Jews lived longer because 
they had poisoned Christian wells, becoming one of the continuous elements of past and in mutated form 
also contemporary antisemitism. 
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the opposite is true and with higher levels of organization, religion became one of the most 
successful tools not only to enable cooperation, but also to rein in violent behavior (Pinker 
2011), at least within, if not so much between, societies. My second argument is that 
cooperation would be better and more widespread if the delusions of religion had not 
prevented us from identifying and acting according to the principles of reason and 
rationality (See, for example: Dawkins 2006; Harris 2006; Hitchens 2008). Since the 
substantive content of religions has an impact on actual social outcomes, it should always 
be the subject of intense scrutiny and evaluation. It is, however, something completely 
different to argue that the religious impulse as such can be replaced with pure rational 
sober-mindedness.  
Even North concedes that the level of cooperation and social behavior observed 
throughout the world would be impossible without our ability to create religious-like 
institutions that incentivize trust and cooperation (Douglass Cecil North 1981, 45–58). We 
most likely will also have to re-evaluate the claim that with modernization religion 
becomes less important. It is true that the belief in god is declining as economic and 
political development are progressing, but the religious impulse is finding other ways to 
express itself, only this time in the form of ideologies (Hoffer 1951; Lindholm and Zuquete 
2010; Zuquete 2007). From an evolutionary psychological viewpoint this should not come 
as a surprise, since even the religious sense does serve an evolutionary function. The 
creation of social cohesion and the increased survival chances for the members of a tight-
knit community (Pinker 2009, 554–58).  
Shared mental models are not a collective agreement on the most rational way to 
cooperate; rather, they are collectively-held beliefs about how to behave towards others 
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and the environment. That is, such models generate an emotional bond that allow 
cooperation through emotions like shame if one violates moral codes, anger if someone 
else violates them, or pride if our commitment to these values is recognized. Moral codes 
cause more than the anxiety that Freud was concerned about, instead,  
people gain pleasure from or feel morally obliged to cooperate with 
like-minded people. People also enjoy punishing those who exploit the 
cooperation of others, or fell morally obligated to do so (Bowles and Gintis 
2013, 3).  
 
Shared mental models serve the purpose to create “like-minded” people and thereby 
trigger the emotional-moral switch that improves the capacity for cooperation. 
This propensity to follow norms is not only a way to reduce the free-rider problem; 
it also enables a more efficient pursuit of the common good. Douglas North posed that 
question and wondered why 
 we observe people disobeying the rules of a society when the 
benefits exceed the costs, we also observe them obeying the rules when an 
individualistic calculus would have them do otherwise […] Without an 
explicit theory of ideology or, more generally, of the sociology of 
knowledge there are immense gaps in our ability to account for either 
current allocation of resources or historical change. In addition to being 
unable to resolve the fundamental dilemma of the free rider problem we 
cannot explain the enormous investment that every society makes in 
legitimacy” (Douglass Cecil North 1981, 46–47). 
The emotional investment of norms also grants them legitimacy because they start 
to “feel right.” One answer to North’s puzzle would be to accept that it is not only material 
gain that triggers positive feelings. In dealing with human psychology research Fredrickson 
and Branigan have spent a lot of time with negative emotions like hate and anger, compared 
to more positive emotions like joy, love, and contentment (Fredrickson and Branigan 
2001). The dominant materialist framework has blinded us to the possibility that delayed 
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or foregone material gratification can be more than compensated with psychological 
gratification.  
Think about the alcoholic who remains abstinent, the devout religious follower who 
commits to fasting or the pennypincher who decides to give to charity. We might decide 
on occasion not take advantage of others or freeride at the expense of our community 
because not doing so makes us feel better than complying. Equally important, our emotions 
affect others around us – behaving according to moral norms (i.e. “doing good”) not only 
causes the individual who does so to feel better, but it incentivizes those who observe such 
behavior approvingly to do the same (Haidt 2000; Schnall, Roper, and Fessler 2010). 
Nature has equipped human beings with a complex and malleable cause-trigger system for 
emotional reactions precisely to ensure that decisions are not solely based on a rational 
cost-benefit calculation. The emotional investment of behavior is a key element when we 
try to understand why communities can be sustainable. 
Human beings are capable of redirecting instinctive emotions for the purpose of 
creating artificial, family-like groups. It is not our ability to reflect and rationalize ourselves 
into embracing a larger society, since our tribal instincts would immediately lead us to 
attempt to take advantage of the other members for the benefit of our own kin. If, however, 
my emotional bond to my family is no stronger than my emotional bond to the other 
members of society, cooperation for the common good becomes possible. One of the 
purposes of complex cultures was to create an artificial counterweight to our natural 
preference for close kinship relations. Again, the word “natural” should not be 
misunderstood here; what it means is that cooperation among family members happens 
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automatically and instinctively, while cooperation beyond the family needs a cultural 
supports system that reinforces the emotional bond with shared mental models. 
Shared interpretations of the world help solve the collective action problem 
especially in cases where the mental model was especially built to counter selfish behavior  
by presenting rewards and punishments that greatly reinforce the 
gains from cooperation in the here and now. If I believe that my tribe’s chief 
is just another fellow like me following his own self-interests, I may or may 
not decide to obey his authority. But if I believe that the chief can command 
the spirits of dead ancestors to reward or punish me, I will be much more 
likely to respect his word. My sense of shame is potentially much greater if 
I believe I am being observed by a dead ancestor who might see into my 
real motives better than a live kinsman. Contrary to the views of both 
religious believers and secularists, it is extremely difficult to prove or falsify 
any given religious belief. Even if I am skeptical that the chief is really in 
touch with dead ancestors, I may not want to take the risk that he really is” 
(Fukuyama 2012, 37).  
 
That the religious impulse is a human universal does not absolve us from 
acknowledging the differences between religious creeds and how they developed. 
Obviously, a society that believes in irrigation for a better harvest is preferable to one that 
tries to accomplish the same goal through human sacrifice. But it would be a mistake to 
automatically assume that the psychology of the latter is fundamentally different from the 
former – what differs is their mental model. One tried to solve the problem through the 
prescriptions of science, the other via religion. Yet both most likely are not dispassionate 
about their beliefs, but see one as inherent superior to the other.  
Evidence for the psychological underpinning of trust in science is provided by the 
fact that even in modern and secular societies, science loses its appeal when it runs up 
against people’s more important beliefs. This holds true for all political attitudes, too. 
Indeed, it is almost comical to observe how the left and right list examples of how the other 
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side is ignoring science (for criticism of the left, see: Berezow and Campbell 2014; for 
criticism of the right, see: Mooney 2012), when it conflicts with other emotionally invested 
convictions. The big problem in this debate is that neither side is willing to admit that they 
have an emotional reason for why they prefer certain scientific findings to others. The claim 
to be emotion-free has an eroding effect on our ability to self-reflect, because if I am 
convinced that my views are grounded in objective rationality my openness to persuasion 
will be lower compared to a person admitting that there is an emotional component to their 
positions making them more aware of their own potential biases. 
Family-like bonds, tit-for-tat, and reciprocal altruism are not replaced by religion 
or secular ideologies, but they amplify the scope of these biologically-grounded social 
behaviors and add additional components in the form of collective rules to it. These rules 
of social behavior (regardless of their content, e.g. not to eat certain kinds of food) within 
collectively held belief systems are not grounded solely in a cost-benefit analysis (e.g. if I 
wash my hands I will live longer) but are becoming a part of an individual’s identity and 
image of him- or herself (e.g. as a good Muslim or Jew, I have to regularly wash my hands), 
which creates another incentive for collective action. One wants to demonstrate loyalty and 
commitment to the group by actively following its rules and working for its goals. This is 
exactly the phenomenon we can see on a large scale among the main world religions, but 
it also works on smaller scales like towns or neighborhood communities where people take 
pleasure in working together without either being directly related or expecting an 
immediate individual benefit from their commitment.  
Since the first two kinds of social behavior need the least amount of “cultural 
support,” they also posit something like our natural fallback position if shared mental 
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models should lose their credibility and legitimacy. If a society’s mental model is religion- 
based and people lose faith, appeals to their religiosity will become less effective in 
enabling effective collective action and there will be new incentive structures to benefit the 
families and friends. The creation of a society around a collectively-held belief is not an 
easy undertaking, especially if the expectation is that it can override our more primal 
instincts that make us favor family or tit-for-tat behavior (which can be just another word 
for corruption). We will discuss this in more detail once we turn to institutions, but political 
development can hardly be understood without taking large-scale, shared mental models 
into account. A comparison of Japanese and Chinese institutional development, for 
example. demonstrates that the Japanese ability to put government before family gave them 
a significant advantage in organizing governance, at least for a time (Huntington 1965, 
417–18).  
SMMs serve as maps through our social, economic, and political life and enable us 
to follow historically developed paths. There is, however, always the possibility that the 
map itself is wrong and our emotional investment in the charted course makes it hard for 
us to update it. A known consequence of following a flawed SMM is the phenomenon of 
cognitive dissonance, where societies try to confront a new challenge based on their SMM, 
but the model is inadequate for the problem at hand. Since the mental model is invested 
with emotional value, its believers try to fit reality into our model instead of the other way 
round (Festinger 2001; Tavris and Aronson 2016). Francis Fukuyama gives a good 
example, where he describes how 
societies from Rome to China attributed military setbacks to 
inadequate observance of religious obligations; instead of spending time 
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reorganizing and reequipping the army, they devoted resources to increased 
rites and sacrifices” (Fukuyama 2012, 453). 
 
Culture and shared mental models remain double-edged swords. On the one hand, 
they can provide strong incentives for collective action and social cohesion, and as long as 
they don’t encounter a serious contradiction in the realm of objective reality, they can 
deliver positive results for a prolonged period of time. On the other, if such contradictions 
occur, communities may face severe problems, since their emotional attachments create a 
barrier for necessary change.  
 
2.2 The Culture-Biology Connection 
The establishment of a connection between culture and emotions carries with it a 
connection between culture and biology. So far we have dealt with the physiological 
reactions triggered by experienced and observed behavior by ourselves or others, but is the 
experiencing of emotions the only biological element we can connect to culture. We will 
have to take a look at some additional factors of human biology, especially the human 
brain, which has been evolved in many respects to enable social life. This is important 
because it addresses a key question: Are we by nature more individualistic or more social? 
Part of the answer has to do with the design and biochemistry of our brain and whether we 
will find more evolution in the areas responsible for social behavior or for those pertaining 
to our individualistic side. Once more, we follow our approach of interdisciplinarity and 
see what other fields can contribute to our definition of culture. 
One starting point stems from the observation that our position in relation to others 
as well as our recognition of social status by others directly affects human brain chemistry. 
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For example, serotonin levels tend to be elevated with higher social status and serve as a 
safeguard against depression (R. H. Frank 1986, 21–25; Fukuyama 2012c, 41), indicating 
that our physiological well-being is connected to our social needs. Our sense for 
community is hardwired into our behavior to such a degree that as soon as we have the 
smallest communality around which to form a group, we will begin to behave differently 
towards in-group members and out-group members. Known in psychology as the “minimal 
group paradigm,” a number of experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel demonstrated that 
regardless of the criteria by which people are separated into two or more groups, when it 
comes to the distribution of resources individuals will tend to distribute a larger share to 
their group. Examples for the criteria used to divide people into a group included flipping 
a coin or having individuals guess the number of dots on a page. Regardless of their actual 
estimations, 50% were told that they had overestimated the number of dots and were put 
into a group of “overestimators,” while others were grouped as “underestimators.” After 
the investigator assigned groups, the test subjects were asked to distribute money to all 
subjects whose only known characteristic was the group they belonged to. The almost 
uniform tendency of people was to distribute in favor of their group (Tajfel 1970). This 
finding supports the notion that our brain automatically operates as if we are members of 
group, regardless of how that group came into existence and without clear evidence that 
preferring my own group will lead to any form of individualized benefit.  
More recent studies have used functional magnetic resonance imaging monitoring 
the brain activity of individuals watching videos of other people’s hands being pricked by 
a needle or touched by a Q-Tip that revealed that being part of the same community 
influences our experience of pain. The hands were labeled with the person’s religion, and 
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if it was a match with the religion of the viewer of the video, a larger spike occurred in the 
area of the brain that handles pain than when the hand in the video was labeled with another 
religion. This was repeated with similarly arbitrary group definitions as in Tajfel’s 
experiments with the same results, showing that our brain empathizes more strongly with 
those whom we see as part of our group (Vaughn et al. 2018). These experiments all 
demonstrate that the human mind has a repertoire of ways to support group cohesion. 
Outside of the laboratory things are more complex and there are different levels of 
affection and connection we feel with others. As we have discussed, the first community 
we are part of without our own choosing is our family, and we tend to remain more loyal 
to them then to other groups. Additionally, none of these experiments advance the claim 
that we are incapable of reflected decision making and that we can never leave groups or 
communities once we joined them. We can, and we join and leave different communities 
throughout our lives. It does demonstrate, however, that there is a natural inclination 
towards community, which does make sense since we are instinctively aware of our 
limitations to survive as a solitary animal.  
But communities are not just the byproduct of rational individualistic human beings 
forced by nature to work together, but they can be a desirable end on their own. The 
evolutionary advantage that stems from effective cooperation in groups is also maintained 
by a subconscious and physiological need for community and the emotional elevation it 
makes us feel. Even small communal activities that are done together like synchronous 
signing or dancing not only affects us psychologically, but physiologically, too. After such 
synchronous activities, participants exhibit higher levels of physical resilience and 
experience a higher pain threshold (Cohen et al. 2010). It looks as if community does not 
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just make us feel stronger, but actually makes us stronger by allowing us to more fully 
access the potential of our bodies. In this respect, consider the so-called homefield 
advantage of a sports team where the cheering for the team seems to give them an 
advantage due to the emotional elevation the players feel.  
Further evidence of the need for community comes from the field of 
psychopathology, where evidence mounts that an unsatisfied sense of belonging and lack 
of community can cause serious mental illnesses like depression, causing lower life 
expectancy and even suicide (Chandler and Lalonde 1998; Cole et al. 2015; Hari 2018).17 
Sean Twenge and others have observed that the increase of time US adolescents spent in 
front of screens correlates strongly with symptoms of depression and suicide-related 
outcomes, while in-person social interaction, sports/exercise, homework, the consumption 
of print media, and attending religious services had the opposite effect (Twenge et al. 
2018). One of the biggest surprises of the twenty-first century is the social media revolution 
in the most demonstrative way show the extent to which we care about others (in positive 
and negative ways), how greatly we desire to communicate with others, and how much we 
are affected by what others think of us. Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter are social-
attention machines that feed directly into one part of our community-seeking brain, 
especially for the generation born shortly just before or just after 2000 when social media 
became a central pillar of their community life. And just as with other forms of community, 
the online world is heavily influencing our emotional interaction or the lack thereof. 
Positive or negative comments, likes and other ways of interaction produce a measurable 
 
17 It is no coincidence that in January 2018 the British Government made the tackling of loneliness 
a key issue for its “Minister for Sport and Civil Society.” 
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impact on the psychological and social well-being of users (Burke, Marlow, and Lento 
2010; Burrow and Rainone 2017; Kross et al. 2013; Sung et al. 2016; Valkenburg, Peter, 
and Schouten 2006). Interaction with others can be an attributing cause to psychological 
and physiological health or sickness, but the human need for it is becoming more and more 
evident. There is growing empirical evidence that the quality of our social relations has a 
direct impact on life expectancy, something that would support the previously made claim 
that common activities make us more resilient.  
So it is not simply a choice between individualism and sociability that has to be 
made by a rational, individual utility-maximizing person, but the question is how to balance 
individualism with the biological need for community. One of the growing problems is that 
is has become easier to be exposed to the pathologies of communities than to their benefits, 
and the growing role of social media is part of this problem. 
Looking at those who are most likely to shift their community needs to online 
platforms we see concerning trends: depression and suicide attempts among adolescents 
have skyrocketed since the 2000. Among girls, twice as many teenage girls now end their 
own lives compared to the early 2000s (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 150; for a more in-depth 
analysis see: Twenge 2017). Social isolation and reduced in-person social interaction 
literally can make us sick, so based on all the available evidence the idea that our communal 
sense and sociability are results of our rationality no longer holds up. Twenge and her co-
authors point towards the growing evidence that the neural network of the brain needs 
social interaction to develop. When they say “it is worth remembering that humans’ neural 
architecture evolved under conditions of close, mostly continuous face-to-face contact with 
others (including non-visual and non-auditory contact; i.e., touch, olfaction), and that a 
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decrease in or removal of a system’s key inputs may risk destabilization of the system” 
(Twenge et al. 2018, 4).  
Jonathan Haidt and Greg Lukianoff demonstrate that among the generation born 
after 1994 the trend in shifting in-person social relationships to online relationships has 
triggered a mental health crisis among adolescents with growing rates of self-inflicted 
harm, depression, and suicide (Lukianoff and Haidt 2018, 152). If sociability were only a 
choice but not a necessity, we should not observe these kinds of phenomena. 
As previously described, it is safe to say that a first blueprint that nudges us towards 
sociability (including both cooperation and competition) has been psychologically 
hardwired into the human brain. This hardwiring, however, is only a first draft that requires 
revision based on experience. For example, the human brain is built to learn a language, 
but its needs communication to fully develop the actual ability to speak. Luckily enough 
by default we enjoy communicating with others, thereby providing the necessary stimulus 
for the brain to acquire full linguistic capacity (Johnson and Newport 1989). It is not only 
the human body that is born prematurely, but also the human brain continues to mature and 
change at least until the age of 15, if not longer (Epstein 1986; Hudspeth and Pribram 
1990), exposing it to neuroplasticity, or the ability to develop according to external stimuli 
(Wexler 2010), that cannot have been preprogrammed before birth.  
Just as with language, we are a species that enjoys engaging in play to learn social 
skills and support the development of our brain structure, but this is also absolutely crucial 
in understanding the development of culture. The existing predisposition for language and 
play are all designed to allow us to work in groups, but our environment has not 
predetermined the particular content and shape of language and social behavior. To a 
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certain extent, the role of instinct ends here – we are not like termites who would behave 
the same way wherever we encounter them. We use our basic building blocks of language 
and social behavior but create significantly different cultures. And these cultures then 
create the environment that contributes to the determinants of what, for example, causes 
anxiety or joy. Max Weber makes a strong case that the birth of capitalism was exactly 
such a reshaping of the “webs of emotions” that redirected human behavior, since alternate 
sources of positive and negative emotions were created. The Protestant Reformation turned 
the traditional idea of vanity on its head by  
liberating the acquisition of wealth from the inhibitions of 
traditionalist ethics; it breaks the fetters on the striving for gain not only by 
legalizing it, but [...] by seeing it as directly willed by God (M. Weber 2012, 
119).  
 
Max Weber’s famous description in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, is a concise historical hermeneutic of how wealth acquisition became a source 
of positive emotions, through triggering approval in the eyes of god and then in the eyes of 
others. Before Calvin’s time, the connection between wealth and shame was a strong 
inhibition to economic development, since every economic success in this life moved one 
closer to eternal damnation in the afterlife. Assuming that religious sentiments at that time 
were genuine and controlling, this attitude was a real cultural obstacle to improving the 
material conditions in the Christian world. Up until the first half of the 20th century, those 
regions that embraced Protestantism over Catholicism had significantly higher economic 
growth that cannot be explained by non-cultural factors alone (Barro and McCleary 2003; 
Ferguson 2011a). 
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A changing cultural environment, however, does not necessarily only have positive 
consequences. Clifford Geertz writes that “man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs” (Geertz 1993, 5). We can 
imagine the strings of these webs to consist of the emotions that tie us to our cultural group. 
Or to phrase it more in biological terms, culture has an influence on which kind of events 
cause the release of which specific hormone, so a change in the cultural environment can 
have a direct impact on the processes of the brain and endocrine system.  
If these webs start to change, it is not just a social phenomenon but also a 
psychological one. Investigating the cultural change in Europe in the 19th century, Emile 
Durkheim formulated his study about suicide rates in European countries and concluded 
that it “varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the 
individual forms a part” (Durkheim 2006, 208), meaning that those in stable “webs of 
significance” dealt with fewer incidents of suicide than those whose webs were altering. 
Durkheim was among the first to give a social dimension to individual psychological states, 
arguing that people who experience social isolation and crumbling group identities can be 
driven into such a mental state that they view suicide as the only possible way out. 
Durkheim wrote in the late 1800s, but his theory still commands validity today (see, for 
example Eckersley and Dear 2002).  
The sudden change of a cultural environment is not only an aesthetic challenge; it 
can also have severe effects on human psychology. Evaluating the literature on migrant-
psychology and the challenges of integration, Bruce Wexler comes to the conclusion that 
because of the neurobiological importance of the homology between 
internal structures and the external environment, people do not like living 
inside someone else’s symbol system […] Happiness, peace and satisfaction 
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in realizing childhood goals, contributing to and receiving the approval of a 
vital community to which they belong, and assuming the roles of the parents 
and other community elders they had admired are not available to them 
(Wexler 2010, 19). 
 
The contemporary trend toward equating culture with religion or ethnicity has at 
least partially distorted our understanding of the psychological function of culture. What 
Durkheim describes are the consequences of an emergent multicultural society, even 
though there has been no change in the dominant form of religious belief or the ethnic 
composition of the countries he was investigating. What did change, however, was that 
people were forced to move from a primarily rural culture into a growingly urban culture. 
This is just as much a change of the symbolic environment as it is for a Somali Muslim 
moving to liberal Minnesota. And as Wexler has described, it is these changes of the 
symbolic environment that can have severe psychological consequences.  
 
2.2.1 Culture and Evolution 
If we want to better understand the biological underpinnings, it is helpful to 
examine our closest non-human relatives. The basic behavioral patterns that are relevant 
for human culture can also be observed in chimpanzees (F. B. M. de Waal 2007), and they 
allow us to glimpse into the early days of humanity about five million years ago. Although 
humans branched off from its common ancestor, the similarity of human and chimpanzee 
genomes is still characterized by genome overlap of 99% and thereby the two species 
match each other far more closely than any other pair of primates. As a result, this makes 
comparing the social behavior of the two a useful first step in tracing the evolution of social 
behavior (Fukuyama 2012c, 31; Wade 2014, 7, 13–21).  
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Before the emergence of societies based on complex cultures, human communities 
strongly resembled a chimpanzee-colony regarding its social environment, with a 
prevalence of tribal warfare for territory, resources, and females. Among chimpanzees we 
see significant instances of social behavior including violent raids against outgroups and 
the integration of females from outside chimpanzee colonies (LeBlanc and Register 2003), 
the acquisition of social status (alpha male) that must be earned, and the ability to make 
and break coalitions to reach a higher status (F. B. M. de Waal 2007, chap. 2). This status 
is also recognized by the members of the colony and consequently they turn to the alpha 
male or female to settle conflicts (Fukuyama 2012, 32). They are also capable of reciprocity 
and returning favors, even if it comes at a personal cost (Schmelz et al. 2017).  Chimps 
however are also capable of deceiving others, which can lead to being ostracized by other 
chimpanzees (Fukuyama 2012, 33).  
Our closest primate relative moreover shows clear instances of social behavior, 
both in its positive and negative expressions. In its early stages, human existence most 
likely was not much different, and the basic forms of social behavior paralleled each other 
in many respects (F. B. M. de Waal 2007). Raids on other groups for resources and women 
continually took place, and even within tribes violence was not exceptional. As LeBlanc 
and Register observe, “much of noncomplex society human warfare is similar to 
chimpanzee attacks […]. The chimp and human behaviors are almost completely parallel” 
(LeBlanc and Register 2003, 83). Since chimpanzees also live in groups, they are 
confronted with the same problems of group governance as other species, including 
humans. And as with humans, emotions play a key role in ensuring the social functioning 
of groups.  
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The difference, however, is that human beings can influence what triggers an 
emotional reaction; a chimpanzee will never display an emotional reaction because another 
chimpanzee has violated a sacred rule or desecrated a holy site. Other species have 
something like instinctive emotional reactions that allows the emergence of social 
hierarchies, but complex moral imaginations that spring from shared mental models are 
most likely exclusive to humans. Chimpanzees have the emotional building blocks (the 
ability to feel sympathy, fear, anger, affection, envy) that play a key role in the creation of 
shared mental models, but they lack the ability to put together a full-fledged model of the 
world and then invest it with intrinsic value. (On the existence of emotional building blocks 
in chimpaszees but their lack of an ability to put them together, see: Frans B. M. de Waal 
1997). Thus, will our closet ancestors are social creatures, but they cannot develop ideas 
of morality that would allow them to cooperate as closely as human individuals can. 
For all the social behavior we see in chimpanzees, their actual ability for collective 
action is also quite limited. Michael Tomasello conducted several experiments trying to 
evaluate the cooperative capacities of chimpanzees and other primates. Based on the results 
of these studies, he concluded that their ability of chimps and other primates to cooperate 
is limited at best.  In one key publication, he states that “it is inconceivable that you would 
ever see two chimpanzees carrying a log together” (quoted in: Haidt 2013, 204). What they 
are missing is shared intentionality (Tomasello et al. 2005)--or what we described as the 
formulation of common goals based on a shared mental model. Once you agree on how the 
world supposedly works, it is much easier to intentionally grasp the meaning of somebody 
else’s actions. Like actions, language too rests on shared intentionality, since words are an 
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agreement among people as to what a sound describes (Haidt 2013, 206; Tomasello et al. 
2005, 683).  
Most animals react to the environment based on a stimulus-instinct basis, meaning 
that their ability for reflection and abstraction is limited compared to human beings. Even 
with an almost 99% genome overlap, the chimpanzee has no comparable ability for abstract 
thought that accounts for, among other things, language and religion (Fukuyama 2012, 31). 
Consequently, animal behavior is significantly easier to predict, since the likelihood of the 
same non-human species to come to different interpretations of their environment is 
practically non-existent. This does not mean that chimpanzees and other animals are 
incapable of feelings or cannot develop loyalties and emotional attachments (F. B. M. de 
Waal 2007, 42), but they never reach the level of complexity that prevails among homo 
sapiens. It is, for example, unlikely that chimpanzees will turn vegetarian for moral 
reasons. They understand and are capable of following a set of social rules that enable 
hierarchies within chimpanzee colonies, but unable to reflect on the moral order or some 
transcendent purpose of the community. 
Numerous researchers have also provided strong evidence that human beings are 
also hardwired to create and understand hierarchies and social rules  causes us uneasiness 
if we see these concepts and practices violated (Greene 2014; Haidt 2013; C. Smith 2009; 
and Wright 1994), but different human communities came up with different ideas of what 
actually constitute legitimate rules. These questions do not arise for chimpanzees – they 
follow their natural instincts but lack the capacity to rearrange or suppress what triggers 
these instincts. Human beings on the other hand developed societal constructs that were 
driven by shared mental models and began to refine the triggers for emotions and the urge 
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to act upon them. We know of no human society that does not build some forms of cultural 
structures around symbols like body paintings, ornaments, or certain social rituals. While 
it is true that we for example see elaborate mating rituals among animals, these rituals are 
of significantly less complexity and design as human rituals. The peacock follows a ritual 
in order to attract a mate, but they do so out of instinct and not because there is an oral 
tradition or another similar way of cultural transmission of certain behavior.  
Another main difference between primates and humans is the capacity to reason. 
Contrary to animals, homo sapiens is not only driven by instinct and emotion but has the 
capacity to reason and reflect critically before taking an action. Throughout Western 
philosophy the idea has been that emotions and reason are two competing forces within the 
human psyche. Plato, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson and others proposed different 
interpretations of the conflict between the passions (i.e. emotions) and reason. Ideally, 
although difficult, reason should have command over the passions. More than in other 
philosophical traditions, Western philosophy put a premium on reason while distrusting 
the passions (Solomon 1993).  
Advances in neuroscience, however, strongly suggest that passion and reason are 
not opposed to each other, but are supporting parts of the human psyche that make social 
life possible. The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio worked with numerous patients whose 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the emotional center of the brain, had been damaged. These 
patients were entirely free from emotional reactions but maintained their full memory of 
right and wrong and suffered no loss in IQ (A. R. Damasio 2006). Yet, instead of living a 
life uninhibited by emotions, their lives fell apart – i.e., their decision making was reduced 
to a constant and conscious cost-benefit analysis where any option felt as good as every 
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other. This disability however did not turn these subjects into cold, calculating 
psychopaths, who were able to take advantage of their fellow human beings at every turn, 
since they could still reason their way towards moral behavior. They knew what was right 
and wrong, but that knowledge no longer came to them emotionally; instead,  they had to 
make a conscious effort to morally inform their actions based on information without any 
recourse to what their feelings would tell them to do. Although this might be the 
rationalist’s dream, for those afflicted with this condition it meant the loss of connection 
with family and employers (Haidt 2013, 33). 
Instead of making us physically ally more resilient towards the environment and 
potential predators, evolution reinforced our ability to cooperate and organize into groups 
and communities. The human brain is larger especially in the area of the neocortex than 
other species, which is critical for abstraction, a basic condition necessary for the creation 
of social life beyond the tribal level that dominates among other social species (Pugh 1977). 
For example, before someone can build a society around the belief that after death our 
ancestors can still communicate with us through priests, it is necessary to grasp the idea of 
life after death as such.  
The human brain evolved toward an ever-increasing capacity for social interaction, 
but with significant differences vis-à-vis what other species can do. The focus of studies 
on the human brain have long centered on its ability to enhance individual survival chances; 
but it seems that the more we know about our brain, the more it becomes clear to what 
extend it has evolved to enable more and more complex social interaction. The tendency 
of the brain to look for patterns in the physical and social environment turned out to be the 
basis for “language, imagination, invention, and the belief in imaginary entities such as 
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ghosts and gods” (Mattson 2014). In addition to memorizing food sources and the being 
able  to reproduce perceived patterns in maps or drawings, the human brain comes equipped 
with an additional feature. As Tattersall notes, 
The human brain has a superior ability to mentally manipulate 
animate and inanimate patterns into a myriad of intangible symbols that can 
then be recombined to produce new images of the world; we therefore live 
partly in worlds of our own mental creation, superimposed upon or distinct 
from the natural world” (Tattersall 2010, 193). 
 
Even the human capacity for art and creativity is most likely just another part of the 
evolutionary toolbox for social behavior, since  
art is a symbolic communicative system practiced only by humans, 
and argued to have become a fully practiced behavior at a time when early 
human social groups grew in size and complexity, and communication 
through language and art promoted cohesion and survival (Zaidel 2014). 
 
Contrary to some theories that claim that human sociability is learned behavior, the 
physiological development of homo sapiens made social behavior a necessary condition 
for survival. The tripling of the size of the human brain and the accompanying increase in 
head size lead to human beings being born prematurely for the newborn to fit through the 
birth canal. From the beginning, human beings were dependent on at least one other person 
for physical survival, most commonly the mother. Yet without a surrounding community 
both the mother as well as the baby would have very little chance of survival. Sometimes 
it seems as if studies about human development completely ignore the first stages of our 
existence. We are incapable of living independently for quite a while after being born, so 
any theory that proposes social behavior is exclusively learned behavior must also assume 
that newborns could somehow survive on their own. We are an altricial species, meaning 
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that human newborns need to be taken care of for a long period of time until they are 
capable to provide for themselves. Nature has placed a huge and disproportionate burden 
on women in order to allow the development of humanities most advanced feature: the 
brain.  
Competing theories have been presented as to why human babies are born 
prematurely, but all of them point towards the extraordinary physical burden child bearing 
and child rearing puts on the mother (Dunsworth et al. 2012; Wittman and Wall 2007). As 
we have already discussed, child mortality and the risk for women to die as a consequence 
of giving birth was extraordinary high in pre-modern societies. Creating an environment 
that increased the chances of survival for both mothers and their offspring was one of the 
first challenges for human communities, something that could simply not be accomplished 
by an individual, especially if that individual should happen to be a female that just went 
through the exhausting process of giving birth. Without repeating too much of a point 
already made, cultural progress increased the survival chances for children and women, 
despite the biological burden nature has put upon them.  
The heuristic trick used by philosophers like Hobbes and Rousseau was to start 
their philosophy with the assumption that we are first solitary and then evolve into 
community and society. The problem is, we never had this option in the first place. The 
path of human evolution seemingly made a tradeoff between physical and social 
development, with the social component becoming increasingly more important. We 
cannot survive on our own, but we are able to create social structures of such complexity 
that we outperform any other competing species. Close emotional ties with mates, children, 
parents, and friends can have a positive impact on the chances for survival and reproductive 
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success (A. Damasio and Carvalho 2013). Contrary to what Rousseau, Marx, and Engels 
(Engels 2010) might claim, it did not need a sinister cabal to drag us into a community. 
The idea that society is by default a ruse created by the powerful who tricked others into 
submission and blinded them to being exploited is a retelling of human history that the 
evolutionary record does not bear out. Hierarchies and loyalties to a community are part of 
our instinctive social side, and not a cabal by the powerful.  
Communities were necessary for survival, and the better organized a community 
was, the better were its chances for survival. It seems increasingly likely that the human 
brain was not growing to make us more adaptive as individuals, but to allow new and more 
complex forms of human interaction and the creation of ever more complex social 
organizations (Humphrey 1976, 310).  
Our ability to create a world of our own mental creation and to fill it with 
emotionally triggering symbols and artificially created patterns that then are sustained by 
different forms of communication has of course not only been a blessing. This increase in 
brain size and the growing faculties for social intelligence is not a guarantor that social 
organizations are always functioning or organize human societies for the betterment of its 
members. Human intelligence allowed the development of  
weapons, culture, and population sizes to levels that essentially 
erased the significance of predators of other species, he simultaneously 
created a new predator: groups and coalitions within his own species (R. D. 
Alexander 1974, 335).  
 
2.2.1.1 The Return of Group Selection  
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As Alexander alludes, the further we evolved socially the more dangerous we 
became to ourselves, and with the exception of pandemic events like the Spanish flu, the 
deadliest competitor to human beings have been other human beings. But this danger was 
less one-on-one fighting, but competition among groups and the better organized groups 
tending to outperform less well- organized ones. Evolution of the means of cooperation 
based on shared mental models enabled the human dominance over the planet, not some 
sober cost-benefit calculation by sober individualists. Not surprisingly, a major field of 
evolutionary competition involved the design of the mental models or the culture on which 
a community based its cohesion. 
If culture is the glue that keeps groups and coalitions together, those with the 
stronger glue might have an advantage. Social organization and culture are also shaped by 
an element of competition and those groups that find the best social organization to access 
resources, protect their offspring, and increase group size will have a decided advantage 
over other groups. That social evolution should not be discarded because of biological 
evolution was also observed by Charles Darwin, who wrote that 
when two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came 
into competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included 
a great number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were 
always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, 
this tribe would succeed better and conquer the other.… The advantage 
which disciplined soldiers have over undisciplined hordes follows chiefly 
from the confidence which each man feels in his comrades.… Selfish and 
contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can be 
effected. A tribe rich in the above qualities would spread and be victorious 
over other tribes (Quoted in Haidt 2013, KL 3186).  
 
Darwin realized that the ability for efficient collective action is an advantage, but it 
puzzled him how such courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members” may emerge: 
 
99 
 
But it may be asked, how within the limits of the same tribe did a 
large number of members first become endowed with these social and moral 
qualities, and how was the standard of excellence raised? It is extremely 
doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent 
parents, or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades, would be 
reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous 
parents belonging to the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life, 
as many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often 
leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature (Quoted in Haidt 2013, KL 
3198-3201)." 
 
Like others before and after him, Darwin did not allow any significant role for 
culture. Wedded to the principle of biological dominance, he remained a nativist – meaning 
that in his view the moral qualities that make one tribe superior to another have to be innate, 
and one has to be born with them, without any means of acquiring them otherwise (Haidt 
2013, KL 637). If Darwin were right, any character trait that supported self-sacrifice or 
selfless behavior would die out, because those holding these qualities would lead to having 
significantly fewer offspring. Yet Darwin provides us with an emergency exit – for 
procreation, we seek out partners that display sentiments like honor, respect, and affection 
and thereby natural selection would ensure that these noble qualities would be passed down 
through the generations and enable a functioning society (Haidt 2013, 225).  
In Darwin’s approach, culture is not necessary at all, because the driving factor 
remains exclusively with the individual , and evolutionary adaptation ultimately serves the 
“interests” of an individual’s genes. Although he does not use the term, genetics takes care 
of creating sufficient incentives for social behavior. Through the process of natural 
selection, those who behave less socially have a competitive disadvantage, and the 
subconscious desire to pass on one’s genes should lead to cooperation and functional social 
cohesion.  
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By the same token, however, any kind of observed social behavior that looks like 
altruism or puts the community before one’s individual self-interest is only a thin veneer 
that conceals the true trigger of such behavior, which is to have an advantage when it comes 
to the selection of potential mates. Or in the words of Richard Dawkins, “DNA neither 
cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music” (Dawkins 2004, 133). Dawkins 
may be correct that we dance to the music of our DNA, but it is possible that he is hearing 
the wrong tune. From what we have seen so far, the human brain is a powerful engine 
dedicated to the creation and maintenance of social relations. Human procreation would 
easily be possible without language and religion or a predisposition to take pleasure in 
having company or caring what people think of us, and neither music nor poetry would be 
necessary to ensure our ability to pass on our genes. 
But this is not how we function, and whatever our subconscious according to 
Dawkins tells us to do, it doesn’t speak as clearly as he claims. If the seeking of approval 
is only a function of an elaborate mating ritual, why do we also seek the approval of 
strangers, something that has been demonstrated so strongly by the social media revolution. 
It stretches the borders of logic to assume that evolution has equipped us with all these 
tools for social behavior when passing on our individual genes is the primary goal.  
It most certainly is a goal, but most likely not the only one, and the desire for a 
parsimonious theory of human development does not automatically mean that evolution 
also operates according to the rules of parsimony. Especially in the case of human beings, 
we are confronted with a puzzling duality that enables us to act altruistically as well as 
selfishly based on culturally-transmitted triggers. This is possible because our brains have 
evolved to allow a swift adaptation not of our physiological qualities, but of group 
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characteristics. Changing modes of cooperation can be accomplished much swifter than 
waiting for natural selection to adapt to changing environmental conditions. So, contrary 
to the claim that the individual should be the focus of inquiry, the acceptance of human 
beings as social animals forces us to look at the interplay of communities and evolution as 
well.  
There is an ongoing debate about whether natural selection works only on the level 
of the individual or if there is something like group selection, where evolutionary pressure 
is not applied on the individual member of a species, but on groups. This concept of group 
selection fell out of favor in the 1970s but is now returning from its banishment. Jonathan 
Haidt, David S. Wilson, Edward O. Wilson, and Herbert Gintis have made convincing 
arguments that natural selection can work on multiple levels simultaneously (Bowles and 
Gintis 2013; Haidt 2013; D. S. Wilson 2015; D. S. Wilson and Wilson 2007; E. O. Wilson 
2013). 
Their critics argue that group selection or multilevel selection does not exist. 
Biological nature, they say, has made us selfish and only fear for reputation and cultural 
convention makes us sometimes appear as group-oriented (See, for example: Dawkins 
2016).  For me, this argument is not convincing: it is driven by a genetic determinism that 
almost tautologically argues that every kind of behavior we observe can be reduced to the 
underlying desire of our genes to be passed them on. We might think we protect our family 
out of love, but in fact it is only our subconscious fear that our genetic line might end. 
According to this theory, “true” human nature is inherently selfish and individualistic.  
Everything that appears as altruism or individual sacrifices for one’s community 
must be reducible to some selfish motivation (Haidt 2013, 197). As I will show in my 
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chapter on maladaptation, such a theory lacks any explanation of why communities like 
the Shakers have created a culture that severely impedes the chances for passing on the 
genes of its individual members. It also does not account for pathological altruism, where 
people care about others or their group to the point that they inflict psychological harm on 
themselves (Oakley et al. 2011). These phenomena become easier to explain and 
understand if we take the concept of multi-level selection seriously. Balancing the 
competing evolutionary pressures on the individual and group level is something 
specifically cultural, because it is the cultural environment that encourages and discourages 
individual or social behavior based on the emotional triggers we discussed in the previous 
chapters.  
The idea that every human act is in the end driven by a single factor, be it genes, 
materialism or utility maximization sounds a lot like Marxism and neoclassical economics 
with their tendency towards single-factor or monocausal explanations. For Dawkins and 
others these concepts are replaced with a “selfish gene” as the sole factor of true relevance. 
Religion, ideologies or any other emotionally- invested shared mental model is just a 
deception or superstructure when in fact there is a single explaining factor, the 
subconscious desire to pass on our individual genes. What Marx called the “Überbau” 
(superstructure) of culture that served the purpose of maintaining the ruling class’ grip on 
power, is now put in service of our true master, the selfishness of our genes. One reason 
why group selection fell out of favor was its lack of theoretical parsimony, but not a solid 
empirical refutation (D. S. Wilson and Wilson 2007, 333). Individual selection theories 
might be more elegant, but to put the elegance of a theory above its explanatory value is 
not sufficient grounds to throw out competing approaches. 
 
103 
 
It is important to keep in mind that group selection theory does not refute individual 
selection but sees it instead as an additional component. I think Jonathan Haidt gets closest 
to the truth when he claims that we can be both selfish or “groupish.” He developed the 
concept of the Hive Switch, a hypothesis that states that we are conditional hive creatures 
(Haidt 2013, chap. 10). What thie term means is that given the right conditions, we have 
the ability to “transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in 
something larger than ourselves” (Haidt 2013, 223). Drawing on Emile Durkheim, Haidt 
argues that homo sapiens is also homo duplex, a being that exists at the individual and the 
societal level (Haidt 2013, 225; Kluver, Frazier, and Haidt 2014). On the individual level, 
we have one set of “social sentiments” that we feel individually towards each other and 
that can be fitted into the concept of natural selection on the individual level. There is 
another level already described by Emile Durkheim and that deals with the emotional 
elevation we feel as part of a group. As Haidt argues, 
The second [sentiments] are those which bind me to the social entity 
as a whole; these manifest themselves primarily in the relationships of the 
society with other societies, and could be called “inter-social.” The first [set 
of emotions] leave[s] my autonomy and personality almost intact. No doubt 
they tie me to others, but without taking much of my independence from 
me. When I act under the influence of the second, by contrast, I am simply 
a part of a whole, whose actions I follow, and whose influence I am subject 
to (quoted in: Haidt 2013, 226).  
 
Groups, according to Durkheim and Haidt, are actually real phenomena and not just 
a “veneer” for our selfish genes. Haidt points towards an important element that helps to 
activate the hive switch and reminds us of the role of the sacred that we discussed:  
Durkheim believed that these collective emotions pull humans fully 
but temporarily into the higher of our two realms, the realm of the sacred, 
where the self disappears, and collective interests predominate. The realm 
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of the profane, in contrast, is the ordinary day-to-day world where we live 
most of our lives, concerned about wealth, health, and reputation, but 
nagged by the sense that there is, somewhere, something higher and nobler 
(Haidt 2013, 226). 
 
This is why people continue to revere the flag to demonstrate their belonging to the 
nation or refuse to eat pork to demonstrate their dedication to their faith or to refuse sex 
and other activities that are fundamental for evolution to work on the individual level. The 
intrinsic value that is invested in symbols and shared with others serve as a powerful glue 
for social cohesion, and these symbols can create incentive structures where it becomes 
more important for the individual to ensure the survival of this imagined and symbolic 
world than his or her own existence. 
The assumption that nature has programmed organisms mainly to survive as 
individuals is not universally applicable. Bees, ants, and termites exist as parts of hives 
where the structure does not allow for any individualism, but this turned out to be an 
evolutionary advantage, not a disadvantage. As Edward O. Wilson points out, in many 
respects it is them who rule the world (E. O. Wilson 1987). Would it really be such a 
surprise to assume that some of these evolutionary advantages have also been incorporated 
in human evolution? The search for parsimony in the history of human evolution seems to 
have blinded us to the fact that we are the only species that operates on multiple levels 
simultaneously. That is, we can be both individualistic and collectivistic depending on our 
hive switch. Once again, we have to view them as two sides of a coin and resist the urge to 
value one more than the other. 
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In the next chapter we will see that they indeed cannot be separated and influence 
each other on the cultural as well as the biological level. For this reason, we turn next to 
the phenomenon of Gene-Culture Coevolution.  
 
2.2.1.2 Gene-Culture Coevolution 
Wilson and Lumsden define the concept of gene-culture coevolution as the  
interaction in which culture is generated and shaped by biological 
imperatives while biological traits are simultaneously altered by genetic 
evolution in response to cultural innovation (Lumsden and Wilson 2005, 1).  
 
In other words, genes compel us to create culture; culture helps us to change the 
environment; and a changed environment causes alterations in our genes. Herbert Gintis 
argues that  
population biology traditionally takes the environment as 
exogenous. However, we know that life-forms affect their own environment 
and the environments they produce change the pattern of genetic evolution 
they undergo (Gintis 2003, 418).  
 
Human beings are not the only species that alter their environment. The same holds 
true for different kinds of animals from beavers to termites. But human beings differ 
because their alteration of the environment does not follow predictable lines: The building 
of mounds is genetically blueprinted onto the termites and they will behave the same way 
regardless of the environment. If the encountered conditions do not allow them to do so, 
there is the chance of evolutionary adaptation or extinction in that specific area. They are 
not built to brainstorm and reflect on their environment in order to reason towards a 
possible solution. Their behavior is almost entirely genetically predetermined.  
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Human beings are different as Bruce Wexler (2010, 11) points out: 
Humans alone shape and reshape the environments that shape their 
brains. This cultural evolution differs from Darwinian biological evolution 
in important ways. Firstly, it creates more rapid, incremental, and 
widespread population variability. Second, it uses different processes to 
store the information that influences the development of brain structure and 
function. In biological evolution, information is stored in the largely stable 
base sequence of DNA molecules. In cultural evolution, the information is 
stored in all aspect of cultural artifacts and practice” (Wexler, 2010, 11).  
 
Apart from the fact that culture itself influences the biological evolution of human 
beings, Wexler gives us an even more important aspect: in a certain way, culture is an 
evolutionary booster, because it allows the storage and transmission of information and 
behavior outside of DNA sequences.  
At the same time, if genes a “competing” in an evolutionary sense, so does culture. 
The physiological traits of individuals are the key to understand evolution as competition 
on the genetic level, but we should keep in mind that DNA is ultimately a form of 
information storage. If there are alternative forms of maintaining and disseminating 
information, they might complement the functioning of DNA. Cultural products--like 
stories, paintings, rituals, songs, dances, etc.--are all part of a cultural maintenance system 
designed to pass behavioral patterns from one generation to the next, even if the genome 
between people is not as similar as it would be among close relatives. These patterns can 
become so ingrained in a society that they almost act as second nature, a commonly 
accepted and instinctive way to interpret and interact with one’s environment. Religions 
especially have proven to be very efficient cultural storage and distribution systems, 
demonstrated by their extreme longevity as a form of collective organization. 
 
107 
 
The competition between cultural and genetic explanations for human behavior has 
led to discussions whether our life is predetermined by the sequences in our DNA. (For 
both sides of the discussion see, for example: Heine 2017; Plomin 2019.) But once again 
nature has created something so complex that monocausal explanations only reveal part of 
the picture. Even if we assume that DNA is destiny, the question remains what causes the 
activation or inactivity of genes? Contrary to the idea that research in genetics is making 
culture obsolete, the field of epigenetics increasingly illustrates how genes and culture 
interact. 18 Human DNA is not just a blueprint that gets executed by the body, but is an 
encoded number of possibilities with – depending on the environment – different 
probabilities of manifesting themselves. To put it differently, someone might have a more 
addictive personality than others, but this alone is no guarantee that this person will end up 
as a chain-smoking, gambling alcoholic. We still have a limited understanding of the 
precise mechanisms regarding epigenetics, but there is growing evidence that there m be 
something like an environment-dependent form of gene activation. This could potentially 
mean that the different environments human societies create can have a lasting impact on 
the activity of their genes. 
If we assume that sociability based on culture has a genetic subtext, it is not a far 
stretch to come up with an epigenetic answer as to why complex cultures have developed 
at such a late point in human development. An epigenetic explanation would be that with 
the need for more complex societies due to agriculture the parts of the genome that play a 
role in social behavior have been increasingly activated, enabling a more social 
 
18 Epigenetics is the study of heritable changes in gene expression (active versus inactive genes) that 
do not involve changes to the underlying DNA sequence.  
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environment than in the previous hunter gatherer societies. We have been carrying the 
potential for complex cultures with us probably from the start as homo sapiens 250,000 
years ago, but it took the right environmental factors to activate it. Edward Q. Wilson 
(2013, 195) gives us numerous examples that demonstrate that culture and genes can 
indeed influence each other. From the Westermarck effect (which states that people who 
live in close domestic proximity are less likely to develop sexual attraction towards each 
other), to his prime example, the tolerance for lactose: 
The textbook example of gene-culture coevolution occurring in 
recent millennia is the development of lactose tolerance in adults. In all 
previous human generations, the production of lactase, the enzyme that 
converts the sugar lactose into digestible sugars, was present only in infants. 
When children were weaned off their mother's milk, their bodies 
automatically shut down further production of lactase. When herding was 
developed 9,000 to 3,000 years ago, variously and independently in 
northern Europe and East Africa, mutations spread culturally that sustained 
lactase production into adult life, allowing the continued consumption of 
milk” (E. O. Wilson 2013, 198). The point here is that culture is not so much 
changing our genome, put it influences the so-called gene expression, the 
process by which the genotype gives rise to the phenotype or what we 
usually call observable traits in behavior and physiological appearance. It 
would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to detail the numerous ways 
of how these influences could manifest themselves, but science is getting 
closer to bridging the gap between social processes and biological processes 
(Watters 2006).  
 
Evolutionary changes on the individual-biological level are moving at a slower pace 
than changes on the social level, but they are influencing each other. The changes in life-
expectancy, body-height, and other biological traits was not driven by a social-Darwinist 
survival of the fittest, but by changes to the social system that enabled the improvement of 
diet and health-conditions, reduced child mortality and supported the creation of an 
environment that allowed the human body to make increased use of its potential. It is 
doubtful that a species driven by nothing but selfish motives would have been able to make 
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such progress on the social level. Again, this does not mean that selfish motives do not 
exist, but that one of the core roles of culture is the creation of social controls and self-
control for our selfish impulses. The concept of culture and the selfish inclinations of 
human beings should not be seen as competing, but as complementary aspects of human 
existence.  
 
2.2.1.3 A Quick Remark on Meme Theory  
The idea of cultural transmission of information has become more popular with the 
spreading of meme theory—i.e., the passing on of ideas via non-biological means. Just as 
individual traits can be passed on genetically, so too can ideas also be transmitted 
culturally. The subconscious desire to pass on one’s genes can coexist and be supported by 
the conscious desire to pass on one’s values and ideas. Meme theory is supposed to allow 
for a squeezing of culture into the box of individual level evolution, whereby individuals 
imitate behavior that seems to be beneficial in order to increase their chances for survival. 
This does not explain, however, why in some cases, the desire to pass on ideas can 
outperform the desire to pass on an individual’s DNA. When we think about religions that 
demand celibacy or other ways of banning the production of offspring, there must be 
another explanation for the resilience of belief systems that deliberately restrict the ability 
to pass on one’s genetic code.  
With the advances in information technology it has indeed become much easier to 
disseminate ideas and symbols, and it also reflects the apparent human desire to share these 
with others. This points out once again the fundamental sociability of our species. Although 
there is still some disagreement regarding the significance of memes (S. Blackmore 2000; 
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Boyd and Richerson 2000; N. Rose 1998), they nonetheless fit a pattern of human 
behavior—namely, the ongoing attempt to pass on experiences and emotional states. 
Whether it is cave paintings depicting a hunting scene or oral histories passed down 
through generations, they all contribute to the creation of emotional bonds through the 
elicitation of a shared emotional experiences. 
Unfortunately, even modern meme-theory attempts to operate without the inclusion 
of emotions, and is often presented as a shortcut where individual learning via trial-and-
error is replaced by imitation of others. This falls under the generic term of social learning, 
where “observers” imitate a “model” (K. Aoki 2001, 253). Outcome-oriented social 
learning, like using a stone to crack a nut, has been observed in human as well as non-
human animals. This example demonstrates how behavior can be adopted and imitated by 
others, regardless of any close genetic connection (Heyes 1993; Whiten et al. 2009). Yet 
once again human beings, and especially cognitively fully-developed human beings, are 
different from children and primates. One of the most popular examples of meme 
transmission are surnames, since they are “well-defined units that in many societies are 
transmitted from father to son, just like a gene on the Y chromosome” (K. Aoki 2001, 254). 
While this description is correct, it leaves out the deep cultural underpinnings that allow 
this transmission of information that include an emotional attachment to a given name by 
those who hold it.  
A lot of meme theory tries to fit culture into the same biological box as genes, 
thereby ignoring the potentially important role of emotions. The reason for this is that 
modern meme theory views it as part of an explanation for evolution that works on an 
individual level (Dawkins 2016, 352), thereby reducing cultural phenomena to people 
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imitating what they think works for others. So, for example if we see a group of people 
working together more effectively because they are a religious community, we also adopt 
religion to match their effectiveness. Unfortunately, this is another simplification of human 
behavior that ignores that even social learning is tied to the cultural surroundings. Whom 
and what I imitate is not simply defined by whether I see someone’s actions leading to a 
useful result. There is an entire cultural background that influences an individual’s 
readiness to support or deny the spreading of a meme. To use but one example, researchers 
investigated 180 cases of “genital shrinking” in eleven Sub-Saharan African countries (de-
Graft Aikins, Dzokoto, and Yevak 2015) between 1992 and 2014. “Genital Shrinking” 
most often refers to the perceived loss or shrinking of male genitalia (although there are a 
few cases that include women) as the consequence of a curse, sorcery or shaking hands 
with a stranger. Although there is no scientific evidence that any person was actually 
affected by any changes to their genitalia, newspapers and public officials investigated and, 
in some cases, investigated the supposed culprits and their sorcery. This is a classic 
example of how a meme spreads, but the only reason why it could do so was because the 
cultural environment provided the conditions for it to do so. Beliefs in sorcery, old 
traditions, widespread mistrust towards strangers are all ingredients that made the stories 
of strangers causing one’s genitalia to disappear not only credible, but worthy of being 
disseminated. 
Neither gene nor meme theory can convincingly demonstrate the obsolescence of 
culture and replace it with a simple evolutionary model. Culture has a much more complex 
history, and, as we will see, is much younger than we sometimes realize.  
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2.3 The Culture-Anthropology Connection 
2.3.1 Culture and Complex Culture   
Probably the most neglected fact about sophisticated cultural behavior is its 
inherent modernity. The species of homo sapiens emerged around some 250,000 years ago, 
but complex cultural behavior, like religious beliefs, centered around temple-like structures 
that were only manifested 10,000 years ago. For most of human existence, social life was 
centered around the extended family, which was able to provide the basic advantages of 
collective action and could be held together by instinctive family bonds and small cultural 
support systems that allowed the creation of hierarchies and social organization.  
In order to entangle the confusion around the concept of culture, I want to propose 
a conceptual separation between culture and complex culture. Indeed, I wish to deliberately 
distinguish between culture and complex culture. Culture as a means to tie groups together 
through marital or martial paintings on one’s body, coming of age rituals, circumcisions or 
other traditions has been part of the earliest societies we know of. In these instances, 
however, culture must be understood as a support system for family and kin ties. The 
cultural activity in such cases involvee enhancing and supporting affinal and consanguine 
relationships, but they were designed to support the family as the main unit and strengthen 
instinctively existing bonds between members of a family. The claim here is not that hunter 
gatherer societies had no culture at all, since there is substantial archeological evidence that 
these societies did create cultural artefacts like drawings or even early forms jewelry made 
out of bones. These small artefacts indicate that even before the emergence of complex 
societies there were attempts to signify hierarchies and social structures with the creation 
of paintings or ornaments for the body.  
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Complex culture, on the other hand, describes the emergence of a complex SMM 
that extends rules and moral obligations beyond one’s kin or tribe where culture even 
supersedes the relation based on family ties. The distinction between prehistorical and 
complex cultures is difficult, since we have limited ways to investigate the former for the 
lack of archeological findings. Pre-complex cultures did not keep records, so 
anthropologists and archeologists have had to piece together a picture of what human life 
was like at the time  using evidence that does support the dominant role of the family. To 
be clear, culture and complex culture spring from the same psychological faculties all 
human beings possess, so one is not more natural or authentic than the other. The difference 
is that complex cultures expand beyond kin and tie people together by way of shared 
beliefs. This in turn made more sophisticated symbols and rituals necessary, because the 
loyalty to one’s family is part of our initial psychological blueprint, while loyalty to an idea 
or a religion needs stronger cultural support systems. As I mentioned earlier, these support 
systems do also exist in non-complex cultures, but their role is significantly smaller.  
We see this in still existing tribal societies that have developed non kin-based 
structures in order to further collective action and social cohesion. For example, the so-
called “Big Men” among the societies of Melanesia and Polynesia are revered and high in 
status because they are trusted by their community in the distribution of resources. One 
becomes a Big Man not by birth, but by demonstrating a sense of selflessness and fairness 
in the handling of resources. Yet despite the existence of these structures, relationships 
within these societies are still primarily defined by tribe and family (Fukuyama 2012, KL 
199). It is nonetheless revealing that in communities inhabitants have developed structures 
that permit feelings of trust towards individuals to which they are not related. So culture is 
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not some deus ex machina, but an expansion of existing human inclinations for community 
from family based to non-family (or not exclusively family) based relationships.  
For smaller hunter-gatherer societies the need for complex culture in order to 
organize social life was limited; but with the emergence of settled agricultural societies the 
demand for efficient cooperation also increased and could no longer be provided by purely 
kinship-based cooperation. The defining point of a complex culture is its ability to create 
emotional bonds between larger and genetically less-related individuals and to integrate 
strangers into a network of trust. 
Many of the consequences of complex culture come to us naturally, so we forget 
the long evolutionary history that stands behind it. The degree to which modern societies 
are characterized by interactions of non-related individuals is astounding, and we tend to 
forget the important role of culture in it. Culture is sometimes described as preventing these 
interactions and one can immediately think of situations where Catholic parents would 
have reacted with shock if their offspring would wanted to marry a Protestant or perhaps 
even someone from a completely different faith. But such a view is shortsighted: 
historically, social approval was given to marriage within the tribe and not to outsiders. 
The advancement of religion artificially created a wider pool of socially-accepted 
relationships: For Greif and Tabellini,  
Tribal tendencies were gradually undone by the Church which, in 
addition to generalized morality, advanced a marriage dogma that 
undermined large kinship organizations. The Church discouraged practices 
that sustain kinship groups, such as adoption, polygamy, concubinage, 
marriages among distant kin, and marriages without the woman’s consent” 
(Greif and Tabellini 2010, 3). 
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A consequence of all of this was that “it also curtailed parents’ abilities to retain 
kinship ties through arranged marriages by prohibiting unions that the bride didn’t 
explicitly consent to” (Greif 2006a, 309). Far from limiting options of partnerships, the 
early Catholic Church actually expanded them. In similar fashion, Islam allowed new 
connections between people to be established, since religion was supposed to be more 
important than kin.  
Greif and others view the reasons for the emergence of such systems as firmly 
lodged in the economic interests of the major agents, but such a materialistic explanation 
leaves a great deal to be explored and answered. Without at least a significant number of 
people being true believers, it is doubtful that they would have given up the practice of 
favoring kin over strangers--something that has dominated human social interactions for 
thousands of years before complex cultures emerged. The argument that economic 
necessity drove social evolution is a popular one, but there are at least some indicators that 
show that social necessity drove economic evolution, and that it was desire for stable 
communities that stood at the center of the agricultural revolution.  
The oldest known temple structure in the world, Gobleki Tepe in contemporary 
Turkey dates back 11,000 years  Its history potentially indicates that the evolution of settled 
cultures may have preceded the agricultural revolution. In other words, there is a chance 
that we started to build temples before plowshares and didn’t need the former to maintain 
the latter, but that it was the other way around. Archeologists like Klaus Schmidt, Ian 
Hodder, and Jacques Cauvin even go so far to claim that 
it was the urge to worship that brought mankind together in the very 
first urban conglomerations. The need to build and maintain this temple 
[Gobleki Tepe], he [Schmidt] says, drove the builders to seek stable food 
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sources, like grains and animals that could be domesticated, and then to 
settle down to guard their new way of life” (Symmes 2010). 
 
Cauvin (Cauvin 2000) makes a strong argument for the hypothesis that the more 
sophisticated our ways of worship became, the more sophisticated our economies became.  
In his words, “The beginning of gods was the beginning of agriculture” (quoted in Symmes 
2010). The social psychologist Nicolas Humphrey suggests that technological progress did 
not so much stem from a process of problem-identification and problem solving but instead 
that 
many of mankind's most prized technological discoveries, from 
agriculture to chemistry, may have had their origin not in the deliberate 
application of practical intelligence but in the fortunate misapplication of 
social intelligence. Once Nature had set up men's minds the way she has, 
certain 'unintended' consequences followed - and we are in several ways the 
beneficiaries (Humphrey 1976, 312) 
 
Although I will not be able to solve this chicken-and-egg problem, there can be no 
doubt that the complexity of culture increased at least simultaneously with the complexity 
of economic life. It seems likely that cultural and economic life have been intertwined from 
the beginning, and that there is no clear causal hierarchy that puts one before the other. As 
the economic historian Gregory Clark points out, “the average person in the world of 1800 
was no better off than the average person of 100,000 BC” (G. Clark 2009, 1).19 Even 
Francis Fukuyama in his first volume of The Origins of Political Order does not come to 
a satisfactory answer as to what triggered the emergence of more complex societies. As he 
points out, societies that had the technological ability to produce food surpluses and thereby 
 
19 I do think that Clark is engaging in some hyperbole here and Fukuyama also doubts this claim: 
“The assertion of Gregory Clark that there were no increases in productivity from hunter-gatherer times to 
1800 is highly implausible” (Fukuyama 2012, 532). Nonetheless, the average living standard does not start 
to improve significantly before 1800. 
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maintain higher population densities sometimes simply didn’t do it, like the New Guinea 
highlanders and the Amazonian Indians (Fukuyama 2012, 84). The question Fukuyama 
tries to answer is what triggered state formation, and, for him, economic factors seem 
insufficient to answer this question. 
I would propose that in addition to the already discussed concept of gene-culture 
coevolution there was also something like economic-culture coevolution. Even if culture 
was the driving force behind economic progress, such progress in turn allowed much more 
powerful displays of culture.  That is, the more productive our species became, the easier 
it was to sustain parts of society exclusively dedicated to maintaining rituals and traditions. 
At this point, religious classes emerged that took a share of the limited resources without 
contributing to its production. From an economic viewpoint, such a class does not make a 
lot of sense, unless it provided and maintained a form of social cohesion through cultural 
activity (i.e. formulating sacred laws, displaying rituals, create written records,…) that 
allowed collective action to take place with lower transaction costs and higher efficiency. 
While Clark is right that the average person lived on the same economic level for most of 
human history, we must not forget that the absolute number of people was constantly 
increasing. Available estimates put the global population in 10,000 BC at roughly two to 
three million. In 1800, it is close to its first billion (around 900 million). Even though 
individual living standards only improved at a slow pace, better modes of production were 
still needed to maintain the same living standard for ever more individuals. This means that 
forms of cooperation needed to be developed that enabled increased productivity, despite 
the average living standard remaining mostly unaffected.  
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We must assume that all of this contributed to the emergence of the first 
civilizations rooted in complex cultures that appeared in Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus 
Valley around 3000 BC, which is at least 245,000 years after homo sapiens emerges as a 
distinct species. This means that by archeological-historical standards complex cultures 
that enabled the kind of collective action necessary to build the first civilizations were a 
rather modern phenomenon. If we were to reduce human history to one hour, complex 
culture would not be even a minute old. Yet within this minute humanity changed more 
than it did in the previous 59 minutes. What makes this even more astounding is that this 
change was almost exclusively a form of social evolution, compared to a much less 
significant biological evolution. The human ability for organizing large-scale collective 
action increased significantly within the last 10,000 years. An important element in these 
new forms organization was the growing complexity of shared mental models and belief 
systems, with religion as one of the first among them. 
While some forms of religious belief seem to be universal even in pre-historic times 
and, among proto-human groups like the Neanderthals (Wade 2009, 18–37), it was not 
until 3000 BC that they reached a complexity involving written rules, organized 
hierarchies, and entire religious classes holding ritual and social power. The expansion of 
cultural complexity also allowed wider and more secure cooperation than within a tribe. 
Culture turned out to be a way of redirecting our tribal instincts and create bonds replacing 
family relations with cultural ones. The problem with pre-historic societies wasn’t that 
there was no community, but there were significant limits on its possible scope. Around 
3000 BC these limitations were broken as human beings found ways to expand tribal 
loyalties beyond kin relations. Increasingly sophisticated ideological constructs about the 
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nature of good and evil allowed people to share a common identity around rituals of 
worship, something that was intensified by the spreading use of common activities like 
song and dance that also became more complex as culture progressed, including the first 
writing systems in Egypt and Mesopotamia – again around 3500 BC.  
As noted earlier, what makes humans different from other species is the ability to 
create shared mental models that allow an expansion of instinctive social behavior to 
conscious social behavior. Shared mental models do not have to be religions and be tied to 
some supernatural belief, but they tend to be religious in nature, meaning people believe 
in a model of the world they did not themselves originate and elaborate, but that was 
transmitted to them culturally. (What I mean by “religious in nature” is that these models 
are based on emotional ties and not a scientific-rational evaluation or a cost benefit 
analysis.)  
Culture is a human universal, driven by what Clifford Geertz calls an inherent 
human need to make sense of the world around us: “The drive to make sense out of 
experience, to give it form and order, is evidently as real and as pressing as the more 
familiar biological needs” (Geertz 1993, 140). While looking at the evolutionary 
underpinnings of culture is helpful, we should not make the mistake of interpreting culture 
solely as a means to an end, but as a psychological end in itself. Culture with its quality as 
a shared system of believing can be a source of meaning. Geertz makes his argument for 
the need of meaning from an anthropological viewpoint, but he gets support from 
psychology as well. In a comprehensive review of the literature investigating the 
relationship between happiness and religious belief, Rizvi and Hossain found that the vast 
majority of studies confirms that religion is an efficient technique “to attain purpose in life, 
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mental health, physical well-being and internal peace, which ultimately leads to happiness 
in life.” What is even more fascinating is that “that the claim has proven to be true by a 
vast majority of the surveys irrespective of religion, gender, nationality or race” (Rizvi and 
Hossain 2017, 1561). So, it matters not so much what one’s belief is, but simply the fact 
that one has something to believe in. This adds further evidence to the assumption that 
culture is not merely a mechanism to deal with the challenges of the environment and social 
life, but a psychological need.  
Our ability for abstract thought is continually on the lookout to give meaning to the 
world around us and fit it into familiar shapes. Just as we tend to see faces in clouds or rock 
formations, we also have a tendency to try to understand social phenomena as part of a 
larger whole. With supposed understanding, we also develop a desire to influence, which 
is why sacrificing to the gods is common in so many ancient religions, since the existence 
of gods should allow us to influence them. These basic behavioral traits are recognizable 
across all human societies; indeed, some form of religion and communal worship with an 
attached moral code has emerged in all known societies. Even in its earliest stages, human 
tribes have had some intuitive ordering principles that were shared universally across 
peoples known to ethnography and history, like dichotomous thinking, empathy, social 
groups, ethnocentrism, play, exchange, cooperation and reciprocity, aggression and 
violence (D. E. Brown 2004, 47). Yet despite these universals, societies have been arranged 
in many different ways around them. 
My argument is that human societies have been engaged in a trial-and-error process 
throughout history that have tried different ways of community organization. Unlike other 
species, universally observed behavior among humans can be the subject to culturally- 
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grounded exceptions. For example, exceptions to the incest taboo exists among high-status 
groups among the Incas and ancient Egyptians (E. O. Wilson 2013, 199). The cultural 
factor makes human behavior especially difficult to predict, given that it is driven by more 
than just a will to survive, includes a search for meaning, and attempts to understand and 
explain the world. Adding to further complexity, once groups of people agree on a model 
of the world, they do not just believe in it in a purely utilitarian way, ready to discard it if 
a better model comes along. Instead, they invest these models with intrinsic value, and 
holding them becomes part of their identity and emotional structure, meaning that the 
treatment of their model of the world by others triggers emotional reactions. This is 
reflected in the earliest artistic human activities that depict the symbolic representations of 
how people viewed the world. 
And this is exactly what the anthropological record shows. Societies differ along 
dimensions that are exceptional, given that it is the same species that constitutes these 
societies. Despite different forms of marriage (polyandry, polygyny, polygamy), different 
class structures (in some cultures the “warrior class” dominates, in other the “theological 
class,” i.e. the priests), different claims to the metaphysical (the worshipping of god or gods 
compared to forms of ancestor worship), there are multiple dimensions of social 
organization where human societies show something approaching universals. But while the 
dimensions (marriage, religion, etc.) might be universal, the way societies construct rules 
around them are not. Complex cultures emerged independently from Asia to South 
America as a reaction to the difficulties of organizing the social life of growing societies, 
demonstrating that the ability for complex culture is a human universal, but the actual shape 
and form is not. 
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No other species engages in contemplation about the environment and then tries to 
organize accordingly to its specific challenges. What makes matters even more 
complicated is that societies have tried different ways of organization, not all of them 
successful. So far, every study that has endeavored to explain the emergence of 
civilizations out of tribal structures has revealed fascinating insights as to the role of 
geography, climate, religion, available food sources and the like, but has discovered that 
“complex societies are simply not amenable to the simple kinds of structural, functional, 
or ‘culturological’ analysis” (Flannery 1972, 399). The attempts by historians, sociologists, 
economists, and political scientists have delivered a much better understanding about how 
complex societies function after they emerge, but studies in these disciplines still lack an 
compelling account of how they came into existence in the first place. (Good examples are: 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Ferguson 2011; Fukuyama 2012b; Mann 1986, 1993; 
Morris 2011). Indeed, the only thing we have no evidence for in the archeological and 
anthropological record is the autonomous, utility-maximizing individual or the equalitarian 
harmonious tribesmen. 
 
2.3.2 Social Evolution or Social Decay? 
Not everyone agrees that the growing complexity of human relationships has been 
beneficial for humanity. As we will explore in the next part, the increasing complexity of 
culture with its different layers of loyalty from which one can choose, was interpreted by 
its critics as throwing us off our more natural way of interacting with each other. The desire 
to identify the “natural” state of human affairs is a problematic one, especially regarding 
culture, because it creates exogenous factors out of endogenous ones. As I have tried to 
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demonstrate in the previous chapters, culture is part of the human condition and there are 
numerous arguments from a variety of fields that indicate our inclination towards cultural 
activity. As I have also tried to show, culture springs from biological faculties shared by 
all human beings that leads to different outcomes in the design of the shared mental models 
of a society. In other words, there is no guarantee that culture will always lead to the best 
possible outcome, since a large part of it experiments with different forms of social 
organizations. Thus, even though complex cultures only emerged in the more recently in 
human history, we should be careful not to view everything before as “natural” and 
everything after as “artificial.”  
This is an important element in the intellectual hostility towards the concept of 
culture from various sides. Some outright condemn modernity and materialist progress as 
being inauthentic and thereby an atypical way of life and argue that pre-modern humanity 
actually got it right. Another group of critics embraces material progress and sees the 
persistence of culture as a threat to the ability of the market as the place and human 
rationality as the means to a peaceful and prosperous future. So complex culture is under 
attack from at least two sides – those who claim it has alienated us from our true authentic 
selves and those who claim it is the biggest obstacle to a truly enlightened and rational 
society.  
Western philosophy and political thought since the Enlightenment have not only 
created modernity, but also developed the arguments to attack the modern world that 
emerged after the Neolithic revolution. Not everyone viewed the emergence of more 
complex cultures as a positive development, and the idea that the hunter-gatherer society 
is more akin to true human nature still has some appeal in academic circles. (For an 
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overview, see: Lanchester 2017). We have to engage these views because they are part of 
the reason why there is an inherent hostility towards complex culture in modern Western 
thought. One of the lasting consequences of the Enlightenment is the search for the 
supposedly lost authenticity of life. The striving for material well-being and the non-
metaphysical explanation of natural phenomena caused a widespread anxiety that life was 
losing all meaning. German Romanticism took a leading role in giving a voice to this 
anxiety, and the writings of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Marx and later Heidegger and 
Schmitt offer a blistering attack on the materialist life in the age of modernity. Even 
differences between left and right begin to become opaque regarding the issue of modernity 
vs authenticity. It is no coincidence that Martin Heidegger writes about the “homelessness” 
of modern man and invokes Marx in his support, saying: "Because Marx by experiencing 
estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is 
superior to that of other historical accounts" (Heidegger 2008, 243). 
The most influential and destructive ideologies of the 20th century were partly a 
consequence of the romantic longing for pre-modern and supposedly natural times (Stern 
1974), which is why we have to take these viewpoints extremely seriously. Meanwhile, 
although ultramodern in its use of modern technologies, fascism in both German and Italian 
variants were marked by a constant revolt against modernity (see, for example: Evola 
1995). The same holds true for Marxism in all its forms, an ideology that promised a merger 
of to the utopian times of pre-modern ways of living with the technological advantages of 
modernity. The supposedly secular ideologies on the left and right of the 20th century all 
claimed to have left religion behind, just to create their own gods, prophets, and 
eschatologies.  
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For all his supposed focus on economic matters, Karl Marx was recycling all 
manner of Christian teachings and values and combining them with German Romanticism 
(Löwy 1987; Muller 2003, 167)--something that his modern followers could not escape 
either. (For a history, see: Crossman 2001.) The right does not fare much better: both 
German and Italian fascism was driven by what Leo Strauss called “German Nihilism,” the 
idea of a heroic fight against the decadence of modernity, most strongly embodied by the 
philosophies of Martin Heidegger (S. B. Smith 2007, 108–30) and Carl Schmitt (Schmitt 
1976). Roger Scruton makes a strong case that the postmodern writers of the Frankfurt 
School after the Second World War continued the quasi-religious critique of modernity 
(Scruton 2016). Even modern ideologies as different as Islamism and environmentalism 
share this trait of German Romanticism that prefers an idealized past over a complex 
present.  
The romantic view of a peaceful and satisfying state of nature as formulated by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and a still existing anxiety with modernity allows a widespread 
belief that life before complex culture was more authentic and harmonious to live on. The 
idea that culturally complex societies as a consequence of agriculture were the harbinger 
of all that ails mankind even compelled a mind as sharp as Jared Diamond’s to write that  
forced to choose between limiting population or trying to increase 
food production, we chose the latter and ended up with starvation, warfare, 
and tyranny. Hunter-gatherers practiced the most successful and longest-
lasting lifestyle in human history (Diamond 1987).  
 
Diamond’s view, I would argue, reflects the idea that culture is somehow an 
alienation of our true selves that we fully possessed in pre-modern times. Diamond presents 
us with his own version of the anti-modern branch of 19th century European Romanticism. 
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(See Yack 1992, for an overview of this anti-modernity impulse). In this respect,he does 
not sound much different from Rousseau who wrote in 1755 that: 
so many writers have hastily concluded that man is naturally cruel, 
and requires civil institutions to make him more mild; whereas nothing is 
more gentle than man in his primitive state, as he is placed by nature at an 
equal distance from the stupidity of brutes, and the fatal ingenuity of 
civilized man. (Rousseau 1997, 166) 
 
Although not wishing to return to pre-modern times, philosophers like Philip 
Selznick also share this discomfort with modernity when he writes that "the fundamental 
truth is that modernity weakens culture and fragments experience" (Selznick 1992, 8). 
Similarly, Robert Bellah and his co-authors write that “modernity has had […] destructive 
consequences for social ecology [and] the destruction of the subtle ties that bind human 
beings to one another, leaving them frightened and alone” (Bellah et al. 2008, 284). 
Modern life is thus portrayed as a corrupting influence that breaks harmonious 
bonds among egalitarian societies and replaces them with imprisoning authority structures 
and other modes of oppression. The natural goodness of mankind, these critics argue, was 
diluted by incentives that made us greedy for individual property and cruel towards others. 
Underlying these arguments is the assumption that there is a “natural” culture represented 
by pre-modern societies and an “artificial” culture that is lived by settled societies and 
causes all kinds of anxieties among its members. Although Rousseau accepted that 
modernity can no longer be reversed and a return to the state of nature is impossible, he 
stands at the beginning of a debate that runs like a common thread through Western theories 
of society and human behavior since the Enlightenment. On the one hand, the 
Enlightenment searched for universal laws of human behavior and development, thereby 
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opening up the door for the scientific study of man as such. At the same time, however, 
this approach  demystified the meaning of life.  
There no longer was a struggle for the salvation of an eternal soul, but only this 
world and the universal laws by which it is governed. Humankind turned from the subject 
to the object of history.20 Among these supposedly universal laws was the application of 
Darwin’s concept of the survival of the fittest on human societies. In a world governed by 
such laws a clear hierarchy of perceived human races was propagated, and those on top 
were seen as the natural rulers of those below. In other words, human society became not 
only disenchanted, to use Max Weber’s phrase, it became instrumentalized by the iron laws 
of nature. Free will and a sense of moral responsibility became irrelevant in a world where 
human beings were only the object of external laws (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995, 2013, 2). 
From there it was only a small step towards “scientifically” justified racism. 
Rousseau’s defense of the natural state found renewed energy during the 1920s as 
part of a backlash against this scientism of social Darwinists and their claims about the 
racial superiority of Europeans. Pioneers of anthropology like Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, 
Alfred Kroeber, and Ruth Benedict tried to counter such views by developing theories that 
denied any biological component to human behavior. In a foreword to Margaret Mead’s 
Coming of Age in Samoa, Franz Boas declared that “much of what we ascribe to human 
nature is no more than a reaction to the restraints put upon us by our civilization” (quoted 
in: Wrangham and Peterson 1996, 102). Although these anthropologists viewed natural 
culture as crucially important, they also argued that modern society is characterized by a 
 
20 We will discuss this and the backlash in form of German Romanticism in a later chapter.  
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lack of harmony that existed or persisted in pre-modern societies. Therefore, they virtually 
excluded biological-evolutionary factors regarding human behavior, turning the human 
mind into a blank slate on which anything could be written (Fukuyama 2012, 50). 
While I am sympathetic with the significant role these early anthropologists gave 
to culture and social constructivism as a critical factor in organizing society and by the fact 
that they eschewed any kind of biological determinism, I see in this research and popular 
writings a tendency to place complex culture almost entirely outside of human nature and 
to describe it more as a historical accident from which we still suffer (hence Diamond’s 
claim that settled societies were the “worst mistake in human history”). This view, I 
believe, is mostly due to the politicized understanding they have of the emergence of 
culture and a certain uneasiness with it. The scholarly malaise comes from the problem that 
if we allow for an evolutionary approach towards culture, we could talk about more or less 
developed cultures--something that would go against “the enduring legacy of political 
correctness in the field of comparative anthropology” (Fukuyama 2012, 51). This political 
correctness was initially well-intended in order to avoid claims of racial or cultural 
superiority, but it eventually caused a trained incapacity to objectively compare and 
evaluate different cultures and their characteristics.  
Even Clifford Geertz sees anthropological studies as more a taxonomy of how 
different societies have tried to answer fundamental questions about life and human 
relationships without attaching a normative value to those answers (Geertz 1993, 30). The 
psychological anthropologist Richard Shweder struggles between cultural universals and 
cultural relativism (Shweder 1991) but in the end comes close to endorsing cultural 
relativism (Shweder 1990a). Again, much of this is well intended, but the desire to be 
 
129 
 
entirely non-normative caused the unintended consequence of a romanticized version of 
pre-modern and non-Western cultures.  
Steven Pinker describes such a romanticized view of the pre-historic past as “the 
belief that humans in their natural state are selfless, peaceable, and untroubled, and that 
blights such as greed, anxiety, and violence are the products of civilization” (Pinker 2002, 
6). In other words, the relativists are only so in defense of pre-modern cultures but make 
significant normative claims when it comes to criticizing complex cultures. Some aspects 
of life might have indeed been better in pre-historic times, like the fact that archeological 
findings indicate that human beings shrank by six inches after the adoption of agriculture, 
which could be an indicator for a better diet. But can one really claim that hunter-gatherer 
life was affluent and egalitarian (James C. Scott 2017; Suzman 2017) to the point that one 
should make a “case against civilization” (Lanchester 2017)?  
Despite being taller, the life expectancy in hunter-gatherer societies reached a 
maximum of 40 (Gurven and Kaplan 2007), and although that was not easily surpassed by 
agricultural societies until later, those who settled were soon able to reduce infant mortality 
below 20%, which was common among hunter-gatherers (Howell 2007).21 As Konner and 
Shostak point out, “data on morbidity and mortality, though not necessarily relevant to the 
question of abundance, certainly made use of the term ‘affluent’ seem inappropriate” 
(Konner and Shostak 1986, 73).  
 
21 This indicates that weak children died very early, leading to a selection process which can explain 
why those who survived turned out to be taller than their agricultural relatives who might have been on 
average physically weaker but had higher numbers.  
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Another significant element in the prevalence of low life expectancy was violence. 
Archeology, as well as more recent anthropological studies, give us solid cause to believe 
that the likelihood of violent death for an individual was significantly higher in pre-historic 
times than Diamond and others would allow us to suspect. The archeological record has 
excavated prehistoric skeletons that show a high rate of axe marks and embedded 
arrowheads, strongly suggesting that violent death was a far more regular occurrence than 
it is in culturally complex societies. Similar observations were made in contemporary 
isolated societies. The anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, who studied the Yanomamö 
indigenous people in the Amazon rainforest, concludes that about 44 percent of men older 
than 25 actively participated in killing someone, that one-third of deaths were the result of 
violence, and that more than two-thirds of men over 40 had lost at least one close relative 
to violence (Chagnon 1988). As Steven Pinker has pointed out, if we apply the level of 
violence of a prehistoric tribal society onto the wars of the 20th century, the death toll would 
have been two billion, not 100 million (Pinker 2007). For the larger part of its history, 
human existence was dominated by continued prevalence of violence. Margaret Mead 
herself wrote that “most primitive tribes feel that if you run across one of these subhumans 
from a rival group in the forest, the most appropriate thing to do is bludgeon him to death” 
(quoted in: H. Bloom 1997, 74). Even the Jared Diamond concedes that “to venture out of 
one’s territory to meet [other] humans, even if they only lived a few miles away, was 
equivalent to suicide” (Diamond 2007, 229). 
In addition to violence, the often-assumed egalitarianism in hunter-gatherer 
societies does not holding up to the findings of more recent studies. Good hunters kept 
more of the acquired food for themselves and their families instead of sharing it with others 
 
131 
 
(Gurven 2004). Also, good hunters received higher social status that increased their 
chances of reproduction (E. A. Smith 2004), causing an actual level of inequality that, 
although moderate, was far from nonexistent (E. A. Smith et al. 2010). 
Even the claim that in hunter-gatherer societies women were supposedly better off 
is only defensible if one ignores that women were one of the resources over which the male 
members of tribes were fighting. From Friedrich Engels (Engels 2010) to more 
contemporary contributions (see, for example: Ryan and Jethá 2010), modernity has been 
accused of breaking up the more harmonious relationships between the genders--an 
argument that became an important aspect of postmodern thought at least since the critical 
treatment of it by Michel Foucault (Foucault 1990). The interesting thing is that complex 
cultures indeed transformed the relationship between women and men, but I would argue 
in the opposite direction from what the critics of modernity presume. Even if Engels and 
others are right and the concept of the monogamous lifelong marriage is just another 
invention of modernity that causes us anxiety, we should look at the available alternatives. 
According to the anthropological record, 85% of known societies allowed men to have at 
least occasionally more than one wife, while only 15% practiced monogamy and less than 
one percent practicing polyandry. Yet somehow monogamous societies outperformed the 
alternatives due to the evolutionary advantages that monogamy brings for both sexes. 
Normative monogamy is actually more of an equalizing force between men and women 
than the competing models: 
The unusual package of norms and institutions that constitute 
modern monogamous marriage systems spread across Europe, and then the 
globe, because of the package's impact on the competitive success of the 
polities, nations and religions that adopted this cultural package. Reducing 
the pool of unmarried men and levelling the reproductive playing field 
would have decreased crime, which would have spurred commerce, travel 
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and the free flow of ideas and innovations” (Henrich, Boyd, and Richerson 
2012, 657).  
 
Before the spread of monogamy, women had been the spoils of war in tribal 
societies (Wade 2014, 149) and the first modern societies, like ancient China and ancient 
Greece (Gottschall 2004).22 Rape and other forms of violence always went hand-in-hand, 
and were considered a particular degrading forms of inflicting pain on one’s adversaries. 
We see similar behavior in chimpanzees that integrate captured females into their group 
after raids against other groups of chimpanzees (Fukuyama 2012, 31). The biological 
anthropologist Richard Wrangham took a close look at the literature about supposedly 
equalitarian and rape-free societies and concluded that the evidence actually pointed in the 
other direction—i.e. male sexual violence against women occured more regularly in pre-
modern societies and was most definitely not an invention of settled agricultural societies 
(Wrangham and Peterson 1996). On the contrary, while we are still far from true gender-
equality in most societies, it is doubtful whether the dissolution of monogamy will be the 
way to get us there. If the past truly is any indicator, the “natural” state of society would 
be one where powerful men have access to multiple women, who then themselves have to 
compete among each other. Once marital fidelity was incorporated into the value-core of 
complex cultures, however,this became one more element to improve their evolutionary 
fitness. To reiterate that point: this cultural development weakened the ability of the 
individually strongest males to pass on their DNA by producing offspring with multiple 
women. But monogamy reduced the intra-group competition for partners and therefore 
 
22 Consider this line from Homer’s Iliad “So don’t anyone hurry to return homeward until after he 
has lain down alongside a wife of some Trojan” (Homer, 1999, Book 2, 354-55). In fact, the entire story of 
Homer is full of stories brutalizing women (see: B. S. Strauss 2007). 
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freed resources for other things, while also  strengthening the care for one’s offspring, since 
both males and females had increased certainty about fatherhood. These stronger family 
bonds and higher survival rates contributed to the prevalence of more close-knit societies 
compared to those based on looser relationships, even though their members might have 
possessed stronger physical characteristics on the individual level.  
Modernity most certainly has not ushered in the kind of Utopia some of its 
proponents hoped for, but to claim that pre-modern times were better for human flourishing 
than modern times is increasingly indefensible. Human beings did not suddenly leave the 
path of some“natural” progression when they settled down in more permanent societal 
structures; but they were acting on something that is just as much part of our human nature 
as the behavior of the hunter gatherer – the creation and maintenance of communities. 
Unfortunately, there are instances where culture can indeed diminish the sustainability of 
a community, and it is these cases to which we will turn next.  
 
2.3.3 Culture and Maladaptation 
How communities organize themselves can follow widely different paths. An 
Amish society has a different conception of the sacred compared to a gang like MS-13. So 
too, a commercial-capitalist society has a different imagination of what is valuable than an 
aristocratic warrior-society. We know that there are societies that put the individual above 
the community and there are societies that do the opposite (Greif 1994; Greif and Tabellini 
2010). This is what so fundamentally differentiates human beings from other animals.  If 
you expose termites to an uninhabited island, they will do what termites do--build a hive 
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and multiply. Like any other non-human animal, they will follow their instincts, which 
makes their behavior largely predictable. 
Human cpacities, however, go beyond instincts and include the use of abstract 
thought and the creation of ideas about how the world is causally connected. Out of this 
perceived causality came the desire to influence or control natural phenomena. Satisfying 
a deity to ensure a rich harvest is a completely different act from genetically engineering a 
more resilient type of grain. Nonetheless, both behaviors spring from an instinctive human 
desire to understand and possibly influence the world. This example demonstrates how the 
desire to explain often overlapped with the desire for community. Praying to the gods might 
have a limited effect on the harvest, but it does bind the people together through rituals like 
engage in prayer. The bonds that are being created in turn facilitate cooperation and at some 
point possibly have a positive effect on agriculture due to more efficient use of labor. The 
geneticist in his laboratory has a much more direct influence on the potential agricultural 
output, but she no longer enjoys the communal aspect of collective worshipping. She might 
satisfy this need by attending Sunday church or joining a bowling league, but being part of 
a community in the modern era involves much more of a conscious act than it did in the 
past.  
I think we have to reject the idea that community in pre-modern times was more 
“authentic,” since community was baked into the very fabric of every aspect of social and 
economic life. The possibility of living as a recluse previously was not readily available to 
the extent it is today. Theoretically, through a combination of delivery services and home-
office opportunities a person can lead a life without physical interaction with others. 
Community in the past was not just authentic, but a fixture and necessity of life, and its 
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romanticizing does not help in finding ways to reconcile modernity and the desire for 
community. 
The underlying culture to which people are loyal and that serve as a basis for their 
community has a huge impact on the development of their societies and can cause empires 
or extinction (Diamond 2011). Culture is crucial in the formation of communities, but it 
does not make communities immune or perfectly adaptable to external change. As Robert 
Edgerton’s concept of maladaptation has demonstrated, culture can build communities, but 
it can also be the cause of their demise (Edgerton 1999).  
Sam Harris gives us an interesting example based on a field study conducted by the 
anthropologist Ruth Benedict, who was describing the life and culture of the Dobu 
Islanders. For these islanders the most important idea was that ultimately life is governed 
by magic spells that are cast upon one by other members of the tribe. Whenever something 
bad befell a Dobuan, it was believed tathe or she had fallen prey to a spell, while every 
positive event like a good harvest could only be the result of a successful spell that took 
away from other members of the tribe and added to the resources of the spell casting 
Dobuan. As Harris points out, a good harvest was seen as “a confession of theft” (Harris 
2011, 61). Benedict herself writes that all “existence is cut-throat competition, and every 
advantage is gained at the expense of a defeated rival”  (Benedict 2005, 141). Life among 
the Dobuans was a zero-sum game where even cooperation among family members within 
the tribe was viewed with suspicion for “the power of sorcery was believed to grow in 
proportion to one’s intimacy with the intended victim. This belief gave every Dobuan an 
incandescent mistrust of all others, which burnt brightest on those closest” (Harris 2011, 
61). The belief system of the Dobuans was so persuasive that it was even capable of 
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overriding the assumed natural instinct of loyalty and trust to one’s closest kin. If we 
perceive culture as the ability to extend trust beyond immediate kin, this case study 
demonstrates that culture might as well have the opposite effect.  
A similar case relates to the community of the Shakers in 19th century North 
America, a Christian community that viewed celibacy and the foregoing of procreation as 
a central tenet of their faith. Here culture did not extend ties of trust beyond the family, it 
tried to replace the (biological) family altogether. Although economically highly 
successful—at least until after the Civil War-- and outright progressive (women and men 
were equals in many respects), the emphasis on celibacy lead to the end of the Shaker 
community. By 2017, there are only two members left (Sharp 2017). From an evolutionary 
perspective, both the Dobuan and the Shaker culture created strong belief systems that 
made community life and the community itself increasingly unsustainable.  
Jared Diamond also provides an example of a case where cultural beliefs 
counteracted the sustainability of a community. Dealing with the disappearance of the 
Norwegian Norse from Greenland in the 15th century, a peculiar finding from archeological 
research revealed a very limited consumption of fish by the Norse, despite the abundance 
of this food source and the lack of alternatives. Diamond developed a theory how the main 
figure of the Norse settlement, Erik the Red, may have contracted food poisoning from 
eating fish and upon his recovery started to tell everybody “how bad fish is for you, and 
how we Greenlanders are a clean, proud people who would never stoop to the unhealthy 
habits of those desperate grubby ichthyophagous Icelanders and Norwegians” (Diamond 
2011, 230). Assuming that Diamond’s theory is correct, the deciding factors leading to the 
disappearance of the Norsemen was almost entirely due to cultural maladaptation.  
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Although hardly the first person to suffer from food poisoning, having the group leader 
suffer from it turned a problem of individual health into an issue for the entire community. 
Any other Norseman might have refused the consumption of fish after such an experience. 
Only Erik the Red however had the authority to transcend his individual experience and 
transform it into a group experience and taboo. The nature of this group experience, 
however, was quite coincidental. Erik could also have interpreted his poisoning as a 
punishment by the gods and turned his people into a more devout people – albeit one that 
was still permitted to eat fish and thereby survive on Greenland. Or his people could have 
refused his interpretation. Erik however played to his people’s identity by claiming that 
eating fish was primarily a question of who the Greenlandic Norse were, which is better 
than those fish eating “grubby ichthyophagous Icelanders and Norwegians.” 
It is the cultural factor that allowed Erik the Red to discard a crucial food source 
during the little ice age when fertile land became less accessible. What additionally 
highlighted the role of culture was the fact that the Norsemen were not the only people on 
Greenland at the time. The Inuit shared the same environment, but since their leaders 
seemed to have avoided food poisoning by bad fish, they had no artificial restrictions when 
ecological changes forced them to switch their diet. Not surprisingly, the Inuit are still the 
demographically dominant group on Greenland. 
These examples demonstrate that shared mental models can be “invested with 
considerable emotional meaning and therefore are believed for intrinsic reasons and not 
simply because they are accurate or useful” (Fukuyama 2012, 443). To elaborate on an 
earlier point, anthropologist Robert B. Edgerton, in coining the term “maladaptation,” used 
it to describe the phenomenon of cultural rituals being adopted and maintained despite 
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being “inefficient at coping with environmental demands or harmful to people’s health or 
well-being (Edgerton 1992, 15). Going strongly against the concept of cultural relativism, 
Edgerton makes a convincing argument that not every aspect of culture is a perfect form 
of adaptation that can only be understood through the lenses of those who hold it, but that 
there are ways to evaluate the actual level of adaptability or maladaptability of certain 
cultures. (For an overview see: Edgerton 1999.) The best way to describe this view is 
probably as a cultural consequentialist, which tries to isolate the ability of cultures to adapt 
to a changing environment. Cultural relativism remains an issue regarding the moral 
qualities of cultural values, but in the case of cultural consequentialism there is no need for 
relativism, only for precision. It is no moral judgment to point out that the culture of the 
Shakers lost the adaptive advantage it might have once had, just as it is fair to say that 
effective collective action will be hard to achieve by the Dobuans. In many cases, the 
cultural influence on a society’s development is more difficult to isolate than in these 
examples, so we have to be careful about using culture as “one-size-fits all” explanation 
for social change, regardless of its adaptive qualities. 
While there can be no doubt that Western culture has proven to be very adaptive 
over the last five centuries, there is no guarantee that this will be an eternal condition of 
the world. What was once adaptive might at some point turn maladaptive: 
As Robert Bellah and his colleagues have shown in their book 
Habits of the Heart, our cultural commitment to individualism rather than 
collective achievement has enhanced our self-reliance, a virtue that was 
probably adaptive earlier in American History but that has also brought 
about such a loss of community that the consequences now threaten our 
common well-being” (Edgerton 1992, 65). 
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Bellah, of course, is not the only observer who laments the overarching role of 
individualism that some authors view no longer as a safeguard ,but a major threat to a 
liberal society.  (See, for example: Deneen 2018.) Deneen and others argue that modern 
individualism has actually decreased and not increased self-reliance.  
The existence and changing nature of culture makes human behavior particularly 
difficult to predict, and while culture as such is a universal characteristic of all societies, 
its peculiarities can differ significantly regarding culture-specific taboos, symbols, and 
figures of authority. These in turn influence the scope of a cultural community – for 
example, is it small and tribal or designed to potentially encompass the entire human race? 
These peculiarities matter, because they influence the ability of humans to work in teams 
and facilitate cooperation between and among groups. 
It is not the sociability alone that distinguishes human beings from other animals; 
rather that the scope of that sociability is not predetermined. It depends on a complex 
interplay of the environment, ecological factors, and often sheer accident that gives rise to 
cultural creations that in turn enable increased levels of collective action. This complexity 
is absent in the organization of social life among non-human species.  
Diamond’s example about Greenland makes the case in point about how animals 
and humans react engage differently with their environment. The Norwegians were fully 
aware of the nutritious benefits of fish, and there is no evidence that the Norwegian settlers 
had “forgotten” how to fish, but the mental model provided by Erik the Red prevented them 
from making use of a readily available food source. A Norwegian animal species would 
have searched for the area that most resembles its original homeland, and if such an area 
could be found it would follow its instincts in the same fashion as it would do in its previous 
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habitat. In fact, such an animal does exist: The reindeer. And it exists in Greenland and 
Norway with no significant differences in behavior. 
Could we make the same claim about human beings? Imagine that we exposed 
groups of people on each island. Immediately we would have to gather significantly more 
information about each member of that group when trying to predict the possible social 
structure.23 Are the people religious? And if yes, what creed are they holding? Are they 
educated? What was their upbringing before being exposed on the island? Even if these 
factors and many others were the same, there is still a significant chance that human life 
on each of these islands would develop quite differently. Over time, we would see certain 
universal traits developing among our island societies – hierarchies, symbolic structures, 
forms of social order would all emerge. This is something that can be predicted with some 
certainty, but it is the details of these universals that are also crucial. How effective is the 
cultural system to enable large scale collective action? Will the societies remain tribal in 
nature or become more complex and structured over time?  
The emergence of large-scale societies made it necessary to find ways to apply our 
pre-installed social software to be updated beyond the level of smaller groups. Culture, I 
argue, fulfills precisely this role. Culture enables societies to apply cooperative social 
behavior beyond kin and tribe. It is an artificial amplifier of our existing social capabilities. 
We feel natural affection towards our children, parents, and close family members, but in 
order to extend this affection to people who are initially strangers to us , it needs the help 
of artificial creations. These creations are the core of what I define as culture: a shared 
 
23 Here an important caveat for my thought experiment is warranted: Under the condition of having 
all the information about each individual including biological factors like brain types as well as the full array 
of social and psychological factors a reliable prediction might be possible. 
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belief system that rests on rules, symbols, rituals, and traditions that define a group as a 
community even though its members might be barely blood-related.  
If culture is as central to community as I claim, and community a basic 
psychological need of the individual, the vision of a purely individualistic and rational 
society is entirely utopian. The Enlightenment, which was the birthplace of the idea of a 
society based on reason, played a great and unintended trick on all of us. It mocked the 
way in which people clung to their religions or other beliefs as pitiful without realizing that 
even the Enlightenment philosophers were far from being ice-cold calculating automatons. 
They just switched their source of recognition from religion to reason but maintained the 
same need for community and belonging. The “Republic of Letters,” the emergence of 
philosophic salons, and the widespread exchange of letters and ideas were not driven by 
rationality, but by a religious fervor in the name of the Enlightenment (Gay 1966, 1969; 
McMahon 2002; Gay 1966, 1969; McMahon 2002). To be clear: The Enlightenment values 
are by far preferable to those of the Middle Ages, but the Enlightenment did not overcome 
culture; it created a new one. It is no coincidence that the Enlightenment also brought forth 
the world’s first ideologies and secular religions. Worshipping was shifted from the 
religious to the secular, but it remained central to the human experience of community.  
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CHAPTER III: SCIENCE, RATIONALITY, AND THE TURN AGAINST CULTURE 
The main goal of the previous chapters to firmly establish the psychological, 
evolutionary, and anthropological roots of culture in order to demonstrate that we are not 
dealing with an exogenous phenomenon but with something that is deeply embedded in 
human nature. I hope that the first part has established a way to understand culture as an 
emotional phenomenon that influences human behavior. It is an essentialist approach 
towards the idea of human nature, resting on the claim that as a species it is the ability to 
create ideas of how the world works and invest them with emotional value. These 
emotional commitments are fundamental to the creation of stable social organizations that 
coordinate collective action and social interaction. Despite the possible variation in the 
nature of these ideas, human social life is most likely not feasible without them. There is 
growing scientific evidence that without the ability to experience emotions, a human 
being’s capacity for social interaction diminishes considerably. Studies involving 
individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex have shown that while the ability to 
utilitarian behavior increases, social and moral behavior necessary for sustained social and 
cooperative behavior diminishes (S. W. Anderson et al. 1999; Bechara et al. 1994; Koenigs 
et al. 2007).  
What these studies do not reveal, however, is how the relationship between triggers 
and emotional reaction is supposed to be designed – they only tell us that if human beings 
are incapable of feeling emotions, social life becomes increasingly difficult. What these 
neurological studies have shown is that emotional connections are necessary even if actions 
can be comprehended rationally. Individuals with a damaged prefrontal cortex could not 
function properly in society because what comes to many of us naturally and instinctively 
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needs a cognitive effort by those who have a limited ability to feel emotions. It is based on 
these assumptions that I will develop my further discussion of culture and explain where I 
take issue with the contemporary role of culture in political science. In a nutshell, I hope 
to demonstrate that the Enlightenment was not the switch from emotion to reason and 
rationality, but that the Enlightenment filled the concepts of reason and rationality with 
emotional value, turning them into the sacred cores of a unique (although not historically 
isolated) culture in its own right. I am not the first one to remark that a dominant tradition 
within Western philosophy has always been distrustful of emotions and attempted to 
replace it with a social order based on reason and rationality (Solomon 1993), but so far no 
one has connected this question to the larger issue of culture. It often eludes us how 
interwoven culture is into our daily lives and how strong our ability to ignore or deny our 
intuitive emotional biases has become. The West has developed a culture of rationality, but 
completely forgotten that it is just that: a culture of rationality that still has all the emotional 
qualities we can also find in cultures that are built on religious or other foundations. 
Most people in the Western world believe in atoms, evolution, and the laws of 
physics even though only a minority of the population has the training and intellect to 
understand the complex theoretical and mathematical underpinnings of these and other 
fields. Yet an explanation of an observed phenomena that involves something like natural 
laws will be inherently more credible than the invocation of a supernatural force. The 
Enlightenment created a culture that was putting a premium on science and scientific 
methods, leading to the emergence of new mental maps to interact with the world at large 
(Golinski 1999; P. Jones 2008), a map that gradually trickled down to all layers of society 
(see, for example: J. Rose 2010).  
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Discussions about how such political dominance came about tend to focus on the 
Western part of the term Western Culture (Ferguson 2006, 2011a; Morris 2011), when the 
decisive part should be Culture. As I will try to demonstrate in the following chapter, 
culture is accessible to every human being, which is why we had civilizations and high-
cultures as well as declining civilizations and cultures in many different geographical areas. 
Roman and Chinese culture did not create civilizations because of their geographical 
location or the phenotypes of the local populations, but because of the ideas and subsequent 
cultures that emerged in these areas.24 History is full of examples where cultural ideas 
originate in one place and spread across tribes and ethnicities: Christianity, Islam, 
Communism, and other visions of human society attached themselves to the most diverse 
people regardless of their biological or geographical background. In fact, in cases like 
Turkey or Japan we have interesting examples of how states deliberately tried to adapt new 
cultures to replace existing ones (Esenbel 1994; Irokawa 1988; Jansen 2002).  
I am not disputing that some cultural beliefs can be more grounded in objective 
reality than others, and there can be no doubt that the idea of gravity is more convincing 
than the assumption that some conscious entity is juggling the planets like a set of balls. 
That being said, however, the foundation of every scientific endeavor is the belief that the 
world is accessible to rational inquiry and that there is an underlying systemic that governs 
the universe. Whether or not this is ultimately true remains to be seen, and the more we 
learn of the physical universe the more complicated it seems to be (Ballentine and Jarrett 
 
24 Some authors like Jared Diamond argue that geography is the “ultimate cause” of civilization 
(Diamond 2011, 2017), but I do not think that these arguments are fully convincing. As the historian Victor 
Davis Hanson points out in his writing about the Spanish conquest of Mexico, geography and resource-wise 
the Aztecs had everything necessary to build a sophisticated arms industry – what they lacked were the 
necessary ideas (Hanson 2001, 196). 
 
146 
 
1987). Contrary to some contemporary champions of the Enlightenment (Harari 2014; 
Pinker 2018), the Enlightenment was neither the end of the passions nor the end of 
emotionally-held belief systems, but a transformation of said things. Authors like Pinker 
describe the story of the Enlightenment as a conflict between rational reason and its 
enemies, completely ignoring that the Enlightenment itself produced and was part of the 
backlash against it. The so-called counter Enlightenment realized “the irrationalist core of 
all knowledge - that reason itself presupposes a faith or belief in reason” (S. B. Smith 2016, 
KL 5545). All the atrocities of the 20th century like fascism and communism in their various 
forms were not simply a revolt against the Enlightenment but perceived themselves to be 
an alternative and an improvement (Furet 1999; Griffin 2010). I will elaborate on this point 
later in the chapter, but let it suffice for now that the phenomenon of culture as an essential 
part of human nature has not yet disappeared.  
As will hopefully become clear in the following pages, I am not taking issue with 
the concept of reason or some of the assumptions of rationality, but instead the idea that a 
“society of pure reason” can exist without any emotional commitment. This has important 
political implications, because even the most reasonable political system will have trouble 
surviving if the people it is supposed to organize have no emotional attachment to it. The 
Weimar Republic looms large as an historical example how an otherwise well intended and 
modern political system was brought down by a lack of emotional commitment and 
identification with it: “Important segments of the German army, civil service, and 
aristocratic classes rejected the Weimar Republic not because it was ineffective, but 
because its symbolism and basic values negated their own” (Lipset 1959, 87). In this sense, 
the Weimar Republic did not fail politically, but culturally.  
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The goal of my argument is to revive the importance of culture as a form of 
collectively and individually held passion that influences human interaction and institution 
building. The Enlightenment plays a key role here, because philosophers like Hobbes and 
Rousseau were fully aware of the role of the passions in human life, but viewed them as a 
profound danger and the cause of much human suffering. I take no issue with this view, 
but I claim that they overlook that the passions were also necessary for functioning societal 
life and that individuals cannot interact solely on the basis of reason. Before I will begin 
my genealogy of how culture fell out of fashion in Western political philosophy, I will 
provide a cohesive definition of culture that, I hope, will help to avoid confusion in the 
following chapters. 
 
3.1 What Culture Is – And What It Is Not  
The often-arbitrary distinction as to what constitutes a culture and what does not 
has at times made discussions about matters of culture impossible. In order to allow us to 
continue with a concise discussion about culture, I need to introduce a modified definition 
of the concept of ethnicity. The term ethnicity can cover cultural phenomena like national 
identity or affiliation with a particular religious group as well as genetic and biological 
factors like appearance and skin color in the form of an ethno-racial interpretation of 
ethnicity. For the argument I am making I will distinguish between culture and ethnicity, 
the former being a collectively held social construct with intrinsic value, the latter being 
defined as biological, genetic, or geographic factors that are beyond an individual’s control. 
Culture in my definition is inherently linked to the possibility of choice. As I laid out in 
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Part one, culture is grounded in human biology, but the shape and form of cultural activity 
is subject to human choice and creativity. 
For example, I distinguish between an ethnic Austrian and a cultural Austrian in 
the sense that one can be born in Austria but not need to have any kind of emotional 
attachment to one’s Austrian identity and the sentiment of a common bond between all 
Austrians stemming from  history, tradition, and custom. This distinction is crucial, 
because the evolutionary purpose of culture is to tie individuals together into groups so that 
they can act collectively, create a common identity, and generate social capital. Ethnicity 
– although it can of course overlap with culture – does no such thing. Sharing eye shape or 
skin color does not inherently enable better cooperation. It is a classification of groups of 
people by characteristics that can, but do not need to have any emotional meaning to those 
who are being classified.  
In fact, it is absolutely possible that an ethnic Austrian – somebody who was born 
in the country and holds an Austrian passport – is less a cultural Austrian than a recent 
immigrant who for whatever reason fully internalizes an Austrian identity and even 
replaces his ethnical history (the history of his original country) with his newly-chosen 
history (the history of Austria). Culture in its proper meaning always includes the element 
of choice and one can join and leave cultures to an extent that one cannot join and leave 
ethnicities.25 This process of course is very close to the concept of assimilation, where 
people switch one primary identity for another. This happens continuously, and I 
distinguish between one’s cultural and ethnic history purposefully. One can be born in 
 
25 I will address cases of cultures that are centered on ethnic characteristics a little later in this 
chapter. In these cases, individuals cannot join or leave as easily.  
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Sweden, emigrate to the United States and develop more pride and identification with the 
Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution than the Swedish Crown. One might 
forever remain ethnically Swedish, but it is absolutely possible to become culturally 
American.  
The misattribution and conflation of culture and ethnicity has been the cause for 
much grief in human history, because people became boxed into cultures connected to their 
ethnicity and are deprived of the opportunity to choose. This does not mean that there are 
not often strong correlations between ethnicities and cultures, but they are not causal in 
their relationship. My gender or skin color does not determine my political orientation – it 
can have an influence on it, but this is most likely again more a cultural phenomenon than 
anything else. The contemporary assumption, for example, that certain ethnic groups like 
African-Americans or Hispanic Americans will always and forever be politically left 
leaning (see, for example: Judis and Teixeira 2004) is a profound conflation of culture and 
ethnicity, for it presumes that there is only one set of values and ideas that can appeal to 
people of a specific ethnicity and skin color. In other areas we already see trends that 
reinforce the idea of culture as being subject to choice: a growing number of members of 
the gay community lean conservative (Huneke 2019), and some scholars have coined the 
term “homonationalism” to discuss, among other things, the idea of a culturally nationalist 
yet by sexual orientation gay community (Puar 2013; Schotten 2016).  
The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci is best known for his development of the 
concept of cultural hegemony, describing how a ruling class frames its values as normal 
and universal values in order to benefit their own social status (Gramsci 1971, pt. I). The 
kind of agency that Gramsci gives to the ruling class is most likely exaggerated and there 
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is no great cabal of capitalists that organizes the dominant culture (for a somewhat different 
critique along similar lines see: Yanarella 1993).26 Nonetheless Gramsci is correct that 
there are hegemonic structures in the realm of culture, and if there is, for example, a 
dominant cultural interpretation of what it means to be “a man” or “a woman” or a “person 
of color” it is difficult for an individual to be completely indifferent to concepts that merge 
the question of culture and ethnicity. That being said, it does not change the fact that a one 
can change one’s cultural identity even if it should come at great emotional cost. The 
arguments I will make in the following pages nowhere claim that cultural change is easy, 
but that it is possible.  
One’s cultural identity depends on the intensity of feeling towards the defining 
characteristics of a culture. There is a distinction between my individual cultural identity 
and whether other members of that culture accept me into their cultural group. One of 
history’s most tragic examples of one-sided cultural adaption is the story of Germany’s 
Jews, who despite the many ways  they adopted  German culture-- including language, 
conversions to Christianity, and fighting in the armed forces--never became fully accepted 
as German. (Enzo Traverso has a detailed account how German Jews could never be 
German enough--see: Traverso 1995.) And this became worse with the racialization of 
politics in general and Jewishness, in particular, in the 19th century. This was summarized 
sadly in a rhyme that was popular in early 20th century Austria and Germany: “Ob Jud, ob 
Christ ist einerlei – in der Rasse liegt die Schweinerei” (“Jewish or Christian it’s all one / 
 
26 In fact, culture has been the biggest weakness of the capitalist system and instead of emotionally 
connecting with people, capitalist systems have created profoundly anti-capitalist cultures. This has been 
explored in great detail by Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Schumpeter 
1994). 
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It’s their race that makes them scum”). This of course is a profoundly anti-cultural position, 
because if your supposed race is the sole determinant of who you are, culture is entirely 
irrelevant or at best just another symptom of your underlying ethnicity. At the same time, 
however, this anti-cultural position is of course itself a cultural phenomenon, because 
people believed fervently and emotionally in the supposed inferiority and superiority of 
different races. 
In Europe and other nation states we often encounter a very strong overlap between 
ethnicity and culture that such that the two become almost indistinguishable. In other areas 
of the world, however, this overlap can be much weaker. In sub-Saharan Africa, for 
example, there is wide variation between people who identify primarily with their state 
(e.g. Uganda) or their ethnic group (e.g. the Baganda, the largest ethnic group in Uganda), 
which has a huge impact upon social cohesion and institutional performance in these 
countries (E. Green 2018).  
Writing about contemporary Britain, Brain Barry points out that for many people 
“’British’ seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship 
rather than one with significant affective, cognitive, or behavioral connotations” (Barry 
2002, 83). At the same time, newcomers to Britain tend not to feel “comfortable with the 
idea of being British being more than a legal title” (Modood 1998, 384–785). If being 
British is nothing more than a legal title without any affective, cognitive, or behavioral 
connotations, it would seize to qualify as a culture according to the terms we laid out in 
part one. Holding British citizenship would confer certain advantages, but emotionally it 
would not be much different from joining Amazon’s Prime Membership. It has advantages, 
but it doesn’t come with moral obligations or strong emotional attachments, and the only 
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thing that keeps me a member are the member benefits. With loosening emotional ties it 
should become more comprehensible that as of 2015 more British Muslims have joined 
Islamist militant groups than serve in the UK’s armed forces (Weaver 2015)--especially if 
religion provides more of an emotional home than the country one lives in. Before its defeat 
in 2019, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (commonly known as ISIS) recruited over 
30,000 fighters from at least 85 countries (Benmelech and Klor 2018) with an appeal that 
rested almost exclusively on issues of emotional, religious, and political identity.  
Culture depends on people emotionally identifying with its symbols and principle 
ideas, since it is this process that creates the instinctive triggers we discussed in Part One. 
Let me add one more point here that has been obfuscating the debate about culture: the 
emotional attachment to something like Great Britain does not mean that the symbols and 
ideas what what constitutes “Britishness” have to remain the same. The underlying 
symbolic structure can change, but as long as there is an agreement among and an 
emotional attachment of the people who identify as British, it is appropriate to speak of 
British culture. This also holds true for countries like the United States, where the idea of 
what it means to be a US citizen has changed fundamentally over the course of the 
country’s history. But as long as people feel attached to the struggle of the United States 
and its evolution and this emotion is shared by others, we have an American culture in the 
broadest sense. The US flag, for example, changed over 30 times in its history, but not 
every flag brought forth a new culture. As we have discussed in the first part of this 
dissertation, cultures evolve and their values can change, while the people still identify 
with what they perceive as a historical continuum that goes beyond their own individual 
existence.  
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To use another example: The Catholic and Protestant churches of today have 
undergone significant changes in the last four centuries, including the abandonment of 
burning supposed witches and heretics. But these changes did not create a new culture; 
instead, they changed the underlying values and symbols of a pre-existing one. As we will 
see in our discussion about institutions, such changes can strengthen or weaken the bonds 
between the individuals who make up a cultural community. This is an important 
contemporary question, because the sustainability of many states in Europe, North 
America, and elsewhere will depend on whether the evolution of what it means to be a 
member of these states will be an identity based on ethnicity or culture.  
Principles and ideas can differ from culture to culture, but there are some general 
similarities. Since culture is an expansion of the bonds of loyalty that exist between family 
members, cultures often imitate and build on family relations. Similarly, people that share 
certain physiological traits like skin-color have historically been more likely to form 
cultural groups together. This does not mean, however, that physiological or genetic 
resemblance is the sole or even a necessary determination of culture. Ethnicity can play an 
important role in culture, but it does not have to. The more recent history of Southeast Asia 
shows how culture and cultural identities can overcome ethnic markers in a variety of ways, 
unfortunately often also creating new political tensions. The ethnic difference between 
Muslims from Pakistan and Hindus from India is minimal, but the cultural (in this case 
mostly, but not exclusively, of a religious nature) differences have been a constant source 
of conflict. 
More positive examples that emerged from the uneasy relationship between culture 
and ethnicity would be South Korea and contemporary China, where the spread of 
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Christianity has been a central force for the promotion of human rights, democracy, and 
more accountable governments (Aikman 2006; Huntington 1993). Any attempt to predict 
the long-term development of China that does not take into account the profound cultural 
changes that are currently underway will lead to unreliable results. Given current 
demographic trends, China is on track to become home of the world’s largest Christian 
community, which is already leading to a fundamental overhaul of the communist party’s 
attitude towards religion (Yang 2007), a development that could lead to unforeseen changes 
in Chinese foreign policy regarding the Middle East, for example. It remains puzzling why 
this development in the realm of culture is barely recognized as an important factor in 
contemporary scholarship (Yang 2014). 
The Christian awakening in China is a good example of how ethnicity and culture 
can diverge. Christianity (just like Communism before) is the adaption of a worldview and 
the norms and values that come with it; this adaption however is a process of socialization 
and choice and independent from biological markers that define individual ethnicity. In the 
same way that Indonesia became the world’s largest Muslim nation, there is some 
likelihood that China will become the world’s largest Christian nation. Should this happen, 
it remains to be seen what these new dynamics will produce in the regional politics of Asia. 
The emergence of culture can be seen as a reaction to ethnicity and the limits it puts 
on the organization of large human groups and the ability to act collectively. The depth and 
breadth of human cooperation has been subject to cultural evolution as much as to 
biological evolution. Altruistic and cooperative behavior was increasing proportionally 
with the commonality of genes among the participating individuals, limiting cooperation 
first to the family, then to the tribe. The emergence of culture and cultural institutions 
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(churches, political movements, interest groups) was a way to overcome these biological 
limitations on cooperation and altruistic behavior. Yet while there is a regularity when it 
comes to cooperation and shared genes, there is no such “natural rule” when it comes to 
culture. Some cultural constructs were an expansion of the principle of kinship to more 
extended relatives, something that can be seen strongly for example in ancestor worship in 
Chinese or Asian culture. Others deliberately broke and tried to overcome the limitations 
of kinship.  
This can be observed continuously at different points of human history from the 
early days of Islam27, the American Revolution (which proclaimed that US identity is based 
on an American Creed and not ethnicity), the French Revolution (that wanted to expand its 
vision of human rights to all mankind ) up to the international ideologies like Communism 
in the 20th century (that aimed to unify mankind under an ideological banner). 
In fact, culture and ethnicity can be seen as being in constant tension with each 
other, for all the anti-ethnic cultural constructions just mentioned that had to face an ethnic 
backlash: Islam is still confronted with internal tensions between Arabs, Persians, and 
Asians (especially in Indonesia)28; the United States were unable to extend its ideals to all 
and especially the black population was explicitly excluded for the majority of modern US 
history; the French Revolution gave way to the racially charged views that dominated 
 
27 One of the first Caliphs, Umar, supposedly said to the Arabs “learn your genealogies, and do not 
be like the local peasants who, when they are asked who they are, reply: ‘I am from such-and-such a place’” 
(quoted in: B. Lewis 2004, xx) 
28 Although anecdotal, a well-known attitude in Indonesia is that the greatness of God is exemplified 
by the fact that he revealed his holy text to the most backwards of all people, the Arabs. 
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European colonialism; and Communism could never rid itself of its ethnic and nationalist 
undertones in the Soviet Union. 
Social capital and the ability for collective action as consequence of culture can 
come in many shapes and forms: Mohammed and his unification of Arab tribes under Islam 
is as valid an example as is the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership in 1871. 
Religion and nationalism are probably the most successful cultural artefacts if measured 
by the number of people they are capable of unifying for concerted action. Yet culture can 
also appear on lower levels – basically every community that creates ties of mutual trust 
beyond immediate kinship is based on a form of culture in its own right. What we must 
distinguish is the risk of mutual exclusiveness of the values (i.e. the cultural glue that keeps 
groups together) of different groups within a society. Ideally, people could join different 
communities simultaneously, and contribute to the accumulation of social capital for 
society as a whole. But what if the social capital of a particular group is in an antagonistic 
relationship with the social capital of the larger community?  
This is a phenomenon we can increasingly observe in the United States, where the 
confrontational stance between the so-called elites and – for lack of a better word – the 
working class is feeding of each other, creating an ever deeper rift and loss of overall social 
capital (Murray 2012; Putnam 2016).  
Similarly, in Europe the autochthone population and the growing minority of 
Muslims make their differences the key element for group cohesion, thereby dividing and 
diminishing overall social capital. Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point when he writes 
that  
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the Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islam, and Michigan Militia possess 
social capital, but a society made up of such groups would not be 
particularly appealing and might even cease to be a democracy (Fukuyama 
2000, 22).  
 
The cases Fukuyama mentions are particularly interesting, because they highlight 
the different effects that the cultural basis for the formation of social capital can have: 
Religion, for example, in most cases allows the option of conversion, thereby integrating 
previous outsiders into the group and enhancing social capital and the potential for 
collective action. An organization like the Ku Klux Klan is based on ethnic markers like 
skin color and heritage, thereby not really overcoming a tribal structure only expanding it. 
Instead of the family as the main unit we end up with moral tribes (Greene 2014) – which 
is only a gradual change from communities based on immediate kinship. This is not a minor 
factor in contemporary politics, where it becomes increasingly common for politicians to 
speak what I call a tribal language – that is, appealing to voters’ gender, skin color, sexual 
orientation or ethnical heritage is an attempt to activate our tribal and more narrow-
groupish senses, creating a real threat to the social capital available for society as a whole 
and the cohesion of multiethnic states. 
At this point it is helpful to once again emphasize what culture is not: it is not 
ethnically-, geographically-, or genetically-determined. Contemporary political rhetoric 
tends too often to lump all kinds of identities together – religious, ethnic, sexual or other. 
Not all of them necessarily constitute a cultural phenomenon. In the United States there is 
without a doubt a black and African-American culture that expresses itself regarding 
certain attitudes towards the arts, politics and other aspects of life. But this does not mean 
that every black person is by default a member of this culture. By the same token, there is 
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a vibrant queer culture, but being gay or transgender does not automatically make you part 
of this culture. This also applies to religion – being born into a Catholic or Muslim family 
increases the likelihood that such an individual will adhere to some of the values of these 
faiths, but it is by no means a given. An individual becomes part of a culture once he or 
she internalizes and emotionally bonds with the ideas and values that are central to the 
culture in question. Regardless of what these values are, however, what matters is the 
emotional connection to them. The idea that a person who has certain physiological traits 
or sexual preferences must be part of a certain culture is not apriori true, even though there 
might be a higher probability in some cases compared to others. 
Ultimately ethnicity can be used to describe gene-related markers (e.g. skin color, 
body type, gender, etc.) and geographical markers, but culture always includes the 
possibility of choice.29 The key distinction being that to a large degree ethnicity is beyond 
human choice, but culture is not. Cultural identity is a social construct and subject to human 
choice, while genetically- determined characteristics are a given in the life of the 
individual.30 There can be significant overlaps between ethnicity and culture, like Islam 
and Arab ethnicity, but this relationship is neither determined for all eternity nor is one a 
condition for the other. It is a matter of correlation, but not causation.  
The same holds true for other societies as well. In the United States, a white 
conservative and a white liberal share less in common culturally than two conservatives of 
 
29 This does not mean that these choices can be made easily and without incurring significant 
emotional stress and interpersonal conflict: Something we see very often in migrant communities where the 
younger generation wants to join the culture of their new country, leading to conflicts with the older 
generation that wants to maintain certain traditions. That being said, however, it does not change the 
fundamental fact that an individual can change his or her culture, but not ethnicity.  
30 Due to the progress in the medical sciences this view might be contested, for one’s gender or skin 
color are now changeable to a degree that was impossible for most of human history. In general, however, I 
believe the distinction between ethnicity and culture remains a valid one. 
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different ethnic backgrounds. As we have discussed, culture is about emotional attachments 
and while attachment to ethnicity is possible, it is neither necessary nor inherent. A culture 
can attach intrinsic value to the skin-color of its members, but this does not mean that 
everybody who happens to be of that color needs to be part of that culture. The element of 
choice is not just important for a better definition of culture, but it also helps us to better 
understand that cultures compete for members. Even in our times the discussion of what it 
means to be part of an ethnic or religious group is essentially a cultural competition about 
finding the mental model that shows the strongest ability to connect emotionally with the 
largest possible number of people – or the maximum number of people a culture’s content 
is supposed to appeal to.  
The confusion between culture and ethnicity arises because many cultural ideas 
deliberately put ethnicity front and center, claiming that they know how to genuinely live 
one’s ethnicity and that only by adhering to a specific culture can one be his or her “true 
self”. But claims about what it means to be authentically Indian or authentically Russian 
are cultural claims not ethnic claims. The claim towards authenticity comes from the 
adherence to a certain behavior that helps to self-identify and be identifiable by others as a 
member of a certain group. But what this behavior is can be disputed, because our 
biological characteristics have us hardwired for culture, but not for a specific culture.  
This is highly relevant for politics, because it creates limits to what states can 
theoretically demand from their citizens: It is impossible for an individual to change their 
ethnicity, so a state that bases its politics on ethnicity automatically creates a class of people 
that are forever excluded from participating in the body politic. Apartheid South Africa 
and Nazi Germany assumed cultural characteristics of Blacks and Jews based on their 
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ethnicity, making it absolutely impossible for the latter to ever become (or remain) equal 
citizens of the state.  
On the other hand, in the realm of culture states theoretically can make demands on 
its citizens and actually do so on a regular basis. We will be investigating this further in the 
third part of this dissertation, because it also has a huge impact on the construction of 
institutions. For now, it is important to highlight once more the distinction between 
ethnicity and culture. To connect a person’s beliefs to a person’s genetics is a dangerous 
game, because it would give rise to the claim that such a person is forever bound to one 
identity that can never be changed. This is of course also the essence of racism – the claim 
that a person is genetically bound to an identity without any choice in the matter. Racism, 
as I have pointed out, is also an absolutely anti-cultural ideology, because the whole point 
of culture is to socially construct a common identity that is able to overcome ethnic 
limitations to community. As we have discussed at greater length in Part One, the strength 
of culture is to expand bonds of loyalty beyond one’s kin and replace blood-relations with 
shared beliefs and values. A return to define community exclusively in racial terms is not 
much more than a slightly more expansive form of tribalism. Nazi-Germany deliberately 
shrank the circle of people it allowed access to being German, excluding people that had 
felt German all their lives and, in many cases, risked their lives for the German nation in 
World War One. But the act of redefining Germany as a racial and not a cultural nation 
excluded those who according to ethnic and other criteria (like sexual orientation) were not 
“authentic” Germans.  
This does not mean, however, that communities can make no demands on its 
members and those who aspire to join. The point is that these demands should be fulfillable 
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by the individual and not be tied to something they have no control over, like their skin 
color or other genetic markers.31 For example, when we expect people to respect individual 
rights and to refrain from throwing virgins into volcanoes to please a deity for a better 
harvest, we do so because we know that a person that holds such beliefs is absolutely 
capable of changing it. Whether it would be by persuasion and explanation why sacrificing 
virgins is wrong and does not work or via laws that ban such actions, we would assume 
that this particular cultural value can be overcome independently of the ethnicity of those 
who hold it.  
The reader might recoil from such an example as being unimaginable, but practices 
that make the modern mind cringe have been quite commonplace among human societies 
for a long time. There is ample archeological evidence that human and even child sacrifice 
was practiced in the Near East and the Mediterranean during the Bronze Age (B. S. Strauss 
2007, 38), in China, South America and Northern Europe. Homer’s epic about the battle 
of Troy, The Iliad, starts with Agamemnon sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia. Also, the 
biblical story of Abraham includes him being willing to sacrifice his son Isaac until God 
reverses his initial demand to test Abraham’s loyalty. And there is, in fact, also the biblical 
story of Jephthah who offered his daughter as a burnt offering, this time with no divine 
last-minute intervention.32 None of these societies is still use these practices, demonstrating 
 
31 Does this have to apply to all communities within a state? No, of course certain exceptions are 
possible for example the existence of different sport leagues for women and men is also based on a distinction 
where individual choice is (for the moment) almost impossible – but we accept it out of considerations of 
fairness and the enjoyment of non-predetermined competition in sports. The same is not true, however, when 
it comes to questions like citizenship.  
32 It is worth noting that in both the case of the Iliad as well as the biblical story of Jephthah there 
are versions and interpretations that see the daughters saved. It remains an open question, however, whether 
these new interpretations have been influenced by the desire to clean the stories of human sacrifices because 
the practice appears unfathomable to the modern mind.  
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that these were matters of culture and not ethnicity and luckily as human societies 
progressed they shed ideas like human sacrifice.  
Belief in human sacrifice, belief in a religion, belief in a nation, belief in an ideology 
are all powerful forces, but none of them is unchangeable or genetically fixed, so a 
community can make demands in these realms because they are within in an individual’s 
ability to change. A communist can become a fascist and then a liberal democrat, just as a 
Muslim can become a Christian and then a Jew – based on adopting behavior and values 
that characterize these beliefs. What is not possible is for an ethnic Arab to become an 
ethnic Scandinavian and then an ethnic Pacific Islander. To conflate and blur the 
differences between ethnicity and culture creates something close to a form of benevolent 
ethnocentrism, where cultural demands on a group seem inappropriate if they could be 
construed as being contradicting their “authentic” self. This is what we encounter in the 
discussion about the assimilation of migrants into their new countries, when concerns are 
raised that assimilation is forcing people to give up their heritage and their true self. While 
this can be the case, very often what supposedly is someone’s true self becomes connected 
to their ethnicity, once again putting someone’s genetic characteristics over their ability for 
cultural change.  
We need to discard the notion that there is something like an “authentic” or 
“inauthentic” human being based on behavior that is “typical” for others who belong to the 
same ethnic group.33 An atheist Arab is no less and no more an authentic Arab than a 
 
33 My argument does not dispute that there can be a higher probability to encounter certain behavior 
within a specific group, or what is generally called “stereotype accuracy” (Jussim, Crawford, and Rubinstein 
2015; McCauley, Jussim, and Lee 1995). My issue is that behavior is supposed to determine the “authentic” 
belonging to an ethnic group.  
 
163 
 
Christian or a Muslim Arab. Why? Because being of Arab ethnicity is not a choice, but a 
given. 
The claim that only certain behaviors and beliefs allow one to be an authentic 
member of an ethnic group can have severe consequences in real life. For example, in some 
African-American communities individuals are discouraged from performing as good as 
they could in an academic environment in order to reinforce their group identity because 
good grades are stigmatized as “acting white” (Hess et al. 2003; Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 
1999; Steele and Aronson 1995). This is what the literature describes as “Stereotype 
Threat” – “being at risk of confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about 
one's group” (Steele and Aronson 1995, 797). To put it differently, the negative stereotype 
can become part of the very group it is targeting. In a keynote address at the 2004 
Democratic National Convention then senator and later president of the United States 
Barack Obama highlighted one of the most telling examples of the conflation of ethnicity 
and culture in his remark that “the slander that says a black youth with a book is acting 
white” (Obama 2004) has to be eradicated. He was referring to the phenomenon that 
expectations of a certain behavior are tied to one’s ethnicity. Carrying a book and striving 
for academic excellence – to remain with President Obama’s example – is supposedly 
connected to a person’s skin color. Although no such biological connection exists, this has 
significant consequences of a cultural nature. As Fordham and Ogbu demonstrate, the 
internalization of a supposed connection between academic ambition and belonging to a 
group creates what they call “fictive kinship” that in part is based on reinforcing one’s own 
identity in ethnical terms by rejecting characteristics that are supposedly part of another 
ethnic group: “the fear of being accused of ‘acting white’ causes a social and psychological 
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situation which diminishes black students' academic effort and thus leads to 
underachievement” (Fordham and Ogbu 1986, 176).34 
In purely cultural settings, stereotypes can be quite accurate – for example, the 
assumption that when an individual introduces him- or herself as Jewish or Muslim, that 
they would reject an offer of bacon; or the rather low likelihood of a member of an Amish 
community to possess most recent high-tech gadgets. But in these cases, the individuals 
introduced themselves based on their cultural identity, an identity that is defined by the 
values and rules that define their respective faith. It is appropriate to assume that a person 
that introduces herself as “I am a Mormon” will live according to the dominant 
interpretation of what it means to be a Mormon, just as we can make assumptions about a 
person claiming “I am a communist” or “I am a fascist.” The same does not hold true, 
however, if a person says, “I am Scandinavian,” “I am black,” or “I am Arab.” There is no 
handbook for being an ethnicity, but there (sometimes literally) are handbooks for cultural 
identities like religious creeds or ideologies. 
In other words, when it comes to one’s cultural identity the term authentic can have 
actual meaning, since being part of a cultural group means to have shared emotional 
commitments to whatever it is that is this group holds sacred. To return to a previously 
offered example, if someone joins a fan club for the Boston Red Sox, but cheers for the 
New York Yankees and whose emotions are tied to the victories and defeats of the latter 
but not the former, such a person would not be an authentic member of the culture of Red 
Sox fans. In the cultural realm there is a connection between group belonging and behavior, 
 
34 Although Fordham and Ogbu published their paper over 30 years ago, more recent studies come 
to similar conclusions (Fryer Jr and Torelli 2010). 
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because it is the behavior that allows me to be identifiable as a member of the group. I am 
expanding on this point because too often cases of culture and ethnicity get mixed up, 
despite their fundamental differences. Being white and being Protestant are two completely 
different categories, just like being Middle Eastern and being Muslim are two completely 
different categories. One is based on unchangeable biological characteristics, the other one 
is not just cultural, but also includes the element of choice. Once again, this does not mean 
that there cannot be significant overlap between ethnicity and culture, but one does not 
condition the other.  
White, black, male, female, gay, or straight and similar characteristics can be, but 
do not have to be the basis for one’s culture. Stereotyping in its soft form can be the 
assumption that if certain behavior is very common among people that share certain 
physiological characteristics, that if we encounter a random individual that belongs to such 
a group will most probably show this common behavior. The problem begins if we assume 
that being part of an ethnic group determines or should determine specific behavior and if 
individuals do not display it, they cannot be “authentic” members of this community.  
This is very similar to the idea of “false consciousness,” the Marxist idea that some 
people don’t identify with the “right” group and therefore are not their own authentic self35: 
“False consciousness is defined as the holding of false beliefs that are contrary to one's 
social interest and which thereby contribute to the disadvantaged position of the self or the 
group” (Jost 1995). Whether or not someone is truly suffering from false consciousness is 
hard to determine, since the definition limits it to the threshold of “contrary to one’s social 
 
35 A classic example of this is Thomas Frank’s “What’s the Matter with Kansas” (T. Frank 2005).  
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interest.” In other words, an African-American individual who identifies as libertarian and 
rejects a policy like affirmative action would suffer from false consciousness, since this 
position might harm his or her social interest. Equally, a white individual that supports 
affirmative action would also harm his or her social interest and therefore also suffer from 
false consciousness. With increased migration into Western countries and a changing 
demographic profile there has been a wave of predictions how this will change the political 
balance between the political right and the political left on the long run (see, for example: 
Judis and Teixeira 2004; Phillips 2018), but these observations only hold true if we 
construct an overlap of ethnicity and culture that is possible, but not necessary.  
The very concept of false consciousness assumes that an individual belongs to a 
specific group, defined by the outside observer who then judges whether the individual acts 
in accordance of their social interest or not. But these are not objective, but cultural 
assumptions: Marx assumed that the workers’ “authentic self” can only identify with their 
socioeconomic class, and that any other form of identity – religious, national, etc. – must 
be the consequence of brainwashing by the ruling classes to further their interests at the 
expense of the working class.  
If the first individual in our example strongly identifies and feels emotionally 
attached to a libertarian culture, it would be extraordinarily presumptuous to claim that this 
is not the individual’s true consciousness because a black person cannot be an authentic 
libertarian. Additionally, we must keep in mind that most people inhabit multiple cultural 
spaces and can value multiple things simultaneously, but with different emotional 
commitments. The African-American individual in our example might be fully aware of 
and value the idea of affirmative action as a means to correct historical injustices, but at 
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the same time she can still value the idea of individualism and libertarianism higher, 
thereby rejecting this specific policy not out of false consciousness but out of a moral 
commitment that is difficult to align with the policy of affirmative action.  
Ethnicity can become an integral part of a cultural system, but it doesn’t have to. In 
fact, historically the concept of ethnicity was significantly more rigid than it is today, and 
it was only through cultural ideas that these differences could be bridged. It is often 
forgotten that in the United States as well as Europe until the early 20th century, Germans, 
Poles, Italians, French and other nationalities were not just seen as different cultures but as 
distinct ethnicities and races that are unchangeable. The mainstream position at the time 
was that  
there could not be a new American identity because […] different 
races responding to the same stimuli are still different, and no 
environmental influence […] can ever remold them into an indifferent 
sameness (Barry 2002, 85; and for a more detailed historical account, see: 
Spinner 1996).  
 
This kind of thinking was due to the emergence of ideological racism that was 
pervasive not only in Nazi Germany or the major colonial powers of the 19th and 20th 
century, but every western country (Barry 2002, 85). This racism, of course, was in many 
respects also a cultural phenomenon that put the idea of race on a pedestal by which to 
judge differences between individuals or groups. Although a cultural phenomenon in itself, 
the content of ideological (or scientific) racism was profoundly anti-cultural, because it 
entirely eliminated the element of choice. Once you were born into an ethnic group, all of 
your behavior could be traced back to this one factor. Although scientifically complete 
nonsense (Smedley and Smedley 2005), something that has become increasingly obvious 
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as early as the end of the 20th century (Barkan 2000), the idea of a world that could be 
explained through race-biology was an emotionally attractive shared mental model. It 
allowed the strengthening of ties to one’s own group under the exclusion of others – but 
had the additional modern feature of being exclusive, not because of superstitious or 
religious reasons, but because of scientific reasons. Racism and the justification of slavery 
in Europe and the United States was partially rooted in tradition and to some extent religion, 
but in the 19th century there was a growing trend to justify slavery and racist policies in 
scientific terms (Stanton 1982). 
Yet the story of the emergence of this racism is more complex than one would think 
after a first glance at modern European history. There are good reasons to claim a certain 
affinity between nationalism and racism, but there is equal evidence that nationalism in its 
early stage was an integrative force. Although heavy with symbols and cues like flags, 
anthems, and myths, national identity was a powerful force in overcoming tribal and 
religious antagonisms through the altering of emotional attachments. As Brian Barry points 
out in his description of English identity:  
National identity was additive, not absorptive. The cultural 
threshold of incorporation was lowered – the cultural content of 
‘Englishness’ thinned – by dropping the connection with Protestantism 
(Barry 2002, 85).  
 
The following emergence of not only an English, but a British identity enabled three 
distinct ethnicities to cooperate successfully through the adoption of a common culture that 
was not so much characterized by the imposition of a new culture on a conquered people, 
but by the creation of a new identity that managed to incorporate previous identities. That 
the Scottish, the Welsh, and the English created a common state where some of the most 
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consequential prime ministers were of either Welsh (David Lloyd George during World 
War One) or Scottish origin, is an astounding example of the power of culture.  
Similarly, the differences between Saxons, Prussians, and Bavarians have been real 
but were gradually overcome with the idea of a common German identity. The German 
states of Bavaria, Baden Württemberg, and Hesse are the contributing the highest amount 
of money to the federal budget of Germany to be redistributed among the economically 
weaker states of Germany, but no one would claim that the people of Bavaria suffer from 
false consciousness because they have a sense of loyalty towards the non-Bavarian people 
of Germany. To put it differently, it is not ethnicity that matters, but ideas about ethnicity 
that matter. France, Italy, Spain, and other European nations were never just given entities, 
but emerged out of a cultural shift that replaced religion and kinship with the idea of the 
nation as a cultural and historical being (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012; E. Weber 1976). 
Despite its name, nationalism has more in common with religion than kinship, because 
both build on what Benedict Anderson calls “imagined communities” (B. Anderson 2006), 
that are constructed around a common identity. This identity is in turn more a social 
construct than a biological reality, and although one can trace the idea of the nation back 
to medieval times (Cannadine 2011), it was not until the 17th century and the Napoleonic 
era that nationalism became a dominant historical force. Although the positive and negative 
effects of nationalism remain widely debated (see, for example: Hazony 2018), nationalism 
itself serves as a strong reminder of humankind’s cultural side. With the decline of religion, 
it was not secularized reason that took its place, but secular nationalism.  
The trend of ethnic, religious, gender, and racial identities becoming more and more 
prominent in contemporary politics is creating cultural rifts that were either less important 
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or non-existent in the past (Jardina 2019). Building on what we discussed in the first part 
of the dissertation, the fracturing of societies and retreat into smaller cultural groups is a 
sign of a weakening culture, because it loses its ability to hold larger groups of people 
together. It is an open question whether this cultural fragmentation will be a good or a bad 
thing in the long run, but what should become increasingly clear is that we are confronted 
with a deeply cultural phenomenon. I argue that one cause of this growing rift is rooted in 
the neglect of culture as we have described it so far. Modern social sciences often seem to 
lack the vocabulary to address this issue or tend to resort to root causes grounded in 
economic considerations. Yet the neglect of culture will become more clearly understood 
if we take a look at the one social science that comes closest to revealing a form of 
predictable human nature and simultaneously also comes closest to the Enlightenment ideal 
to investigate social and natural phenomena by the same means. Therefore, it is to 
economics that we will turn next before we return to our investigation into the 
Enlightenment roots of the neglect of culture.  
 
3.2 The Rise of Economics and Rational Choice 
While trying to improve political science through the exclusion of culture, it was 
the methods of economics that seemed to have the greatest success in the quest for 
emulating the methods of the natural sciences. And members of that discipline were quite 
confident about the superiority of their field compared to others:  
political scientists have less powerful analytical tools and know less 
[than economists]. By scores on the Graduate Record Examination and 
other criteria, [economics] attracts students stronger than theirs, and our 
courses are more mathematically demanding” (Freeman 1999, 141).  
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Economists themselves celebrated their “superiority” (Lazear 2000) to other fields, 
and the imperial character of economics is well documented (Fine and Milonakis 2009; 
Hirshleifer 1985; Mäki 2009; Stigler 1984). Not surprisingly, economists have eschewed 
more than any other field the idea of interdisciplinarity. According to a recent survey 
among US university professors, fewer than half believed that something could be learned 
from other fields, compared to members of other disciplines where a majority viewed 
interdisciplinary approaches as important (Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan 2015).36 
Economics tends to view human beings and human behavior as mostly uniform, with other 
disciplines working on the periphery of comprehending human nature while economists 
have found its core understanding of basic human nature (Rosenberg 1979). 
This belief in the uniformity of human behavior only gradually became a dominant 
force in economics and the broader social sciences and it was not uncontested. It first was 
brought to the forefront in the “Methodenstreit” of the 1880s between the Austrian School 
of Economics and The German Historical School. In this great debate, the Austrian school 
attempted to formulate general laws regarding human economic behavior while the latter 
defended an institutionalist-historicist position. Many of the methods of modern social 
sciences have been formulated and discussed in this scholarly quarrel (Bostaph 1978) and 
150 years later it is hard to dispute that the Austrian School came out victorious. There are 
numerous schools in the United States like George Mason University or the University of 
Chicago that place themselves in the tradition of the Austrian School, but one will look in 
 
36 Economists would be surprised that no other than David Hume was writing about the “arrogance 
of the economists” as soon as 1769: “I hope that in your work you will thunder them [the economistes], and 
crush them, and pound them, and reduce them to dust and ashes! They are, indeed, the set of men the most 
chimerical and most arrogant that now exist, since the annihilation of the Sorbonne.” (Hume 2007, 216).  
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vain for a university displaying a commitment to the German Historical School. The study 
of history fell out of fashion since the past became irrelevant once we allegedly 
comprehended the mechanics that drove human behavior (advanced by, among others, 
Oakeshott 1991; Ziliak and McCloskey 2008). This development gradually moved from 
economics to other fields, something that is reflected in modern terminology as well. In 
international relations, we talk about Realism and Neo-Realism (or structural realism), 
which is the political science equivalent of Classical and Neo-Classical economics (a point 
is made explicitly by Krasner 1978, 37).  
Overall, the concept of rationalism or Neo-Utilitarianism as defined by Ruggie 
(1998) involves a narrowing of the concept of human nature to an individualistic-
rationalistic framing that emphasizes structure more than its constitutive elements. One 
effect of this is the reduction of individual agency as a relevant factor, since it is the 
structure that determines the behavior of the individual unit. Regardless of what they want 
to do, the system compels them to behave in the way they have to. The ahistorical nature 
of these neo-approaches and the anti-cultural turn they signify was well captured by 
Richard K. Ashley and his critique of structuralism in general (Ashley 1984). This 
emerging structuralism also restricted human agency and the role of human beliefs and 
desires, something that was taken most seriously by an older generation of political 
scientists--including Morgenthau, Kissinger, Ruggie and others – who also called for an 
emancipation of political science from the discipline of economics and other fields (e.g., 
Morgenthau 1967, 12–14). 
Even Karl Popper, who was fiercely critical of historicism and the idea that human 
behavior can be rationally organized or predicted like the laws of physics, carved out a 
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special, elevated place for economics as the only social science that allowed for the 
development of empirically testable theories (Popper 2002, 2). Popper relativized that 
argument later, but it should not be surprising that once all this approval has been heaped 
upon economics that it became the “gold standard” or other disciplines. That economics 
would become such a powerful influence is not a surprise if we look at the connection 
established by Jeremy Bentham between money and utility. Monetary and material wealth 
according to Bentham are the sole accurate ways to measure utility and therefore the moral 
content of policies (Shapiro 2012, 25). Bentham’s utilitarianism is not just the forerunner 
of modern rational choice theory with the assumption that it is rational to choose what gives 
us pleasure and to avoid what is causing us pain, but he also claimed that it can be 
effectively measured in monetary terms. All of a sudden it seemed possible to measure and 
analyze human behavior in a way resembling the natural sciences, since just as the 
thermometer is “for measuring the heat of the weather” and the barometer is “for measuring 
the pressure of the air,” so money “is the instrument for measuring the quantity of pain and 
pleasure” (Shapiro 2012, 25).  
The discipline of economics pushed the rational choice approach to the center of 
the social sciences, making it one of its most powerful theories. Originally more a method 
than a paradigm, the rational choice approach has moved from being applied as a tool for 
problem-solving to becoming one of the gatekeepers determing which problems should be 
dealt with in the first place, or at all. Indeed, according to Kuhn (2012), this is one of the 
chief characteristics of a paradigm operating in normal science (Brogan 1996). (For another 
argument viewing Rational Choice Theory as a paradigm, see: G. W. Cox 2004). The forms 
of behaviorism and positivism that often go hand-in-hand with rational choice 
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utilitarianism carry with them the narrowing our perception of the driving forces of human 
behavior. I hasten to point out that this also means that it is only capturing some aspects of 
behavior. Like rational choice theory, culture cannot be the sole answer for all forms of 
human behavior. Instead, we have to determine carefully those areas of life where the 
assumptions and conditions of rational choice are most closely met (e.g., situations where 
people tend to weigh information objectively, have clearly stated and observable 
preferences, and only a limited emotional attachment to the situation in question is evident). 
As we will see, there are plenty of situations where these conditions exist and allow social 
science researchers to build insightful models reflecting this feature of human behavior. 
At the same time, however, there are also situations where individual utility 
maximization under these conditions does not apply. A particularly problematic aspect of 
rational-choice theory is the strong application of methodological individualism where the 
individual only decides via reflection upon him- or herself. Culture tends to fall by the 
wayside in this approach, because ultimately individual utility maximization always wins, 
and culture might influence my preferences, but I would never act out of any other 
motivation than individual self-interest. 
This is a crucial point, because culture cannot be analyzed as a phenomenon that 
operates on the individual level; the concept is intersubjective and rests on emotions that 
need others to be triggered. What makes culture such a difficult phenomenon is that it 
emerges out of moral imaginations and abstractions of reality that gain authority by way of 
tradition, habit, and the creation of symbols, and establishes the priority of community over 
the individual. This stands in direct contradiction to one of rationalism’s main concepts: 
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the practical application of reason that can emancipate itself from the past and stand on its 
own.  
Michael Oakeshott highlights the difference between a purely rational and a cultural 
approach when he writes that 
“to the Rationalist, nothing is of value merely because it exists (and 
certainly not because it has existed for many generations), familiarity has 
no worth, and nothing is to be left standing for want of scrutiny … The 
conduct of affairs is a matter of solving problems, and in this no man can 
hope to be successful whose reason has become inflexible by surrender to 
habit or is clouded by the fumes of tradition” (Oakeshott 1991, 4). 
 
The assumptions made for the modeling of human behavior in the realm of 
economics are persuasive, because in many cases they reflect actual human behavior to a 
significant degree. In economic theory, the rational choice approach remains the most 
important way to analyze problems, and “explanations are regarded as 'economic' to the 
extent that they explain the relevant phenomena in terms of the rational choices of 
individual economic agents” (Sugden 1991, 751). Rational choice itself was defined as 
consistent human behavior where decisions are being made in order to satisfy one’s 
preferences at the lowest cost possible. Defenders of rational choice theory claim that 
nowhere does this approach limit itself to materialism (Geddes 2003, chap. 5; Keohane 
2002, S309), although they seem to have a difficult time fully defending this position. 
Robert O. Keohane, for example, argues that: 
there is no necessary connection [between materialism and rational 
choice] at all. A rational altruist allocates her charitable donations so that 
the marginal value of the additional dollar, given to each of a variety of 
charities, is equalized. The rational environmentalist chooses strategies with 
the highest expected value of improving environmental outcomes. The 
rational anti-globalization demonstrator picks situations where the world’s 
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media will be hungry for pictures of demonstrators, engulfed in waves of 
tear gas, confronting troops in ugly gas masks (Keohane 2002, 309). 
It remains questionable, however, whether the most prominent rational choice 
theorists would agree with Keohane. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, 
probably the most famous representatives of rational choice theory in political science, 
reduce almost all significant political behavior to material incentives – most famously their 
claim that the Russian Revolution occurred because of the Vodka tax and the low payment 
of common soldiers (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012, 37).  
Barbara Geddes, a more critical defender of rational choice approaches attributes 
the possible limits of reducing human behavior residing in isolated motivations:  
There is, to my knowledge, no rational choice argument to explain 
why a few educated, comfortably middle-class individuals ignore family 
responsibilities and more secure and lucrative career opportunities in order 
to join nascent revolutionary movements in which the likelihood of 
achieving power is far lower than the likelihood of ending up dead or in jail 
(Geddes 2003, 182).  
 
Robert Keohane, in his desire to defend rational choice from the claim of 
materialism, succumbs to the temptation of inferring motive from observed behavior. He 
simply assumes he knows why the altruist, the environmentalist, and the anti-globalization 
demonstrator act the way they do--in order to satisfy some individual preference aimed at 
utility maximization. Geddes, in her example, pulls the rug out from under his argument, 
saying, “When goals are directly inferred from observed behavior, rational choice 
arguments slide from ‘creative tautology,’ to use Brian Barry's phrase, into mere tautology” 
(Geddes 2003, 181).  
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This is not a small problem, since it pertains directly to the ability of researchers 
using rational choice as a framework for reliable predictions. Referring to middle-class 
individuals and their role in political change, Geddes continues writing: “We know that 
such individuals play an important role in the early stages of revolutionary movements, 
regardless of objective chances for the movement's success.” Similarly, Francis Fukuyama 
has pointed out that the Arab Spring of 2011 was triggered by a Tunisian vegetable seller 
named Mohamed Bouazizi who set himself on fire after his fruit cart was seized (Fukuyama 
2012a). Tunisia, one of the economically and politically more progressive countries in the 
region became the first hotspot of the 2011 revolutions. It is hard to believe that either 
Bouazizi or the people who took to the streets against authoritarian regimes were driven by 
the kind of utility maximization that Keohane finds too easily discernible. In like manner, 
and echoing Geddes’ argument, are studies about terrorism that show that higher income 
and education can be positively correlated with participation in terrorist organizations (e.g. 
Krueger and Malečková 2003). 
Once again, it is Geddes who more honestly acknowledges that  
rational choice arguments are not usually useful for explaining acts 
of extraordinary heroism, stupidity, or cruelty, which are often motivated 
either by highly idiosyncratic goals or by lapses of means-ends rationality” 
(Geddes 2003, 181). 
 
Likewise, rational choice completely missed the fragility of the Soviet Union and 
its dissolution in the early 1990s (M. Cox 2008; Hopf and Gaddis 1993). Of course, the 
same can be said of other theories and disciplines as well; but few others in the social 
sciences have for so long and so strongly advocated for the predictive power of their 
approach, despite such potentially unrealistic assumptions (see, for example: Downs 1957, 
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chap. 2; Friedman 2001, 15). But this is an odd defense for a supposedly scientific 
approach. Let us think about it this way: In medieval times, the higher emphasis on hygiene 
by Jews and Muslims caused fewer incidents of disease and a longer life-expectancy for 
members of these communities. Their interpretation was that bodily cleanliness pleases 
God, and therefore he grants a longer life. We can assume that the theologians of that period 
had no proof of divine intervention, but they could also claim that since they can predict 
the longer life expectancy of Jews and Muslims with high accuracy, their theories should 
be treated as valid. The power of predictions should call for attention, but it is not 
affirmative of the underlying theory if it cannot be augmented by a chain of causality. 
Rational Choice in politics has been substantially criticized (Pressman 2004), 
because it fails to answer fundamental questions like why people vote in democracies – the 
question that according to the political scientist Morris P. Fiorina poses the “the paradox 
that ate rational choice theory” (Fiorina 1990, 10). Even worse, individual utility 
maximization as the main motivation for political behavior has been empirically refuted, 
and economic interests turned out to be a very weak predictor of political behavior (Kinder 
1998). What has been demonstrated empirically is that “in matters of public opinion, 
citizens seem to be asking themselves not ‘What’s in it for me?’ but rather ‘What’s in it for 
my group?’” (Kinder 1998, 808). Politics and political opinions are not vehicles for selfish 
economic interests but “badges of social membership” (Haidt 2013, 85). 
Even in their own field, economists have a difficult time providing the predictions 
that matter. The aforementioned Lazear was in May 2008 still convinced that there was no 
recession on the horizon (see: Pulizzi and McKinnon 2008), and weeks later the world was 
on the brink of another depression matched only by the 1930s Great Depression (Drezner 
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2014). Similarly Ben Bernanke, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank announced 
in 2004 the beginning of “The Great Moderation” that will be characterized by decreased 
economic volatility due to improved predictability of market behavior (see: Bernanke 
2012). None of this means that the attempts to build economic models and aspire to precise 
forecasting are futile endeavors, but it is equally important to recognize prevailing limits.  
One of the biggest throwbacks in these discussions is the desire to elevate one 
model over  others. Behaviorism and the model of the utility maximizing homo-
oeconomicus revealed valuable insights into human behavior and played a key role in the 
development of the modern social sciences. At the same time, however, there are limits to 
the predictive power of these models: The tendency of actual human behavior to resemble 
the homo-oeconomicus takes place in stable market conditions when confidence in certain 
outcomes is high. As the economic crisis of 2008 has shown, sometimes a distortion in one 
market can have such psychological repercussions that human behavior becomes 
unpredictable. This is when “animal spirits” replace rationality and confidence is flees 
market (see: Akerlof and Shiller 2010). 
In order for rational choice to be applicable and fulfill its claim of being “a form of 
positive science” (Zuckert 1995, 179), certain conditions must be met. Without them it runs 
the risk of turning from a positive into a normative “science” that qualifies not only 
behavior, but also affects the objects of its analysis (human beings) as being either rational 
or irrational, which is more than a purely observational statement. The critique aimed at 
rational choice theory so far is not particularly new, but what I am trying to offer in addition 
is the claim that rational choice and the way of thinking that describes it has roots that go 
much further back than we usually realize. Catherine Zuckert correctly points out that  
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there is no place for that third part or aspect of the human soul, the 
part Plato called ‘spiritedness,’ the part of the soul which serves to channel, 
control, or suppress desires, according to the commands of reason (Zuckert 
1995, 180).  
 
The difficult but necessary distinction that needs to be made is that people behave 
differently in different situations – and that culture shapes such variations in such differing 
contexts. Plato describes the human soul as consisting of three parts: A desiring part, a 
reasoning and calculating part and, finally, the part that makes up man’s spiritedness and 
heartiness. Plato describes this as the man who is thirsty and yet refuses to drink – 
metaphorically pointing at the human capability to restrain from the rationally sound choice 
if it would violate moral codes. “The soul of the man who is thirsty,” Plato writes, “wishes 
nothing other than to drink.” And yet we sometimes see men that “are thirsty but not willing 
to drink.” Based on this observation, Plato concludes that there is more to man than reason 
and desire: “Isn’t there something in their soul bidding them to drink and something 
forbidding them to do so, something different that which bids?” (Plato 1991, 118). We 
touched on this in our discussion about the moral matrices created by culture. A hungry 
person might eat bacon, but a hungry person who is Jewish or Muslim might not. One could 
now make the counterclaim that taking their religious commitments into account, both Jews 
and Muslims act rationally in order to satisfy their revealed preference of religious fealty 
over quenching their hunger. In other words, rational behavior can be defended within a 
cultural approach, but this approach needs to be taken seriously. Very often any action that 
results in a materialistic deterioration is considered irrational, when in fact there may be 
situations where the material is less important to people than the emotional. 
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Any attempt to revive the concept of culture in the social sciences (and especially 
political science) must start with a critique of the utilitarian-rationalist view of human 
behavior, but not its complete banishment. As Plato points out, depending on the situation, 
different parts of the soul might get the upper hand. As in his example about the thirsty 
man who refuses to drink, Plato does not say that he never drinks under any circumstances, 
but that there can be situations where one part of the soul overrules the other. A critique is 
not a rejection, and it is reasonable to point out that the rationalist approach can provide 
useful tools in social scientific inquiry, but it cannot provide the  one unified scientific 
method that can be used to investigate all societal phenomena.37 Gary Becker, however, 
has been making exactly that claim:  
The heart of my argument is that human behavior is not 
compartmentalized […] the economic approach provides a unified 
framework for understanding behavior that has long been sought by and 
eluded Bentham, Comte, Marx, and others […] a valuable unified 
framework for understanding all human behavior” (Becker 2008, 14, 
emphasis in the original ).38  
 
The economic approach resting on rational choice then was supposed to be the 
unified field theory of the social sciences, making other approaches obsolete. Political 
scientists even started to sound more and more like economists, and the claim that culture 
is “the rabbit out of the hat” to explain political behavior was made by Becker and others 
before political science picked it up. Becker shuns “sociology, psychology, or 
anthropology” when, “with an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to better use,” they 
 
37 I cannot emphasize this enough – rational choice is profoundly useful in situations where the 
preferences of agents are now with a degree of certainty: i.e. profit maximization in the stock market or the 
desire of a politician to be re-elected.  
38 The reason why Gary Becker is so prominently featured on this chapter is to avoid the claim that 
I am building a rational choice strawman. He has been one of the most prominent proponents of the economic 
approach in all areas of life, and his influence in the social sciences remains considerably high. 
 
182 
 
account for “almost any conceivable behavior” by resorting to “ignorance and irrationality, 
values and their frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradition, the compliance 
somehow induced by social norms, or the ego and the id” (Becker 2008, 13). Once the 
economic approach is consequently applied, all political questions will be answered 
through its analytical powers and “culture (custom and tradition), specifically sociological 
factors (social norms), and individual psychology (“the ego and the id”) are no longer 
needed” (Morson and Schapiro 2018, 123). In other words, according to Becker and his 
followers, the entire first part of this dissertation could be replaced with the sentence 
“human beings maximize their utility.” Becker and his followers further argue that the most 
efficient way to maximize utility is through the market mechanism, creating circumstances 
that force people to analyze expected costs and benefits and then act accordingly. From 
marriage (Becker 1973, 1974) to crime (Becker 1968) to organ donations (Becker and Elias 
2007) everything can be solved through the process of rational utility maximization.  As 
he puts it: 
The approach taken here follows the economists’ usual analysis of 
choice and assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility 
to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources 
at other activities. Some persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because 
their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their 
benefits and costs differ” (Becker 1968, 14). 
 
The argument against Becker’s approach is not of a technical nature, because his 
analysis that market forces can work on every conceivable product is not wrong. Just as 
economists are not wrong in the general assumption that as long as there is demand and 
supply for a good or a service, a market for it exists. But even these market forces are not 
operating completely independent form emotional and cultural underpinnings, which is 
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why companies try to create brand loyalty and other ways to bind customers beyond the 
benefit they get from the utility value of the products they buy from them.  
The problem is whether there are additional effects to be considered that do not 
enter the purely economic analysis. Does, for example, the view that the decision for or 
against a crime is based solely on a cost-utility calculation change the likelihood of a person 
committing a crime in the first place. Michael Sandel has argued that “economists often 
assume that markets are inert, that they do not affect the goods they exchange. But this is 
untrue. Markets leave their mark” (Sandel 2013, 9). Sandel’s approach has recently 
received significant support from psychology and the relatively young discipline of 
behavioral economics. (For a good introduction to behavioral economics see: Mullainathan 
and Thaler 2000; Thaler 2015.) In this literature, recent studies have shown that behavior 
can change dramatically depending on the setting of a transaction. Dan Ariely and others 
have done groundbreaking work on this (Ariely 2009; Heyman and Ariely 2004; Mazar, 
Amir, and Ariely 2008). They have described how human beings distinguish between a 
social and a monetary market: For example, even if you know that professional movers 
charge $15/hour for moving a couch, you might still agree to help a friend move for free. 
If he offers you 15 cents for your help, however, you might refuse. In the first instance, 
you decide to help because the cultural environment has created a certain code of conduct 
regarding friendship, and, in the second case, you decide against it, because your friend 
switched to a market setting and you are not willing to sell your labor below the regular 
market price. Contrary to Becker and other economists, our preferences are not fixed, and 
the social setting can have a huge impact on our decision making: 15 cents is better than 
nothing, yet some people would be compelled to regard this offer as an insult and refuse to 
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provide the same kind of help they would have provided if  asked by a friend. Which of 
these decisions would be rational? From a purely individualistic viewpoint the latter, the 
hidden weakness of the economic or neoclassical approach is that it cannot account for 
intersubjectivity without becoming tautological.  
Of course, 50 cents are more than zero, but it is the perceived insult from a friend 
that causes the rejection of the offer, even if we could make good use of the money. In the 
words of Plato, we might be thirsty, but we refuse to drink. The importance of this should 
not be underestimated. If the only reason we do not commit crimes is because of a fear of 
being caught and punished, you move criminal behavior from the social to the monetary 
market. Should I steal gum from the supermarket? Should I take the old lady’s purse? After 
all, if I can do it without being caught, obviously the supermarket and the old lady made a 
mistaken calculation regarding security and the risk of being robbed – it is basically their 
own fault. And economists have told us it would be irrational not to follow my preference 
for gum and money out of some (according to them) weird moral commitment.  
Becker also cannot assure us that the state, which is supposed to play significantly 
into our cost-benefit analysis due to its power to punish, will not descend into complete 
corruption. In the end, the state and its institutions are made up of bureaucrats, so which 
incentives will prevent them from taking bribes if they are certain they will not be caught? 
James Q. Wilson, who was somewhat of a “soft rationalist,” described in his work about 
bureaucracy how complete rationality would almost never suffice to fulfill the tasks a 
complex organization is supposed to fulfill (J. Q. Wilson 1989). In fact, the more complex 
organizations become, the more important culture becomes as well, since it plays an 
important role if you want to keep enforcement (or transaction) costs low and maintain 
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high levels of trust in your organization. (A similar argument is made by the proponents of 
the concept of social capital like Fukuyama 1996; Ostrom and Ahn 2003.) Francis 
Fukuyama even goes so far to claim that “a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to 
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust 
inherent in the society” (Fukuyama 1996, 7).  
Before a community can aspire to cooperate in the execution of complex tasks, the 
community as such must exist, and the level of “existence” or cohesiveness of a community 
is largely defined by the trust between its members and the mechanics that exist in order to 
sustain that trust. As we have discussed previously, this is where the culture-emotions 
connection comes in that defines the way individuals feel about others and the group as 
such. It is no coincidence that the modern corporation emerged out of family businesses – 
i.e., individuals that were connected by high levels of trust (Fukuyama 1996; Greif 2006a) 
within the original emotional community, the family. In some instances, culture managed 
to expand that trust beyond the family and allow the economic expansion to go beyond the 
limits of kinship. Capitalism, just like other forms of exchange, is not the natural order of 
things but was itself the result of a culture that enabled the mindset necessary to trust others, 
allow interest and the accumulation of capital, as well as encourage a positive attitude 
towards being wealthy. The argument that culture played a key role is not particularly new  
and has been made by numerous scholars (Casson 2006; McCloskey 2007, 2010, 2017; 
Mokyr 2018; Sapienza, Zingales, and Guiso 2006). What seems to elude them, however, 
is that culture did not just appear before the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution 
and then disappeared once economic growth took off around 1800. Recalling our earlier 
chapter dealing with the first permanently settled societies, the arguments made by Max 
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Weber and others about the influence of culture on economic behavior most likely have 
also been true, when some societies decided to settle down while others remained hunter 
gatherers and nomadic.  
We are once again faced with what one could call the “fallacy of cultural 
foundations.” We take the cultural fundament that created a community out of shared 
morals for granted, assuming that one can replace morality with rationality. Yet this seems 
highly unlikely, because the claim that cost-benefit analysis is the most rational way to 
approach a problem has significant moral content. It is only a small step from arguing that 
moving from behavior is rational to seeing such behavior is good thus creating a completely 
new moral matrix (and thereby culture) that structures social relations. Although 
unintentionally, my point is that Becker and others are not making a descriptive argument; 
instead, they are making a deeply prescriptive and cultural one, telling us how the rational 
society is supposed to work.  
The reason why I spent a significant part of the first chapters on historical and 
anthropological anecdotes was to demonstrate the pluralism of behavior that can be 
perceived as good or rational in the eyes of those who act. If we elevate the individual cost-
benefit analysis to be the most important threshold when considering an action, we will act 
differently compared with, for example, thresholds of a religious nature. The rational 
choice theorist wants to have her cake and eat it too, getting rid of culture, but keeping its 
effects on sociability. The problem is that some economists realized that the market 
depends on non-market forces and that the attempt make them marketable effectively 
changes their nature: As Kenneth Arrow has argued:  
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Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely 
efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other 
people’s word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought 
very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what 
you’ve bought. Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth-telling, are 
examples of what the economist would call ‘externalities.’ They are goods, 
they are commodities; they have real, practical, economic value; they 
increase the efficiency of the system, enable you to produce more goods or 
more of whatever values you hold in high esteem. But they are not 
commodities for which trade on the open market is technically possible or 
even meaningful (Arrow 1974, 23). 
 
Arrow does not deny the value of rational choice, but he is aware of its limits and 
the dangers of turning a tool of analysis into a normative concept (Arrow 1982). If we 
imagine a society where every behavior has to be judged by economic criteria, trust would 
only emerge if both sides can be sure of their mutual benefit from trusting. Taking this 
approach to the extreme would mean that those who trust without clearly benefiting from 
it would be acting irrationally, potentially socially stigmatizing those who do not follow 
the rules of the market. But if trust can be solely based on expected benefit, the need for a 
powerful third party emergeies that ensures that both sides live up to the agreed upon 
bargain.  
At the end of Becker’s vision is a police state that ensures that any cost-benefit 
calculation will make crime and cheating too expensive, but no longer will moral 
considerations play any role. Not culture or morals define your behavior, but the fear of 
punishment and lost utility. Welcome to Hobbes’ world.!  There we would be all alone and  
only the mighty Leviathan state would exist to prevents us from taking advantage of each 
other. As I will demonstrate in the following pages, the true father of modern economics is 
not Adam Smith, but Thomas Hobbes. And it is not political science that has been 
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emulating economics, but economics that has been emulating the Hobbesian version of 
political science.  
Contrary to his modern interpreters, Smith distinguished carefully between the 
different areas of life and their demands on human behavior, as well as the difference 
between laissez faire economics and laissez faire politics. The distortion of Smith’s work 
is astounding, if not necessarily intentional. Students around the globe are taught his Wealth 
of Nations, while his more profound and constantly updated and revised The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments is largely  ignored. This is concerning, because Smith’s thinking about 
society and the market is in many areas more complex than that of many of his successors. 
Before turning to the question of economics, Smith concerned himself with matters of 
morality, concluding that human behavior is mainly driven with our concern for others: 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the 
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or 
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner” (A. Smith 1982, 9). 
 
Smith talks about our interest in others as an “original passion” (A. Smith 1982, 
chap. 1), something we are born with and not something that is acquired via socialization. 
The notion that human relationships can or should only be the result of self-interest is 
nowhere to be found in his writings. At the same time, however, Smith was well aware that 
just as sociability is a human trait, so is the ability for self-interest and that there are plenty 
of situations where self-interest is the appropriate approach. It is here where is Wealth of 
Nations comes in, an analysis of a very specific aspect of human behavior, namely the one 
necessary for the functioning of markets. So Smith provided two major works, one dealing 
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with a general analysis of human behavior and a case study of the market. The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments then is the foundation for the Wealth of Nations (Macfie 1959), and the 
latter is not to be understood as a generalized theory of human behavior. 
First of all, the marketplace is an exceptional situation in which the assumptions of 
rational choice can apply wholesale, including knowledge about the motivation of an 
individual or a group that participate in the market. If I go to a store to buy a hammer and 
there are two almost identical models, I most likely will pick the one with the better (i.e. 
cheaper) price. Similarly, if a large number of individuals is engaging in the buying and 
selling of stocks, we can somewhat safely assume that their goal is profit maximization. 
Whether it is the shop owner selling me the hammer or the company issuing the shares, 
both sides of the exchange know the goals of the other side as well as their own, so the 
economic transaction can take place with a limited amount of social transaction. This is 
what Adam Smith means when he writes that the main driver of market forces is individual 
self-interest, not social mindedness: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher the 
brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” 
(A. Smith 2005, 26).  
What these described actions of trade have in common is that they almost entirely 
lack any intersubjective quality, meaning that I am making my decision in isolation from 
others, thereby fulfilling a key assumption of rational choice theory. Another important 
point is that the so-called economic imperialism of economics into political science is 
actually the consequence of a reverse imperialism occurring a few centuries earlier. The 
idea of human nature in the marketplace and its application on other realms did not start 
with Gary Becker (Becker 1993) or the popular book series “Freakonomics” (Levitt and 
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Dubner 2009, 2011).  Its origins reside in the self-declared father of political science, 
Thomas Hobbes. The market place in its purest form is the ultimate social contract – 
rational individuals get together and agree on rules of how to engage in order to ensure the 
highest possible mutual benefit, and once the market transaction is concluded they return 
to their individualistic self. Homo oeconomicus owes more to Thomas Hobbes than to 
Adam Smith, and could with some justification be renamed Homo-Hobbes.  
In a world where human relations could be reduced to the transaction of goods and 
services, culture would indeed become obsolete. Voltaire as well as Smith saw that in the 
marketplace we do not trade as Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians but as self-interested 
individuals who are seeking to maximize their utility. Relationships in the market are 
entered for mutual benefit and can be relinquished or renewed based on a cost-benefit 
analysis. The problem that Smith saw and that many of his later followers have been 
overlooking, however, is that we cannot organize all human relationships in a market 
fashion. There is a life beyond the market, and most people find their identity not in buying 
and selling alone, but in establishing relationships with others that are of emotional and 
psychological value. The idea that there are economic solutions to all societal problems – 
whether in a free market or socialist variety – is fundamentally anti-cultural and rests on 
the idea that human emotions are reactions caused only by material needs. Yet despite 
growing global prosperity, culture stubbornly refuses to disappear. This is because the 
nature of economic transactions is itself culturally influenced. The entire advertising 
industry appeals to our cultural side, trying to influence our economic decision making to 
go beyond mere cost-benefit analysis and self-interested utility maximization. In other 
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words, even the markets are often part of a cultural sphere that influences our supposedly 
rational decision-making.  
The elegance and persuasiveness of formal mathematical models in economics tend 
to come at the cost of reliability, because in real life the predictive power of economic 
models has been rather poor. Barely any of the recessions and economic downturns has 
been predicted correctly by such models (An, Jalles, and Loungani 2018; Morson and 
Schapiro 2018, x). This justifies casting doubt on the disciplines self-declared superiority. 
Nonetheless, at least since the 1960s mathematical abstractions increased in importance 
compared to the realm of culture with its identities, norms, aspirations, ideologies and 
ideas. (For a related history of political science see: Dryzek 2006; Gunnell 2005). The 
social sciences started to embrace a naturalistic monism that saw value only in applying 
the methods of the natural sciences, and one way to do so was through the reduction of 
social order and social action to material interests and utility maximization (Ruggie 1998, 
859).  
There have been some changes in this trend, and political science as well as 
economics are starting to pay renewed attention to matters of culture, even though full 
systemic integration is still missing. Katzenstein and others have been leading such efforts 
to bring renewed attention to matters of identity formation (Abdelal 2009; Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999; Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996). And even economists have begun 
to concede the importance of culture in human decision making (Akerlof and Kranton 
2011; Akerlof and Shiller 2010; Sapienza, Zingales, and Guiso 2006). Recognizing the 
limitations of economic forecasting, the noble laureate Robert Shiller created the the 
subfield of “Narrative Economics,” with the goal to explain how the way we perceive the 
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world influences our emotions and decision making (Shiller 2017). Recalling a 
conversation he had with the historian Ramsey MacMullen, author of Feelings in History: 
Ancient and Modern (MacMullen 2003), he states that what we lack is  a word conveying 
“stimulus to some emotional response, and there is no such word” (Shiller 2017, 973). I 
hope that based on the first part of this dissertation we can say that such a word actually 
exists, and that word is culture. Shiller and others are still tip-toeing around the term, and 
even his paper manages to talk about cultural phenomena while only using the word culture 
once.39 Nonetheless, this is a movement in the right direction and a welcome change from 
the claim that narratives are no more than “mere storytelling” (Ruggie 1998, 884). It also 
helps us to understand that the inclusion of cultural factors is not primarily opposed to the 
idea of rationality, but actually lends precision and nuance to it. Once we understand what 
motivates groups and individuals, we can adapt the parameters of rationalist models to 
include culture. Studying different economic behavior across countries, research has shown 
that “variables reflecting culture have as much power as variables derived from the 
lifecycle hypothesis in explaining cross-country savings ratios” (Akerlof 2007, 16).  
While these developments demonstrate a newfound interest in culture, we need to 
investigate in more detail why it fell out of fashion in the first place. The question of culture 
has been a contested issue in Western science for several centuries, but we are still missing 
a comprehensive account of what was at the root of these quarrels. The following chapters 
will try to address this question in more detail. 
 
 
39 It does appear four additional times in the references.  
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CHAPTER IV: CULTURE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
The matter of culture takes an important turn with the beginning of the 
Enlightenment and the growing influence of the idea that nature as well as social life can 
be entirely subjugated to human will and the human capacity for planning. If culture 
enabled community through intuitive and emotional commitments to a group, the same 
should be possible on the basis of reason. The Enlightenment, in other words, did not view 
culture as unimportant, it just viewed it as obsolete. The world became disenchanted 
(Gauchet 1999), and nothing could withstand the forces of science and reason, liberating 
the individual and making community a means to serve this liberation. Emotions 
particularly came under suspicion and were supposed to take a backseat to the rational and 
cognitive (Haidt 2013). 
Yet despite its novelty in many areas, the Enlightenment was also wrestling with 
questions that can be found at the earliest stages of political philosophy: The issue of 
emotions has been identified by ancient Greek philosophy in many variations, particularly 
the dilemma whether loyalty should be with one’s state or one’s family (Hill 2010, pt. 1; 
S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 2). Whether the inherent tension “between a politics of pure 
reason—the sophistic claim that man is the measure of all things—and the attitude of 
sacred awe and piety before those things that reason cannot control” (S. B. Smith 2012, 18) 
can be resolved loomed large in Western philosophy more than a millennium before the 
Enlightenment emerged. The philosophical dualism between emotion and cognition is 
mirrored in political thought, and the difficulty and perhaps impossibility of a satisfactory 
resolution lay at the heart of the debate between Enlightenment and the Counter-
Enlightenment thinkers.  
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It was with Thomas Hobbes that we first encounter the popularization of the idea 
that the emotions that bind us together also make us use violence against each other, and 
that therefore any political construct should aim primarily at the limitation of emotions. As 
we will see, Hobbes accepted the emotion of fear in the hope that if we accept that our 
undisturbed physical existence is the best we can hope for, our fear of losing our security 
should also make us more peaceful or at least less violent.  
In the following chapters I will attempt to create a genealogy of political thought 
that ultimately led to the marginalization of culture in the social sciences. Culture rests on 
perceptions of the world that in turn built upon ideas about the world (discussed as 
discussed shared mental models), highlighting the importance of ideas in societal 
development. This does not mean, however, that the influence of ideas is straightforward, 
and the way they affect the thinking of generations of intellectuals can of course stray 
significantly from the original inception of an idea. (For an overview how ideas can change 
see: Berlin 2013a, 2019.) The history of the Enlightenment is often emptied of its cultural 
content (C. Taylor 1995), basing itself solely on the idealistic Kantian view that the 
Enlightenment is the end to our (intellectual) immaturity and inability to think for 
ourselves, opening up the world to the irresistible force of reason (Kant 1784a).  
Yet this very idea depended on a very specific set of cultural factors, where religion 
and tradition were replaced with the idea of explaining the world through rational 
reasoning. What this ignores, however, is that reason itself wasn’t born ex nihilo (out of 
nothing and/nowhere), but in many respects concluded an intellectual tradition that started 
in ancient Greece, was lost for a time in medieval times only to be rediscovered and merged 
with Christianity (Herman 2010). Even medieval Christianity was not characterized by 
 
195 
 
blind faith and with Thomas Aquinas and his Summa Theologica in the late 13th century, 
even the existence of God increasingly needed to be proved logically. (See in particular 
Aquinas’ writings on “Proof of God’s Existence” in: Aquinas 1998, chap. 11.) Similarly, 
in the Islamic world science developed as a means to certify the existence of a deity and 
not to refute it (D. A. King 2016). The relationship between science and religion has overall 
been more complex than is often assumed, and just like there is no major civilization 
without religion, all major civilizations also had scientific aspirations (Selin 2016).  
The key difference in Western culture was that gradually science became 
disconnected from religion and turned into a sacred core in its own right. This is not a 
minor observation, since there has been a growing trend in popular literature arguing that 
the Enlightenment is antithetic to human nature, that it replaced irrationality with 
rationality, superstition with science, and made us more peaceful, more understanding and, 
in short, better people (this line of argument is popular with conservative and liberal leaning 
authors. See, for example: Goldberg 2019; Pinker 2018). But this is an absurd contention, 
since it is built on the assumption that the entirety of Western civilization was built on a 
mass revolt against human nature – the sheer possibility of which would render the very 
concept of human nature meaningless. If the Enlightenment is truly the antithesis to human 
nature, it should never have occurred in the first place, much less as a phenomenon of such 
influence and durability.  
The Enlightenment in my argument is a cultural phenomenon that created its own 
system of emotional commitments that were susceptible to technological progress and 
fostered by ideas like universal human rights and democratic government. But none of 
these notions was a rejection of human nature, but rather the consequence of what we 
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discussed in previous chapter—namely, the human ability to experiment with different 
forms of societal organization. I have already hinted in the previous chapters at certain 
forces that also sprang from the Enlightenment and to which we will return again—
specifically, the existence of a dark side of the Enlightenment and the modernity it 
produced (Jeffrey C. Alexander 2013) precisely because it could never fully replace the 
emotional longings of human beings and the complexities of human interaction. Instead of 
replacing emotions with rationality, it connected them, allowing the emergence of 
ideologies that claimed to justify a wide and often horrific variety of policies on scientific 
grounds.  
While I dedicated an entire chapter to the rise of economics to demonstrate that 
there are areas of human interaction where instrumental rationality serves us well, I doubt 
that these areas can be expanded to all aspects of human life. Class, race, nation, ideology-
the Enlightenment brought forth a plethora of new ideas regarding the creation of 
community, replacing the once dominant position of religion as the cultural center of 
society. Authors like Steven Pinker tend to cherry-pick from the historical record what they 
count as part of the Enlightenment and what to the anti-Enlightenment reaction. Such a 
reading of history allow a thinker such as Pinker to group everything he regards as bad the 
17th century as part of the counter-Enlightenment and everything good as part of the 
Enlightenment. But this is a profound misreading of the actual history of the 
Enlightenment. Indeed, many of the central elements of Enlightenment thought were alive 
and thrived in the destructive ideologies of the 20th century. Fascist and communist 
ideologies prided themselves on the “scientific” content of their theories (Peukert 1994; 
Weikart 2006) and constantly threatened and ridiculed religious worldviews. In the words 
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of Martin Bormann, Hitler’s secretary and de-facto deputy “Führer” of Nazi Germany: 
“National Socialism on the other hand must always, if it is to fulfill its job in the future, be 
organized according to the latest knowledge of scientific research” (quoted in: Conway 
1997, 383). Yet despite the ridicule they had reserved for religion, their own theories 
attempted to bring back what the Enlightenment in its idealized form was unable to provide 
– a sense of belonging and transcendental purpose (Habermas 2010). The argument that 
twentieth century forms of totalitarianism are partially rooted in the lost emotional 
connections to others and a pervasive feeling of loneliness was explicitly advanced by 
Hannah Arendt: 
What prepares men for totalitarian domination in the non-totalitarian 
world, is the fact that loneliness, once a borderline experience, usually 
suffered in certain marginal social conditions like old age, has become an 
everyday experience of the ever growing masses of our century (Arendt 
1973, 478). 
 
The desire to fill this void in some instances morphed into a toxic combination of 
religious-like fervor draped in the language of the Enlightenment, something that Fritz 
Stern (1974) justifiably labelled, “The politics of cultural despair.” The return of the human 
ability for mass slaughter and human sacrifice came back with a vengeance in the first half 
of the 20th century, and while Hitler and Stalin would have scoffed at the idea of human 
sacrifice for some deity, they nonetheless oversaw the killing of millions at the altars of 
race and class (For a deeper contextualization of the religious nature of 20th century 
ideologies see: Payne et al. 2008.) While it would go beyond the main scope of this 
dissertation, we should ask whether the conditions Arendt and Stern diagnosed did in fact 
disappear with the end of World War Two or if the experience of war and deprivation, as 
well as the exposure of unspeakably human cruelty, has only caused them to lie dormant. 
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New nationalisms, the resurgence of fundamentalist religion, and environmental 
eschatologies are not simply rational reactions to a challenging world, but manifest 
powerful emotional and passionate commitments continuous with the war years of the 
early-to-mid twentieth century. I make no claim to the validity of the ideas that motivated 
these movements, but it does seem obvious that their actions should also be understood as 
emotional phenomena that satisfy a sense of belonging.  
More to the point, the question we need to engage here is whether the loss of a sense 
of belonging was a deliberate or an accidental part of the Enlightenment. As I will argue 
in the following pages, this was not just an accident but built into a set of core ideas. The 
reason for this was not that the Enlightenment did not take the matter of emotions seriously, 
but that on the contrary many of the Enlightenment philosophers saw this desire for 
emotional fulfillment as the main political problem to be solved. Moreover, these thinkers 
had strong arguments to support their case – specifically the fact, that the most devastating 
wars before the emergence of the Enlightenment were fought in the name of religion and 
driven by the fervor with which human beings held their beliefs. Without these emotional 
commitments, violence could become less frequent or maybe be banished as a way to 
conduct human affairs altogether.  
If this fervor could be lessened, the likelihood of violent conflict – its was believed 
– should also diminish. But if culture is the embodiment of collectively- and emotionally- 
held systems of belief, a weakening of these emotional commitments perforce leads to a 
weakening of culture itself. I argue that this well-intended idea stands at the beginning of 
the anti-cultural turn and does so to this day. As we have discussed before, in light of this 
argument, it should not be surprising that the field of economics has assumed such a role 
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model, since it is the field in which the matter of culture has been most successfully 
obscured. The moral case the Enlightenment is making for the importance of the individual  
is less driven by the idea of individualism as an end in itself (see: Siedentop 2015, for a 
history of individualism), but by the idea that individualism and valuing of the self will be 
a counterweight to any tendency towards self-sacrifice or murder in the name of a religion 
or ideology. This makes clear that postmodernity with its abandonment of so-called meta-
narratives (Lyotard 1984) is much closer to original Enlightenment thought than is often 
conceded. Critical theory too tends to overlook this part when two of its main 
representatives write that “for the Enlightenment, whatever does not conform to the rule of 
computation and utility is suspect. Enlightenment is totalitarian” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
2007, 6). While I would agree with the general assessment, I think the conclusion is 
misguided. The very reason for the Enlightenment’s emphasis on computation and utility 
rests on the hope that rationality itself is the best way to prevent and reduce human beings’ 
totalitarian tendencies. If I no longer care about the religious and ideological world of my 
neighbor and I can rest content with the knowledge that while emotionally less fulfilled, 
my life will be safe and economically prosperous, why should there be any reason for 
violence or a totalitarian state.  
Intellectuals in philosophical circles often-shunned bourgeois thinking that 
exemplifies precisely this type of society—i.e., autonomous individuals connected by 
economic interests but nothing more. (For an overview of the anti-bourgeois reaction to 
the Enlightenment see: S. B. Smith 2016.)  But this type of bourgeois principle is almost 
entirely fictional. As we have pointed out before, many revolutions are triggered and 
depend on the middle class, and even World War One was more of a middle-class 
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phenomenon (Eksteins 2000; Fussell 2000) than one driven by the monarchs who ruled the 
European powers. (Some authors even argue that European royalty was one of the least 
war inclined classes in the Europe of 1914. See: Clark 2013.)  
But even defenders of the bourgeois Enlightenment tend to get it partially wrong. 
In her multi-volume vindication of the Enlightenment and the society it produced, Deirdre 
McCloskey praises the 
broader, not narrower, choices of identity than the one imposed on 
them by the country, custom, language, and religion of their birth. They 
have deeper, not shallower, contacts with the transcendent of art or science 
or God, and sometimes even of nature, than the superstitious peasants and 
haunted hunters-gatherers from whom we all descend (McCloskey 2007, 
KL 512-514). 
 
But this is precisely the problem identified by the critics of the Enlightenment. If 
there are so many choices of identities, can there ever be something like an authentic 
identity be left? Horkheimer and Adorno lament the “mechanical” and totalitarian nature 
of modernity that McCloskey seeks to refute, pointing towards the wide array of choices 
made possible by modernity. In the end, however, their differences are only superficial 
ones because they do agree on the underlying issue: The main reality is an economic reality 
that depends on utility and calculation, and everything else is relegated to private and 
individual pleasures that should have no or only limited impact on the public sphere. In 
other words, the public sphere should be an economic sphere because the existence of 
mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services should make violence increasingly 
unlikely, since it would go against one’s major interest: the economic one. This society is 
therefore neither totalitarian since it allows for a large private sphere with significant 
autonomy, something that would be unthinkable in a truly totalitarian society. Nor is it full 
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of deeper contacts, because the sheer fact of choice makes it harder to have strong 
commitments and the promotion of an economic mindset increasingly contradicts these 
strong commitments, because by a mere utility calculation there might be no point to stay 
with a community that asks more of me in sacrifice than it brings to me in benefits.40 
At this point it is important to clarify something in order to avoid confusion later 
on—that is, the claim that Enlightenment thinking created some of the ideological 
preconditions for Fascism and Communism must not be confused with the claim that 
Enlightenment thinkers themselves were inclined towards totalitarianism. On the contrary, 
my claim is that the Enlightenment was deliberately seeking out a way to avoid forms of 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism by elevating reason above emotion. They could not 
have anticipated that the need for emotional fulfillment and their ideas would create 
modernity’s primordial intellectual soup out of which every modern ideology from 
liberalism to totalitarianism would emerge. The initially optimistic idea was that the natural 
sciences would lead the way and the epistemology so that in the same way human beings 
gained control over nature, the natural and social sciences would gain control over the 
social world, replacing conflict with harmony and prosperity based on scientific processes 
that would be so obvious that force would be unnecessary to convince the people of its 
validity and everybody would join out of their own volition.  
The Enlightenment’s abandonment of a specific type of belief system that was 
based on revelation and the supernatural led to the optimistic worldview that without god 
and religion, the way would be free for the full emancipation of reason and rationality. The 
 
40 A similar point is made by Fukuyama (2006, pt. V) in his engagement with Nietzsche’s concept 
of “The Last Man.” 
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problem, however, never was god or religion per se, but the human ability to turn 
everything they believe in into a sacred and inviolable issue, a consequence of the 
emotional attachments that we discussed in the previous chapters. Religion certainly 
deserves a special status as one of the oldest belief systems we know about, but this does 
not mean that the psychology that enables us to experience religion simply disappears once 
we disavow the Torah, the Bible, the Quran, or any other faith system. 
Mass slaughter in the name of ideologies in the first half of the 20th century should 
serve as a stark reminder that just because a society abandons belief in the supernatural 
does not mean it abandons belief as such. Moreover, it will not suffice to simply ascribe 
these events to anti-Enlightenment movements. The communist and fascist regimes that 
rose from the ashes of the First World War did perceive themselves as alternative 
modernities but not as reactionary movements (Griffin 2008, 2010). They claimed to have 
found the answer to the anxieties of the modern era, and this claim was so seductive that 
even a mind as brilliant as Martin Heidegger fell for its appeal. Both major ideologies did 
not appeal to the people because of their conservative or reactionary content, but because 
of their self-perception as revolutionary movements that found the answer to the pressing 
question of the 19th century: how to maintain a sense of belonging and meaning in a world 
that has become thoroughly secularized and devoid of all transcendental meaning (I claim 
the centrality of this question because it was a main theme for every social commentator 
from Durkheim to Taylor. See: Carlyle 1869; Durkheim 2006, 2008; James 2011; C. Taylor 
2007a; Thiele 1994). 
To make this observation is not to endorse these movements, and the story of course 
is much more complex. Just because these ideas existed did not guarantee that they would 
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or will ever come to power; and I would discourage any historicist approach that claims 
that the Gulag and the Holocaust have been written into the DNA of the Russian and 
German people, simply waiting to break free. My analyses and arguments do not claim to 
have all the answers, but I suspect that one of the reasons why totalitarian movements came 
to power is because the pre-existing systems lost all legitimacy and support as a 
consequence of the lost World War. These systems were already under pressure before 
1914, but tradition and economic progress maintained and sustained emotional ties that 
kept them in power. Being utterly defeated in a war that they promised to win opened up 
an ideological and cultural gap, because the emotions once invested in the ancient regime 
needed “rewiring,” and totalitarian ideologies arose to fill that gap.  
One should, however, not only focus on radical and negative examples. The idea of 
society as a community with shared values is not limited to religion and totalitarian 
ideologies but also played a role in the ideological evolution of Great Britain, as can be 
seen in the conservative political theories and writings of Edmund Burke (see: Levin 2014) 
or the United States’ concept of American exceptionalism (Bellah 1967; Bellah et al. 2008; 
Lipset 1997). The United States in particular is less a product of the Enlightenment in its 
purest form than in the application of Enlightenment ideas built on an emotional 
underpinning that the founders where well aware of and exemplified by John Adams: 
We have no government armed with power capable of contending 
with human passions unbridled by morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, 
revenge or gallantry would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as 
a whale goes through a net. Our Constitution is designed only for a moral 
and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for any other (Adams 1798). 
 
Contrary to the French Revolution of 1789 the American Revolution was much 
more careful in its handling of matters like religion. Whether or not the Founding Fathers 
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were religious or not is a lively debate for another place, but there can be little doubt that 
they were astutely aware of the social implications of religion, and that a wholesale 
abandonment in a revolutionary fashion could be troubling for the social cohesion of a 
young nation (for the role of religion in the founding of the US, see: Meacham 2007). 
Sometimes what seems to be superstitious and irrational is not necessarily without 
advantages regarding social organization. We know of no complex civilizations that 
existed wholly without religion – whether in the form of believing in a supernatural being, 
worshipping dead ancestors or obeying the rules of some sacred text. These sacred items 
are guidelines for our naturally occurring emotions. For example, we are all capable of 
feeling pride and shame or affection and anger. But what triggers these feelings is strongly 
influenced by culture. Some of the biggest successes in the liberation of the individual and 
the emergence of modernity have been achieved by precisely such a re-direction of 
emotions (for an overview of the literature describing the redirection of emotional triggers 
see: Keltner and Haidt 2001).  
Most people reject slavery not because of some rational cost-benefit analysis, but 
because the idea of slavery itself strikes us as repulsive. The rejection of slavery becomes 
a cultural phenomenon, something we retain due to an emotional tie to values, not 
something that we have to renegotiate with every new generation. We might like to tell 
ourselves that the moral advances of the last few centuries like the abolition of slavery, rise 
of women’s rights, and legitimation of the LGBTQ movement are all the consequence of 
reason’s final victory, but this could be a dangerous misinterpretation as to how that 
progress was achieved. All these social changes were driven by a change in the emotional 
reaction people held towards each one od them, so  just as being gay was once seen as a 
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mental illness at best and a moral abomination at worst, now we tend to see it the other 
way round. It is no coincidence that we use the term homophobic, indicating that a rejection 
of homosexuality is a phobia, something grounded in an irrational fear.  
To be very clear, I am not creating a moral equivalency here; on the contrary the 
goal is to demonstrate that the path towards a liberal and tolerant society has to lead 
through culture and not around it. This in my argument was the grand miscalculation of 
modernity and the Enlightenment: the idea that the passions themselves can be wholly 
redirected into self-fulfillment and economic interests and that this new form of 
individualism will finally resolve the problem of violent anarchy.  
The reduction in violence that has been documented by Steven Pinker (Pinker 2011) 
is not simply the result of us getting more rational, but of filling the idea of resolving 
conflicts without violence and respecting the dignity of others with emotional content. It 
could be very dangerous to assume that this progress is irreversible; such a view reveals a 
profound misreading of history. The argument has been made before, but it is worth 
repeating: totalitarian ideas did not take hold of the world’s most irrational societies 
isolated from the ideas of science and progress, but emerged in societies that in many 
respects were among the most advanced of their time. And totalitarianism did not only 
appeal to the masses, but was equally widespread among the intellectual classes.  
In his study about the Russian Revolution Orlando Figes writes that “most of the 
revolutionary leaders were first and foremost intellectuals. Their heads were full of 
European literature and history” (Figes 1998, 125). The same is true of National Socialism 
(Höhne 2000; Ingrao 2015) and contemporary ideological movements like political Islam 
(Byman 2015). These movements were able to inspire and incite a crucial mass of their 
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followers to believe in the rationality of their actions, and to pursue them at all cost. Often 
these ideologies were able to build on what was left of the legitimacy of the previous regime 
and thereby bolster their own. The loyalty of the population and especially the state 
apparatus to the Nazi government remained very high until the approach of the end, and 
there can be no doubt that the war would have ended sooner if the regime would have 
collapsed through growing internal resistance, just like Wilhelmine Germany did in 1918. 
But the ability of National Socialism to describe and assert itself successfully as a 
legitimate form of government in the eyes of most of the German people and project all the 
existing German passions of loyalty, patriotism, and nationalism onto itself played a key 
role in preventing an uprising against the regime. (Ian Kershaw describes in great detail 
how little public support there was for resistance against Hitler, and how many members 
of the military felt that they could not break the oath they swore, despite their realization 
of what was going on. See: Kershaw 2001, 656) 
As always, however, one can point to positive examples of such a process as well. 
The cultural change running through US history from being a slave-holding society to one 
of the freest countries in the world is a story of cultural change that happened gradually 
and with the constant building of new ideas on existing ones. The efforts of Frederick 
Douglass, Martin Luther King, the abolitionists, as well as the Civil Rights Movement, 
stand witness as examples to the energy and perseverance such a process requires. Both 
Frederick Douglass and Martin Luther King appealed to the promise of America and its 
Constitution, thereby directly addressing the emotional core of American identity and an 
existing shared mental map defining what it means to be American. Whether intuitively or 
strategically, individuals like Douglass or King realized what constituted the “sacred” on 
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the other side and used it to convince others of their position. In other words, individuals 
like Douglass and King connected emotionally with society, creating an atmosphere where 
negative emotions were increasingly connected with opposing their ideas, while positive 
emotions derived from supporting them.  
Despite claims to rationality as the basis of government, the concept of the sacred 
exists also in secular societies and these sacred institutions often play a fundamental role 
in maintaining a society’s social cohesion. Take, for example, the US Supreme Court as 
the final arbiter in constitutional disputes. With the constitution being one of the most 
sacred artifacts in American political life, the role of the court equals that of a class of high 
priests. (This observation is neither original nor new; see, for example: Segall 2018, 12.)  
The influence wielded by nine robed individuals over deeply cultural questions like the 
definition of marriage, freedom of speech, or the termination of pregnancies is not so much 
justified by a democratic process that underpins the decisions in such cases, but by the 
legitimacy the Supreme Court enjoys among the people. The religious-like reception of the 
US Constitution was intended and expressed by its architect, Chief Justice John Marshall 
in Cohens v. Virgina in 1821, when he ruled for the court, writing: “A constitution is framed 
for ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions 
can approach it” (Marshall 1821). The US constitution is perceived as the highest 
expression of the will of the people in an almost Rousseauean approach of the general will, 
that has authority over all other laws. 
Although made by human beings, the constitution derives much of its power from 
its metaphysical quality of laying out what values are central to the American identity. 
Therefore, even laws that have the support of the people can be overturned if they are 
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deemed unconstitutional and thereby in violation of the US’ founding values. Religious 
conflicts in the United States are not fought on theological grounds, but constitutional ones, 
since the court enjoys such legitimacy throughout the country that its verdicts are generally 
accepted even by the parts of the country that oppose the final outcome.41 This was 
captured quite nicely by the Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who remarked 
that:  
The court has no troops at its command, doesn’t have the power of 
the purse, and yet time and again, when the courts say something, people 
accept it. […] [After] the court rendered its decision, there were no riots in 
the streets. 42 
These sacred values are double-edged swords, for they are an effective glue to 
create communities, but they are also an efficient tool to organize them against each other. 
In the end, however, I believe there is significant supporting evidence to make the claim 
that without collectively-shared belief systems that are invested with intrinsic value, “it is 
hard to see how human beings could have evolved beyond small band-level societies” 
(Fukuyama 2012, 37). The question for modernity is whether we can build social cohesion 
without the negative side effects of sacred values. A first step into that direction, however, 
would be to acknowledge that all communities that expand beyond kinship have an array 
of sacred values, symbols, and rituals that tie their members together. It is no coincidence 
that even atheists start forming their own congregations that mimic a religious service 
 
41 The former Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi made exactly such an argument when she 
commented on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London: “So this is almost as if God has 
spoken.” 
42 These remarks were made during an interview on NPR. Available at 
https://www.npr.org/2019/07/24/744633713/justice-ginsburg-i-am-very-much-
alive?utm_term=nprnews&utm_campaign=politics&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&mod=
article_inline (last accessed July 31, 2019) 
 
209 
 
where people seek to form a community around the sacredness of not believing (Wheeler 
2013). 
The sidelining of culture in the social sciences is not simply grounded in a 
methodological quarrel but is based on prescriptive arguments by early political 
philosophers like Thomas Hobbes. Far from being ignorant of culture, Hobbes saw the 
willingness and fear of individuals to kill and be killed for some higher ideal as the main 
threat to what was to him most precious: human life and its survival. The writings of 
Hobbes can be read (in part at least) as a defense of individual life against the vicissitudes 
brought against us by nature and society alike. Contrary to those who interpret Hobbes as 
a materialist realist, he was seriously concerned with ideological and moral disagreements 
among people that could lead to conflict and create conditions where human existence was 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Abizadeh 2011). Hobbes did not emphasize 
individualism because he viewed it as the most natural state, but because he identified pure 
individualism and concentration on the self as a way to prevent conflict. We will also return 
to Hobbes in due time in this part of the dissertation, but for now it suffices to say that the 
stripping of culture as an important factor has only recently become a matter of 
methodology, when in the beginning of modern political thought was a matter of policy. 
The emphasis on reason and the belief in a rational social order are two sides of the same 
coin: rationality describes the best way to achieve it (hence often the term instrumental 
rationality) and reason helps us define individually and collectively beneficial goals. It is 
through this tandem that Enlightenment optimists like William Godwin could argue in the 
1790s that human society was progressing towards a state where everybody “was capable 
of listening with sobriety to the dictates of reason” (Godwin 2013, 77) and that a society 
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with barely any institutions can be sustained through a benevolent anarchy. Bernard 
Mandeville in his famous “Fable of the Bees” (Mandeville 1989) in the 18th century put 
forward the argument how selfishness - which he viewed as human beings’ main emotion 
- could lead to overall positive outcomes for society, echoing the idea that reason and 
rationality can be enough to sustain a society. For Mandeville and Godwin there is nothing 
truly sacred that should command our emotional commitment; and Godwin especially is 
straightforward about it, arguing that loyalty to one’s country, laws, or religion can only be 
justified by reason, which he defines as centered around “utility […] the only basis of moral 
and political truth” (Godwin 2013, 112). For thinkers like Godwin there was no longer a 
real place for culture in the field of politics, a mode of thought that has become dominant 
in many areas of political science.  
Some authors like Patrick Deneen have claimed that the disregard of culture is a 
consequence of political liberalism and individualism (Deneen 2018), but I conisider that 
assessment not entirely correct. A liberal political order and the emphasis on individualism 
are a consequence of an ideological anti-cultural term,  not the other way round.  
4.1 Avoiding Theoretical Strawmen 
I need to avoid from the outset the impression that my genealogy rests on the 
erection of theoretical strawmen. The history of ideas is a complex one, but there are more 
and less dominant schools of thought, and for the purpose of this dissertation we need to 
focus on those. As Peter Gay points out, the history of rationality in political thought and 
the tensions between the Enlightenment and Romanticism/Idealism involve not a clear-cut 
competition between different schools of thought (Gay 1954). The Romantics used 
rationality just as many members of the Enlightenment philosophers were, in the end, 
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romantic rationalists and rational romantics (McMahon 2002). The thought of Hobbes, 
Hume, Bentham, Smith and others has a level of complexity that often forced us to 
distinguish between their early and later writings as if they were written by completely 
different people. The same applies to writers like Aristotle, Rousseau, Habermas, Rawls 
and others. (On the often considerable evolution of thought, particularly regarding Hobbes 
and Rousseau, see: S. B. Smith 2016.)  
Yet not every idea of these thinkers has developed the same historical weight, and 
the fact that, for example, Adam Smith and David Hume were much closer to 
sentimentalism than tp rational utilitarianism did not prevent them from often being 
grouped with other rationalists. Some authors have named Smith in the same sentence with 
the extreme libertarian Bernard Mandeville, someone whose approach Smith 
wholeheartedly rejected (e.g. Rothschild 2003, 40; A. Smith 1982, 308). So we must 
distinguish between the actual ideas and the effective ideas of the thinkers and historical 
periods we are addressing. Someone like Montesquieu was fully aware that culture is a 
crucial factor when he wrote to the astonishment of his contemporaries that “when 
Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted that the religion of the Spaniards was good 
for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity” (Montesquieu 2011, 
KL 13678). Yet Montesquieu’s overall legacy is not that of a cultural pluralist but as one 
solidly in the camp of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on reason as the crucial bar every 
idea has to meet. Similarly, the position of Rousseau remains unclear since he can be read 
both as a defender as well as a critic of the Enlightenment (Berlin 2013b, 8; S. B. Smith 
2016). What remains particularly important for us is his claim that reason unites people, 
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while emotions divide them--the precise sentiment that lies at the heart of the anti-cultural 
turn.  
The principles laid out by the Enlightenment centered around the idea that the world 
around us is not only entirely intelligible, but that everything is governed by immutable 
laws that are waiting to be discovered. Emotions are mainly a reaction caused by the despair 
of us not knowing these laws, because once one knows the inevitability of causal reactions 
there is no point in reacting any more emotionally than we would to the fact that two plus 
two equals for (an argument also made by Berlin 2013b, 40). Isaiah Berlin offers us three 
basic assumptions that characterize the Enlightenment despite the existing disagreements 
between the philosophers of its time (Berlin 2013b, xiii): 
• All genuine questions can be answered 
• These answers can be known by methods that can be learnt and taught to others 
• The answers must be compatible with one another 
 
Based on these three principles, the Enlightenment ascribes to the idea that the order 
that was created through Newton’s methods regarding the physical universe could be 
repeated in the realm of the social or human sciences as well. Culture from the outset 
became problematic with respect to these three assumptions, because it would be difficult 
to fit the idea that the objectively same things could mean something different based on a 
person’s culture into the concept of universal applicability. As we have discussed in 
previously, it is also not something that can be learnt, but instead that needs to be felt. The 
application of naturalist methods in the social sciences also pushed forward the concept of 
materialism, making the standing of emotions as a crucial factor increasingly difficult. As 
“The Oxford Companion to Philosophy” explains, materialism became a precondition to 
apply the methods of natural science (Honderich 1995, 530), so in order to make social 
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phenomena subject to the natural sciences, it was advantageous if they could somehow be 
put into materialist shape first. The reduction of human motivation to material needs as the 
ultimate end might be true in some cases, but most definitely not in all instances; and as 
we saw in prior chapters, political scientists who remain befuddled as to why people do not 
always vote according to their economic interests tend to overlook that sometimes other 
considerations outweigh the purely materialistic ones. But there is another problem in that 
observation—namely, that people who do not act solely according to their economic 
interests are somehow irrational, and it is only a matter of time until the materialist mindset 
will replace supposedly higher values of a non-material nature. 
This second problem is a dangerous misperception. For it assumes that culture is 
somehow a leftover anomaly from pre-rational times and it is only a matter of time and 
education before all humans can turn into fully reasonably beings driven by nothing but 
instrumental rationality. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, culture did not end with 
modernity and the Enlightenment. On the contrary, the story of modernity is one of a 
continuing struggle over culture and its proper place in life. Some hoped that the 
Enlightenment would bring an end to this search altogether and that with culture’s 
banishment as the embodiment of emotional ties to custom and tradition societies would 
become even more cooperative and peaceful (see Condorcet for a good example for this 
way of thinking in Condorcet’s 1795 writing on the progress of the human mind-- 
Condorcet 2009). In his essay about secular religions, Raymond Aron makes a similar point 
(although without endorsing it), writing that “humankind, without God or master and ruling 
itself by reason, is bound to become peaceable and fulfilled” (Aron 2011, 103). Even more 
concise is Steven B. Smith’s argument about “the broader philosophical project of the 
 
214 
 
Enlightenment, with its goal of the liberation of men from the sway of prejudice and 
tradition” (S. B. Smith 1991, 12).  
The Enlightenment caused a real existential struggle in the intellectual circles of 
Europe that is still with us today. It is impossible to read Gustave Flaubert’s Madame 
Bovary, Leo Tolstoy’s War and Peace, his Anna Karenina, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment or The Brothers Karamazov as anything but novels wrestling with the idea 
of human life between tradition and modernity and the tensions between reason and 
morality. For the purpose of this dissertation the ultimate conclusions of Dostoevsky, 
Flaubert, and Tolstoy are not of concern. Raher, what is important is the extent to which 
the question of whether or not human life can be grasped rationally was a core topic for 
novelists as much as philosophers. While we should be careful not to draw simplified 
causal chains of history, the overall assumption that the Enlightenment did change the 
relationship between society and the individual and the role assigned to culture as a central 
element in the creation and sustainability of communities.  
 
4.2 From the Enlightenment to Rationalistic Utilitarianism 
There are reasons to believe that the rationalist-utilitarian worldview is a direct 
consequence of the triumph of the (idea of) reason put forward by the Enlightenment. The 
scientific method that emerged during that time opened the world to a form of inquiry that 
did not exist before. Although the scientific revolution did not develop independently of 
religion as is sometimes believed (Stark 2004, chap. 2), religion became increasingly 
identified as a source of conflict and violence. To rely on faith and by extension emotion 
was not seen as a way to generate and maintain communities, but to set them against each 
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other. It is no coincidence that Thomas Hobbes called voluntary associations “worms in 
the intestines of Leviathan” that must be “purged” (Hobbes 1988, chap. XXIX). Society 
supposedly consisted of independent individuals who should be arranged according to 
scientific knowledge, and not faith or tradition. Just as there are laws that govern physics, 
so there should be laws that govern society and politics. It is again no coincidence that 
August Comte originally wanted to call sociology social physics (Morson and Schapiro 
2018, 120), and that early anthropology was driven by similar ambitions. The early 
anthropologists were hoping for the ability to make a “prediction of our future” 
(Malinowski 2013, 8) or to arrange possibilities of human developments into “a table of 
elements” (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 55). Isaiah Berlin was among the first to point out that 
political science was from the very beginning influenced by the idea that the law of physics 
should have their equivalent in the social sciences.  According to Berlin, this ambition was 
the notion, either concealed or open, of both Hobbes and Spinoza, 
each in his own fashion—and of their followers—a notion that grew more 
powerful in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the natural 
sciences acquired enormous prestige, and attempts were made to maintain 
that anything not capable of being reduced to a natural science could not 
properly be called knowledge at all (Berlin 2019, 51).  
Jeremy Bentham believed that human morals can be studied like Newtonian physics 
(Bentham 2018, 169); Although the idea that the realm of the material and the realm of the 
social can be inquired by the same methods became the subject of strong criticism even in 
the writings of rationalists like Rawls (Rawls 1999) or Habermas (Habermas 1984), it did 
create a standard by which the social sciences became relegated to a supposedly second 
tier kind of science (Morson and Schapiro 2018). That this supported a new form of 
“philosophical radicalism” based on “moral Newtonianism” was pointed out as soon as 
1928 by philosophers like Elie Halevy (Morson and Schapiro 2018, 62), who were critical 
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of the idea of turning politics into a subfield of the natural sciences. In his study on the 
evolution of Newtonian influences on the social sciences Charles Camic writes that “the 
new scientific challenge led, above all else, to a search in history for the inevitable 
principles of its development” (Camic 1979, 537). 
The assumption of law-like behavior remains so pervasive that even a critic of 
rational choice theory like Ian Shapiro claims that without laws, the study of politics would 
become impossible:  
We are not saying that political behavior is not law governed; to 
make this claim would be effectively to give up on scientific study of 
politics. It is one thing, however, to suppose political behavior to be law 
governed, quite another to suppose that it is all governed by the same laws. 
Some kinds of political behavior may be irreducible instrumental, others 
irreducible expressive, routinized, or other-directed” (D. P. Green and 
Shapiro 1994, 184). 
 
Criticism of the natural scientific approach towards politics should not be confused 
with the resignation of the study of politics. What it should do, however, is alert us to look 
more closely for patterns of human behavior and the inherent difficulty of making it 
predictable soon or even in the long run.  
The question of universal laws that govern the behavior of humankind is not really 
new, and we can find it at least as early as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he argues 
that “the degree of precision and certainty that can be sought in the study of any subject [in 
this case, politics and ethics] is dependent on the nature of the particular subject” (Aristotle 
2009, Book 1, Chapter 3) and that “about some things it is not possible to make a universal 
statement which shall be correct” (Aristotle 2009b, 99). We are on much safer ground if 
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we perceive human behavior in terms of principles and not laws, allowing for a more 
central roles of the particularities that characterize individuals and societies.43  
The problem, however, was that the promise of “inexorable laws of social and 
cultural development” was too seductive and gradually replaced the more cautious 
approaches of Adam Smith and others (Camic 1979, 537), who still believed in the 
fundamental variability in human morality and its consequences on behavior. As we have 
already mentioned, it is no coincidence that the Wealth of Nations remains widely read, 
while the Theory of Moral Sentiments has been relegated almost exclusively to the 
philosophy departments or less often to history of modern economics courses. The reason 
for this development was the complex interplay of intellectual, social, and political forces 
that unfolded in the era of the Enlightenment. It is important to realize that there has been 
a tense relationship between culture and the Enlightenment’s emphasis on science from the 
very beginning, especially since the former was supposedly based primarily on 
superstition. By the same token, however, the idea was to create morality – which is at the 
core of culture – but free it from the surrounding ballast of belief and ritual. God or tradition 
were no longer an acceptable justification for morality, but that was not supposed to elevate 
an immoral world, but to create a moral society on surer footing. Consequently scripture 
and other sources were increasingly discarded as sources of moral authority (Hazony 
2012).  
 
43 The emergence of so-called “narrative economics” is precisely that: A return of casuistry and a 
gradual turn away from universalisms. It remains to be seen whether or not this new school of thinking will 
have a lasting impact on the social sciences, but it marks a first significant break with the core principles of 
the utilitarian viewpoint. 
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The utilitarian viewpoint does not deny the historical importance of culture; instead, 
it claims that with the emergence of reason humankind can free itself from the yoke of 
theological ignorance or mere philosophical abstraction. It is during the Enlightenment that 
human history is bestowed with a purpose—i.e., the culmination of historical experience 
in a secular and positivist stage, where 
the human mind, recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute 
truth, gives up the search after the origin and hidden causes of the universe 
and a knowledge of the final causes of phenomena. It endeavors now only 
to discover, by a well-combined use of reasoning and observation, the actual 
laws of phenomena – that is to say, their invariable relations of succession 
and likeness. The explanation of facts, thus reduced to its real terms, 
consists henceforth only in the connection established between different 
particular phenomena and some general facts, the number of which the 
progress of science tends more and more to diminish” (Comte 1988, 2). 
 
Culture came under pressure from the search for natural laws that govern society 
and the fear of culture as the main source of conflict. As we will see, the idea of society 
consisting of independent autonomous individuals is not just a descriptive concept, but a 
prescriptive one. It is no coincidence that Thomas Hobbes was a severe critic of Aristotle 
(Laird 1942) and the ancient Greek’s idea of natural sociability and the limits of absolute 
laws. 
Condorcet and other thinkers of the Enlightenment proposed a shift from 
transcendentalism and metaphysics to society as it objectively exists and questions about 
maximizing utility and happiness,  thereby creating a completely new ontological frame 
for human existence (Baker 2004, 58). The advancements in technology and state-
organization allowed an individualism that was historically unprecedented, since 
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community slowly but inevitably moved from being a necessity to being an option. Steven 
Smith points out what these changes meant:  
The Enlightenment had bequeathed a set of dichotomies between 
public and private, reason and passion, and the noumenal and phenomenal 
parts of the self that would have to be resolved if our moral and intellectual 
lives were to be satisfactory (S. B. Smith 1991, 7).  
 
This, in a nutshell, is the dilemma created by the Enlightenment and one of the core 
questions of modernity itself--how to resolve this dichotomy? To this day, I would argue, 
no satisfactory answer to this question has been presented, and that is at least partly due to 
the fact that one of the elements for bridging the dichotomy has been pushed to the side: 
namely, culture.  
The way we have discussed culture so far stems from a psychological-functionalist 
viewpoint – the role of culture in the creation of shared mental models and their role in the 
formation of communities. Here we will take a more political-philosophical look on 
culture, demonstrating, one hopes, that it can help us resolve this dichotomy. The 
Enlightenment’s critique of the old regimes being incompatible with human freedom was 
not a mistaken one; and Hobbes’, Locke’s, and other early modern theorists’ contention 
that the individual has a right to individualism and autonomy from arbitrary authority was 
crucial in the establishment of ideas like human rights and modern liberalism, two concepts 
that, I believe it fair to say have overall benefited the condition of humanity, since without 
them innovation and economic progress would have been hardly possible. What these 
concepts underestimated, however, is the human willingness to voluntarily, and even at the 
risk of personal disadvantages. join communities and submit to authority. This anti-
authoritarian turn rested on the idea that the individual is supposed to govern him- or 
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herself, based on what Hegel called “the atomistic principle, that which insists upon the 
sway of individual wills” (Hegel 2011, 405).  
One of the most durable influences of the Enlightenment on the social sciences was the 
idea that we can look at human nature in an individualized methodological fashion, stripped of 
all the diluting effects of society, upbringing, and tradition. While there is much to be said about 
the scientification of the study of humans, we cannot ignore the fact that it was very special 
historical and cultural circumstances that coincided in a way to allow for the emergence of 
Enlightenment thought itself. Contrary to the idea that rational thought is some kind of natural 
evolution of thought in general, I would argue that rationalism is in itself a product of culture. 
This has of course huge implications for the political application of Enlightenment ideas; the best 
ideas are hard to implement without the cultural setting in which they can flourish. The 
Enlightenment’s approach to history was addressed by the first significant figure of the counter-
Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in a similar but more nuanced way. Joining the 
Enlightenment philosophes in their rejection of Christianity, Rousseau remained convinced of 
the importance of religiosity as a core human sentiment. Therefore, he proposed the concept of a 
civil religion that would garb the underlying governance of human affairs by reason. Rousseau 
was not alone in this. Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise, Locke’s The Reasonableness 
of Christianity, or Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason ( Spinoza 2001; Locke 1958; 
Kant 2018) all attempted a fusion between the morality of religion and the requirements of 
reason. The original Enlightenment philosophers were not unaware of the crucial role of emotions 
(or faith, to use the term that was more common at the time) in the construction of human 
morality; but there was an equal awareness that belief without proof but only feeling is a 
dangerous thing. This is one of the key differences between the original Enlightenment and the 
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modes of thinking that characterize modernity: Hobbes, Smith, Spinoza, Locke, Rousseau, 
Hume, Kant, and others viewed culture as an issue to be dealt with in one way or another. The 
rationalists of modernity, on the other hand, jettisoned the matter of culture altogether. 
It must be pointed out that the rationalist approach is a young phenomenon, and marks a 
significant break with other historical schools of thought. Having its roots in the moral philosophy 
of the Enlightenment, the rationalist approach attempted to imitate the evolution of natural science. 
Once known as natural philosophy, natural science has left behind most of earlier more metaphysical 
philosophy and focused on the discovery of mechanical “laws of nature” that could be revealed 
through the application of empirical and experimental methods. Unintentionally or not, this 
evolution also created a qualitative split in the way science was perceived. As John Blackmoore 
points out, “… it becomes natural to call ‘empiricism’ realism and all philosophy or ‘metaphysics’ 
idealism” (J. Blackmore 1979, 129). This immediately had an effect on the study of culture which 
is, by its nature, part of the metaphysical experience (Verene 2009). The now dominant rationalist 
approach reduced culture to a functionalist minimum, describing it as the result of economic and 
structural pressures but with barely having an influence as a primary mover on human agency.44 
Seeing culture as a consequence rather than a cause of rational behavior, however, obscures the 
significant cultural and institutional ontology that is the basis for so-called rational behavior.45 
 
44 It must be mentioned that this view is probably one of the lasting legacies of the Marxist school 
of thought. For Marx as well as the rationalists culture is a “superstructure” that flows from but has no 
influence upon the underlying materialist realities. 
45 The close relationship between culture and institutions will be elaborated further in the course of 
this dissertation, but for now it should suffice to say that “institutions are, of course, in some sense the 
products of culture” (Ferguson 2011, 10). Institutions and culture, therefore, are corresponding and not 
competing concepts. Culture shapes institutions, but at the same time institutions reinforce and shape culture 
(Greif 2006). 
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Once again, this way of thinking does not apply to the same degree to every figure of the 
Enlightenment. Instead, it was most certainly pervasive enough that those philosophers who turned 
against it and mounted their counter-attack in the name of Romanticism and Idealism saw the biggest 
threat precisely in social Newtonianism. For William Blake, Friedrich Nietzsche, Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky, Martin Heidegger, as well as  other modernists and post-modernists, the idea that 
human life could be mechanized without the agency of the individual was absolutely horrifying. It is 
no coincidence that the Scottish philosopher Thomas Carlyle delivered his critique of the 
Enlightenment in a tract on heroes and hero worshipping (Carlyle 1869). At this point, however, let 
me discourage any attempt to take sides in the conflict between the Enlightenment and its 
Romantic/Idealistic counterpart. Just as psychologically we are equipped with cognitive as well as 
instinctive/emotional abilities that only together allow for a full account of a human being, we need 
to view these supposedly opposing schools of thought as the intellectual expression of the continuing 
struggle between cognitive and emotional.  
The Enlightenment had good reason to discard many parts of past traditions as the cause for 
conflict and human suffering, just as the Romantics were not wrong in their fear that a life based on 
nothing but natural laws would not only threaten the idea of free will but also dissolve any attempt to 
find a meaning in life. It was precisely this question that Kant among others was wrestling with when 
he tried to find eternal and objectively valid social laws, but simultaneously strived to maintain the 
concept of free will, without which true morality would be impossible (Kant 1998, 27). Yet even for 
Kant culture in the sense we have defined it so far would be problematic, because it does not allow 
for one universal conceptualization of morality, but accepts the possibility of moral pluralism. And 
even for as complex a thinker as Kant, free will is a necessary condition for his theory of morality, 
because only moral behavior that happens out of free will is true moral behavior. If we only obey the 
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laws because we are afraid of punishment, we might be called law-abiding, but we are not moral in a 
Kantian sense. If we would obey the laws because it is the right thing to do independent of possible 
reward or punishment, then we are acting truly morally. The problem with Kant and other 
Enlightenment thinkers, however, is that they believed that we could arrive at ideal laws and 
consequent moral behavior solely by reason. Moral behavior according to them is something to be 
followed instinctively not because it feels right, but because we know it is right. Emotions are entirely 
unnecessary in this theory. The point here is not that such ideal laws do not exist – if we could free 
people entirely from their emotional faculties it might be possible to arrive at such laws but the point 
is that even if these laws would exist, I doubt that appeals to reason alone would be enough to make 
people adhere to them. In fact, an assumption that reason alone would suffice puts and extraordinary 
burden on our ability to reason without the support system of emotions.46 
It is important to end the misperception that emotions can only be attached to 
unreasonable or irrational goals. On the contrary, emotions can be a way to reinforce the powers 
of reason because they add an instinctive certainty to modes of behavior. To provide but one 
example, slavery in the modern era was not ended because it was identified as unreasonable, but 
because it was seen as emotionally untenable. From a power politics perspective it would have 
been absolutely reasonable for Great Britain and other European powers to support the 
Confederacy during the Civil War, because two mutually hostile states in North America would 
have increased the relative power of Europe compared to the prospect of one United States. Yet 
the issue of slavery made it impossible for Europeans in general and the British in particular to 
support the South, despite widespread sympathy for the right of secession (Hamand 1988).  
 
46 Kant was of course aware of this: “Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was 
ever made” (Kant 1784b, l. 22).  
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Psychologically, culture is a pluralistic phenomenon with numerous possible ties between 
emotions and their triggers. The emergence of these ties is often lost to us and based on habit and 
tradition that is rationally hardly graspable but still has strong emotional effects. An 
Enlightenment perspective would argue that this might well be the case, but only because we 
haven’t been exposed to the singular underlying truth that – in theory – would allow the “right” 
application of emotions. Culture is like a thick layer of barnacles that has grown around the core 
laws that govern human relations and that were necessary due to a lack of scientific understanding 
and methodology. In other words, a supernatural being, for example, was necessary to create 
moral behavior because we were not fully aware that moral behavior mutually benefits all who 
act according to it. Even worse, sometimes the belief in supernatural forces took over and became 
more important than its original function, the ordering of human relations. None of this would be 
needed anymore once the scientific method has uncovered the causal relations of human 
interaction, allowing a harmonious society to emerge based on sound principles that owe nothing 
to faith or tradition. Intended or unintended, this was a decisive turn against culture as a primary 
mover (meaning something that stands on its own and is not just a symptom of something else) 
of human behavior. As we will see, the break with culture as a relevant factor in the political 
sphere did not happen at once but gradually, starting with the desire to protect politics from 
cultural influences to the gradual perception of culture as a negligible factor.  
The Enlightenment with its emphasis on reason and the aspiration to apply the methods 
of the natural sciences to the study of politics was searching for a formalized and ultimately (even 
if unintended) emotionless way to investigate political phenomena. The growing rationalization 
of society would ultimately replace tradition and religion, allowing politics to become the 
execution and manipulation of natural laws, independent of the realm of culture. These attempts 
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set the stage for the growing rejection of culture as an explanatory variable, causing some leading 
contemporary political scientists to discard it altogether and to declare it basically a waste of time 
(Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow 2004, 9).  
One reason is the assumed non-linearity of cultural factors that makes them difficult to 
be used as variables in empirical and statistical research. This inherent nature of culture makes it 
prone to “be employed as a ‘missing link’ to fill in anything that cannot be explained in political 
analysis” (Sills and Merton 1968, 204). Political scientists Jackman and Miller make a similar 
argument, focusing their critique on the alleged tautological quality of a concept of culture and 
its empirical invalidity. “To draw rabbits from the cultural hat” as they call the habit of 
introducing cultural values as ex-post variables (Jackman and Miller 1996, 712). They claim that 
this kind of inquiry does not further our understanding of collective decision making, while 
Przeworski argues that the idea to introduce a concept of culture to explain group behavior was 
irrelevant in political science (Przeworski et al. 1996; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). What is 
surprising about many of these arguments is that their articulators seem to be completely 
oblivious to their own cultural groundings. The idea that collectively-held beliefs are an 
unimportant factor in politics and that behavior can always be reduced to the utility maximization 
of an individual is a prime example of Enlightenment thinking.  
The following rise of structuralist theories in political science and other social sciences 
was another factor working against the inclusion of cultural factors in political research. Culture 
became seen as the expression of underlying power structures that served the vested interests of 
particular groups, classes, or individuals but did not play any role independently of these 
interests. Just as planets are moved by forces they cannot control, so human beings also behave 
according to external pressures that emerge from the structure of a surrounding system. Although 
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I am simplifying here, the rise of secular utopian ideas beginning in the 18th century and 
culminating, among other things, in the French Revolution of 1789 was driven by the growing 
perception that a perfect society is indeed possible. What these events also show, however, is that 
the distinction between Romanticism and the Enlightenment is not clear-cut. The idea of a society 
based on reason is in itself inherently romantic and idealistic, something that does not change 
just because the intellectual and actual revolutionaries at the time laid claim to having found an 
objective and universal formula for human society. The problem is that human beings have a lot 
in common, but probably not as much as would be necessary to develop a theory of human 
relations that would be akin to the theory of gravity. Both Romantics and the proponents of the 
Enlightenment bring something to the table that has validity: Without a doubt, structure matters 
and human beings are susceptible to incentive structures and decision making based solely on 
self-interest. It is also true, however, that sometimes individuals and events can play the role of 
so-called black swans: Unpredictable events that cause systemic changes (Taleb 2007).  
Since we cannot re-run history, it is impossible to conclusively test whether every 
historical event was predetermined by the structure of an evolving system or specific 
individuals and events. Yet any thick historical description of the unfolding of events of huge-
impact demonstrates the many contingencies and even coincidences that led to specific 
outcomes. Regardless of whether one looks at the American, French or Russian Revolution, 
or the world wars, these events might in hindsight seem inevitable and predetermined, but it 
most certainly did not appear as such for those who participated at the time. Was Lenin a 
decisive factor in the Russian Revolution? Would World War Two have taken a different 
course or happened at all if the Wehrmacht had gone through with its plans for a coup in 
September of 1938 or if any of the numerous assassination attempts on Hitler would have 
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been successful? These answers cannot be answered with absolute certainty and it is also true 
that every politician has to operate within certain structures, but it is a far shot from arguing 
that individuals have no more say in course of events than Jupiter has about its orbit around 
the sun. Contrary to Jupiter, human beings care about their “orbit” and cherish the idea of free 
will and finding meaning in whatever they do, making it very difficult to fit human behavior 
into immutable laws that can be perfectly captured by theory. I think Hans Morgenthau got 
comes closest to reality when he writes that there is  
a rational element in political action that makes politics susceptible 
to theoretical analysis, but there is also a contingent element in politics that 
obviates the possibility of theoretical understanding (Morgenthau 1970, 
254).  
 
What this means is not the abandonment of the scientific approach to politics, but an 
embrace of a more nuanced one that takes historical and cultural surroundings into account. 
Such analysis can lead to much richer explanations of political developments and thereby help 
in the formulation of new, generally applicable research strategies that recognize the possible 
differences of the object under investigation. (A good example is Parson’s theory of European 
Community formation, although the factors he investigates might be unique to Europe, their 
absence in other cases could be an explanation why similar processes have yet to be seen 
outside Europe: Parsons 2002.)  
Ironically, even the laws of nature are only immutable under certain conditions, 
exemplified by the differences between Newtonian physics and Einstein’s theories of 
relativity, or Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that tells us that we cannot precisely 
determine a particle’s position and momentum simultaneously.  
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For the most part, however, what the social sciences wanted to emulate was the claim 
to precision and law-like causal relations that would allow for predictable outcomes. In order 
to get there, the emotional and supposedly irrational side of human behavior needed to be 
eliminated from the equation so that only the “true” factors determining human behavior 
would remain. From Thomas Hobbes to Karl Marx to modern structuralists one of the most 
pervasive ideas has been that the structure of the system is the main factor driving human 
behavior with little to no influence of their own. For Hobbes, the system was created by human 
beings’ constant state of fear; for Marx it is the ownership of the means of production; and 
even neoclassical economists are ultimately structurally influenced with the assumption that 
the incentives that maximize utility determine human behavior in every area of human life 
(we will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter).47 I am of course not the first one to 
point this out, and similar arguments have been made by Leo Strauss and Michael Oakeshott, 
among others (Tregenza 1997, 531). What they have overlooked, however, is the profound 
impact this new way of thinking had beyond the field of political philosophy. The idea that 
human agency is a mere illusion and it is systemic forces that control our behavior without us 
knowing it had huge ramifications for not only the question of morality, but also the value of 
human life. 
To be clear once more, my criticism of rationalist-structuralist approaches does not 
deny the important role of exogenous factors and I am nowhere claiming the complete agency 
of the individual. My criticism is aimed at the idea that all societies and individuals react in 
 
47 Without a doubt, members of these schools of thought would protest being thrown together like 
this. But they all share in common the idea that culture is only the symptom of a “true” underlying cause – 
whether it be the desire for material possessions or fear of violence. With Hobbes being somewhat of an 
exception, since he took emotions so serious that his theoretical work can be read as a blueprint how to get 
them out of social life, most other modern schools don’t see culture as an independent phenomenon.  
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equal fashion to exogenous factors. The reason the role of culture in my approach is so 
important is because culture plays a crucial role in the way a society and individuals react to 
events.  
 
4.3 Idealism and The Enlightenment 
In order to discern the problem with the concept of culture it was helpful to look at 
the development of the social sciences and how they differ from the natural sciences. This 
was important, because culture is a unique social phenomenon, and therefore eludes the 
toolkit of the natural scientist. This elusiveness is frustrating and can lead to a plethora of 
attacks on the concept of culture itself. The difficulties in investigating culture should not 
be confused with the impossibility of doing so. A first step is to acknowledge the possibility 
that we are in fact facing two kinds of reality. One is the material and physical reality 
guided by the laws of nature, the other one the social reality guided by human perception. 
What has been driving the tensions between the natural and the social sciences is the 
question: which one of these realities is more “real” than the other? As we will see, both 
are real and they build upon and influence each other (Morson and Schapiro 2018; Searle 
1995).  
The distinction we wish to make is between the “brute” reality that is independent 
of human perception like the law of gravity and the social reality that is created through 
ideas and collective agreements like “money, property, governments, and marriages” 
(Searle 1995, 1). In many instances the construction of social reality is a reaction to the 
force of “brute reality” – for example, the human individual is ill-equipped to survive as a 
solitary being, therefore she creates social mechanisms that enable collective action and 
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survival. The influential ideologies of the past did not spring from nowhere but were in 
many ways attempts to resolve brute changes in the environment. The Enlightenment was 
a reaction to the felt need to explain a world that seemed to have become explainable 
wholesale via scientific means; idealism was the attempt to save the dignity and meaning 
of human life at a time when it seemed that human society was being atomized and 
fractured; mass democracy was a reply to spreading literacy and rising incomes.  Then, 
too, Marxism could be seen as a consequence of the social defects of industrialization, 
while Fascism and Communism attempted to control the consequences of science with 
metaphysical and transcendental ideas.  
As we have discussed previously, culture is a way to adopt the social structure of a 
society to a changing environment. And while these attempts often ended in disaster, there 
are success stories that we have almost entirely forgotten. In their insightful history of 
European and particularly the British states, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge 
paint an astounding picture of how cultural changes allowed European states to cope with 
the consequences of industrialization and explosive population growth (Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge 2014). It might be common to think of Victorian England or Prussia of 
Frederick the Great as stuffy, narrow-minded, and quasi authoritarian systems – and that 
view might be justified from a 21st century perspective.  
But in fact, from the newly-founded United States, through the British Isles and on 
to continental Europe liberty was breathing probably stronger and became accessible to a 
larger number of people than ever before in human history. On June 22nd 1772, the British 
judge Lord Mansfield set the precedent for the abolition of slavery with the first legally 
sanctioned emancipation of a slave in the British Empire. Part of his ruling deserves to be 
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given at length, because it highlights in a single case the dilemma of the Enlightenment 
and Idealism: 
The state of slavery is of such a nature that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, 
which preserves its force long after the reasons, occasions, and time itself 
from whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is so odious, that 
nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law. Whatever 
inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say this 
case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black 
must be discharged (Usherwood 1981). 
 
Mansfield, whose Scottish heritage is probably no coincidence, since it makes him 
a close contemporary of Adam Smith and David Hume, applied one of the key features of 
Enlightenment thinking here – that tradition and reverence of the past can never be the 
justification for something as odious as slavery, and that it only remains because human-
made laws allow it to continue. This is a clear indication of the idea that some laws, no 
matter how old, are made by human beings and therefore can be changed. I assume that 
Lord Mansfield thought himself to act in accordance with the laws of reason and rationality, 
but it was not the laws of said things, but the embedded culture.  
Great Britain than moved on to ban the slave trade throughout the British Empire 
in 1807 and to abolish the institution of slavery itself in 1833. Continental Europe followed 
gradually as well, with Frederick the Great of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria and Russia’s 
Alexander II beginning a process of abolishing serfdom throughout their respective 
empires. The United States struggled longer and was caught in the duality of a system that 
had the highest ambitions for liberty, but also maintained the institution of slavery. This 
was only resolved through a bloody Civil War that killed three percent of the population, 
and its consequences still linger on in contemporary US politics. None of this should be 
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read as a hagiographic account of 18th and 19th century Western society and politics, and 
mentioning the advances of liberty does not mean denying that industrialization and 
urbanization brought with it horrible working conditions, child labor, and other forms of 
exploitation. The marginalized role of women and other minorities and their mobilization 
are also worth mentioning (for women and Victorian society see: Walkowitz 1991).  
Nonetheless, the 18th century and the Enlightenment did fundamentally change 
many of the moral standards that had often prevailed for centuries, and I believe it would 
be a mistake simply to discard so-called Victorian morality as something merely 
hypocritical because the standards of this morality were often and regularly broken. From 
prostitution to drug consumption, these vaunted values seemed to be the thin veneer of a 
society that broke them idly and often. Or were they? The beginning of cultural change 
typically contains a shift of sacred values, and such a shift does not necessarily occur within 
the entire population at the same time, but gradually grows in power and influence until 
the new culture has fully established itself. The Victorian Virtues described by the historian 
Gertrud Himmelfarb (Himmelfarb 1996, 2007), were remarkable because they started to 
reshape the ideas and values around which an ideal society should be constructed. 
Historians and philosophers alike agree that most Western nations in the 19th 
century experienced a “golden age of associational life” (Ferguson 2013, 118). The fact 
that in 1911 the gross annual receipts of registered charities in Great Britain exceeded 
national public expenditure on the Poor Law is as remarkable as the fact that the absolute 
number of cases of hardship reviewed by charities between 1871 and 1945 remained almost 
constant. Similarly, Tocqueville (Tocqueville 2012a, 2012b) described with great 
enthusiasm the “art of association” as a main virtue of the young American Republic. 
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Associations in Germany were formed that actively tried to bridge differences (Ferguson 
2011b), accompanied by a culturally awakening working class that, despite the remaining 
class antagonisms, tried to live up to a Victorian standard (Himmelfarb 1985, 1991; J. Rose 
2010) as a basis of collective identity. To be sure, not everybody was included in the 
construction of this new society and, as Michel Foucault (Foucault 1988) has pointed out, 
this unity came at the cost of excluding others and destroying more local ways of life. But 
overall many of the moral standards, especially those attached to the importance of the 
individual are still with us today; and although they are being applied more widely and in 
new areas (e.g. sexual and gender identity), the underlying morality is rooted in ideas that 
started to spread during this historical period.  
Intellectual life too came to flourish as a consequence of these freedoms as well – 
an intellectual life that already carried the notion that not all these freedoms came without 
consequences, resulting in a new anxiety that grew in the shadows of liberty. William 
Blake, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, and others formulated their replies 
to a world that was in complete upheaval and characterized by the vision of finally 
elevating reason above the passions. The elevation of reason by the Enlightenment was 
liberating in many respects, but it also replaced the certainties of a life based on the 
transcendental values of religion. While there were optimists of modernity that viewed the 
triumph of reason as a first step towards true human liberation, others saw something 
deeply concerning and started longing for supposedly easier and more “natural” times: 
Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the 
absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only 
a fractional unity dependent on the denominator; his value is determined by 
his relation to the whole, which is the social body […] He who in the civil 
order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not 
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know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating 
between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or 
citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one 
of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He 
will be nothing (Rousseau 1979, 4). 
 
Rousseau, of course, overstates here the solitary qualities of human beings, 
something he shares with John Locke, who also believed that “man is by nature a solitary 
being, concerned only with his preservation and his comfort” (A. D. Bloom 1987, 168). 
The similarity between Rousseau and Lockean thinking is not a minor issue, because very 
often Rousseau is credited as the intellectual forefather of the brutality that occurred during 
the French Revolution, while Locke is viewed as the creator of a tolerant liberalism (see, 
for example: Ferguson 2011a). But this view overlooks some major parallels in their 
thinking, especially regarding their attitude toward what I consider to be relevant for the 
concept of culture. Rousseau and Locke came to different conclusions, the former 
becoming increasingly concerned with a collectivist approach and the concept of the 
“General Will” that must come before and above the will of the individual, while the latter 
developed a theory resting on the sovereignty of the individual. Rousseau differs in one 
aspect, however, and that is his realization that there is a collectivist and an individualistic 
side to human nature (S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 10). While Hobbes and Locke focused on 
individualism, Rousseau tried to square individualism with collectivism, something that is 
reflected in his writings about small republics where the participation of the individual in 
the formation of laws for the community presents his way of transcending individualism 
into community.  
Nonetheless, their starting points are remarkably similar, with both Locke and 
Rousseau asserting that human beings are born free and equal, and that it is the institutional 
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framework built by positive law that creates differences and contradicts the state of natural 
freedom. Even more important, both believed that human affairs can be fully organized by 
reason, once again underestimating the crucial role of emotions. Locke shows no or only 
limited support to communities established by culture or tradition, arguing that consent is 
the only acceptable reason for an individual to join a community: “Every man being… 
naturally free,… nothing [can] put him into subjugation to any earthly power but only his 
own consent” (Locke 1980, 63). Similarly, Rousseau laments that while we are born free, 
society has put us everywhere “in chains” (Rousseau 2011, 156).  
Rousseau’s political theory is a tricky read and, as Steven B. Smith points out, it is 
hard to fit him entirely into either the Enlightenment or the Counter-Enlightenment since 
his writings strike both an Idealist, as well as an Enlightenment, chord. He was, in other 
words, “at once both and neither” (S. B. Smith 2016, 176). But despite the opaqueness of 
Rousseau there is an undercurrent that justifies putting him into the Enlightenment 
category, despite his criticism aimed at Enlightenment optimism. I believe it fair to say that 
for Rousseau culture becomes a technical issue, meaning that he viewed it as a tool to be 
controlled and yielded as a way to create political order, but I am doubtful to what extent 
he would have supported the idea of a genuine emotional connection that emerges 
naturally. In the end, Rousseau argues for the power of a rational state that creates a civil 
religion and the people that adhere to it (Rousseau 2011, 156–69; 224–52). He does not 
deny the importance of emotions, but, as Yoram Hazony writes, they “are ersatz creations 
of the Lockean rationalist universe, in which Rousseau’s thought remains imprisoned” 
(Hazony 2018, 247–48).  
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John Locke differs from Rousseau because he sees another purpose in human life, 
and that is the owning of property and by extension the amassing of economic wealth. As 
we have already mentioned, for Locke a true association must be entered into voluntarily 
as a first step, but he also gives us an insight into the actual purpose of an association of 
individuals.  On this matter, he says: “The great and chief end of men’s uniting into 
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property” (Locke 1980, 65). The materialist interpretation of history starts with Locke, for 
he was one of the first philosophers to tie political action almost exclusively to its 
relationship with property. His property-centered approach is combined with more than a 
little disdain for other kinds of loyalty, becoming clear in his treatment of nations which 
would not exist  
[were] it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, 
there would be no need… that men should separate from this great and 
natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and 
divided associations” (Locke 1980, 67). 
 
There are of course glimpses within Locke’s writing that seem to emphasize an 
emotions-based form of community, particularly in his writings regarding toleration, where 
some of his most interesting paragraphs deal with what Locke would not be willing to 
tolerate: neither atheists nor Catholics can be trusted since “promises, covenants, and oaths, 
which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” while Catholics 
serve a prince outside the established commonwealth (Locke 2010). I believe that the term 
tolerance in its contemporary use has evolved to mean something much closer to the idea 
of endorsement, but this is of course not what Locke meant. Like the US Founders, he 
tolerated certain ideas and religious creeds on the basis that they are part of one’s private 
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sphere and barely influence public policy making and its core concern of protecting private 
property. Ultimately, Locke is a believer in the primacy of individualism and the 
individual’s right to property coupled with an unobstructed life, expressed in voluntary and 
mutually beneficial contractual obligations. Locke thus is suspicious of any form of 
community that exists or claims to justify its existence outside a voluntarily entered 
contract. It makes sense, because in addition to a state of nature Locke also describes a law 
of nature:  
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm 
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions (Locke 1980, 8–9). 
 
Despite their different policy-prescriptions, Locke and Rousseau share a great deal   
of common ground in their definition of human nature, and to some extent even Locke 
belongs to both the Idealism and the Enlightenment movements. For if the law of nature is 
reason, and this law should induce us to respect each other’s life, health, liberty and 
possessions, how else can we explain war and violence except for attributing them to the 
flawed institutions created by humankind.  
Once again, Locke is absolutely open about this when he writes that  
mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all 
other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and viciousness of 
degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men 
should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive 
agreements combine into smaller and divided associations(Locke 1980, 67). 
 
So it is the “corruption and viciousness of degenerate men” that creates 
communities concerned with anything but the mutual respect for the individual. I argue 
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that Locke’s writing has been at least in part been misread as a purely liberal document; 
but in fact his writing concerns toleration only as a resignation to the fact that probably we 
cannot completely rid society of “corruption and viciousness.” Therefore we might as well 
allow some associations besides the ones created by voluntary social contracts. Society, for 
Locke, can and should only be held together by mutual obligations enforced by the state, 
and the people are defined as members of this contract: “wherever any number of men, in 
the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body politic under one 
supreme government” (Locke 1980, 47). Society is formed by reason, not by discrete 
traditional bonds or emotional commitments to sacred values. 
This engagement with Locke and Rousseau is important, because I concur with Leo 
Strauss to the effect that given the many similarities of their theorizing Rousseau’s writing 
is “the first crisis of modernity” (L. Strauss 1965, 252). The great break in Western political 
thought starts with Thomas Hobbes who laid the groundwork for many of the ideas of 
Locke and Rousseau, because it was he who first proposed the concept of thoroughly 
rationalist politics (Hazony 2018, 247). There are, of course, differences. And in many 
respects these differences are most relevant to the realm of culture as discussed so far. 
Hobbes, contrary to Locke  is fully aware of the fact that even if we presume a natural law 
of reason, in order to enforce such a law, it needs a powerful state, something that Rousseau 
also views as necessary. This, of course, makes individualism not only less natural, but 
connected to a very strong institutional framework. While Locke viewed individualism as 
natural, Hobbes argued that it has to be enforced by an institution. Yet all of them agreed 
that the measure of things is the individual, and that society serves this individualism and 
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not the other way around (for a more detailed account of the individualism on Hobbes and 
Locke see: C. B. Macpherson 2011). 
One of the more convincing points of Patrick Deneen’s critique of individual 
liberalism is his notion that the natural state of human beings is not as solitary beings, but 
that the advances of modernity have made it a possible option (Deneen 2018) – but one 
that needs substantial government support. Individualism can only be accomplished 
through independence from every community that was not entered voluntarily and for 
mutual benefit, so the state must by necessity play a larger role in liberal societies – 
according to Deneen’s argument. A different way to look at it would be to say that the state 
has to create what Rousseau and Locke perceived as natural but muddied by modernity, 
namely our natural individualism. As I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous 
chapters, such a natural individualism has never existed, and the idea that it did is grounded 
in culture, not science.48 
Francis Fukuyama makes a similar argument, writing that human beings are by 
nature social and political, siding with Aristotle over the individualism of the 
Enlightenment:  
It is in fact individualism and not sociability that developed over the 
course of human history. That individualism seems today like a solid core 
of our economic and political behavior is only because we have developed 
institutions that override our more naturally communal instincts” 
(Fukuyama 2012c, 29). 
 
 
48 I would like to highlight here once again that this is not supposed to be a criticism of liberalism, 
but rather its establishment as a cultural phenomenon.  
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What is interesting about Rousseau’s statement regarding modern society is the 
underlying assumption that modern (or civil) life has created the bourgeoisie, and that one 
of its characteristics is to be “nothing.” The issue Rousseau is pointing towards is that with 
the progress of scientific approaches, the certainty of older values was gradually 
disappearing. So despite his emphasis on the power of reason, Rousseau complains that 
modern life has deprived us of something and that the state should artificially create ways 
to fill these emotional gaps. I remain uncertain, however, if the anxiety Rousseau has 
diagnosed has not always been there, and that modernity has only exacerbated an already 
existing condition.  
I maintain the argument that the diagnosed anxiety created by the demands of the 
individual upon himself (i.e. what do I desire from a purely selfish perspective) and the 
demands created by the values of the community (i.e. the limitations on behavior based on 
religious and social rules) always existed, but that the Enlightenment made the latter much 
harder to justify. In his treatment of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Alan Bloom sets out to 
describe exactly this argument. Without the sincere belief in absolute and non-negotiable 
values, we can have no culture and, in the end, no society (A. D. Bloom 1987, 194–217). 
One does not have to fully endorse the cultural pessimism and relativism of Nietzsche or 
its conservative reading by Bloom, but the key observation that absolute values and their 
emotional certitude did crumble under the Enlightenment does contain some truth – and it 
fits the contemporary movement to perceive one’s individuality and the recognition thereof 
as the highest moral value. The demands of the individual upon oneself are outweighing 
the demands of the community, but at the same time we still have the urge to be part of 
communities and submit ourselves to their rules. This is the anxiety caused by the 
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Enlightenment, and this caused the Idealistic reaction and triggered the following crisis of 
modernity. 
 
4.4 The Ancient Greeks, Hobbes and the Birth of Modern Utilitarianism  
There is a good argument to be made that the question of how to balance 
individualism and community in an ideal political regime has been a defining element from 
the beginning of Western philosophy, starting with Plato and Aristotle. Despite their 
differences, as Deneen noted, both dealt with this question, in which the virtuous individual 
would be fostered to help create a virtuous regime which in turn would create a virtuous 
individual – resulting in a “virtuous cycle” (Deneen 2018, 99). Without using the term, the 
implication is that the political system should infuse its citizenry with virtuous values that 
they hold so dearly that the only system they can create would also be inherently virtuous. 
What they were talking about, in other words, was an emotional tie to behaving in the 
interest of the common good without betraying oneself or experiencing negative emotions, 
describing something very similar to what we have defined as culture. 
This becomes even clearer when we look at the value the ancient Greeks put into 
the arts and education as tools to form the moral qualities of citizens. The question of who 
should be tasked with the education of the next generation is a recurring theme for Plato 
(S. B. Smith 2012, chap. 3). None of them relied on an inherent automatism that would 
lead to the virtuous citizen who would know how to arrange individual and collective needs 
for the common good, independently of experience, culture, and history. At the same time, 
however, this solution poses a problem: If people have to be educated (or indoctrinated) to 
be virtuous, would that not be tantamount to a justification for totalitarianism? Also, if 
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virtue becomes an unreflective habit or the product of indoctrination, does it even remain 
something praiseworthy (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 5334)? Not surprisingly, Plato has on 
occasion been associated with totalitarianism (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 516). Although this 
association is often facile, it points toward an important fact of social life: Human societies 
tend to build around forms of hierarchy that constitute a main component of social reality. 
Yet since these hierarchies are socially constructed there is a potentially limitless variety 
of possible hierarchical structures, including totalitarian ones. Plato and Aristotle were 
concerned with what form of education would give rise to what hierarchy and which 
political system. In fact, their concern is with different political outcomes and the 
possibility for the degradation of political systems due to the inherent emotional tensions 
of human beings.  
For Greek philosophy, political life took place between the tensions created by 
emotional commitments and choices based on reason, something that Leo Strauss so aptly 
calls the “theologico-political dilemma” (L. Strauss 1995, 224). What should weigh 
stronger on the mind of a person: the claims the state makes to her as a person, or the claims 
of tradition as part of a tight knit community? In Greek thought. the state tends to represent 
the forces of reason and rationality, while the family is the seat of the emotions; and these 
two institutions tend to be in unending  conflict with each other, because both can make a 
valid moral claim on the individual. To use a simple example: if the father commits a crime, 
should the son report him to the authorities? It most likely depends on the seriousness of 
the crime.  But this is an example where two sources of morality collide: The rational 
authority of the state, that prosecutes and punishes crime to maintain order, on the one side, 
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and on the other, the traditional and highly emotional authority of the family, that demands 
loyalty above all else.  
This dilemma is a key theme for classical Greek literature and philosophy, and also 
crucial for us here: Social theory in both its modern and post-modern varieties--from 
Durkheim to Freud, Weber, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Foucault, Taylor, 
Habermas and others—offered diagnoses of the modern world characterized by internally-
induced societal and individual anxieties, and all of them proposed their own remedies and 
solutions to this problem. But I would argue that very often they missed the key point, since 
this anxiety is hard-wired into us as a species that uniquely understands the emotional value 
of both group membership and being free and autonomous as an individual. I see no 
circumstances where an ultimate solution to this dilemma will be found, because to be 
either fully individualistic or pathologically altruistic is not a realistic option for most 
people. 
On the other hand, one means by which these two extremes can be reconciled is to 
create a certain type of culture, because cultural creation means the creation of common 
values where the giving up of individualism and being part of a group creates a positive 
emotional sensation, even if it comes at the cost of personal sacrifice or endured hardship. 
Military service, giving to charity, or even something as simple as the voluntary payment 
of taxes are all infringements on individualism and individual property, but they are (or can 
be) perceived as justified and a necessary contribution to the community. In fact, very often 
the dedication of time or economic means to a common cause can increase a feeling of 
belonging and reinforce one’s identity, because the act of sacrificing makes the valuing of 
the group over oneself even more visible and accessible. This kind of tension is also a key 
 
244 
 
theme of Enlightenment and Idealism thinking, as Hegel himself demonstrated when he 
wrote that:  
The collision between the two highest moral powers is enacted in 
that absolute exemplar of tragedy Antigone. Here, familial love, the holy, 
the inward, belonging to inner feeling, and therefore known also as the law 
of the gods, collides with the right of the state” (Hegel 2006, 353) 
 
For Hegel, of course, in the end the authority of the state is tantamount, but he does 
realize that what is described is a conflict between two moral positions and that both have 
a strong claim to validity. But it is not just Sophocles’ Antigone who deals with this 
question, the same story looms large in the Oresteia by Aeschylus (see: Hill 2010, 6–16).  
The resolution of this problem, or at least the taking of a side, is a key element of 
the Enlightenment, which must be understood as the attempt to ultimately replace the 
dictates of faith (or culture) with those of reason. I believe that keeping that position and 
the philosophical quarrels it created in mind helps us to understand why the Enlightenment 
is such a double-edged sword. Defining the state as the ultimate authority is one of the 
more contentious interpretations of Hegel, and one that caused many thinkers to view him 
as an intellectual precursor to totalitarian forms of government. Francis Fukuyama, in his 
benevolent treatment of Hegel accuses one of Hegel’s critics (e.g., Karl Popper) of exerting 
“his usual lack of insight” (Fukuyama 1989, KL 6600) when writing about Hegel. But it is 
more complicated than that and this becomes clear when we remind ourselves of the crucial 
role of emotions: Even if the state is entirely rational and based on reason, its dictates can 
still violate the emotional inclinations of people towards their traditions and identities. Any 
state that attempts to replace them would have to at least gradually act in a totalitarian way, 
interfering with the deepest beliefs of its citizens. For Hegel, this was not really a problem, 
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because as a believer in the forward-directedness of History (deliberately written with a 
capital “H”) the bourgeoisie state would merge with the bourgeoisie values of the citizens, 
and when there is no contradiction between state authority and the authority of culture, 
there is also no potential for conflict. Hegel was engaged in a dilemma similar to Plato in 
his dialogue, the Republic, that also wrestled with the problem of how to square individual 
reason with the demands of a harmonious political community (see, for example: Browning 
1987). In fact, the writings of Plato and Aristotle could and should be read less as a political 
blueprint and more as a description of the endless conflict between individualism and 
communitarianism as an emotional phenomenon.49 Plato’s concern with spiritedness or 
Thymos is a key theme in his Republic, where he wrestles in Socratic Dialogue with the 
question of how the needs of the good citizen can be brought into accordance with the 
needs of the good human (Plato 1991; and for a similar interpretation see: Smith 2012, 
chap. 4). The role of the Thymos has been treated extensively by Francis Fukuyama and 
Catherine Zuckert, both making the convincing case that politics depends on more than 
rationality (Fukuyama 2006b; Zuckert 1988).  
Notwithstanding the profound differences between Plato and his student Aristotle  
(Herman 2010), there can be no doubt that both of them and Greek philosophy in general 
were constantly concerned with the questions to which culture supposedly gives answers: 
How do we create loyalty to our communities, how do ensure adherence to the law without 
resorting to tyrannical government, and how can education help us align the interests of 
the individual and the common good?  The idea put forward by Aristotle that true liberty 
 
49 Not surprisingly, Popper is also a fierce critic of Plato whom he accuses of being yet another 
forerunner of totalitarianism (Popper 2013).  
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is not unhindered self-interest and individualism under self-imposed constraints is one 
answer, but the question remains: from where do these constraints come? Aristotle does 
not believe in the unlimited power of positive law, and carves out significant space for a 
culture of obedience that might be more important than the laws itself:  
The law has no other source of strength through which to secure 
obedience apart from habit. But habit can be created only by the passage of 
time; and a readiness to change from existing to new and different laws will 
accordingly tend to weaken the general power of law (Aristotle 2009a, 66). 
 
In other words, Aristotle does not believe that simply because a law might be 
objectively good, it can be easily implemented. And this is important because he sees that 
there needs to be room for cultural change before legal change can happen, which also 
means that the deep-seated biases of a community will always be reflected in a 
community’s willingness to abide by certain rules, and these rules are firmly lodged in 
what we would describe as culture. His concerns ring particularly modern, because his case 
is one that emphasizes that a government cannot simply be neutral towards the values of 
its citizens, and that a strict separation of the private and the public is probably impossible. 
That being said, we now have to turn to where I would locate a true break between Greek 
and modern political thought. This story starts with the political philosophy of Thomas 
Hobbes. As we will see, Hobbes is a more nuanced thinker regarding the matter of culture 
than are many of his successors, because not only does he take it seriously, but he gives a 
full-fledged theory of how to limit its influence on politics.  
For Aristotle the community is more natural than individualism, a view that was 
challenged by modern philosophers, first among them--Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, 
community was the consequence of a deliberate social contract concluded between 
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individuals who agree to invest a higher power (i.e. the state) with the authority to prevent 
violence among the members of society. Aristotle, on the other hand, identifies a natural 
human urge towards forming communities and denies the idea that society emerges purely 
out of intention and instead locates its source in human nature itself. Aristotle is very 
explicit about this, writing that a human being who can live without community must be 
either “beast or god”. We are neither of those, according to Aristotle, since “the impulse 
for such a community is in everyone by nature” (quoted in Keyt 1987, 74).50 This is the 
essence of what Aristotle means when he describes human beings as “political animals.” 
This idea has led to a wide discussion on whether Aristotle is actually contradicting 
himself in his Politics, since he is highlighting the artificial nature of the state and at the 
same time making the case for its naturalness (Keyt 1987). I argue that this debate is 
misleading because it does not take into account the difference between community 
formation and the form of the community. Aristotle’s argument is a description and a 
recommendation: A description of the naturalness of community formation and a 
recommendation for the Polis as the ideal form of the community. Yet at the same time 
Aristotle does not argue that the Polis is the natural form of community: Community is 
natural, the Polis as a form of community is artificial. Community falls into a grey area 
between nature and artificial creation by intent:  
In saying that the state is natural he [Aristotle] does not mean that it 
'grows' naturally, without human volition and action. There is art as well as 
nature, and art co-operates with nature: the volition and action of human 
agents 'construct' the state in co-operation with a natural immanent impulse 
(Keyt 1987, 56). 
 
50 Depending on the translation there are slightly different versions of that part. Fred Barker, for 
example, translates it as “a natural impulse in all men towards an association of this sort” (Aristotle 2009, 
11). The basic meaning, however, remains the same: Community is natural to human beings. 
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For Aristotle the polis is the ideal form of government, since it is most beneficial 
to the development and sustaining of virtuous citizens, which should be the desirable end 
of any political community. Aristotle is not dissimilar to Fukuyama, who argues that the 
reason for the final triumph of liberal democracy is its ability to satisfy our most basic 
psychological need, the desire for recognition by others. The only problem is that human 
beings seem to be incapable of reaching this final or ideal stage straightforwardly by 
rational means but have to evolve towards it. It is a journey where the destination is known, 
but not the path. Aristotle is less concerned with recognition, but he also sees as a problem 
that there is no automatic mechanism to reach the best possible (meaning the most virtuous) 
polis. As Keyt points out, Aristotle does not believe that “men belong to the best polis by 
nature” but that “neither by nature nor contrary to nature do the [moral] virtues arise in us; 
but we are fitted by nature to receive them, and brought to completion through habit” 
(quoted in Keyt 1987, 62). Aristotle describes acting in accordance with acquired virtues 
as “arational.” This means that it is not by rational calculation that the virtuous citizen come 
to live a virtuous life, but achieve this by an emotional urge to do so. 
One should not be entirely focused on Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue, since he 
himself is not blind to the possibility that a society might emerge without any regard to the 
virtues he is promoting. Aristotle argues that the natural drive towards community creates 
the potential for the polis made up of virtuous citizens, but nowhere does he claim that it 
must come into existence. Human beings have the capacity for virtue, but it is the prevailing 
culture that plays a crucial role in creating the virtuous citizen. “Habituation, guided by 
practical wisdom and law” is the key to reaching full virtue, according to Aristotle (Keyt 
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1987, 62). Aristotle assumes the existence of a potential for virtue, but there is no natural 
law that ensures its emergence.  As he says,“Man is furnished from birth with weapons 
which are intended to serve the purposes of wisdom and goodness, but which may be used 
in preference for opposite ends” (Aristotle 2009, 11). 
In other words, the potential for virtue is innate in all of us, but it is its development 
through a community that decides whether it emerges or not. It is no coincidence that 
Aristotle puts such emphasis on the role of the lawgiver in a community (see: Aristotle 
2009, 78, 80, 117, 134). The lawgiver’s task is to create the right institutions to allow the 
emergence of a virtuous society, taking actual circumstances into account as an important 
limitation for even the most ambitious lawmaker “For this reason,” he says, “ most of the 
writers who treat of politics, even if they deal well with other matters, fail when they come 
to matters of practical utility” (Aristotle 2009, 134). Although not explicitly, Aristotle 
makes a subtle argument for taking culture into account: 
All producers— weavers, for instance, or shipwrights—must have 
the materials proper to their particular work; and the better prepared these 
materials are, the better will be the products of their skill. In the same way, 
the statesman and the lawmaker must have their proper materials, and they 
must have them in a condition which is suited to their needs. The primary 
factor necessary, in the equipment of a city, is the human material; and this 
involves us in considering the quality, as well as the quantity, of the 
population naturally required (Aristotle 2009, 260–61). 
 
Without the proper “materials” even the most ambitious plan to create a virtuous 
polis might fail. So it would be better to settle for the best possible option: “We have to 
study not only the best constitution, but also the one which is practicable, and likewise the 
one which is easiest to work and most suitable to cities generally” (Aristotle 2009, 134). 
Aristotle’s view is not without consequences, as we will see in the following chapters. We 
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can already provide a historical analogy for his argument. The democratization of Japan 
and Germany after World War II followed Aristotle’s principle of practicality over the 
ambition to create the best possible outcome, whereas one could argue that similar attempts 
in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 were dominated more by ambition 
than by practicality. Yet even with these examples it is important to keep in mind that 
Aristotle is not proposing a relativistic view here. The normative goal of virtue must still 
be achieved. A virtuous society, however, emerges not out of the rational calculation by 
communities to be virtuous, but through historical and cultural processes. 
Although Aristotle was more popular with Enlightenment thinkers than Plato, these 
aforementioned elements of his thought got at least partially lost with the appearance of 
philosophical realism. The first and most remarkable divergence from Aristotle came in 
the philosophical approach of Thomas Hobbes, who tried to refute the idea of human being 
as political animal. To say that Hobbes was critical of Aristotle amounts to a gross 
understatement, considering that he called his works absurd, repugnant, and ignorant 
(Hobbes 2019, KL 16119). The emphasis by Aristotle on the importance of the community 
and its demands on the individual were not shared by Hobbes. Individualism and its 
protection as a political idea finds its first proponent in the figure of Thomas Hobbes (S. 
B. Smith 2012, KL 2907), and although it seems so natural to us today, even a 19th century 
writer like Alexis de Tocqueville had to admit that “individualism is a recent expression 
arising from a new idea” (Tocqueville 2002, 482).  
Regarding culture, the rise of individualism with Hobbes is of crucial importance. 
As we have already discussed, the functionalist purpose of culture is intended to fill 
communities with emotional content and intrinsic value that goes beyond any cost-benefit 
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analysis. We have also argued that this ability is natural in the sense that being with others 
can cause emotional reactions, and these emotions are not just optional, but potentially 
crucial to our health and well-being. Society in the cultural approach, I have suggested so 
far, is therefore more than just the solution of an organizational problem (since we need 
others to survive in a hostile environment), but the consequence of an actual emotional 
need. 
For Hobbes, however, neither society nor the social instinct of human beings are 
entirely natural. Hobbes argues that it is fear of violence and the need for protection that 
leads to emergence of a social contract in which the participants agree to endow the state 
with the necessary power to protect and punish. Yet this agreement for Hobbes is an act 
against, not in line with, human nature (Keyt 1987, 62). The creation of society is an 
artificial act conducted by naturally selfish beings who are in constant fear of violent death. 
They form a society around a social contract to protect the one existing natural right, the 
right to self-preservation. The formation of society is an artificial act carried out to protect 
a natural right, but society as such does not come to us naturally, according to Hobbes. 
This is partially because most people are not equipped for social life:  
Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in 
Infancy, are born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men) either 
through defect of minde, or want of education remain unfit during the whole 
course of their lives; yet have Infants, as well as those of riper years, an 
humane nature; wherefore Man is made fit for Society not by Nature, but 
by Education: furthermore, although Man were born in such a condition as 
to desire it, it followes not, that he therefore were Born fit to enter into it; 
for it is one thing to desire, another to be in capacity fit for what we desire 
(Hobbes 2019, KL 3815). 
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Hobbes does not fully discard Aristotle’s view of human beings as social animals, 
but he does not see it as a natural inclination, but more as a desire like there are many 
desires we encounter during a lifetime. He emphasizes that this desire is based on the 
conditions into which we are born, which is more than a subtle hint that once these 
conditions could be changed, the desire itself might also disappear. Here we once again 
encounter a very modern idea in Hobbes’ thinking that distinguishes him from later liberal 
thinkers in his tradition. For Hobbes, a society of self-interested individuals does not 
emerge by nature, but by the creation of institutions that support such a society. It is worth 
noting that it is the modern liberal state and its welfare provisions as well as technological 
progress that would enable a life disconnected from a larger community including family 
is very Hobbesian. To make a somewhat provocative argument, Hobbes proposes 
something akin to upside-down totalitarianism. The known totalitarianisms tried to take 
control over the life of individuals in the name of an ideological community, while 
Hobbes’s totalitarianism aims at breaking the ties of community and replacing them with 
individualism. In his view, your life should be yours alone and you should extent the same 
right to everyone else. Using the word absolutism instead of totalitarianism, Steven B. 
Smith comes to a similar conclusion: “Hobbes is […] absolutist not despite his 
individualism but because of it” (S. B. Smith 2012, KL 3154). It is only through the 
powerful and impersonal state that individualism can be guaranteed.  
Despite their differences regarding the state of nature, we see a strong parallel here 
with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who equally argued that individual freedom must be enforced 
by the laws and that even those who might refuse have to be “forced to be free” (Rousseau 
2011, x). It is debatable to what extent the use of force would have found Rousseau’s 
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approval, but it does highlight that even he argued for the necessity of a strong institutional 
framework to guarantee individual freedom.  
These similarities are quite important, because they highlight another 
misunderstanding when it comes to the liberalism of Hobbes and Rousseau. Their 
philosophies aim at breaking free the individual from any form of community that puts 
obligations on a person that cannot pass muster with reason.  
Hobbes does not force a specific way of life on the citizen like a totalitarian would, 
but he denies certain lifestyle choices. There is only one authority in the world of Hobbes, 
and that is the state which not only rules supreme as the representative of the people but is 
also the only source of law. In his view, laws made by the state can be good or bad laws, 
but they can never be unjust (Hobbes 2019, KL 19150), because justice is solely defined 
the state itself and no other authority. Rousseau will later ascribe a similar role to his 
concept of the “General Will” that would serve as the sole authority and casting aside other 
sources of law like nature, custom, or revelation (S. B. Smith 2012, KL 3977). 
The good laws that Hobbes envisions do not force people to do something, but 
rather encourage them not to do something: 
For the use of laws, which are but rules authorized, is not to bind the 
people from all voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a 
motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashness 
or indiscretion; as hedges are set, not to stop travelers, but to keep them on 
their way (Hobbes 2019, KL 20847) 
 
Now, what would be the source of such “desires, rashness, or indiscretions”? Most 
likely misguided teachings that emphasize the wrong values and are unconducive to public 
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tranquility. This problem will be solved by censorship and a rather tight conceptualization 
of free speech: 
Sixthly, it is annexed to the sovereignty, to be judge of what 
opinions and doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and 
consequently, on what occasions, how far, and what men are to be trusted 
withal, in speaking to multitudes of people; and who shall examine the 
doctrines of all books before they be published (Hobbes 2019, KL 18765) 
 
Hobbes confronts us with the paradox that an omnipotent state that has control over 
all the laws, religion, and education will nonetheless act as a representative of the people 
and be its protector, but not its suppressor. This is a tall order, but Hobbes does resolve it 
through his abandonment of culture. If people no longer see the need or have the desire to 
harm each other in the name of the metaphysical, who else could prevent them from 
realizing that the most precious thing to preserve is life itself. Pride and the habit of 
moralizing is for him one of the biggest reasons for violence, when fear and respect for life 
would be much more appropriate. Hobbes, and this cannot be stressed enough, did not 
create a cold emotionless political theory, but a political theory that aimed at redirecting 
and reevaluating the emotional capabilities of human beings. When I argue that Hobbes 
started the movement against culture in political theory, what he in fact did was create a 
cultural revolution that attempted to replace communitarianism with individualism and 
instrumental communitarianism.51 All of this was well-intended and it was impossible for 
Hobbes to foresee how strong our groupish instincts and desire for community actually are. 
 
51 By “instrumental communitarianism” I mean the idea that community is not an end in itself but 
only a means to achieve the goals of individuals. 
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There are passages in which Hobbes sounds surprisingly modern, but also shows 
an acute awareness of the actual ramifications of his theory. For example, he writes both 
that the poor should be taken care of by the state in order not to depend on the charity of 
others, but equally proposes public works programs by the state to combat idleness 
(Hobbes 2019, KL 11917-11921). Hobbes is fully aware of the idea that his Leviathan 
needs to provide more than just the upholding of the law. The individualization of society 
will need an active, not an absentee, Leviathan that will have to focus his resources on the 
creation and sustaining of a society of individuals. The modern state with its welfare and 
support systems owes much more to Hobbes than is commonly realized. It would go 
beyond the purpose of this dissertation, but it is worth remarking that Hobbes probably also 
had a possible answer for the dilemma of multicultural societies. For him, government 
provisions of any kind serve the emancipation of the individual, so the question of how to 
handle diversity would not even arise: Participation in the modern Hobbesian welfare state 
would require individuals to forswear any allegiance with the exception of allegiance to 
individualism, respect for human life, and the laws of the Leviathan.  
It is important to point out that despite the powerful role Hobbes has reserved for 
his Leviathan, the role of the state is arguably more limited than Aristotle’s or Plato’s. The 
Greek philosophers viewed the creation of government as a main tool in the emergence of 
virtuous citizens, therefore an active interplay between individual, state, and society was 
built into the theoretical DNA of the polis. Hobbes abandoned these ideas as overly 
idealistic and empties the political theory of any teleological content that concerns itself 
with virtue or morality. Hobbes becomes the first philosophical “Realist” who wants to 
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describe human behavior in its true and timeless form, undiluted by culture, traditions, and 
institutions (Strauss 1965, 170–75).  
The Hobbesian state allows society to exist through the prevention of violence and 
the protection of the natural right of human beings: The right to self-preservation. In 
Hobbes’ theory there is no real room for community but only for an artificial society of 
human beings who are to one degree or another frightened of each other:  
I set down for a principle by experience known to all men, and 
denied by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that 
except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power, every man 
will distrust and dread each other… . . . (Hobbes 2019, KL 3666), 
And also:  
I hope nobody will doubt but that men would much more greedily 
be carryed by Nature, if all fear were removed, to obtain Dominion, then to 
gaine Society" (Hobbes 2019, KL 3804). 
 
The state according to Hobbes emerges out of fear and forces individuals into 
civilized society (meaning a society in which the right for self-preservation is respected) 
through the replacement of fear from each other with fear from the state. The location and 
application of fear is the linchpin in Hobbes theory, because without it we would not create 
society but instead seek  dominion over each other. So even if the creation of society can 
be accomplished, the people “never acquire any genuine regard for one another; they 
remain always potential enemies, held in harness by the power of the sovereign” (Gauthier 
1979, 211). Hobbes’ theory hinges on a very specific conceptualization of human nature, 
one that simultaneously pitches us against each other but simultaneously endows us with 
the rational faculties to create a system to restrain ourselves. And that system culminates 
in the creation of the state that has the ultimate say in spiritual as well as secular matters. 
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This ultimate say, however, does not mean that the state forcefully imposes a belief system 
on its citizens, only that the state is supposed “to control ideas that genuinely are dangerous 
to peace and order, but still leave ample room for what people are allowed to think and do 
in their private lives” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1704). 
Although enormously powerful in theory, the Leviathan is quite limited in its actual 
competencies. Its powers may be absolute – “for the Sovereign [must be] absolute … or 
else there is no Sovereignty at all” (Hobbes 1988, 257) – but its use highly conditional. 
Hobbes’ state is neutral in spiritual areas or questions of what supposedly makes a good 
life – as long as the individual answers to these questions do not question the key value of 
the state: individualism. In other words, you can worship within your heart whatever you 
want, but keep it to yourself. This is also how we must understand Hobbes’ call for 
censorship. His concern is more with what kind of information gets disseminated and not 
necessarily what people truly believe. 
The fact that Hobbes allows the individual in the private sphere such a high degree 
of autonomy caused some to call him one of the first major characters in the liberal tradition 
(S. B. Smith 2016, 71, where Smith refers here especially to Michael Oakeshott). Hobbes 
is a liberal in the sense thathe rejects any kind of moral zeal – people are what they are, 
and there is no way to change that. He allows the highest level of individual freedom 
conditional such freedom not interfering with or compromising public safety. The state is 
neutral and does not impinge upon the private sphere of its subjects, while the private 
sphere of its subjects does not interfere with the public sphere that is the realm of the state. 
Moral convictions like religion are to be held in private and should not be the source of 
public conflict. In his awareness of the influential power of religious sentiments, Hobbes 
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even provides an escape hatch for the true believer to be able to observe both the state and 
his religion: 
Laws can compel actions but not faith. For this reason, even if a 
person is forced to forswear belief in Christ, Hobbes argues that he commits 
no sin. ‘Profession with the tongue,’ he remarks, ‘is but an external thing’ 
and can signify obedience, but not belief (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1649).  
 
So even if the state bans one’s religion, the believer should not despair since the 
government can only forbid the public profession of faith: the soul remains untouched. 
Through this way of thinking Hobbes hoped to carve out a path that allows the existence 
of an absolute secular state and religious sentiment in tandem and in service of social peace. 
This way of thinking remains valid today, as Mark Lilla points out: “The way modern 
liberal democracies approach religion and politics today is unimaginable without Hobbes” 
(Lilla 2007, 88). 
Hobbes believed in the possibility that a person can be a citizen in support of a 
protective state and relegate all things spiritual to one’s private sphere. Public and political 
life for him are to be cleansed of religious influence and the state should serve the purpose 
of allowing each person to be happy according to “his own fashion.” Supposedly Hobbes 
theory found its partial realization in the enlightened absolutism of Frederick II’s Prussia 
in 1740, whose regent declared that “religions must all be tolerated; only the Attorney 
General should see to it that none of them injures any other, for here everyone must be 
saved in his own fashion” (quoted in: Gay 1966, 349).52 If we take another close look at 
Frederick II, we will see why he was so comfortable promoting religious toleration. For 
 
52 Gay also writes about Prussia that “Hobbes, had he lived to see it, would have approved” (Gay 
1966, 349). 
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Frederick and the anti-religious philosophers of the Enlightenment, religion was to be 
challenged and ridiculed. Frederick himself wrote about Christianity as  
an old metaphysical fiction, stuffed with miracles, contradictions 
and absurdities, which was spawned in the fevered imaginations of the 
Orientals and then spread to our Europe, where some fanatics espoused it, 
some intriguers pretended to be convinced by it and some imbeciles actually 
believed it (quoted in: Clark 2009, KL 3655) 
 
To view the abandonment of religion as Hobbes’ triumph would miss the mark 
regarding what he means when he talks about religion. For Hobbes, religion is born out of 
the human fear of death; one way or another, Hobbes sees fear as the main driving impulse 
of human behavior. Once religion has emerged, however, it becomes the cause of pride and 
other emotions that tend to trigger violent behavior. Hobbes is best known for his idea that 
the state of nature is synonymous with the the state of war. But as Only when men seek to 
impose their beliefs on others does the war of all against all break out (Fukuyama 2006, 
KL 4642). Hobbes does not believe that religion as such can be abandoned, but if its 
source—fear--can be tamed by the state, it could cease to be the cause of violence. This is 
a crucial part of Hobbes’ writing that often tends to be misunderstood. He wrote about 
religion since it was the main inspiration for ideological and cultural conflicts at his time. 
When the Puritans banned theatres throughout England in 1642 shortly before the outbreak 
of the English Civil War, Hobbes was not entirely mistaken in identifying the conflict 
between religious and secular authority as an important contributing factor. As Stephen 
Holmes points out, Hobbes viewed “laymen in the grip of enthusiasm” and those who 
inspired them as the main culprits of rebellion and civil war (quoted in the preface to 
Hobbes 1990, x). 
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I believe it is safe to say that Hobbes would maintain the same position even if this 
inspiration would be of a non-secular nature. A communist society would not gain Hobbes’ 
approval simply because it is secular and anti-religious. On the contrary, Hobbes would 
reject any political system that tries to impose a vision of salvation on its citizens, 
regardless of whether this vision would be secular or religious. It is those who can incite 
the imagination and enthusiasm of the population that for Hobbes tend to cause war and 
violence. Hobbes identifies religion as a source of pride for the individual, leading to a 
situation where “most men would rather lose their lives … than suffer slander” (Hobbes 
1990, x).  
Yet, if fear is the source of religion, and religion the source of pride that inspires 
violence, then the containment of fear should ultimately also lead to the containment of 
religion, pride, and ultimately violence. This is possible for Hobbes, since he views religion 
as purely functional in its relation to fear. If this issue can be resolved, religion itself might 
one day become obsolete.53 The fear that gives rise to religion should be redirected into a 
fear of the state which resembles a godlike entity.  
Therefore the age of enlightened absolutism should have been the beginning of an 
era of peace, since religion was increasingly put at the margins and the state was close to 
being as absolute as at the times possible. If indeed religion was the main culprit for causing 
violence, its marginalization should have limited the causes of violence within and among 
states. The weakness, however, of Hobbes theory is that he misinterprets the source of 
religion. While fear might very well play a crucial role in the emergence of religion, a more 
 
53 It was this view on religion that made him a heretic in the eyes of many of his contemporaries. 
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important element is the natural sociability of human beings that incentivizes us to build 
communities around sacred objects. These communities form moral norms and values that 
enable and facilitate collective action.  
For Hobbes, there is no community but only individuals that are put into relation 
via society – and these relations are by nature characterized by latent violence. This does 
not mean that there is constant war, but that the conditions always point into its direction: 
For warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but 
in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battell is sufficiently 
known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature 
of warre; as it is in the nature of weather. For as the nature of foule weather, 
lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many 
dayes together: So the nature of war, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but 
in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to 
the contrary (Hobbes 1988, 186).  
 
In other words, everybody is in constant fear of violence without any assurance of 
safety unless this fear drives people to enter into a social contract that leads to the 
emergence of the state. This leads to the larger question whether a society without culture 
can exist at all. According to Hobbes and his followers, the answer is not only yes, but 
emphatically yes. If society could be held together simply by the rational agreement of the 
individuals constituting it, culture – regardless if secular or religious – would become 
irrelevant as a defining element of society. 
The central figure in Hobbes theory remains the individual that is subject to being 
misguided by superstition, deceived by clergy, and riled up by intellectuals. It creates the 
conditions under which people become willing to harm each other in the name of honor or 
other “trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, 
either directed in their persons, or by reflexion in their kindred, their friends, their nation, 
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their profession, or their name” (Hobbes 1988, 185). In addition to honor (or glory) Hobbes 
identifies competition and diffidence as the “three principal causes of quarrel,” all of which 
emerge because of us “keeping company.”  
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of 
griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them 
all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same 
rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or 
undervaluing, naturally endeavours, […]to extort a greater value from his 
contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example (Hobbes 1988, 
185).  
 
Community and society are related to unhappiness since they are the field upon 
which competition, diffidence, and the strive for glory can take root. Only a “power able 
to over-awe them all” can reign in our violent instincts, and according to Hobbes we are 
rational enough to leave our state of nature and form such a power. This power will ensure 
the relegation of our religious instincts to the private sphere and minimize violence since 
its driving forces will be restrained by the state.  
Although rarely credited for it, Hobbes initiates consideration of a key problem of 
modernity: The question whether a civilized society is actually in contradiction of our 
“natural” instincts. After all, if society is only possible through the rational overcoming or 
replacing of humanity’s state of nature, would we not enter a constant state of anxiety 
driven by living in denial of our true nature? From Durkheim’s anomie to Freud’s 
civilizational discontents, multiple variations on this theme exist. To locate human 
existence on the plane between individualism and sociability has puzzled the social 
sciences at least since the abandonment of what Hobbes called “Aristotelity,” the 
combination of Christian and Aristotelian thought. Hobbes’ theory liberates the individual, 
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but simultaneously limits the entire emotional life of the individual to the private sphere. 
Society becomes functional as a place to conduct economic exchanges, but it is separated 
from any true form of community:  
Even in times of peace, Hobbesian or Lockean liberalism provided 
no reason why society’s best men should choose public service and 
statesmanship over a private life of money-making (Fukuyama 2006, KL 
3037). 
 
A peaceful community in Hobbes’ world can exist only because of a social contract 
that establishes the “Leviathan,” but that social contract springs from rationality and is 
sustained by fear and not some natural sociability or desire for community. Francis 
Fukuyama labels this the “Hobbesean fallacy” – the assumption that human beings are by 
nature individualistic and enter society at a later stage out of rational calculation 
(Fukuyama 2012, 29). The minimalist yet powerful state Hobbes envisions takes the 
concept of rationality to an extreme, since everybody who partakes in this social contract 
is apparently rational enough to also forswear any temptation to free-ride or otherwise take 
advantage of this newly created system. This is especially surprising, given that Hobbes on 
the one hand identifies the emotional side of being human (that we rather risk our life than 
endure slander) but at the same time places such high trust in our ability to rationally 
overcome these emotions. In an argument based on Weber, Durkheim, and Talcott-Parsons, 
Richard K. Ashley writes that  
in the absence of a framework of norms consensually accepted by 
its members, it might be possible momentarily to establish an orderly social 
aggregate (a "social contract," for example) among instrumentally rational 
individuals. Except under conditions of absolute stasis, however, it cannot 
be maintained (Ashley 1984, 246).  
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If everything is instrumental, the individuals will constantly reevaluate the utility 
of the existing framework and give it up as soon as such an action would lead to higher 
benefits. Not at all, Hobbes would reply, since the powerful state would prevent any 
deviation from the social contract. But even so, what at the outset seems like a very limited 
state only designed to prevent violence between the people becomes much more complex 
once we realize that such a state would not only have to prevent violence as such, but also 
guard against the emergence of conditions that could lead to violence. Hobbes elegantly 
circumvents this problem by arguing that through the redirection of fear from a god-
imposed punishment in the afterlife to the possibility of a state-imposed punishment in the 
here and now, the fewer incentives for violence there will be. The only thing to be feared 
is a state that can punish in this life and not the afterlife, giving it the power to rationally 
compel people into obedience. All are still free to believe whatever they want in their 
private life, but public life is to be cleansed of discussions about higher things that can lead 
to violence. Hobbes, in other words, replaces the irrational fear of god with the rational 
fear of the state. Similarly, as Fukuyama points out, he wants to channel the readiness to 
act violently in the name of trifles into commercial energy, where honor is not defined by 
prowess in battle or piousness in religious questions, but by material success in the market 
place.  
Whatever positive content life may have has to be filled by the 
individual himself. That positive content can be a high one of public service 
and private generosity, or it can be a low one of selfish pleasure and personal 
meanness. The state as such is indifferent. Indeed, government is committed 
to the tolerance of different “lifestyles,” except when the exercise of one 
right impinges on another. In the absence of positive, “higher” goals, what 
usually fills the vacuum at the heart […] liberalism is the open-ended 
pursuit of wealth (Fukuyama 2006, KL 3028). 
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Hobbes cannot reverse the emergence of society, but his model at least partially 
recommends a reduction of human interaction. If rational utility alone would be the 
overriding reason for people to interact, communal activities like religious services and the 
fervor they might cause would be diminished or even disappear. In Hobbes world, you can 
have an altar in your home, but you worship alone. We might view these arguments as 
fervently anti-religious, but they are in fact profoundly anti-cultural in character.  Why? 
Because a world in which we define the scope and purpose of our social life by the security 
and personal benefit that is in it for us would have no need for communities in order to 
praise god or recite the pledge of allegiance. We would remain alone unless we have a 
material need to interact with others. This might suffice to make a society possible, but 
most likely not a community. The entire body of literature dealing with the matter of social 
capital argues convincingly that if people trust each other, material conditions tend to 
improve along with other factors necessary for a satisfied life – also on the individual level 
(Fukuyama 1996, 2001; Elinor Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Putnam 2001, 2007). Even the 
Leviathan and Hobbes impersonal government would most likely function better if people 
identified with it (Rothstein 2011). Yet the terms “social capital” or “social trust” are just 
a very fancy way of saying people sharing a common culture and identity – something 
Robert Putnam openly admits (Putnam 2007).  
Hobbes lays the groundwork for what later would become the definition of the so-
called bourgeois or bourgeoisie: Interested only in physical security and material wealth, 
this new class of people is supposedly disinterested in questions of religion and ideology. 
“Hobbes gave decisive expression to a new morality that has its home with the modern 
bourgeois desire to achieve peace, safety, and comfort” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1398). 
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Historically, however, it turned out that the very comfort the bourgeoisie enjoyed, was also 
a cause of great anxiety. Far from adhering to Hobbes’ strict separation of private and 
public, the bourgeoisie became the driving force behind ideologies and secular religious 
movements. We must understand that for Hobbes the problem was not so much the content 
of religion, but the fact that it can enflame our passions. And where there is passion, there 
is also the risk of violence. As Leo Strauss points out, the main virtue for Hobbes is 
peaceableness, which creates the conditions under which self-preservation becomes 
possible (L. Strauss 1965, 187). Any idea that would incite the passions is therefore a 
potential threat to a peaceful society, and it does not matter whether such an idea has 
religious roots or not.  
Hobbes and later writers of the Enlightenment wrote at a time when religion was a 
major cause of conflict, and understandably their approach towards religion was 
fundamentally critical. The question whether Hobbes himself was a Christian or not has 
been debated extensively (for example S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 4) and without clear 
conclusion, but his criticism of religion was substantial enough that even the Enlightenment 
philosophers thought it wise to use Hobbes’ ideas without giving him credit, since his 
reputation for impiety would have made him a political liability (Gay 1966, 43). Regardless 
of how Hobbes felt personally about religion, it was not for him a source of absolute truth 
or revelation, but an artificial creation to combat mankind’s fear of violent death.54  
There is no higher meaning in religion, only a functional approach that reduces it 
to a mechanism that allows us to cope with our fear of death. The problem, however, is that 
 
54 Hobbes might not have been an atheist, but he was definitely a sceptic. It was not so much the 
underlying question of whether God exists that troubled Hobbes, but the wide variety of interpretations and 
claims to ultimate authority of religious writing.  
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religion teaches us to fear the punishment we might receive in the afterlife – allowing 
religion to incite passions that run contrary to peaceableness in the here-and-now under the 
promise of a peaceable life after death. It is here where we find Hobbes’ secularism: The 
fear of punishment must be in the here-and-now, since otherwise there could be incentive 
to act violently out of fear of punishment in the afterlife. For the social contract to function 
properly, the people must fear punishment by the state more than anything else, including 
punishment by some invisible forces. It does not matter for Hobbes if we are willing to die 
and kill in the name of religion, nation, or ideology. What matters for Hobbes is that we do 
it in the hope that our sacrifice will benefit future generations and our own chance for 
eternal salvation. It is exactly this kind of thinking that Hobbes seeks to combat, for it 
misdirects our fear and encourages us to act contrary to peaceableness.  
Hobbes’ position of rejecting any belief that would make people get passionate for 
no other reason than the belief itself, makes him the first anti-culturalist in Western thought. 
If we take the  claim seriously that he was the founder of modern political philosophy with 
his publication of De Cive in 1642 (for this claim see: S. B. Smith 2016, KL 1318), then 
modern Western political thought had a problem with culture as soon as 1642. One pillar 
of the definition of culture, we have argued, is the creation of community via emotional 
and passionate bonds between its members. Yet it is exactly these bonds that Hobbes sees 
as problematic: We should form a community out of fear of each other and not out of love 
for each other.  
Hobbes deems knowledge of the passions as the most important, since it is the 
passions that are the most common cause of conflict. His theory is thus of high 
contemporary relevance:  
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I say the similitude of Passions, which are the same in all men, 
Desire, Feare, Hope. Not the similitude or The Objects of the Passions, 
which are the things Desired, Feared, Hoped, for these the constitution 
individuall, and particular education do so vary (Hobbes 1988, 83).  
 
Hobbes argues that while the nature of the passions is the same among all human 
beings, the objects of the passions can vary. We are all able to feel certain emotions (Desire, 
Feare, Hope), but what triggers them depends on the upbringing and the education of the 
individual. The Hobbesian argument is making here is almost entirely in line with current 
research into the psychological role of emotions that we have addressed in previous 
chapters (Haidt and Joseph 2004; Keltner and Haidt 2001). 
When Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph write that  
People have created moralities as divergent as those of Nazis and 
Quakers, headhunters and Jains. And yet, when we look closely at the daily 
lives of people in divergent cultures, we can find elements that arise in 
nearly all of them – for example, reciprocity, loyalty, respect for (some) 
authority, limits on physical harm, and regulation of eating and sexuality 
(Haidt and Joseph 2004, 55),  
 
Is it (the above) really that different from Hobbes when he writes that  
for though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the 
diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, 
and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different 
passions […] For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth Feare; 
and one Cruelty, what another Justice; one Prodigality, what another 
Magnanimity; one Gravity, what another Stupidity. And therefore such 
names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination”(Hobbes 1988, 109–
10)? 
 
Social psychology tells us that the occurrence of passions and emotions are a 
combination of nature and nurture, the former defined by biological and genetic factors 
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(i.e., the actual physiological processes that take place when we feel an emotion) and the 
latter by culture and upbringing (i.e., what triggers these physiological processes).  (For a 
good overview of the relation between nature and nurture see: Carruthers, Laurence, and 
Stich 2005.) What has been confirmed by these modern approaches, I argue, was 
anticipated by Hobbes.  The major difference is that but Hobbes drew different conclusions 
from these social psychologists. Hobbes does not deny the existence of the passions, but 
he argues that reason should allow us to control those triggers. For example, the fact that 
insults to our family, religion, or nation make us angry is an arbitrary thing. Someone who 
feels no emotional connection to any of these cannot be upset by any insult to it or even 
have an incentive to insult them in the first place. To sever this connection and subdue or 
sublimate it to the more important priority of ensuring an individual’s physical safety is 
Hobbes’ main imperative.  
Doing so comes, however, at a price. Reason must be able to suppress the passions 
in order to allow the coexistence between human beings, with one exception: the passion 
of fear. For Hobbes, the unique quality of this emotion is that is forces us to act rationally.  
That is, I am afraid of my neighbor just as much as he is afraid of me; therefore I will 
construct a system that evokes a third party my neighbor and I fear even more than each 
other--the State. And the only thing the State asks from us is to respect each other’s right 
to self-preservation. 
Hobbes made the first step towards a sociology that viewed a functioning society 
as tantamount to being in a constant stage of anxiety. If we are only entering communities 
to ensure our survival but in reality would be rather on our own, community is reduced to 
the lesser of two evils. You can either be an individual in permanent fear of being killed or 
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be part of society that will ensure survival but will make you unhappy, since community is 
against our nature. The idea that civilization (and particularly modern civilization) makes 
us unhappy is an idea that gets increased traction in the years following Thomas Hobbes.  
According to Rousseau, it was the early tribal societies that were “the best for man” 
and also “the happiest and the most lasting epoch” (Rousseau 2011, 74) until the rise of 
modern civilization started to make us unhappy. Modern life makes us constantly 
discontent since it suppresses our natural urges (Freud 1961) or we escape the body‘s yoke, 
but end up being subject to that of society (Durkheim 2006, 276) and we become animals 
suspended in webs of significance we ourselves have spun (Geertz 1993, 5).  
Supposedly, reason forces us to escape our state of nature by denying part of our 
nature, and, for Hobbes, this reason gives rise to the emergence of the modern state that is 
liberal in that it does not impose a moral value on its citizens, but it is also authoritarian 
since it does not allow its citizens to compete about which moral values should dominate.55 
This is why the separation of the public and private sphere is so important for Hobbes: He 
is liberal regarding the exercise of one’s passions in private, but his state will prevent one 
from exercising them in public. On the other hand, Axel Honneth may be right in claiming 
that Hobbes “ultimately sacrificed the liberal content of the social contract for the sake of 
the authoritarian form of its realization” (Honneth 1996, 10), since his liberalism only 
applies to the individual, but not really to the public sphere.  
 
55 Needless to say, I disagree with the assumption that civilization puts us into conflict with our true 
human nature. As we have extensively discussed in previous chapters, the anthropological record does not 
support the idea of an ideal society before modern civilization arises.  
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Hobbes proposes a neutral state--one that must not pursue some moral or spiritual 
goal in order to provide social peace. If this peace is not threatened, the individual is free 
to do as she pleases. Since we are by nature solitary animals, we do not really care for what 
others do around us as long as they do not pose a threat to us. Even modern thinkers like 
John Rawls who have been influenced by Hobbes argue that the state must “remain neutral 
to comprehensive moral doctrines— doctrines about the good life, what makes life worth 
living, and so on” (S. B. Smith 2016, KL 180). In a sense, the modern concept of a 
multicultural society owns more to Hobbes than any other modern philosopher: If our 
cultural identities and individual passions are limited to our private lives without ever 
competing in the public sphere, there really is no reason why society should not be made 
up of a multitude of cultures.  
From Hobbes to Rawls and later to Habermas, there is a thread of thought that aims 
at the creation of a political community out of reason and free of passion. Competing ideas 
about the good life are a problem, because they might be so different among people that 
they cannot form a community or state. If, however, ideas of what a good life is form the 
essence of what we call culture, then culture itself becomes the problem. If the only passion 
we accept is fear, there is no room for public spiritedness or the positive emotions that 
spring from communal life. Norms, values, and traditions become a nuisance that dilute 
our ability to realize that communities exist primarily to protect the rights of the individual, 
but only to a very limited extent place obligations on said individual. John Locke builds 
upon Hobbes just a little further, adding that it is not just life that that state has to protect, 
but property as well. For Hobbes, the main moral question is the preservation of life; for 
Locke it is life and property.  For none of them, however, is it some form of higher moral, 
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intersubjective matter. That this was a break with ancient Greek philosophy and tradition 
was pithily summarized by Rousseau: “The ancient politicians forever spoke of morals and 
virtue; ours speak only of commerce and money” (Rousseau 2011, 16). 
While Plato and Aristotle viewed reason as a pathway to virtue, its interpretation 
since Hobbes was one that saw reason as the main tool to advance individual interests – 
first in the name of protecting life, then later including property.56 
The intentions of both Hobbes and Locke as well as Rousseau later on were 
definitely noble, so the goal here is not to undermine the values and insightfulness of their 
thinking. The problem, however, is that both Hobbes and Locke believed that society could 
be maintained almost exclusively by self-interest.57 For them, culture simply has no room 
in this theory.  
Leo Strauss formulated the problem with putting this kind of reason before culture 
thusly: “The more we cultivate reason, the more we cultivate nihilism: the less we are able 
to be loyal members of society. The inescapable consequence of nihilism is fanatical 
obscurantism” (L. Strauss 1965, 6). 
Strauss goes on to make two important points here that directly relate these 
problems with the societal vision of Thomas Hobbes – two points that were also picked up 
by Fukuyama and Smith. First, Hobbes wants to push the passions out of public life, but 
this would potentially not only limit the occurrence of violence, but also “the noble 
 
56 That the idea of virtues as a basis for community has fallen out of fashion in modernity was 
already observed by Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre 2007) 
 
57 Rousseau takes a slightly different take on self-interest: Although his idea of the general will is 
resting on the possibility to merge collective with individual desires, he still views emotional bonds between 
individuals as important. But even he believes that they can be created solely out of reason.  
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passions of patriotism, courage, generosity, and public-spiritedness” (Fukuyama 2006, KL 
3047). The public life in Hobbes’ world is devoid of passions, regardless of whether their 
content is noble or otherwise. It is not worldviews that the Leviathan bans, because people 
will always believe in different things, but it is their potential effect in the public sphere 
that concerns Hobbes. He is fully aware of the plurality of possible beliefs, but he sees 
them only as a problem if they enter the public sphere where people begin to try convincing 
each other of their views. And if persuasion fails, Hobbes is afraid, some will attempt to 
use violence to make their values the dominant ones. Discussions about moral issues are a 
potential risk, not the source of potential social and moral progress. Therefore it would be 
best to keep them to the privacy of one’s home, while in the public sphere the state 
determines what is to be discussed and what is not. Hobbes does not view an ideal society 
as a moral community but as a conglomerate of individuals who want to advance their self-
interest. Human beings, for him, are “egoistic calculators, who remain more or less the 
same after [entering] the [social] contract as they were before” (S. B. Smith 1991, 90). The 
state is supposed to use its power in order to influence that egoistic calculation to it inclines 
every individual towards peace.  
Second, Strauss sees another consequence of Hobbes, which is that if the only 
criteria for the judgment of one’s behavior is its effect on public safety, the range of what 
is permissible is quite broad. This observation of Strauss also shows a weakness in Hobbes’ 
thinking, namely, that human beings can be fully content with their choices on an 
individual level. What I mean by this is that in Hobbes’ thinking an individual should be 
satisfied if he or she can live out their identity without the recognition of said identity by 
others. The problem with this, however, is that identity very often depends on being 
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recognized by others and can hardly exist for and by an individual alone (Honneth 1996; 
the deconstruction of recognition as an intersubjective phenomenon is the most important 
and insightful argument of Charles Taylor: C. Taylor 1992, 1994). In a world where 
everything is permissible, the struggle for recognition becomes actually more acute than 
before, and Strauss points towards the combination of nihilism and obscurantism – that the 
more that is permissible, the harder one has try to gain recognition. It is an open question 
whether a society that demands conformity in certain areas causes more anxiety than a 
society where nobody is supposed to care about the identity of others, but by the same 
token should take identity very seriously. We will return to this topic again a little later, 
but for now let me summarize how Hobbes matters for the concept of culture: 
Hobbes’ theory hinges on the assumption that communities are purely artificial and 
instrumental, meaning that they emerge out of a contract between individuals for 
controlling the most basic of all passions: fear. Religion, as well as the urge to form a state, 
are not driven by some natural sociability, as Aristotle would argue, but by fear of violent 
death. For Hobbes, human beings are anxious, frightened beings whose survival instinct 
makes them create society even though, as we have seen before, is contrary to their 
individualistic nature. Hobbes is the first in a line of philosophers to argue that the 
potentially civilizing effect of community is not a fulfillment of a deep-seated desire but 
the deliberate suppression of our actual human nature for the sole purpose of minimizing 
the risk of violent death. Since it is fear of death that reinforces life as the most important 
natural right. Allan Bloom summarizes this argument as follows:  
In particular you should imagine how you feel when another man 
holds a gun to your temple and threatens to shoot you. That concentrates all 
of the self in a single point, tells us what counts. At that moment one is a 
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real self, not a false consciousness, not alienated by opinions of the church, 
the state, or the public. This experience helps much more to ‘set priorities’ 
than does any knowledge of the soul or any of its alleged emanations such 
as conscience (A. D. Bloom 1987, 174).  
 
The social contract allows the “natural” condition of human individualism through 
guaranteeing the most basic natural right of human beings: The right to life, which we are 
constantly in fear of losing. The society created by the social contract has no intrinsic 
purpose but a purely functional one—i.e., society exists to serve the security needs of the 
individual, nothing more. Hobbes philosophy is inherently atomistic and materialistic, and 
thus always falls back on the individual and her material interests. The extent to which 
Hobbes has emptied the concept of society from a true sense of community has received 
surprisingly little attention, given the importance it has for his overall theory of politics (Z. 
A. Pelczynski in Hegel 1964, 136)  
Hobbes breaks intentionally with what he considers the core mistake of the 
idealistic tradition in political philosophy, which is the assumption that man is by nature a 
political or social animal. A community for Hobbes is the agreement between individuals 
to give up the right to do as they please and create a third party, the state, which will ensure 
everybody’s right to self-preservation. But, ultimately, the only two “natural” feelings are 
pride and fear, both of which act on the individual level and are determined by our self-
interest.  
More than any other philosopher, Hobbes laid the groundwork for the utilitarian, 
rational-choice based view of human nature. Or, put differently, the rational-utilitarian side 
of human nature has to be elevated above any other aspect. In order for the social contract 
to work and to avoid the negative influence of cultural passions,  
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it requires such a radical change of orientation as can be brought 
about only by the disenchantment of the world […]. Hobbes’s is the first 
doctrine that necessarily and unmistakably points to a thoroughly 
‘enlightened,’ i.e., a-religious or atheistic society as the solution of the 
social or political problem (Strauss 1965, 198).  
 
What would be left in a disenchanted world? Strauss, in his interpretation of 
Hobbes, has an answer for us: Political hedonism and material enjoyment. Although 
Hobbes himself was no hedonist, he was fully aware that if political and religious passions 
are to be banned from public life, fulfillment must come in the form of a complete lifting 
of all restrictions on the sensual pleasures (as long as they do not interfere with societal 
peace).  
The “sacred duty of the rulers is no longer ‘to make the citizens good 
and doers of noble things’ but to ‘study as much as by laws can be effected, 
to furnish the citizens abundantly with all good things […] which are 
conducive to delectation’” (Strauss 1965, 198). 
 
Hobbes is arguing that all the passions below the desire for self-preservation should 
be redirected into the desire for a materialistically good life, where sensual pleasures would 
replace emotional ones that come from following moral imperatives that have no grounding 
in true human nature. Turning against the idealism of the classics and their 
conceptualization of the best possible political regime as the one that creates the virtuous 
citizen, Hobbes strives for the creation of a political system that creates the hedonistic 
citizen. Not least because the hedonist is expected to be more concerned with his self-
preservation than the morally inspired ascetic, who must always be suspected of giving up 
his desire of self-preservation and the respect of others’ self-preservation in order to 
achieve some higher, more idealistic goal. This is the core of Hobbes’ so-called realism, 
the reduction of human beings to materialistic utility maximizers. It is not regard for each 
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other or any form of sympathy that keeps a Hobbesian modern society together, but the 
desire to improve our material well-being as well as the guarantee of state-protected self-
preservation. 
 
 
 
4.5 Culture and the Utilitarian Worldview  
Utilitarianism is a central concept of my overall argument, not only because of its 
crucial role in the development of economics but also because of its role in the 
advancement of an individualistic worldview. A good definition of the term “utilitarian” 
comes from one of its defenders, Charles Camic:  
The distinguishing feature of utilitarian moral philosophers was an 
ethical principle which viewed the morally good as those acts whose 
consequences tend to promote the greatest good for the greatest number of 
individuals. This is the ‘principle of utility’" (Camic 1979, 520). 
 
Morality in this conceptualization is the best possible life for the highest number of 
people, and whether unintentionally or not, this view merged quickly with a materialist 
idea of human flourishing. This is not unreasonable either, because “the greatest good” is 
a broad term, and what constitutes the “good” is a question yet to be conclusively decided. 
Hobbes and Locke were straightforward in their answer: good equals security and property. 
So a society able to provide protection for life and possessions is, in a utilitarian sense, a 
good society. 
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Since the key figure of utilitarianism is Jeremy Bentham (Bentham 1970; Mitchell 
1918), we have to ask whether there is any connection between his thought to that of 
Thomas Hobbes. Some claim that Hobbes is no utilitarian at all (Camic 1979) or that it is 
at least uncertain (Crimmins 2002), whereas I believe that there are some clear parallels of 
thought that are more than coincidental. I agree with the assessment that Bentham’s “chief 
ideas and methods are to be found in Hobbes” (W. Graham 2016, xx) and that both 
Bentham and James Mill come close to “an uncritical acceptance” (Plamenatz 1949, 2) of 
Hobbesian principles. In one of the most influential books on Hobbes, John Bowle argues 
that Thomas Hobbes is “a forerunner of the Benthamite school of political thought” (Bowle 
2015, 43–44). 
There is a rich and interesting debate surrounding utility, and it has been interpreted 
and reinterpreted in different ways (see, for example: Camic 1979; Mill 2015). One of its 
main characteristics remains a form of naturalistic monism, that reduces  
problems of social action and social order to material interests, and 
both embraced a naturalistic monism--that is, the belief that the natural 
sciences embody the only valid model of science to which the social 
sciences should, therefore, aspire (Ruggie 1982, 859). 
 
This observation was not lost on many 19th century philosophers and social 
thinkers, and German Idealism especially directly attacked the concept of utilitarianism 
and its foundation of naturalistic monism. German Idealism particularly was worried about 
the idea of a world devoid of transcendence or it being “disenchanted.” Charles Taylor 
among others has written insightful about modernity and utilitarianism making the world 
more accessible in terms of understanding, but potentially making it less “experienceable” 
(C. Taylor 2007a). Of the early idealists, Heinrich Heine, for example, lamented that  
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French philosophers chose John Locke as their master […] He was 
the savior they needed. His Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
became their gospel, and they swore by it. […] He turned the human mind 
into a kind of calculating machine; the whole human being became an 
English machine (H. Heine 1985, 168) 
 
Karl Marx was equally critical of this idea, remarking that it is only in the world of 
the markets and utility that “Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham” rule (quoted in: 
S. B. Smith 2016, KL 441). Max Weber built his theory of modernity’s disenchantment 
with the world at least partially on a severe critique of utilitarian principles (Koshul 2005; 
S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 6). Friedrich Nietzsche, probably the most important philosophical 
defender of culture in the idealist tradition (see: A. D. Bloom 1987), wrote about the 
struggle against the “English-mechanistic doltification of the world” and that  
They are no philosophical race, these Englishmen; Bacon signifies 
an attack on the philosophical spirit; Hobbes, Hume and Locke a 
debasement of the value of the concept of philosophy for more than a 
century […]. it was Locke of whom Schelling said understandably, “je 
meprise Locke” (Nietzsche 1989, 189).  
 
That Benthamite utilitarianism was not much interested in intersubjective relations 
is not an unfounded claim, and it should give us pause that the founder of utilitarianism, 
Jeremy Bentham, was a decidedly unemotional person that drew the irritation of many of 
his contemporaries like John Stewart Mill for being unsympathetic to “the most natural and 
strongest feelings of human nature”—namely, the desire for company (quoted in: Haidt 
2013, 118). There is a lot of credible speculation that by modern standards Bentham would 
have been diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome (Lucas and Sheeran 2006). This is no 
indictment of Bentham, since his ideas remain intriguing and inspiring, but in the end for 
his societal model to work most individuals would have to score extremely high on the 
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autism spectrum, meaning that they would be strong systemic thinkers and weak empathic 
thinkers (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004).  
Bentham serves as an important reminder in our treatment of culture that there are 
differences in the level to which people desire the company and emotional bonding with 
others.  This means that on the individual level culture will be perceived and experienced 
differently. Special cases like people with autism, or socio- and psychopaths are just a few 
examples of conditions under which my theory of culture would break down, since 
emotional empathizing is such a crucial element for cultural activity and a significant lack 
thereof would render culture itself less important. 
So while acknowledging these exceptions are important, it is equally important to 
emphasize that a majority of human beings does not meet the conditions for these special 
cases, but the model we tend to use in the social sciences potentially does. Homo 
economicus is one expression of a model that describes human beings as self-interested 
utility maximizers, which has become the main description of human nature in many of the 
social sciences. This model, however,  neglects most of the intersubjective qualities of 
human beings, including our desire for recognition and other emotional needs, something 
that makes such models of human nature resemble something closer to a high score on the 
autism scale than a social animal. (I am not the first one to make such an argument. See, 
for example: Devine 2003)  
Most people are hardwired for grouping and emotional bonding around ideas and 
activities, which is why we find competitive games, music, dance, and collective praying 
across all societies. Within society, other individuals are more than means to satisfy selfish 
desires via cooperation and competition. From war to sports external challenges and the 
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prospect of working together for something that has higher meaning have reinforced the 
bonds among the members of communities since the appearance of the first form of 
organized religion. This observation does not deny that this can lead to negative 
consequences, because the improvement in collective action for common goals extends to 
organized violence as well.  
But this is why we should take culture so seriously: The creation of individual 
identities that are emotionally tied up with the community can become so intense that it 
overrides our more individualistic instincts. It is impossible to talk about violent conflicts 
between groups and completely ignore the question of what makes the individuals that 
comprise these groups hang together. It is here where the argument regarding rationality 
becomes most problematic. The reason is because, while cooperation in the economic 
sphere can be explained without giving up the concept of the individual utility maximizer, 
it is much less easy in times of war. 
This is not necessarily so, argue the utilitarians: violent conflict also serves some 
purpose, and therefore has a utilitarian quality after all. It just might happen that the utility 
is received in non-material form like honor or a lasting legacy for one’s sacrifice. Such an 
argument, however, is equally relativistic and tautological since it boils down to “that 
people will pursue whatever it is they pursue” (Fukuyama 2018, KL 280), and cannot be 
falsified.  
To reduce the concept of Benthamian utility maximization to material utility 
maximization is not an attempt to build a strawman and then tear it down. But in order to 
have a viable concept and engage critically with this idea, one must break it out of its 
tautological cycle. The materialist conceptualization of utilitarianism is not to be 
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understood as just an observation of human behavior, but must be seen as a moral and 
ethical idea. A world that is primarily guided by the avoidance of pain and the seeking of 
pleasure in materialist terms should be less prone to violent conflicts over metaphysical 
matters, especially if these goals are pursued rationally. Maybe unintentionally, Bentham 
laid the groundwork for a materialist interpretation of utility when he declared money to 
be the most suitable measure for pain and pleasure (Shapiro 2012, 25), and since Bentham 
argues that preferring pleasure to pain is the foundational premise of rationality, it was only 
a matter of time that this morphed into the idea that any action that increases an individual’s 
monetary endowment should be considered rational.  
There are, however, some differences between Bentham and Hobbes I do not want 
to gloss over and that help us to understand the ways in which Hobbes was ultimately a 
moral thinker, despite the seeming coldness of his political proposals. Hobbes grounded 
his philosophy in an unwavering belief in natural rights, he just saw that there can be 
occasions on which some natural rights might be in conflict. Particularly the right to 
freedom and the right to life, in Hobbes view, could create tensions if the exercise of 
freedom by one individual should infringe on the right to life of another individual. This is 
why he hesitates to outright ban certain religions or ideas and just wants to relegate them 
to the private sphere, because there I can fully exercise my right to believe what I want 
with a minimal risk of interfering with the life of others. Hobbes might have been too 
optimistic in his conviction that human beings can be thoroughly individualized, but the 
motivation of his thought was coming from a deep belief in the value of human life.  
Jeremy Bentham is different from Hobbes primarily because he does not believe in 
natural rights at all. According to him they are ““simple nonsense […] rhetorical nonsense, 
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nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 2011, KL 625). All law for Bentham is positive law, but 
this does not mean that Bentham does not also adhere to some moral criteria. But his criteria 
is not one based on the natural right of the individual, but the principle that every action 
that increases the maximum happiness for the maximum of people should be judged as 
morally good. So in a certain way Hobbes is an individualist and Bentham a collectivist, 
with the later defending a strictly consequentialist doctrine that theoretically could justify 
policies even if they should involve  
grave harm, perhaps death, for some, that is no reason to object to it 
if the net effect is to maximize total utility. This is why links can be drawn 
between utilitarianism and eugenics, and why it confronts severe difficulties 
in dealing with the disabled. If the costs of keeping someone alive exceed 
the benefits to her and to the rest of society, then there is no utilitarian reason 
not to let her die. And if supremacist members of the Aryan race experience 
an increase in utility as a result of exterminating the Jews in their midst that 
exceeds the suffering experienced by those Jews, utilitarianism supplies no 
grounds for objecting. On the contrary, it would actually support such a 
policy, as even those who are sympathetic to consequentialist theories have 
been forced to concede. (Shapiro 2012, 26) 
 
Hobbes and Bentham, however, do show strong similarities in their treatment of 
culture, because neither one of them grants the concept of community significant 
importance. We have discussed this in great detail regarding Hobbes, but Bentham also has 
no interest in the idea of community as a human need. According to his theory, as Robert 
Nozick points out, the best possible life would be one in which we are plugged into 
“experience machines” that consist solely of an endless stream of pleasure (Nozick 2013, 
42–45).58 
 
58 One could imagine that Bentham as a movie critic would have perceived “The Matrix” as an 
intriguing utopian model. 
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Theoretically, utilitarian morality should not lead to the breakdown of order and 
people robbing and betraying each other for material gain, since such an order would not 
be sustainable and in the end would most likely make it harder to enjoy one’s material 
gains. In the utilitarian society we are driven by our materialist instincts to create social 
institutions that support an environment that allows for the peaceful accumulation of as 
many material goods as possible. Kant himself points out that “hard as it may sound, the 
problem of establishing the state [i.e., the just social order] is soluble even for a nation of 
devils, provided they have sense” (quoted in: Strauss 1965, 193). Kant, in true utilitarian 
form, argued that enlightened self-interest should make a beneficial social environment 
possible. The problem for utilitarian ethics is not so much its practical feasibility but the 
resistance of people to use reason. It is no coincidence that the Enlightenment is not only 
seeking the liberation of the individual, but also its goal of emancipation from the comfort 
of relying on somebody else’s interpretation of the world (Kant 1784a).59 Seeing the world 
through a collective lens is not the consequence of some innate desire for community, but 
a laziness of mind. We need religion-like institutions because they allow us to work 
together despite us being too lethargic to realize through reason that working together is 
the right thing. Once reason is realized, collectively-held belief systems should and could 
gradually wither away.60  
 
59 Kant is quite explicit about this: “Thus it is very difficult for the individual to work himself out 
of the nonage which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown to like it, and is at first 
really incapable of using his own understanding because he has never been permitted to try it. Dogmas and 
formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the 
fetters of an everlasting nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the 
narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is why there are only a few men who 
walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds” (Kant 1784). 
 
60 The convergence of Kant’s and Bentham’s thinking might (again) be connected to an exceptional 
medical condition. There is the possibility that Kant developed a brain tumor at the age of forty-seven. He 
began complaining of headaches, and soon after that he lost vision in his left eye. His writing style and his 
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The belief in one’s god, nation, or ideology is an obstacle to “having sense,” which 
would be the ideal of homo oeconomicus – a calculating automaton who behaves rationally 
and seemingly in a moral manner not for some higher cause, but because he or she realizes 
that in the end it is to their own benefit.61 History in this reading is just the long way of 
realizing the futility of culture and then finally throwing off its shackles. Violent conflicts 
should become solely possible over economic issues, but religious or ideological wars 
should disappear since reason leaves no justification for them. The Enlightenment project, 
in other words, was the attempt to replace the cohesive effect of culture with the supposedly 
cohesive effect of reason. The strength of a belief is not to be measured by the passion with 
which it is adhered to, but whether or not it is reasonable.  
The proponents of the importance of culture argue that passions are necessary to 
achieve such ends as group cohesion and enable collective action, something that the critics 
of culture concede, but with an important limitation: Group cohesion and collective action 
need the support of culture in pre-enlightenment times when something like religion was 
necessary to make people work together, since they lacked the rational thinking to realize 
that cooperation is beneficial as such. In using Kant’s dictum that “Enlightenment is man's 
emergence from his self-incurred immaturity,” they argue that the age of modernity since 
the Enlightenment has made culture obsolete – we now know through reason and 
experience all the positive effects of culture and can therefore afford to discard all its 
 
philosophy changed after that too, and some have speculated that he developed a tumor that interfered with 
emotional processing in the left prefrontal cortex, leaving his high systemizing unchecked by normal 
empathizing (Haidt 2013, 314). 
 
61 Kant for his part lived up to the ideal and was a utilitarian social being that enjoyed laughter and 
good company – because it was good for his health (Haidt 2013, 120). 
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superstitious side effects. If we know the benefits of cohesion then there is no need for a 
culturally triggered emotional support system. 
Religions and ideologies become obsolete since the enlightened mind does not have 
to share an emotional bond with his or her fellow human beings – reason has revealed how 
to work together, so even the most selfish individual will work towards the common good 
since she knows that in the long run it is in her own best interest. The idea of receiving all 
the positive effects of culture, like enabling cooperation and peaceful coexistence, but none 
of its negative effects, like conflicts over cultural values, is a tempting on.  I am afraid 
however that it is an idealism that is not grounded in the reality of human psychology. 
4.5.1 Alternative Utilitarianism: Adam Smith and David Hume  
Despite the criticism by the Counter-Enlightenment, English and particularly 
Scottish political philosophy was not entirely uncritical of utilitarianism. Adam Smith 
especially had strong doubts regarding the thin psychological grounding of utilitarianism, 
but he also realized that there can be conditions in which the utilitarian model applies. A 
good political system would cultivate the passions in such a way that they would support 
the virtues necessary for an ordered and prosperous society. While Hobbes believed that a 
good political system would relegate the passions to the private sphere and that concepts 
of vices and virtues have no room in the public sphere, the utilitarians were hopeful that a 
philosophy of material prosperity should also help solve the problem of order and living 
together in a society. Adam Smith is an important figure in our genealogy, because he is 
often named in one breath with utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham (Camic 1979). The 
utilitarian argument about self-interest as the main driving force of human action became 
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so pervasive, that in the course of time even its critics became interpreted as hidden 
supporters.  
It is astounding that a supposedly well-known philosopher like Adam Smith is often 
seen as a promoter of a Hobbesian system based on self-interest (Lamb 1974, 672). Smith 
identifies two sources of the philosophy of individualistic self-interest, and then disagrees 
sharply with both of them. One of them is Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of The Bees in 
which the author claims that individual selfishness leads to public benefits, an idea Smith 
calls “in almost every respect erroneous” (A. Smith 1982, 308). The second one is none 
other than Thomas Hobbes himself. While granting the possibility that laws emerge from 
human reason, the formation of community and cooperation cannot spring solely from the 
reason of self-interested individuals but instead comes first from immediate “sense and 
feeling.” Relying on individual reason as the sole source of functioning social systems is 
for Smith “altogether absurd and unintelligible” (A. Smith 1982, 320).  
This has far-reaching implications: Contrary to the common belief that modern 
neoclassical economics is a descendant of Adam Smith, it in fact owes more of its 
intellectual inheritance to Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham. It is Hobbes who claims 
that the state is not supposed to care about the promotion or production of a virtuous life 
but should limit itself to the protecting the sole natural right of human beings: the prospect 
of violent death (Strauss 1965, 181). Smith, on the contrary, is constantly concerned with 
the question of virtue and how to promote it. For Hobbes, there is only one virtue: 
peaceableness. Peaceableness is the condition for self-preservation, leading to the cessation 
of other forms of virtue like courage, temperance, magnanimity, liberality, or wisdom that 
 
288 
 
have no or in the worst case a negative effect on the virtue of peaceableness (Strauss 1965, 
187). 
Smith, on the other hand, dedicated a huge part of his moral philosophy to the 
question of virtue and its varieties. Like Hume, Smith takes the idealistic viewpoint that 
virtuous behavior can be maintained if people start to take pride in it and if their vanity is 
flattered by demonstrating their virtuous behavior. Consequently, Smith argues that “the 
great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects” (A. Smith 1982, 259). 
Throughout his works Smith shows his concern with the maintenance of a virtuous society 
and the different challenges to it. Even the division of labor, something he so admires for 
its positive impact on the productivity of society, does not escape this scrutiny: “Division 
of labor operates to impair the intelligence, enterprise, martial courage, and moral character 
of the laborers” (Viner 1927, 215). 
The more the division of labor progresses, the bigger the role Smith sees for the 
state in the provision of education, to maintain the moral integrity that he views as equally 
crucial to the maintenance of society as the pursuit of self-interest. (For the equal 
importance of self-interest and morality see: Lamb 1974; regarding the importance of 
public education see: Viner 1927, 227.) Despite putting questions of human relations at the 
core of his writings, Adam Smith remains most famous for his metaphor of the invisible 
hand – a concept that is hardly as central to Smith’s political thought that one would think, 
based on the frequency of its referencing; indeed, it might be that he meant it in a purely 
sardonic sense (E. Rothschild 1994).  
The “Nachtwächterstaat” or “Night-Watchman State” whose obligations are 
limited to maintain the peaceableness of society correlates more with the Hobbesian vision 
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of the state than it does with Smith’s. As we have already discussed, the spreading of 
economic methodology to the other social sciences has led to the dominance of Hobbes’ 
view of human nature in many disciplines,  although he barely gets much acknowledgment 
or credit for it. 
Elaborating on why human beings strive for material well-being, Smith argues that 
it is not the materialist aspect alone that motivates us: Material wealth (or the lack thereof) 
influences how we are perceived by others, which is the ultimate motivation of human 
action (A. Smith 1982, KL 797). By a similar token, Smith is critical of utility and the way 
Hume describes it (Macfie 1959, 209). For Smith, Hume applies the concept of utility too 
broadly, muddying crucial distinctions when it comes to human motivation:  
It seems improbable that the approbation of virtue should be a 
sentiment of the same kind as that by which we approve a convenient or 
well-contrived building; or that we should have no other reason for praising 
a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers. […] The 
sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite 
distinct from the sense of utility (A. Smith 1982, pt. iv, chap. ii). 
 
Smith sees more clearly than Hobbes and others that even pleasure or 
“delectability” of material goods depends on social interaction. When writing about the 
differences between rich and poor, Smith defines it as more a problem of emotional distress 
than lack or abundance of property (highlights by me):  
The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they 
naturally draw upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are 
disposed to go along with him in all those agreeable emotions with which 
the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him. At the thought of this, 
his heart seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of his 
wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it procures him. 
The poor man, on the contrary, is ashamed of his poverty. He feels that it 
either places him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice 
of him, they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and 
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distress which he suffers. He is mortified upon both accounts. For though 
to be overlooked, and to be disapproved of, are things entirely different, yet 
as obscurity covers us from the daylight of honour and approbation, to feel 
that we are taken no notice of, necessarily damps the most agreeable hope, 
and disappoints the most ardent desire, of human nature (A. Smith 1982, 
56, my italics).  
 
Matters of right and wrong, according to Smith, can be explored by reason, but the 
first reaction by which we judge something comes from our emotions, not our reason: 
It is altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first 
perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those 
particular cases upon the experience of which the general rules are formed. 
These first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any 
general rules are founded, cannot be the object of reason, but of immediate 
sense and feeling (A. Smith 1982, 320) 
 
Adam Smith is making a point similar to that of the theory of moral intuition, where 
we first feel and then try to rationalize and ground the feeling in reason.  
Adam Smith and his close friend and contemporary David Hume can be viewed as 
the last skeptics regarding the Hobbesian worldview. The division of Smith’s work into the 
realm of economics and the realm of passions is well documented (Macfie 1959), while 
David Hume proves trickier. Hume was more of a utilitarian than Smith, but not to the 
same extent of Bentham, who tried to fully absorb Hume’s approach into the utilitarian 
framework common in modern economics (Darwall 1994).  
Hume himself was somewhat torn between the scientism of the Enlightenment and 
the centrality of emotions as part of the human experience. He has been praised as a 
paragon of the Enlightenment as well as an example of emotivism, moral subjectivism or 
cultural relativism (Capaldi 1992; Manzer 1996). Anti-rationalist and Counter-
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Enlightenment figures of the German Romantic period even went so far to interpret Hume’s 
writings on religion and reason to support their claim that reason itself is a cultural- and 
faith-based phenomenon, and thereby the Enlightenment was wrong to put reason before 
faith, since the former cannot exist without the later (Berlin 1977, 162–87).  
Hume’s main contribution is the realization that any theory of human behavior is 
useless without scientific knowledge about human nature. He was one of the first 
philosophers to realize that natural as well as social sciences “depend on the sciences of 
man” (Gay 1969, 166). Hume’s Treatise on human nature was the starting shot for the first 
serious discussion about human nature and its implications for politics. While the topic 
itself has been covered by figures like Rousseau, it was Hume who argued that human 
nature needs to be looked at through the rigorous lens of science, and to focus on the is 
instead of the ought.  
I think the main reason why Hume could be interpreted to defend two completely 
different views is because Hume was foremost a skeptic. Hume supported the 
Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason, but at the same time remained skeptical whether it 
could replace every other authority that guides human behavior. Hume allowed room for 
the role of customs and tradition, without throwing the possibility of an evolving society 
that is increasingly guided by reason overboard. For Hume, justice cannot exist solely as a 
consequence of reason, but must be “corroborated […] by allegiance,” and he sees a strong 
role for education and acquired habits to cultivate a sense of condemning injustice. Without 
deference to these habits 
you break all the bonds of civil society, and leave every man at 
liberty to consult his private interest, by those expedients, which his 
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appetite, disguised under the appearance of reason, shall dictate to him 
(quoted in: Manzer 1996, 491) 
 
Simultaneously, however, Hume does not promote obedience to everything that 
comes from authority. Hume defines obedience as a rational duty that recognizes obedience 
to an established authority as central to an ordered society. But this is not a slavish 
obedience but one that obliges me to accept authority even if it should act against my 
personal appetites. One could think about it as the way in which defeated parties and their 
supporters accept election results in a functioning democracy. Although the outcome is not 
what they have hoped for, deference to the system and the allegiance to its ideals leads 
them to accept it. Just like Adam Smith, there is a particular emphasis on education. For 
him, it is education that fosters the emergence of a rationality to help us keep our passions 
in check and value the common good as something worth striving for.   
Hume’s and Smith’s Utilitarianism was therefore as much concerned with rational 
behavior as it was with creating the cultural fundament on which rational, utility 
maximizing behavior could lead to society’s well-being. David Hume is quite explicit in 
his rejection of the human ability to reason towards the most rational path of action since 
“reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey them” (Hume 2011, 174).  
Contrary to Hobbes, Hume perceived human beings as social beings arguing “that 
his very first state and situation may justly be esteemed social” (Hume 2011, 208), and that 
this initial sociability  renders the idea of a so-called state of nature in which “man can be 
man” obsolete: “This state of nature, therefore, is to be regarded as a mere fiction, not 
unlike that of the golden age, which poets have invented” (Hume 2011, 208). If human 
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beings are by nature social, are there iron laws that govern that sociability? Hume’s answer 
to this question is rather ambiguous:  
Hume had indeed argued that ‘in its principles and operations’ (its 
functions and mechanisms) human nature is essentially the same ‘in all 
nations and ages’ This affirmation of the existence of discoverable scientific 
regularities did not, however, deny – it actually emphasized – that the 
content of human nature ‘is various and supplied by social and historical 
circumstances’ (Camic 1979, 536).  
 
In other words, Hume believed that there are patterns of human behavior we see at 
all states and ages, which is the formation of societies because of our innate sociability. 
Yet what such a society would look like in detail springs from an interplay of factors and 
not some iron law of human behavior. There is, however, a permanence in the fundamental 
structure of human behavior:  
In all periods actors are social, motivated by a constellation of 
passions (which varies and is not just combinations of egoism and altruism), 
and regulated (in varying degrees) by external (artificial and natural) and 
internal (conscience) controls. This is what Hume meant when writing that 
‘human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations’ 
(Camic 1979, 538).  
In his The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Peter Gay provides us with an 
anecdote that highlights Hume’s way of thinking:  
He (Hume) describes a nation that rewards ingratitude, brutality, 
incest, homosexuality, suicide, and murder – and it turns out to be the 
classical Greeks, and he then plays the same cunning game with Frenchmen, 
who welcome cruelty to children as long as it is the Bastille for a disobedient 
son, and murder as long as it is an honorable duel. An Athenian of merit, 
though civilized and intelligent, would be execrated by modern Frenchmen; 
a modern Frenchmen, though equally civilized and intelligent, would have 
been execrated by the ancient Greeks. It is true that fundamental moral 
principles have changed little, but their expression and application differ 
enormously (Gay 1969, 381, my italics).  
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David Hume, therefore, is not so much the forerunner of a model of rational choice, 
but of moral pluralism. Far from arguing that egoistic behavior will lead to optimal social 
outcomes, Hume maintains that human beings create moral concepts like justice through 
“education and human convention” (Hume 2011, 204) after realizing the “disorders that 
result from following their natural and variable principles” (ibid. 228). Once established, 
it is not just a rational cost-benefit analysis that upholds morality, but the investing of these 
societal interests with intrinsic values so that a  
sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, 
and of itself; […] and that the public instructions of politicians, and the 
private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour 
and duty in the strict regulation of our actions (ibid. 228). 
 
Hume realized three crucial conditions of human existence: First, we are by birth 
social beings and the idea of human beings growing up in isolation and learning sociability 
later is flawed. Secondly, we are passion-driven creatures who can use reason to obtain the 
object of our desires, but our ability to control our passions is limited. Finally, and most 
importantly regarding the concept of culture, we are rule-making animals as well, since we 
know that living only according to our individual natural desires would make a functioning 
society all but impossible. One could construct a contradiction between the second and the 
third point, since how can it be possible that we are at the same time driven by passion and 
yet compelled to follow rules? 
The key to this puzzle is to understand that passion can be expressed towards a 
variety of things, spanning from the material to the immaterial.62 Immaterial passions can 
 
62 This is particularly important for Hume, since a significant part of his reasoning deals (in a 
nutshell) with the question of why people respect the material possessions of others.  
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be the love for another person, but it can also be the passionate belief in an idea and the 
community that forms around this idea. One of the reasons why political systems are slow 
to change is the passion with which its constituents believe in it, despite the possibility that 
the system in question no longer represents the best possible option. A beneficial societal 
order is one where people invest the “right” ideas with passion. This is why investing 
certain rules with intrinsic and emotional value is not just a side note, but is absolutely 
crucial in the maintenance of order within societies. Hume describes this as a “general 
sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one 
another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules” (Hume 2011, 
206). Hume resolves the potential puzzle of human beings driven by passions yet also being 
able to restrain themselves by realizing that  
it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by 
certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observed and 
men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace 
of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it (Hume 2011, 
228). 
 
In other words, society for Hume works if we get more pleasure out of playing by 
the rules than violating them for our own benefit. Hume and Smith presented somewhat of 
a third way regarding the relationship between reason and passion, but ultimately the more 
mechanistic approach to human behavior remained. The reason for this can be found in the 
second promise of the Enlightenment, which was not just arguing for the better 
understanding of human behavior but also the potential for its manipulation that could 
ultimately lead to a utopian state. 
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4.5.2 The Enlightenment and the Natural Laws of Society 
Despite the skepticism of people like Smith and Hume, the Hobbesian view 
continued to attract greater attention. I think this can be partially explained by the strong 
emphasis Hobbes gave to the scientific nature of his theory, and its potential for 
generalization. The dream of fully understanding the world in clear and simple causal 
relationships would also enable a new dimension of social engineering; and after 
understanding how societies work, they can ultimately be rebuilt in a new and better way. 
It was once again David Hume, however, who cautioned against such a simplistic approach 
towards human matters: 
There is no subject, in which we must proceed with more caution, 
than in tracing the history of the arts and sciences; lest we assign causes 
which never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and 
universal principles. Those who cultivate the sciences in any state, are 
always few in number: The passion, which governs them, limited: Their 
taste and judgment delicate and easily perverted: And their application 
disturbed with the smallest accident. Chance, therefore, or secret and 
unknown causes, must have a great influence on the rise and progress of all 
the refined arts (quoted in: Morson and Schapiro 2018, 268). 
 
Hume wanted to put the social sciences on as much of a scientific fundament as 
possible, but he was not oblivious to the extraordinary difficulties in doing so, as well as 
the risk that what starts as scientific inquiry might end up as an ideology. There is an 
ongoing debate to what extent Hobbes was an influence upon Hume, but there is such 
overlap in the themes and structures of their work to make coincidence highly unlikely 
(Moss 1991). Both authors promote a scientific approach towards politics, but Hume is 
more measured in his assessment of what can actually be achieved in practice. The 
Hobbesian approach to politics has at its center the idea of a fully scientific analysis that 
would include the option for the optimal planning of political structures.  
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We find echoes of Hobbes even in the writings of philosophers who would reject a 
Hobbesian label. Yet does Hobbes sound so much different from Marx in his assessment 
that “armed with the proper method or art, we might ultimately become the masters and 
possessors of nature” (S. B. Smith 2012, 146), when the late German philosopher was 
equally contemplating that human beings can alter and control nature through their 
intellectual capacities (Marx 1992, 329). The Hobbesian revolution was twofold: First, it 
established the idea of human beings as potentially autonomous individuals; and, second, 
Hobbes fully believed that human society can be constructed on a thoroughly rational and 
artificial basis. 
The latter point is important, because despite the occasional claim that Hobbes was 
a forerunner of totalitarianism (Nisbet 1943), it was not so much his idea of government  
that is central as his idea that politics is completely cognitively accessible and plannable 
that proved to be tempting for many of the ideologues that followed in Hobbes’ footsteps. 
Hobbes also lays the groundwork for the anxiety of modernity, but less so by intention than 
by his definition of reason: 
Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by 
Experience onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt 
imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in 
proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by 
Connexion of one of them to another; and so to syllogismes, which are the 
Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all 
the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is 
it, men call science (Hobbes 2019, KL 7877-7881) 
 
Reason and science go hand in hand, and the more we understand the consequences 
of our actions, the better we will be able to make responsible decisions. This paragraph, 
however, also reflects the Hobbesian dilemma: What if the commands of reason go against 
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our intuitions? For Hobbes, the answer is clear, which is that our intuitions have to be 
brought in line with reason. And as we have mentioned before, “the passions that incline 
men to peace, are fear of death,” (Hobbes 2019, KL 18156), therefore there should be a 
“general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace” (Hobbes 2019, KL 18178). 
Hobbes does not write extensively about the passion of fear because he simply takes it for 
granted (he does), but because he wants us to fear the right things, thereby convincing us 
of his social contract as the logical and most beneficial solution to the problem of order in 
society (S. B. Smith 2012, 152). 
For Hobbes, the application of reason should enable us to create an individualistic 
society that is held together by a mutual interest grounded in fear. I might not like the 
Leviathan, but the assurance of protection and – most importantly – significant autonomy 
in my private sphere make this creature the best possible alternative to the anxiety of an 
anarchic world. Ultimately, however, Hobbes is not a friend of society but someone who 
views it as a threat to the individual that has to be dealt with. 
This brings us to back to Rousseau, who equally disdained society, or at least 
modern society. He differs from Hobbes in his assessment of reason, which he sees at the 
heart of selfishness and egoism:  
Reason is what engenders egocentrism [amour propre], and 
reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man in upon himself. Reason 
is what separates him from all that troubles him and afflicts him. Philosophy 
is what isolates him and moves him to say in secret, at the sight of a 
suffering man, ‘Perish if you will; I am safe and sound’” (Rousseau 2011, 
63). 
 
Ironically, there are passages in Rousseau that would qualify him as a fierce critic 
of the rational choice approach, but the problem is that even his criticism of reason as 
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making us selfish can hardly be read as a ringing endorsement of society. Rousseau, just 
like Hobbes, views the state as the necessary tool to break societal relationships between 
individuals, but he differs from Hobbes because Rousseau then goes on to replace these 
initial bonds with bonds to the state: 
The second relation is that of the members to each other or to the 
entire body. And this relationship should be as small as possible in regard 
to the former and as large as possible in regard to the latter, so that each 
citizen would be perfectly independent of all the others and excessively 
dependent upon the city. This always takes place by the same means, for 
only the force of the state brings about the liberty of its members. It is from 
this second relationship that civil laws arise (Rousseau 2011, 190–91). 
 
Despite the importance Rousseau places on the importance of the passions and his 
criticism of reason, he remains anchored to the idea that the passions can be fully made 
subservient to a rational design of politics. There are many ways to read Rousseau. Some 
argue that he was a Counter-Enlightenment figure who defended local cultures and 
emotional bonds to one’s community (see, for example: S. B. Smith 2012, 2016). But there 
is another way to read him as well, which is that his admiration for community is that of a  
political community, one which is indistinguishable from the state 
and which shares all the uniformitarian qualities of the state. It is, in his 
mind, a moral unity, but it is a unity conferred by the sovereign will of the 
state, and directed by the political government. Thus the familiar organic 
analogy is used to indicate the unitary structure of his political community 
(Nisbet 1943, 100). 
 
Rousseau and Hobbes both believed that society can be managed in order to lead 
to individual human flourishing, and that the central role in this attempt will be played by 
the state. They differed only in their ambitions: Hobbes was content with managing our 
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inclination toward violence with a perfectly designed “security-system,” while Rousseau 
saw the state as a shaper of human perfectibility (S. B. Smith 2012, 194).  
And they were not the only ones with high hopes for the future. William Godwin, 
the Marquis de Condorcet, and the philosophes of the French Enlightenment agreed all 
upon the potential perfectibility of humanity that was impossible to achieve in pre-
Enlightenment times when superstitions reigned supreme. Change would become possible 
only once we replaced our passions with reason, ideally under the guidance of philosophers 
who “have no particular interest to defend, [and] can only speak up in favor or reason and 
the public interest” (Coser 1997, 232). The disinterested intellectuals are “enlightened 
philosophers, strangers to ambition,” capable of reaching the indefinite “perfectibility of 
man” (Condorcet 2009, 109, 200).  
One of the promises of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment was to 
anchor the human condition in reason, meaning that a clear cost-benefit analysis of every 
possible action should be possible and build the foundation for decision making. Patterns 
of individual behavior and societal structures were no longer to be justified on the grounds 
of religion or tradition but had to meet the bar of reason. In the beginning, this was not an 
open revolt against the past, but an effort to build upon the even positive effects of certain 
traditions that were to be reshaped and potentially improved under the guidance of reason. 
For example, even if one would accept the positive role of religion in the creation of 
communities, reason should enable us to reach the same effect without a theological 
superstructure. Communities under such a scenario would be founded on the realization of 
the mutual benefits of collective action, and the glue holding it together would be 
rationality, not some shared belief in nation, god, or ideology. This scenario made the idea 
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of reason simultaneously a universal as well as an anti-sentimentalist and anti-cultural 
doctrine.  
While culture is always influenced by a path dependence based on the actions and 
beliefs of prior generations, reason supposedly can stand alone without any reference to 
the past. William Goodwin and Condorcet among others believed that experience is 
unimportant compared to reason, while Francis Bacon argued that the present is always 
superior to the past for it can draw on more experience (S. B. Smith 2016, 6). In both cases, 
the Enlightenment began to turn its back on tradition, looking for eternal truths independent 
of experience and tradition. It is important to mention once that not everyone was fully 
convinced of the perfectibility of humanity, as such figures as Adam Smith, David Hume, 
Edmund Burke and the American Revolutionaries engaged in lively debates about this 
matter (Levin 2014). The Enlightenment itself was facing a constant barrage from the 
Counter-Enlightenment, particularly in its German form, from both the political right in 
the persons of Schmitt and Heidegger as well as from the left by way of the Frankfurt 
School figures such as Horkheimer and Adorno (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007; Meier 
2006; Schmitt 1976; Thiele 1994).  
The problem for these Enlightenment critics was that many of the arguments they 
directed against the Enlightenment rested on idealized forms of the past, so while they were 
correctly anticipating the potentially corrosive effects of a materialist-rationalist society, 
they staunchly refused to accept what might have been the answer to the dilemma: The 
Bourgeoisie. That is, one thing the Enlightenment’s modern critics from the left and the 
right had in common was their thorough going rejection of bourgeois society (McCloskey 
2007, 2010, 2017; S. B. Smith 2016). The often quoted line by Barrington Moore, “no 
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bourgeoisie, no democracy” (Moore 1993, 167) contains more than a grain of truth. There 
was more at work than a lucky arrangement of economic interests that then lead to the 
emergence of modern democracy. The American Revolution, the French Revolution, and 
even the enlightened despotism of Austrian, Russian, and Prussian rulers (among others) 
cannot be explained without taking into account the fundamental cultural shifts that were 
occurring at the time. These changes were often painful and full of unintended 
consequences (Eckstein 1988), but they nonetheless rested on a remarkable cultural 
fundament that extended to more than just changing economics. The economic success 
itself was increasingly reassuring to those who believed that a thoroughly plannable society 
was possible, and that morality – while, of course, important – should be based on science 
and not intuition. The idea of achieving societal peace via setting aside deeply cherished 
moral conceptions for the sake of reaching a political modus vivendi as John Rawls 
envisioned it (S. B. Smith 2016, 5), would only be possible under the condition that moral 
conceptions can be set aside in the first place, and their role be taken over by a form of 
instrumental reason.  
For the Whig optimists it did not even matter that the movement that focused so 
much energy on reason, the Enlightenment, was a European phenomenon. Just like the 
invention of the wheel or the printing press, once it invented it is accessible to everyone. 
This argument was put forward by the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. The 
problem, according to philosophers like Kant, was that in the past we made insufficient use 
of our capacity to reason due to group pressure and the comfort of traditions that absolved 
us from thinking independently (Kant 1784a). Once we put reason above tradition and the 
desire to please others, most if not all of us should have a convergent view of the world--
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one that in its conclusion should allow global cooperation to the benefit of the individual 
as well as humankind. There would still be differences based on local geography and 
nature, but even those differences could be explained and grounded in reason until it leads 
to the emergence of an international state (Hazony 2018, 264).  
What I claim, however, is that the success of modernity involved not the 
replacement of culture with rationality, but the creation of a culture of rationality. The 
ideological battle that raged between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment 
was a deeply cultural conflict with its own symbols, shibboleths, group identities, and 
passionately held beliefs (Gay 1966, 1969; McMahon 2002). As Peter Gay shows in his 
two-volume study of the Enlightenment, Voltaire and others used every tool in their 
cultural toolbox to push their ideology forward. The new reverence for ancient Rome and 
Latin, as well as the thinly veiled attacks against Christianity by the likes of Edward Gibbon 
and his The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon 1996), were not 
simply scientific exegesis of the past but deployed directly to undermine the dominant 
culture of the day. Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment produced great history, 
despite it being used “as propaganda (and) generalized too freely” (Gay 1988, 11). Leopold 
von Ranke, Diderot, Lessing, Rousseau, and Kant aimed philosophical salvos straight at 
“changing the general way of thinking” (Gay 1973, 285) and overturning not the existing 
political, but its cultural order. In the words of Diderot, the Enlightenment philosophes 
must “ride roughshod over all these ancient puerilities, (and) overturn the barriers that 
reason never erected” (quoted in: Gay 1973, 286). The Enlightenment and later the project 
of modernity were a gigantic process of delegitimizing traditions that were full of intrinsic 
value. The Enlightenment, however, was less of a liberation from, than a replacement of, 
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culture with something new. Instead of god, it put the individual into its center as faith was 
replaced with knowledge and passions with reason. More important for its success was in 
the end the ability to make Enlightenment thinking “fashionable,” meaning that a growing 
number of people decided that they wanted their identity and recognition to be connected 
to the ideas of the Enlightenment. Many of the key figures of the Enlightenment were the 
celebrities of their day, having pipes carved in Voltaire’s likeness or playing with cards 
that had the images of the philosophes stamped on them (McMahon 2002, 7). Smoking a 
Voltaire-pipe while playing with Diderot cards is not just an act of agreeing with their 
views, but one of identifying with them and wanting others to recognize that new part of 
one’s identity.  
Without acknowledging it, the Enlightenment produced its own form of religious 
fervor, without which their triumph probably would not have occurred. The triumph of the 
Enlightenment is often accorded to the triumph of reason over superstition and the 
disappearance of the blinders of religion and tradition. Yet this story leaves out an 
important part of the narrative – the Enlightenment garnered a lot of its power and influence 
not solely from the superiority of its reasoning, but from an overly receptive audience that 
started to invest the Enlightenment with intrinsic value, thereby increasingly turning it into 
a cultural phenomenon. When the French Revolutionaries banned Christianity and turned 
churches into temples in the name of the “Cult of Reason,” they executed a cultural 
program, not a rationalistic one (Gliozzo 1971). It is absolutely remarkable that this aspect 
of the French Revolution is barely mentioned, and that the importance of the “Cult of 
Reason” as the attempt to establish an actual Enlightenment religion is featured so sparsely 
in published histories of the Enlightenment.  
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The general weakening of traditional bonds allowed serious questioning of 
traditions to occur in the first place, and it was one of the major achievements of the 
scientific revolution and the Enlightenment to open up previously perceived truths to rigid 
questioning. Replacing the will of god and the whims of nature with the search for universal 
laws opened up the possibility of questioning everything and tearing down every dogma 
that could not withstand the skepticism and scientism of the Enlightenment. 
Much has been revealed through this relentless search, but in their quest for 
objective truth and their battles with superstitions and traditions the philosophes of the 
Enlightenment and their contemporary successors have often remained ignorant of their 
own cultural basis. For the most ardent philosophers of the Enlightenment, the more we 
understood nature and the laws that govern it, the easier it would be to overcome the 
shackles of custom, tradition, and ultimately culture if they should conflict with these laws. 
In the words of Isaiah Berlin,  
from this it followed that all other types of authority were to be 
rejected, and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine 
revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorized interpreters, 
tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other 
forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge” 
(Berlin 1977, 163).  
 
The scientism of the Enlightenment was not problematic for its establishment of 
objective principles of inquiry and the aspiration to find ultimate answers, but for the claim 
that there is but one form of inquiry and that other forms of knowledge and experience are 
by definition inferior. Max Weber, one of the key critics of Enlightenment scientism, 
argued that  
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Finally, although a naive optimism may have celebrated science – 
that is, the technique of the mastery of life founded on science – as the path 
which would lead to happiness, I believe I can leave this entire question 
aside in light of the annihilating critique which Nietzsche has made of “the 
last man” who “have discovered happiness.” Who, then, still believes in 
this, with the exception of a few big babies in university chairs or in editorial 
offices? (quoted in: A. D. Bloom 1987, 194) 
 
The position of Max Weber is highlighting the dilemma of modernity, because 
Weber was not opposed to the scientific method – on the contrary. His opposition was 
against the idea that we can explain the human condition by the same means that allow us 
to analyze the forces of gravity. The Enlightenment was not simply the end of humanity’s 
self-imposed immaturity but a rearrangement of values including the so-called 
disenchantment of the world, which was defined by Weber as 
The knowledge or belief that if one but wished one could learn it 
(rationality) at any time. Hence, it means that principally there are no 
mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, 
in principle, master all things by calculation. This means the world is 
disenchanted (quoted in: Gordon 2008, 652) 
 
The growing problem with the disenchanted world was that it increasingly also 
meant that all that was incalculable also seemed of lesser worth. And this is what Weber 
and other critics of Enlightenment scientism feared (e.g. Morson and Schapiro 2018): that 
all the parts of the human condition that are difficult or impossible to measure would 
become additions to the true human condition that could be explained by cold hearted 
individual utility maximization: 
When a man attempts to combat the principle of utility, it is with 
reasons drawn, without his being aware of it, from that very principle itself 
(Bentham 2013, KL 3597) 
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The warrior and the deserter, the cheater and the faithful partner – they all maximize 
their utility, and the only way to make a moral judgement about their behavior is by 
considering whether their actions increase or decrease the overall utility of society. If the 
cheated upon partner, for example, should have a smaller experience of pain compared to 
a greater experience of pleasure by the one who cheats, net utility in society would increase 
and the behavior could therefore be justified. The critics of the Enlightenment did not 
discard its emphasis on science, but they feared its potentially eroding effect on the very 
values that are necessary for the maintenance of society itself.  
None of this should be seen as a full rejection of the Enlightenment and modernity. 
On the contrary, my argument is that culture is the common belief system that holds a 
society together, and that different belief systems result in different political systems. Yet 
while I prefer an enlightened system to a theocracy, I claim that both need to be rooted in 
a common culture that invests its belief systems with intrinsic value. The Enlightenment 
produced a culture that allowed the flourishing of human freedom, creativity, and 
prosperity not as a consequence of a sudden realization of reason and individualism, but 
because it changed the dynamics of desirable recognition. Once the successes of 
economists and scientists started to yield more approving public recognition than being a 
warrior or a priest, more and more people flocked to these fields, increasing the 
opportunities for economic development and scientific breakthroughs. The Enlightenment 
did not just convince, but it converted, people to a new creed they desired to embrace and 
make part of their identity.  
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CHAPTER V: CULTURE AND MODERNITY 
One of the questions we have to ask is whether the Enlightenment and modernity 
are synonymous terms and distinctions without a difference, or if there is actually a break 
in the way the world was perceived. I would argue that the later is the case, because 
modernity as I define it already has elements of a cultural pessimism that we do not find to 
that extent in the Enlightenment. Jürgen Habermas wrote insightful of the cultural self-
understanding of modernity (Habermas 2007), but the philosophers he identified as his 
main protagonists, including Weber, Nietzsche, and Marx, are among those moderns who 
no longer share the optimism of a Condorcet, Smith, or Benjamin Franklin. This trend is 
then continued by the movement known as postmodernity that continued the tradition of 
cultural pessimism that took its beginning in the 19th century.  
This pessimism is in itself a fascinating phenomenon, because overall the human 
condition experienced significant improvements exactly in those areas of the world where 
a majority of these pessimists were working--Marx in England; Weber and Nietzsche in 
Germany; Durkheim in France – all countries that underwent profound social and political 
upheaval, but all nations with indicators one would use to show that human well-being was 
arguably improving. From life-expectancy to literacy, a world that once was available only 
for a tiny elite only became increasingly accessible to a larger part of the population. 
Democracy itself became a mass phenomenon for the first time in history (Ortega y Gasset 
1993). Similarly, the borders between different social classes became more porous and 
contacts more frequent. (A good example for this is the case study of Reinhard Höhn and 
how the army served as an integrative force: Höhn 1963.) It is not until the 18th and 19th 
century and the policies of the modernizing nation-state that we actually encounter the 
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emergence of a genuine “Staatsvolk” (E. Weber 1976), with governments being 
increasingly held accountable by their populations.  
The discomfort expressed by rise of modernity was ultimately a cultural one, 
probably best captured in Emile Durkheim’s concept of anomie. According to Durkheim, 
the era in which he was living was characterized by a loss of norms, and that this norm-
absence generated psychological distress often manifesting itself in individuals committing 
suicide. Durkheim wrote in 1897 that  
man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if 
he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all 
social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him (quoted in: Haidt 
2013, 165–66) 
 
For Durkheim the social pressures created by society were not just an element of 
discontent as Freud would have argued, but an essential feature of human life and daily 
experience. The liberation caused by the social change that occurred during his lifetime 
was not only a benefit, because it was neglecting the psychological desire for social and 
moral rules. The “normlessness” that Durkheim diagnosed was also part of growing 
individualism, that simultaneously liberated people and took the certainties of the moral 
order of the past away from them. The glue that maintained social order and cohesion was 
weakening, and this became a key cause of the anxiety of modernity (Jeffrey C. Alexander 
2013). 
Although Durkheim’s arguments differ in many respects from Marx and other 
contemporaries, he nonetheless is another important example how especially the 
intellectual class was growing uneasy with the emergence of many aspects of the modern 
world.  
 
310 
 
This leads us to another key question: Has modernity or subsequently 
postmodernity been able to sufficiently address this unease? This is the question towards 
which we have to turn now. 
Before doing so, I have to add a few words before starting the following chapter. 
My argument in this dissertation rests on the assumption that social life depends on culture, 
because culture creates the emotional bonds necessary to establish group identities and the 
ability for improved collective action. I also tried to establish that not every cultural 
invention leads to such an improvement, and that cultural change can also cause the 
breakup of communities and a reduction in the ability for collective action. My goal so far, 
however, has been to refrain from making any claims to what an ideal culture would look 
like.  The purpose of my arguments was to show that there has been a trend to oust culture 
as an important factor and replace it with reason and instrumental rationality. I have also 
claimed that this is impossible, because biological factors exist that make us long for 
communities based on a common culture.  
The process that started with Hobbes is still pervasive today in political science and 
political philosophy, and even those who are perceived as defenders of culture resort often 
to anti-cultural arguments in their reasoning. The critique by figures like Nietzsche and 
Weber that we can no longer imagine things to be of value if they have no immediate utility, 
something Weber called the disenchantment of the world, was not entirely wrong (Bell 
1962; A. D. Bloom 1987; Lasch 1991). They did realize that despite all claims to the 
contrary, the Enlightenment did create a cultural atmosphere in which belief in higher 
things that transcend individuality became more and more problematic. The Enlightenment 
ultimately did not just throw out religion; it was increasingly hostile towards any kind of 
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metanarrative necessary for culture and collective identities. The breaking up of ossified 
social structures and the opening up of new opportunities for individuals is and was a great 
achievement of the Enlightenment movement, but even this individualism needs to be 
cushioned in some form of collectively shared culture. Individualism never fully replaces 
our more collectivist inclinations, which is why even the most individualistic societies 
constantly struggle over group-recognition. Discussions about gay marriage or transgender 
bathrooms are conflicts over recognition of group identities, which is why their emotional 
impact is much stronger than their political salience. I will discuss this in more detail in the 
final chapter, but for now it is important to see that from the Enlightenment to modernity 
to postmodernity there was a gradual decline in the role culture was granted within human 
existence. 
In the last thirty years, postmodern thinking has gained a strong foothold in various 
social science disciplines. One of the major elements of postmodern thought is its real or 
supposed emancipation from dominant belief systems, stemming from its argument that 
these systems are social constructs generated in order to maintain oppressive structures 
(Lilla 2003).63” To a certain degree, postmodernism is no less hostile towards cultural 
artifacts like religion and nationalism than rational choice theorists, albeit the latters’ 
arguments derive from a number of different bases. These theoretical approaches are, 
however, politically relevant because the idea of multiculturalism that pervades many 
contemporary debates in Western countries would be unthinkable without its postmodern 
underpinnings.  
 
63 Habermas is a special case in this respect – he also rejects traditional belief systems, but is at the 
same time a fundamental critic of postmodernism, mainly due to the latter’s disbelief in the creation of a 
completely rational society. 
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At some point, however, postmodernity may run the risk of attempting to 
emancipate society from culture altogether, meaning that it would promote a political and 
social system that no longer has internal cohesion based on a collective identity springing 
from shared beliefs about the world. Indeed, at least one major theoretical perspective on 
collective ideologies by a postmodernist suggests such a risk. In a short overview of the 
“postmodern condition,” Jean-Francois Lyotard argues that this condition is defined by its 
“incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyotard 1984, xxiv). In his view, metanarratives are 
the grand stories that are used to justify behavior in the name of religion, nation, or 
ideology–the products of cultural activity. 
The late Samuel Huntington, as well as contemporary philosophers like Mark Lilla, 
increasingly voiced discomfort about a possible risk of societal breakdown occurring 
without any form of collective metanarratives (Huntington 2005; Lilla 2003). Even 
defenders of the multicultural project like Charles Taylor (C. Taylor 2002, 2007b) and 
Michael Ignatieff (Ignatieff 2003) are not blind to these risks, wrestling as they do with the 
question of how to create solidarity among individuals without an overarching grand 
narrative accepted by all members of society. But all of them tend to give a rationalistic 
answer to an emotional problem: If I maintain my cultural identity only because I 
consciously expect some utility from doing so, I will most likely also give it up as soon as 
that utility falls below a certain threshold. When Martha Nussbaum or Charles Taylor write 
about the necessity of patriotism, but equally scold those who are patriotic, it becomes clear 
that they want to safeguard the emotion of patriotism by the rails of reason and rationality 
(M. C. Nussbaum 1994, 2008; C. Taylor 1996). Equally, they have a hard time grasping 
the emotional content of culture, which is why they tend to fall back upon a quasi-Marxist 
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explanation that religious fundamentalism is a reaction to external forces, but not 
something to be held out of faith – a faith that is nearly absolute and does not define itself 
by self-skepticism (C. Taylor 2007b).  
That being said, the following is not an overall critique of Jürgen Habermas, 
Charles Taylor and others, but a specific engagement with their views on culture. As I hope 
to demonstrate, their theories suffer from the same weakness as Hobbes’ and Rousseau’s—
namely, that they build on assumptions that are hard to square with reality and more than 
once forget to distinguish an is from and ought, to use David Hume’s famous phrase. I am 
also not doubting the noble intentions of their theories, and share the moral implications of 
their argument. But this is where the problem begins, because moral arguments are by 
definition cultural arguments and one cannot replace their cultural grounding and simply 
take an entire moral matrix as given. Aware of this problem, it seems that many fall back 
on the Enlightenment position that there is such a matrix, and that matrix springs from 
reason and is therefore less cultural and more objective. While this is an interesting 
philosophical argument, it is also a clever escape – if I can claim that natural morality is 
enlightened morality and enlightened morality is WEIRD (Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) morality, I can build an entire social theory without ever 
having to take genuine cultural diversity and moral pluralism seriously. What I mean by 
this is that if a community shares and cherishes these modern liberal values, they have 
created a genuine culture, one that supersedes other cultural ideas. For example, a group of 
individuals can have a wide diversity of religious beliefs, but if their primary belief system 
is individualistic, tolerant, and liberal their religions will neither be a source of conflict, 
nor will it be their primary identity. This group is not a multicultural group, but a 
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monocultural group that is built around a very specific set of shared sacred values. Contrary 
to some critics of these values (Burnham 2014; Deneen 2018), they are not relativistic, 
because they do elicit emotional commitments from those who believe in them, but the 
proponents have the problem that they often cannot fully accept: their views are ultimately 
also cultural and not objectively enlightened and universal.  
This, I believe, is actually the true weakness of modern Western culture, because 
its inability to self-perceive itself as a culture also makes the necessary emotional 
commitments in order to sustain it more difficult. Additionally, it has narrowed the 
realization that there are genuinely different cultures that value entirely different things, 
and that those cultures will not simply disappear if exposed to Western ideas. Western ideas 
created a culture of its own, with its own sacred values, symbols, and rituals. What I 
propose in this chapter is a deeper understanding of the cultural underpinnings of so-called 
cultural pluralism and its deficiencies. The philosophers I am discussing in the following 
chapters have been among the most influential in the postmodern era, although most of 
them would refute being labeled as postmodern themselves. This makes them the most 
interesting ones to engage, because even those contemporary theorists that do engage with 
culture are still strongly anchored in the Hobbesian idea of the rational, individualistic life.  
 
5.1 Culture and Habermas  
That modernity has a cultural deficiency was diagnosed by Jürgen Habermas when 
he wrote about modernity’s need for self-assurance and its longing for an equivalent of the 
unifying power of religion (Habermas 2007, 17, 26, 105, 123, 166). This is the long 
struggle of Habermas, and I think it is fair to use it as the angle from which to analyze his 
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writings that are relevant for us. Habermas rejects postmodernity as outlined by Lyotard, 
because while skeptical of metanarratives himself, he s maintains the idea of a 
universalistic philosophy (Rorty 1991).  
But what would that universalistic philosophy look like? On the one hand, 
Habermas sees elements of a universalizable kind of reason in bourgeois society 
(Habermas 1989), particularly the emergence of a vibrant public sphere. This public sphere 
provides Habermas with the potential building block for his key to a universalistic 
philosophy applicable to all of humankind: ideal speech situations. Situations where 
individuals come together in uncoerced and open debate and the desire to inquire the best 
possible rational answer to open questions. Habermas tries to save culture by replacing it 
with communication. His concern with the question of culture becomes clear in Habermas’ 
work on the question of legitimacy (Habermas 1975), which he sees as a major issue in the 
crisis of modern capitalist societies. Unfortunately, Habermas remains strongly anchored 
in his focus on capitalism and while not necessarily Marxist in orientation, his theory gives 
such a prominent place to the economics system, that culture appears to be relegated to a 
secondary issue.  
Although an interesting approach, Habermas does not really move beyond the idea 
of Hobbes and the solutions he outlined. At certain moments, Habermas sounds precisely 
like Hobbes: 
The level of the shared political culture must be strictly separated 
from the level of subcultures and pre-political identities (including that of 
the majority), which deserve equal protection provided only that they 
conform to constitutional principles (as interpreted in this particular 
political culture) (Habermas 1996, 133)  
Or 
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As long as the welfare-state program, in conjunction with a 
widespread, technocratic common consciousness […] can maintaintain a 
sufficient degree of civil privatism, legitimation needs do not have to 
culminate in a crisis (Habermas 1975, KL 1048-1049) 
 
These paragraphs without a doubt would have pleased Hobbes, for they describe 
the idea of a culturally neutral state and a political culture that consists almost exclusively 
of that neutrality. Society for Habermas agrees on a set of principles that offers equal 
protection to everyone and does not interfere or promote any kind of specific culture. In 
other words, Habermas just like Hobbes relegates matters of culture to the private sphere 
and – at best – allows culture to “inform” debates in the public sphere (Habermas 2005). 
Hobbes could make such an argument because for him life in society is a necessary means 
to an end, but barely an end in itself. Emotions could be had and experienced largely 
independent of others, so the isolated private sphere of the autonomous individual is no 
problem for him. On the contrary, in his writings Hobbes admittedly treats human beings 
“as if [they] even now sprung out of the earth … like mushrooms” (quoted in: Barry 2002, 
200), demonstrating that intersubjectivity and socialization are not something he engages 
with in much detail, because he views it as acquired art that can be discarded and replaced 
with a different art, the one he outlines in his ideas of the social contract.  
Despite being more open towards interaction between individuals, Habermas still 
views his theory ultimately grounded in rationality and a universal acceptance of his 
definition of rationality that could emerge through the practice of communication. Needless 
to say, this approach builds on assumptions that are difficult to square with the concept of 
culture.  
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Hobbes would not quarrel with Habermas’ ideas, because for the latter as well as 
the former the motivation for interaction is not driven by a purely emotional need, but is 
instead a means to an end. Hobbes distinguished the private and the public sphere, while 
Habermas sees three distinct “cultural spheres” created by the Enlightenment, namely 
science, morality, and art. All three of these spheres are under constant threat of a complete 
takeover by instrumental rationality that is  made the dominant force by capitalism 
(Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1975). Yet it seems that Habermas has less of an 
issue with the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality than on the way this rationality is 
applied. It is the instrumental part of instrumental rationality that bothers him, not the 
concept of rationality itself. Even Richard Rorty was skeptical of the Habermasian claim 
to a universal philosophy and morality derived from communicative action and the ideal 
speech situation (as defined by Habermas) (Norris 2010, 150). Human nature is culture 
bound, and these universal ideas completely discard the idea of culture as an influencing 
factor independent of rationality. In the “ideal speech situation” put forward by Habermas 
“communication will no longer be distorted by the effects of power, self-interest or 
ignorance” (Norris 2010, 149). This form of rational communication rests on an extreme 
demand of cognitive awareness by those who participate in it, plus it assumes – in true 
Enlightenment fashion – that there is a single answer to every problem addressed through 
communication. The idea of competing and contradictory moral claims does not really 
appear in Habermas’ discussions, which is why some of his critics call his theoretical 
approach fundamentally “nonpolitical” (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998, 1979) or 
“curiously antipolitical” (S. B. Smith 2007, KL 2552). But, for me, they are more than 
nonpolitical; they are ultimately anticultural. Habermas would most likely reject such a 
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label, but not only does he not provide us with a coherent theory of culture, but his own 
theorizing is built on 
certain norms of public rationality that are said to constrain what can 
and cannot be used in justifying public policy. Such approaches are 
curiously antipolitical, as they assume the primacy of certain normative or 
ethical standards from which politics are then deduced (S. B. Smith 2007, 
KL 2552) 
 
It is peculiar that Habermas makes his anticultural argument on a cultural basis, 
drawing on the emergent public sphere of the seventeenth and eighteenth century where 
communication in salons and coffee houses paved the way for a new liberal and 
cosmopolitan order (Gopnik 2019, 65; Habermas 1989). Unfortunately, however, 
Habermas overlooks the immense cultural underpinnings that enabled this public sphere. 
The idealized form that begins to emerge but ultimately fails in his retelling of the story of 
the emergence of the public sphere ignores the emotional infusions of a redefined 
relationship between society and the individual. The historical period Habermas discusses 
was characterized by a far ranging idea of moral values individuals were expected to adhere 
to (Himmelfarb 1991, 1996, 2007) and that motivated people to found all kinds of clubs 
and charitable societies and begin the golden age of association (Ferguson 2013; Skocpol 
2004; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). Contrary to previous times, governments and 
private organizations made much broader efforts to include all of society in making this 
moral ideas mandatory (J. Rose 2010). Despite the “utopian sincerity” with which 
Habermas idealizes the concept of the public sphere, he fails to “conceptualize how one is 
actually constructed” (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995, 192).  
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The complex historical processes that took place sometimes seem to take the 
backseat in order to preserve his overall theoretical approach, making the historical record 
playing a supporting role in his theory whenever needed, but always “in danger of 
neglecting the real learning processes in history in a Hegelian jump to a level of abstraction 
which explains less rather than more” (Outhwaite 1994, 63). Habermas sometimes appears 
as a philosopher who tries to maintain two competing and contradictory principles at the 
same time: Critical of Marxist determinism and capitalist utilitarianism, he nonetheless 
does not want to give up completely on the idea of a rationally graspable world. The 
problem is that the same claim was made by the theories that his own Critical Theory set 
out to criticize. He successfully creates a standard against which criticism is possible, but 
he remains opaque on the creation of that standard and the potential of its practical and 
theoretical sustainability. Underlying Habermas’ ideas is still the vision of a world that can 
be perfected through reason. As Jeffrey Alexander points out, Habermas maintains 
“rationalism in a continental, anti-utilitarian romantic idiom” (Jeffrey C. Alexander 1995, 
71).  
When he remains in his Hegelian-Kantian framework, there is a constant undertone 
promoting the idea that world is evolving into a more rational direction (see, for example: 
Habermas 2006). So, despite his criticisms, Habermas also believes that there is a purpose 
or an underlying direction of human history. This also means that as the world becomes 
more rational, it becomes less emotional and, ultimately, less cultural. I believe this also 
explains why Habermas seems to have significantly more patience and admiration for non-
Western cultures compared to his often scathing criticism of the United States and Eastern 
European nations (Auer 2010; Kumar 2008).  
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The problem Habermas encounters is that he wants to preserve a metanarrative that 
provides common meaning and a common horizon around which community can emerge, 
but he never tells us where this metanarrative comes from. If rationality alone already 
enables the public sphere and “peace through communication” as proposed by Habermas, 
why is there any need for a metanarrative? I think Jeffrey Alexander is correct when he 
points out that  
the whole tradition from Kant to Habermas suggests [that] norms 
create order only when they bind action via internal commitments, in 
relation to which an exclusively rational calculation is impossible” (Jeffrey 
C. Alexander 1995, 155).  
 
To put it differently, even the most objectively rational societal order must be 
internalized emotionally on the subjective level – even if this would include supposedly 
irrational elements.  
As I have pointed out before, we can make a solid argument that slavery is 
objectively and universally a terrible thing, and this argument would not have lost its 
validity during all the periods when slavery was practiced. But it was only once it has been 
subjectively and emotionally internalized that people started to have the required moral 
intuition that makes slavery unthinkable in most societies of the modern world. Habermas 
and others are readily accepting the existence of objective moral facts and the rational 
arguments that could justify their support, but they do not provide convincing answers 
about the internalization of these arguments. To be clear, rationality and emotions are not 
mutually exclusive, but as I have argued in this dissertation on multiple occasions, even 
the most rational idea of societal order will remain powerless if it is not filled with 
emotional content. To put it differently, it will not be enough for me to be persuaded by 
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the better rhetorical argument that slavery is wrong, I also have to feel an intuitive rejection 
- because otherwise we might be forced to re-discuss the issue with every new generation. 
The emotional internalization and the passing on of these emotions makes the rejection of 
slavery a cultural phenomenon that new generations pick up an defend without having to 
be convinced in a long series of arguments.  
For a modernist like Habermas and his postmodern critics alike, the idea of loving 
something without a rational cause is hard to accept. They both cannot fully grasp that there 
are still billions of people that passionately identify with their nation or religion without 
expecting something in return or a clearly individualistic reason to do so (Jeffrey C. 
Alexander 1995, 192). The idea that people invest religion or nation with a purpose and 
therefore teleological content that goes beyond the pursuit of some individual need has 
suffered significant neglect in modern as well as postmodern writings.  
Let me emphasize again, Habermas is not blind towards question of culture, but he 
never leaves the plane of the abstract, which is why concrete cultural problems are also 
hard to find in his writings. It is only his high level of abstraction that allows him to expect 
people to view their cultural identity as just that: their own worldview that does not lay 
claim to be better or worse than anybody else’s worldview. Such a conceptualization of 
culture is fundamentally flawed, because the very purpose of culture is to impose moral 
rules on others and to create a hierarchy regarding acceptable and unacceptable moral 
behavior. The only condition under which Habermas’ conceptualization of culture could 
be maintained would be if ultimately a worldview or culture can be an entirely 
individualistic phenomenon that bears little importance for the possibility of sustainable 
societal life. Once again, Hobbes would agree.  
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Habermas is not unaware of this problem, and as a way out he proposes the concept 
of Verfassungspatriotismus a constitutional patriotism that would put patriotic feelings on 
a solidly rational ground--or, to use the words of a critic, to make affect safe for democracy 
(Markell 2000). Unfortunately, we once again encounter a theory of societal structure that 
is based on such far reaching assumptions that we soon enter the realm of “pious illusion 
or […] highly inaccessible ideal” (J. C. Alexander, Giesen, and Mast 2006, 354). In defense 
of Habermas, he refers frequently to the idealistic content of his theorizing (Habermas 
1985b), but he remains nonetheless committed to the framework that he constructs around 
the concept of communication.  
The underlying ideal he presents is in line with liberal traditions—ones, not just 
embodied by John Locke, but also by John Stuart Mill and others who value the idea of 
liberty, especially the liberty to exchange ideas (Mill 2015). According to Habermas, a 
discourse between individuals that is free of blatant egoism, power structures, and openness 
to consensus and the search for truth should be at the core of modern democratic systems 
and what he calls the public sphere (Habermas 1984, 1985b, 1989). It is within this public 
sphere where through communicative politics takes place and intersubjective relations as 
well as collective identities are negotiated.  
a public sphere as porous as possible in which collective identities 
are renegotiated and revised. Open-ended communication is thus a crucial 
precondition for what Habermas has termed the ‘rationalization of 
collective identities’. A sense of attachment, one might say, is formed then 
both to the general character of the society that emerges from collective 
learning processes — and to the very procedures and situated practices that 
make collective reflection and contestation possible as an ongoing project 
(Müller 2006, 287) 
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And it is right here where we encounter the first problem of Habermas and the 
concept of culture: Right from the beginning, identity becomes not just something 
negotiable, but all the individuals enter communication with the awareness that their 
identities are subject to negotiation. Although an interesting ideal, it is a safe assumption 
that making one’s identity negotiable from the outset could be also interpreted as a form of 
self-negation. This goes much further than Hobbes, who only wanted the citizens of his 
state to keep their identities to themselves and leave them out of the public sphere because 
he knew of their violent potential due to the connection of identity with the whole plethora 
of emotions. Habermas circumvents this problem, because for him the emotional 
attachment is not to identity itself, but the process of communication about identity and 
other matters. This is a crucial matter, because Habermas’ constitutional patriotism is not 
the same as, for example, the identity US citizens derive from their pride in the US 
constitution. In the American case, the constitution builds the fundament for a unique 
American identity that extends then to other symbols like the flag and broader US history. 
For Habermas it is processes defined in a constitutional framework that would work 
independently of a particular identity. He makes this quite explicit in his discussion about 
the idea of a European identity (Habermas 2006, chap. 6). 
To put it in somewhat simpler terms: US (and other national) citizenships can be 
held intuitively, while Habermas’ constitutional citizenship is much more a cognitive and 
rational act.  
Habermas is absolutely clear about this and argues forcefully that modern identity 
can no longer be based on traditions but most rest on “formal conditions” that allow the 
constant reformulation of identity. This form of fluid identity is rational because it is based 
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solely on the structure of this process of negotiation about identity, which flexibly” allows 
the reciprocity of recognition among all members of such a society – creating a rational 
identity for complex societies (Habermas 1974). While vague about the precise conditions 
under which this society can emerge, Habermas does not conceal the potential endpoint of 
it: The global public sphere (“Weltöffentlichkeit”) in which these discourses about identity 
will continuously take place.  
Cultural conflicts disappear in the Habermasian universe because cultural identities 
are the building blocks used for the negotiation of new identities that ensure pluralistic, 
reciprocal, and universal recognition. The universalism proclaimed by Habermas does 
surprise, because he is by no means an uncritical supporter of the Enlightenment. On the 
contrary, he is also highly critical of the aspirations of perfectibility expressed by so many 
philosophers of the early Enlightenment. He is fully aware of their  
extravagant expectation that the arts and sciences would promote 
not only the control of natural forces but also understanding of the world 
and of the self, moral progress, the justice of institutions and even the 
happiness of human beings (Habermas 1985a, 9) 
 
The problem with Habermas is not that he does not see the far-fetched expectations 
of Enlightenment philosophers, but that he is not in fundamental disagreement about the 
achievability of their aims, only their means. This is where his theory of communicative 
action comes in, because instead of the all-knowing and planning philosopher it is through 
communication that we reach an ideal state of society. David Harvey summarizes this 
nicely when he writes that according to Habermas out of communicative action, 
“consensual and normative statements do arise, thus grounding the role of universalizing 
reason in daily life. It is this that allows ‘communicative reason’ to operate ‘in history as 
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an avenging force’” (Harvey 1991, 52). Habermas is not an Enlightenment revolutionary, 
but he shares their ultimate goals and proposes to reach it via the grinding process of 
communicative action in a public sphere that as much as possible resembles his ideal 
speech situation. On first glance, this emphasis on communication and the public sphere, 
as well as the view of society as being capable of changing through evolution, might seem 
as a significant departure from Hobbes’ depiction of human nature. But this does not hold 
up to closer scrutiny. The Hobbesian model is aware of the shortcomings of human nature, 
but ultimately rests on the assumption that we ourselves can realize these shortcomings 
through reason and then build an institutional framework to counter them. Habermas makes 
the same argument, he only replaces the Leviathan with the ideal speech situation, but 
ultimately it is reason that solves humanity’s problems. When Habermas writes about the 
necessity of the state to provide “social and material conditions” so that people can 
effectively be “privately autonomous,” his policy prescriptions are almost equal to those 
of Hobbes (Habermas 1998b, xxvii). Granted, Hobbes wants to separate individuals while 
Habermas wants to bring them together in the public sphere, but both of them posit human 
beings as reasonable and individualistic and, ultimately, being capable of creating a society 
without the emotional bonds outside of our rationality.  
The idea of a “universalistic morality” (Habermas 1974) must be hostile to the 
concept of culture, at least the way we have treated it in this dissertation so far. The cultural 
pluralism promoted by Habermas rests on the very assumption that culture is not a decisive 
factor in matters of morality. It becomes clear, however, that he himself is not fully 
comfortable with the loss of culture. In his ideal vision, he sees the “need for unification” 
in order to “regenerate the devastated power of religion in the medium of reason” (quoted 
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in: Hoesterey 1991, 89). In practical terms, that is a very ambitious program because it is 
tantamount to the idea to genuinely feel religion-like sentiments but to completely control 
them through reason. Which, of course, is working against the feeling-component. 
Accepting the existence of genuine feelings outside of reason is one of the biggest 
challenges in Habermas philosophy of society. In equal fashion, Habermas proposes a state 
that is simultaneously religious and secular: 
The guarantee of equal ethical liberties requires the secularization 
of state power, but it forbids the political overgeneralization of the 
secularized worldview. Insofar as they act in their role as citizens, 
secularized citizens may neither fundamentally deny truth-potential to 
religious worldviews nor deny the right of believing citizens to make 
contributions to public discussion in religious language. A liberal political 
culture can even expect that secularized citizens take part in efforts to 
translate relevant contributions from the religious language into a publicly 
accessible language (Habermas 2005, 27–28).  
 
Haberman almost literally wants to have his philosophical cake and eat it too – and 
the way he proposes that this is possible is through the unifying force of communicative 
action. But, as his critics correctly point out, the idea that all opinions can be equalized 
through reasonable discourse ignores or downplays the fact that opposing viewpoints 
cannot simply be resolved via appealing to the ideal of reason (Zerilli 1998, 14). This form 
of communication would transcend all the cultural and moral particularisms and dissolve 
antagonisms from politics.  
Despite the complexity of his writing, in many respects Habermas has added, but 
not fundamentally departed, from the social theories of Hobbes, Locke and others we 
engaged with the early course of this dissertation. True antagonisms in the theoretical world 
of Habermas are the consequence of a lack of reason promoted through communicative 
 
327 
 
action, but with a resolution of that problem emotional loyalties should be replaced by 
rational ones, and there is no reason why these loyalties should not gradually encompass 
all of humanity.  
The problem for Habermas is that he himself is not fully at ease with his theory. 
Hobbes and Locke supposedly took a very straightforward approach in their theoretical 
blueprint, and while Habermas wants to preserve their faith in reason, he is deeply aware 
of the (particularly German) criticism in the tradition of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Horkheimer, and Adorno. Partially accepting their criticisms of the emotional emptiness 
of modern life (Baxter 1987), he is of course also aware of the fact that this criticism played 
a significant role in the intellectual underpinnings of totalitarian systems (Reid and 
Yanarella 1977, 528). Habermas’ hope is that communicative action can preserve both the 
rational and the emotional worlds, harnessing the best of both of them into one 
universalistic morality.  
Yet even such an approach runs against internal contradictions: Habermas assumes 
that there is only one morality, even though there might be different paths leading to it. His 
morality is built on the sacred value of open discourse by honest individuals – and while 
this is certainly a possibility, it is most likely not as universal as Habermas hopes it might 
be. The complexity of moral ideas and their connection to emotions that we examined in 
the first chapters simply does not point towards a convergence towards one unique moral 
matrix shared by all. Habermas, in other words, did not resolve the problem of culture, he 
just created one of his own, complete with its sacred core and accompanying symbols and 
rituals. This does not come as a particular surprise, because insofar as Habermas engages 
with the psychological underpinnings of moral development at all, he remains firmly within 
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a Kohlbergian universe and its concept of moral universalism (Habermas 1990). As 
Richard Shweder points out, this includes the belief that 
liberal enlightenment thinking had come closest to discovering the 
terms of the one true moral charter […] tribalism (in-group favoritism) and 
hierarchy (which they viewed as incompatible with autonomy) [are viewed] 
as lower forms of social organization […] the moral consciousness of 
human beings had not only evolved over the course of cultural history but 
should be encouraged to continue to develop in […] the progressive 
liberated and liberal direction (Shweder 2015, 90) 
 
It is no coincidence that it is exactly in-group favoritism and hierarchy that are 
missing from his ideal speech situation. This is complemented by his attempts “to 
rehabilitate the concept of the autonomous Ego or, perhaps better, a ‘model of 
unconstrained ego identity’ as the developmental keystone of his communication theory of 
society” (Reid and Yanarella 1977, 529). That evolution towards the rational society is a 
core idea of Habermas’s thought is made once again explicit in his own words. Reacting 
to his critics who argue that historically even constitutional patriotism needs a shared and 
common identity, he writes that “the symbiotic relation between nationalism and 
republicanism reveals itself as merely a transitional, historical constellation” and that in the 
future societies might rest on “a new level of abstract, legally mediated social integration” 
(Habermas 2000, 132). 
The quarrel Habermas is having with his critics resembles the conflict between the 
Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment, with the former claiming that reason will 
enable us to “understand the true nature of our circumstances and ourselves” (Shapiro 
2012, 7) and the later claiming that attachments based on tradition and historical affiliations 
are a social reality that cannot simply be replaced by a form of practical reason and 
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detachment from the past (C. Taylor 1992). Habermas, working in a Kantian tradition, does 
not fully discard the past, but it is not much more than the path necessary to the Enlightened 
self, which would enable social life to exist without any emotional attachments to or 
intrinsic value of a specific identity. In his theory we emerge to a state of almost complete 
self-awareness; but, he assures us, this does not mean that society no longer matters, 
because this self-awareness does not just spring from the reasonable individual, but from a 
society that itself is socially constructed around the value of self-awareness (Habermas 
1992, 182–85). This self-awareness is in itself based on constant rational evaluations of the 
social world around us in which the individual “relates autonomously and critically to the 
social expectations he encounters” (Markell 2000, 41). His attempt to anchor a possible 
societal structure in reason and rationality simply prevents him from accepting the full 
implications culture has on public and private life. He wants to separate things that cannot 
be separated without taking over the entire Hobbesian idea of the completely autonomous 
individual.  
Habermas hopes for the emergence of postconventional collective identities that no 
longer depends on kinship, religion, territory or other “fixed contents” but a shared 
“consciousness of universal and equal opportunity to participate in value and norm-forming 
learning processes” (Habermas 1974, 100). And this new collective identity would be 
based on the identification of the idealized “unlimited communication community” 
(Habermas 1992, 185). Habermas dissolves all traditional attachments and loyalties and 
argues for their replacement with an attachment to procedures that are enshrined in 
universal rules of justice (S. B. Smith 2012, 248). The question Habermas is avoiding is 
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how people could develop these attachments. Bertrand Russell, who was wrestling with 
similar questions like Habermas nicely frames the problem the latter encounters: 
Social cohesion is a necessity, and mankind has never yet 
succeeded in enforcing cohesion by merely rational arguments. Every 
community is exposed to two opposite dangers: ossification through too 
much discipline and reverence for tradition, on the one hand; on the other 
hand, dissolution, or subjection to foreign conquest, through the growth of 
an individualism and personal independence that makes cooperation 
impossible (Russell 2015, 9 emphasis by me). 
 
Despite all their downsides and failures, traditional and conventional identities did 
succeed in creating social cohesion, and part of that cohesion came from the kind of moral 
intuitions created by culture that we described in previous chapters. Russell correctly points 
out that there can be an “overdosing” of the elements necessary for social cohesion, but he 
is equally correct that simply appealing to our rational faculties will be an insufficient 
replacement for emotional attachments. Bertrand Russell is worthwhile mentioning, 
because his philosophical work is laced with similar questions, and can be read as a journey 
away from conventional identities and ultimately his return to them (Greenspan 1996). 
Without these “conventional” identities based on fixed contents everything 
becomes debatable, and we need to ask whether the cure Habermas proposes as a remedy 
for the anomie of modern society might be worse than the original ailment. If the loss of 
fixed norms and values caused the anxiety of modernity, it is unclear how the Habermasian 
idea of making everything a subject of debate is going to replace these norms and values. 
The idea to have debate and communication replace those conventional identities is 
intriguing, but we have to ask what the conditions would be to accomplish it.  
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The use of rituals and symbols in the past has not only been a means to reinforce 
identities, but also set the bar of what is necessary to become a member of a community. 
Initiation rituals and pledges of allegiance tend to seem outdated in the post-conventional 
world, but at least they provide possible steps towards community formation. The world of 
post-conventional identities is one that most likely has much more difficult conditions of 
membership. One does not have to resort to as scathing a review of Habermas’ work as 
Roger Scruton does, but he does have a point in mentioning that a much of “ordinary 
humanity” would be excluded from Habermas’ public sphere, and that despite the 
impressive amount of theorizing the ideal speech situation, Habermas fails to tell us what 
he would like to see debated in particular (Scruton 2016, KL 3422). The goal of 
communication is consensus to be achieved in “unrestrained and universal discourse” but  
in so far as we master the means of the construction of [this] ideal 
speech situation, we can conceive the ideas of truth, freedom and justice, 
which interpenetrate each other – although of course only as ideas 
(Habermas 1970, 370) 
 
Religion, nationalism, and ideologies increasingly demanded some basic literacy in 
order to effectively join the communities they attempted to create, but the discourse 
community of a Habermasian nature would probably demand some significant form of 
higher education to enable membership. This is not supposed to be a cynical criticism, but 
is intended to expose a much deeper problem. Even if we assume the aspirational quality 
of Habermas’ idea, it cannot be erected on thin or non-existing cultural grounds. From the 
agreement on the rules of discourse to what can be included and what not to the acceptance 
of other viewpoints over my own, there is a thick web of necessary emotional and moral 
commitments to build what Habermas proposes. The dismissiveness with which he treats 
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the cultural environment of 18th and 19th century Europe is not just intellectually 
problematic, but it also reveals a deeper problem of post-World WarTwo political thought 
to which I will turn shortly.  
To first address the intellectual problem, it is more than a mere theoretical sleight-
of-hand to simultaneously view 19th century Europe as a forerunner to a possibly ideal 
public sphere but at the same time dismiss the historical circumstances that led to its 
emergence. I suspect that Habermas himself is here a victim of his own cultural 
socialization. Due to the role played by modern European culture in laying the intellectual 
groundwork not only for liberal democracy but also for fascism and communism, a critical 
theorist like Habermas has to downplay the role of culture to avoid an (in his eyes) 
unnecessary elevation of a culture that is responsible for history’s worst atrocities. 
Habermas is not alone in this dilemma, and the events of World War Two have created a 
lens through which much of the 19th century is interpreted, often in a very negative light 
(Bruckner 2010; Ferguson 2004, 2011a).  
 
5.1.1 Habermas and the German Question  
Evidence for my suspicion can be found in Habermas assessment of National 
Socialism and particularly the experience of the Holocaust and its effects on German and 
European politics. This is an essential point, because Habermas builds his theory on a claim 
to universalism, but at the same time uses the profoundly unique historical experience of 
Germany as the starting point. Habermas, for example, admits on several occasions the 
crucial role played by conventional identities like nationalism in the construction of the 
liberal democratic state (Habermas 1998b, 492–500), but that Auschwitz made any 
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recourse to traditional identities of that kind impossible – everywhere and not just in 
Germany (Habermas 1988, 4). It would go beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore 
the entirety of Habermas’ historical interpretation of the National Socialist period, but there 
are a few points that need mentioning, since they are crucial to his larger theoretical work.  
While nationalism played a significant role in the emergence of National Socialism 
and fascism, it is worth asking whether nationalism was a sufficient or only a necessary 
ingredient for the rise of this ideology. We need to ask this, because if “conventional 
identities” are to be history’s main culprits, a solid case has to be made in order to justify 
Habermas’s proposal to turn away from them. Needless to say, this is another very 
Hobbesian argument: The idea to prevent violence through the shedding of a certain 
identity.  
I would also like to caution the reader that the following is not supposed to be read 
as a defense of nationalism in general or German nationalism in particular. The purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate two things: The underestimation of cultural factors in 
Habermas interpretation of history; and the identification of the very specific cultural 
framework that would be needed for Habermas’ proposed society to emerge. 
According to Habermas, nationalism and patriotism divides people into groups that 
draw their own identity from viewing each other in an irrationally hostile light (Habermas 
1996),64 making their abandonment a pre-condition for a peaceful society. This is an 
interesting proposal, but it is most likely also a very poor reading of the actual history, 
psychology, and anthropology of nationalism and patriotism (and religion, which is 
 
64 A similar point was made by John Locke that we discussed in an earlier chapter.  
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mentioned in other writings). There is at least some evidence that the very idea of 
cosmopolitanism and world citizenship that Habermas supports, would hardly have 
emerged without the idea of the nation as a historical community (Kleingeld 2012). 
Equally, whether the emergence of nations and religions has divided or united diverse 
people remains a heated debate (Hazony 2018). It is not at all clear whether love of one’s 
own country necessarily needs hatred of somebody else’s (Haidt 2016; Kleingeld 2012). 
As we have discussed earlier, the emergence of complex cultures was one of the main 
causes for homo sapiens to be able to evolve beyond the social structure of the tribe; and 
as we showed, intertribal relations were often characterized by excessive violence is well 
documented in the anthropological record.  
That being said, it is also the case that these complex cultures and their ability to 
enable more effective collective action are responsible for previously unseen levels of 
organized violence. Nonetheless, if National Socialism has made nationalism an 
unbearable idea, we have to ask why other important elements of this ideology escape 
Habermas’ scrutiny. For example, the welfare state is a crucial element in Habermas 
historical vision (Habermas 1986), but his historical account of its inception ignores the 
crucial role of national identity formation that was often a justification for welfare-state 
policies (for example in Prussia: Beck 1995). Equally with democracy, Habermas does not 
accept that national identity could have been, not just a transitional, but a necessary element 
for the expansion of political rights and political participation (Habermas 1974). He neatly 
separates from the historical record what he needs for his theory and discards as merely 
transitional what he does not. It is barely mentioned, for example, that the modern German 
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welfare state that still exists today was in many respects built during the Nazi period (Aly 
2008). 
The answer to this somewhat selective historical memory, I believe, can be found 
in moral intuition developed as a consequence of culture. That the cultural trauma caused 
by the National Socialist experience and the horrors of the Holocaust have fundamentally 
changed social and political life has been well documented as well as its effects on German 
national identity (Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. 2004; Fulbrook 2002). As Peter Katzenstein 
has pointed out, anti-nationalism was a cornerstone of postwar German culture 
(Katzenstein 1997, 2003), and the writings of Habermas on this matter point in a similar 
direction. The uniqueness of the Holocaust and the German experience created the very 
cultural environment in which Habermas’ writing takes place. Being part of the moral 
matrix of an anti-nationalist culture, Habermas has demonstrated all the expected behavior 
of an individual who sees his or her cultural sacred core under attack. During the so called 
“Historikerstreit” (Historians Debate) in the late 1980s several German historians were 
arguing for a new approach towards the history of Nazi Germany, particularly towards a 
more contextualized way of looking at how events could have unfolded the way they did 
in Germany between 1933 and 1945.  
The reaction by Habermas and his contributions to the debate was one of absolute 
rejection of any such contextualization, since this would risk a “laundering” of the German 
past and could be used as a justification for a rehabilitation of German nationalism. The 
entire debate very soon left the framework of an experts debate on a specific period of 
history, and changed into deeply cultural issue where the potential consequences of 
arguments became more important than any claim to truth. (All the contributions can be 
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found in English in: Knowlton 1993.)  This shouldn’t have come as a surprise, because the 
Fascist period is so central to contemporary German identity that it is hard, if not 
impossible, to have an unemotional debate about it in public. What was surprising, 
however, was that the one participant in the debate whose lifework was the development 
of discourse ethics, ideal speech situations, and promoting the “force of the better 
argument” (Habermas 1984, 24, 25, 28, 36, 42) became one of its most fierce polemicists. 
Whether or not the polemics were justified is another matter, but the argument to shut down 
the debate itself revealed its cultural context: We intuitively dislike attacks on what we 
hold sacred, and this dislike makes it very hard for our rational side to function uninhibited 
– and not even a thinker like Jürgen Habermas is exempt from his emotions. For the 
duration of the Historikerstreit there was not much left of the 
Intuitively underlying [the] concept of communication rationality is 
the experience of the noncoercively unifying, consensus-promoting force of 
argumentative speech […] actors […] change their perspective: they […] 
shift perspective from the objectivating attitude of an actor oriented toward 
success who wants to realize some purpose in the world, to the performative 
attitude of a speaker who wants to reach understanding with a second person 
with regard to something in the world. Without this switch to the conditions 
for the use of language oriented toward understanding, the actors would be 
denied access to the potential inherent in the binding and bonding energies 
of language (Habermas 1998a, 220) 
 
Regardless of which side in the Historikerstreit had the better argument, the 
participants in the debate on both sides at least initially wanted to reach understanding 
“with regard to something in the world.” The problem was that this something also 
happened to be a sacred element of Germany’s post-war culture, making the debate 
extremely difficult, even for Jürgen Habermas. And not even a thinker of his complexity 
could fully escape from his emotional and cultural side. This does not, of course, render 
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the Habermasian discourse ethics and his ideas regarding communicative action mere 
hypocrisy, but it does show that culture sets limits to their universality. It also reveals the 
implicit limits of who would be allowed to participate in the discourse – and, from 
Habermas’ perspective, those who disagree with his historical interpretation of the German 
past would not have a place at the table. In order to be part of the community Habermas 
envisions, there must be agreement regarding certain values, ideas, and norms – in other 
words, it is a cultural community, not a universal one.  
The often abstract and complex principles that he proposes would serve as a glue 
among the “diversity in cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions, and world views” 
(Habermas 1996, 133). But as Habermas himself has demonstrated, he does not accept all 
world views as being able to participate in the discourse, and it seems more than likely that 
there might also be some other forms of cultural or religious life that would not find his 
approval. So, on the one hand, his communicative community will, 
unlike earlier forms of patriotism and nationalism, valorize a set of 
universal norms rather than a concrete historical community. Consequently, 
it does not generate irrational, antidemocratic hostility toward an unending 
series of people or groups whom it positions as its "others" (Markell 2000, 
44) 
 
but, on the other hand. he never fully reveals how these universal norms will 
become more important to people than membership in “concrete historical communities,” 
which is peculiar because he proposes that individuals should be able to keep their ethnic 
identities, religions, and world views, but at the same time all subscribe to the unique set 
of norms that Habermas proposes.  
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This, of course, could only function under the condition that the Habermasian 
norms are the sacred core of this new society, and that all other forms of identity are mere 
lifestyle choices that enrich the life of the individual and maybe are topics for public 
discussion, but do not reach the same level of salience and identity-forming power that the 
norms of Habermas do . His theory puts the cart before the horse, because unlike his claim 
that communicative action will in itself create legitimacy as a basis for society, there needs 
to be a legitimate society before one could ever implement Habermas ideas. 
 Habermas’s idea of a rational constitutional patriotism might be implementable in 
Germany, which comes closest to have the historical experience and culture to accept a 
non-conventional identity that he proposes. But to derive universalist principles from a 
philosophical program that is so deeply influenced by particular historic events is much 
more difficult. Without a doubt, the long shadow that is being cast by National Socialism 
has long gone beyond German borders, something demonstrated almost daily by references 
of US political and media figures to Hitler and Fascism. Using Nazi and Hitler as 
derogatory terms has become common throughout the Western World, and most audiences 
immediately know what is meant by invoking them. 
There is no comparable phenomenon, and while every US citizen understands what 
it means when someone is called a Nazi or Hitler, nobody in Germany would understand 
what it would mean to be called a Bull Connor or a Neo-Segregationist. The French 
philosopher Pascal Bruckner is not entirely incorrect when he diagnoses a tendency of 
“Hitlerizing History” (Bruckner 2010, chap. 5) in the West, where the entire history of 
Western culture is viewed as a road to the NS genocide. National Socialism has become 
part of the cultural inheritance of the entire West, and in this respect Habermas is correct 
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when he claims that the German experience had an impact far beyond Germany itself. This 
is also why Habermas is of such high relevance for us here. Because despite the close ties 
of his philosophy to the German experience, the philosophy itself and its rejection of 
specific identities has become more common in the West.  
The declaration of post-nationalism and post-religion could be premature, a view 
that is only compounded by Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the post-secular age (Habermas 
2010) that announced the end of the sacred in politics. In reference to Habermas, Jan-
Werner Müller writes that “the exercise of coercion over citizens can no longer be justified 
with reference to sacred or quasi-sacred sources” (Müller 2006, 287). This, however, seems 
to be a contestable proposition. The term “sacred” seems to automatically imply a 
metaphysical or religious source.  Yet, to attach sacred value can extend to non-religious 
phenomena as well. And many aspects of the German experience have been become a 
sacred core of contemporary Western culture. It would go beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to deconstruct and dissect this phenomenon in detail, but it demonstrates that 
even the most universalist aspirations of some of the most important thinkers rest on a 
cultural foundation. Habermas’ arguments for the abandonment of religion and nationalism 
are well founded in the specific historical and cultural context that underlies his writing, 
but it is entirely unclear why a Buddhist, Muslim, Japanese or Indian nationalist should 
give up their collective identity and trade it for the universal rules of Habermas. Despite 
their claim to universalism and pluralism, the visions of Habermas and similar thinkers like 
Rawls rest on a very narrow set of assumptions. The idea of public reason through 
deliberation cannot exist without a cultural context, an issue that neither Habermas nor 
Rawls ever sufficiently address (Rawls 1999). This leads to a theorizing with “a rationalist 
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bias, [that] homogenizes, and takes a one-dimensional view of public reason” (Parekh 
2000, 312). 
The Habermasian-Rawlsian claim that certain identities have outlived their 
legitimacy is constructed around the historical experiences of particular communities, 
whether it be the United States (in the case of Rawls) or Germany (in the case of 
Habermas). The universalization of these experiences to arrive at better forms of identity 
is treated as some form of logical consequence, but it is never explained how this 
universalization can and will take place.  
Despite his criticisms of modern life and the flaws of rationalism, Habermas is 
entirely silent on the matter of culture as an emotional experience. He assumes that cultural 
attachments and loyalties can be dissolved and weakened by communicative action, but it 
never occurs to him that in order to enter such a communication one would have to be 
willing to give these attachments up in the first place. But why should people do that? If 
the life-world has already been emptied by the workings of modern capitalism, why should 
they now also give up the emotional comfort of a cultural community? In fact, the rise of 
religion (Kepel 1994) and new nationalisms (Gries 2005; Lind 1996) in the early 20th 
century point more towards a revival than and end of conventional identities.  
The idea that the atrocities of the 20th century have finally opened up the path to a 
rational society that will finally control its urges and exert their passions under the strict 
reins of reason is without a doubt noble and well-intended, but its realization is more 
difficult. Ultimately, it argues that an emotional experience would make the rational rule 
based society possible, but this also means that those who do not participate in this 
emotional experience (whether by choice or circumstance) can also not become part of this 
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new society. Despite its appeals to reason, this is as much an emotional as it is a rational 
project. The pluralistic society that Habermas and others envision depends on people 
feeling a higher degree of loyalty to that particular vision than to any other vision of life 
they might inherent from religion, tradition, or a competing ideology: 
He sets up a single model of political discourse and fails to 
appreciate the depth of national diversity. Like Rawls, he too takes a 
narrowly rationalist view of it, stresses arguments and largely ignores other 
forms of reasons, takes a homogenous view of political arguments, 
postulates a culturally unmediated or “pure intersubjectivity” and a 
language “purified” of history (Parekh 2000, 312) 
 
In the end Habermas views culture as something that might enrich the individual 
life and inform the public sphere, but he does not give it a particularly important role as an 
independent force. This is why he believes that it can be replaced with a formal and legal 
structure. Culture might have been important in the past, but that is no longer so. Just as 
Hobbes had the English Civil War as the backdrop for his theory of society, Habermas 
draws on the events of World War Two. But ultimately both of them want to replace the 
passions that they see as responsible with a rationalist approach that hems in the emotional 
attachments that culture demands.  
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5.2 Culture and Recognition: Charles Taylor and Multiculture 
 
That the aftermath of the Enlightenment as well as the beginnings of modernity 
created new ways to look at culture is not an observation that is limited to this dissertation. 
Choosing a similar approach to mine but coming to different conclusions, Charles Taylor 
has proposed that there are two theories of modernity, one cultural and one acultural:  
A ‘cultural’ theory of modernity is one that characterizes the 
transformations which have issued in the modern West mainly in terms of 
the rise of a new culture. The contemporary Atlantic world is seen as a 
culture (or group of closely related cultures) among others, with its own 
specific understandings (e.g., of person, nature, the good), to be contrasted 
to all others, including its own predecessor civilization (with which it 
obviously also has a lot in common). By contrast, an “acultural” theory is 
one that describes these transformations in terms of some culture-neutral 
operation. By this I mean an operation which is not defined in terms of the 
specific cultures it carries us from and to, but is rather seen as of a type 
which any traditional culture could undergo (C. Taylor 1993b, 205, and 
1995).  
 
I would concur with Taylor that “the overwhelming weight of interpretation in our 
culture, positive and negative, tends to the acultural” (C. Taylor 1993b, 208), yet in one 
important aspect he remains unclear: Taylor provides us with two intriguing narratives 
about modernity, one that sees it as a natural evolutionary force and another one that 
interprets it as a cultural phenomenon, but despite the importance he grants to the matter 
of culture and his attempts at formulating a defense, his actual definition of culture remains 
unclear. This fundamentally weakens his case against the acultural approach, because 
without clear definitions, it’s difficult to fully comprehend his defense. This is particularly 
important, because it is one thing to know that culture is a necessity of human life, but quite 
another to define which kind of culture should address that necessity. As we will see, 
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Taylor is challenged by the same problem that Habermas has encountered, namely that 
there are such strong anti-totalitarian undertones to their philosophy that they cannot bring 
themselves to openly endorse one kind of cultural (and therefore moral) values over 
another, despite the fact that their philosophy itself is based on very specific cultural 
grounds. This, unfortunately, often leads Taylor as much as Habermas to be very selective 
in what he counts as being part of a genuine culture and what is not. And, just like 
Habermas, Taylor assumes an almost unlimited possibility for cultures to learn and 
compromise from each other. This is why I claim that despite his more detailed and 
nuanced view of culture, even Taylor has problems with accepting the often irrational 
emotional reactions cultural values can elicit, and that these reactions make it hard if not 
impossible to compromise with cultures that happen to hold cultural values that contradict 
our own.  
This chapter will begin with Taylor’s insightful critique of the Enlightenment 
before turning to his views on the matter of culture in contemporary society that I view 
with greater skepticism. By  doing so, I hope to highlight that very much like Habermas, 
Taylor is critical of overemphasizing of reason and rationality as a consequence of 
Enlightenment thinking and that individualism alone is not a substitute for our natural 
sociability.  
 
5.2.1 Taylor, Modernity, and Rationality  
Charles Taylor plays a prominent role in the question of culture and modernity 
because just like Habermas, he comes from a very critical perspective regarding the 
Enlightenment. Although himself not part of the counter-Enlightenment, he takes seriously 
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their concerns with the overly formalistic and culturally-impoverished approaches of many 
strands of Enlightenment thought. Not coincidentally, Taylor grounded a significant part 
of his philosophical writings on the ideas of Hegel, playing a decisive role in re-establishing 
the German philosopher’s intellectual status in a more nuanced and positive light after 
decades of anti-Hegelian trends especially in the English speaking world (Gordon 2008, 
649). It is also no coincidence that Taylor was taking a close look at the ideas of an even 
more controversial figure than Hegel—namely, Martin Heidegger. While working through 
the more destructive ideas of Hegel and Heidegger, he takes seriously their arguments 
about the shortcomings of a world that explained solely in rationalist and behavioralist 
terms (C. Taylor 1993a). Taylor also shares with me some of the criticisms I have 
formulated regarding the Lockean approach and the idea that human beings can be 
understood in isolation from their cultural and historical environment (C. Taylor 1992).  
But it is also here where we will see some divergence, because while Taylor 
criticizes the individuality that is so central to Enlightenment thought, he struggles with the 
level to which we are bound by our cultural and historical surroundings. Contrary to the 
claim that the Enlightenment has made us hyper-individualistic, I believe that the story is 
a more complex one, consisting not of an end of community but one of the individual being 
faced with an unprecedented range of options from which to choose their identity. As we 
will see, this is a serious problem for Taylor’s philosophy, because if individuals can 
choose their culture and identity, it will become increasingly more difficult to identify an 
“authentic” identity. Taylor is fully aware of this conundrum when he writes that  
The change I want to define and trace is one which takes us from a 
society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in 
which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility 
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among others. I may find it inconceivable that I would abandon my faith, 
but there are others, including possibly some very close to me, whose way 
of living I cannot in all honesty just dismiss as depraved, or blind, or 
unworthy, who have no faith (at least not in God, or the transcendent). 
Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives. And this will 
also likely mean that at least in certain milieux, it may be hard to sustain 
one's faith. There will be people who feel bound to give it up, even though 
they mourn its loss (C. Taylor 2007a, 3) 
 
In his genealogy of the secular age, Taylor provides us with a detailed story of how 
the commitment to any form of faith becomes optional, and that modernity no longer offers 
us the previously existing certainty of religious beliefs that undergirded the normative and 
moral content of culture. In his description of belief systems, Taylor comes very close to 
some of the assumptions we also made in previous chapters, for example that beliefs  
are held within a context or framework of the taken-for-granted, 
which usually remains tacit, and may even be as yet unacknowledged by the 
agent, because never formulated” (C. Taylor 2007a, 13).  
 
This is just another way of describing our intuitive reaction to moral questions and 
whether we consider an act to be appropriate or not. Taylor also realizes that  
we are in fact all acting, thinking, and feeling out of backgrounds 
and frameworks which we do not fully understand. To ascribe total personal 
responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out of the human condition 
(C. Taylor 2007a, 387). 
 
It is here where Taylor most strongly presents the human condition as one of being 
fundamentally intersubjective (C. Taylor 1971), meaning that we cannot understand the 
way we interact with the world outside of the social imaginary (C. Taylor 2004) of people 
based on shared practices, stories, and traditions. On this theoretical framework Taylor 
builds an intriguing model of multiple modernities and how there is not simply a modern 
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and a post-modern world but worlds where we have to take into account the nuances by 
which social change has historically unfolded. Taylor, of course, shares with Habermas a 
strong emphasis on the role of economic exchange and how economic considerations have 
become central to everybody’s life.  
Taylor views this change as lamentable, arguing that another effect of this change 
is the atomization of society into individuals claiming autarky over themselves and their 
experiences,  
A race of humans has arisen which has managed to experience its 
world entirely as immanent. In some respects we may judge this 
achievement a victory for darkness, but it is a remarkable achievement 
nonetheless (C. Taylor 2007a, 376). 
But it is not the atomistic self that worries Taylor the most, but the loss of certainty 
in a single cultural framework and the very choice brought forth by modernity. If there are 
so many possibilities, how can a true transcendental experience of culture be possible, and 
how can we expect a serious commitment to any set of cultural values? Not without reason 
have some of Taylor’s interpreters suggested that he in part sounds similar to Nietzsche, 
and his lamentations of the hollow and uncommitted species humans have become as a 
consequence of modernity (for example: Gordon 2008, 663).  
Taylor defends religion on the grounds that it is the only source of a true 
transcendental experience, and that all that came afterwards are “lesser modes” offering an 
ersatz-transcendence, and that nationalism and other modern ideologies are only substitutes 
that cannot reach the force of the original (Gordon 2008, 664). But without this 
transcendence society might be  
bound to lead to a crumbling and eventual breakdown of all moral 
standards. First, secular humanism, and then eventually its pieties and 
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values come under challenge. And in the end nihilism (C. Taylor 2007a, 
638) 
 
More than once Taylor sounds very much like critics of modernity and the 
Enlightenment, resembling a fear of Nihilism that is usually more common in the writings 
of Leo Strauss (L. Strauss 1965, 2011). The problem we encounter with Taylor is not his 
insightful approach to investigating the evolution of secular societies, but the exclusive role 
he gives to religion. As we will see in the next chapter, Taylor does not support the idea of 
measuring and valuing cultures differently. But I believe that this is in part due to his own 
perception of what culture is supposed to be. For him, it is the true transcendental 
experience that can only come from the collective bonds created around religious belief. 
He is not comfortable with the idea that the transcendental force of religion can be found 
somewhere else, which is why he discards alternatives as lesser substitutes.  
The secular-rational self of modernity might forever be separated from the 
possibility of a true transcending experience (Gordon 2008), and all that is left to do is to 
work towards compromise between the competing lesser modes of supposed 
transcendence. Taylor, in other words, takes culture seriously but that culture is gone. It is 
in this light that we have to engage with his approaches towards the condition of culture in 
the contemporary world. 
 
5.2.2 Taylor and the Wrong Allure of Pluralism  
Despite Taylor’s unease with the disenchantment of the world, his philosophy does 
have significant problems with the reality of culture as an authoritative source in people’s 
moral thinking and the real possibility that cultural values contradict each other. 
 
348 
 
Brain Barry highlights this problem with a summary of Taylor’s position during the 
Rushdie affair, where an author – Salman Rushdie – living in Britain was sentenced to 
death by the Iranian government for the crime of blasphemy: 
Taylor exhibits what appears to be genuine regret that the case of 
Rushdie does not lend itself to compromise: “in the nature of things, 
compromise is close to impossible here – one either forbids murder or 
allows it.” This seems to me to show a sad lack of imagination. There would 
have been nothing to prevent the British government from proposing to the 
Iranian authorities some compromise solution. For example, it might have 
been possible to reach a deal according to which the British government 
would undertake to transport Rushdie to some neutral venue and an expert 
Iranian limb-severer would be flown in to remove some agreed portion of 
his anatomy – say the right arm. The problem is not that it is hard to think 
of compromises, as Taylor suggests. The problem is, rather, that it would 
be utterly revolting, from a liberal point of view, to compromise on the 
proposition that Rushdie should not suffer a legal penalty for writing The 
Satanic Verses. Compromise over liberal principles is not, and cannot be, a 
liberal value (Barry 2002, 283) 
 
Just as with Habermas’ approach we run into the issue of which values we would 
accept in a pluralist society and which we would not. But that, of course, is in itself a deeply 
cultural question. Pluralism will be possible as long as either one set of cultural values is 
prioritized by a majority of the society and as long as different values do not directly 
contradict each other. Liberal societies as envisioned by Taylor and Habermas have solved 
this problem partially by the recourse to a Hobbesian approach: Different cultures can best 
co-exist, if cultural values are the domain of the life of the individual, meaning that I might 
live according to scripture, but I neither care nor demand the same from others. It is, 
however, only a partial recourse because both Habermas and Taylor want culture to be part 
of the public sphere, something that Hobbes rejected because the risk of different values 
clashing in the public sphere could be a source of disorder and violence. 
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The early Enlightenment especially in the form of Thomas Hobbes was fully aware 
of this, which is why he promoted a strong form of individualism and a separate private 
sphere where individuals could search for meaning without allowing it to become a source 
of conflict in the public sphere. If we can find value and meaning in ourselves without the 
involvement of others, there might no longer be the need for conflict. Mainly concerned 
with religion as the dominant cultural phenomenon of his day, Hobbes strived to make it a 
purely individualistic affair where everybody could be happy according to his own beliefs, 
but nobody had the right to judge the behavior of others in the name of some higher 
authority like god:  
This humanization of religion meant that it could eventually be 
reduced to a cipher, belonging ultimately to the private precinct of 
individual conscience and rendered irrelevant to determining the shape of 
the public good (S. B. Smith 2016 KL 1413-1414). 
 
It is also only this condition that we could fully endorse Taylor’s idea of an equal 
value of culture. In fact, Taylor himself restates Hobbes when he writes that  
we might speak of an individualized identity, one that is particular 
to me and that I discover in myself. This notion arises along with an ideal, 
that of being true to myself and my own particular way of being (C. Taylor 
1997, 227) 
 
Taylor’s main concern is not culture as a means for social cohesion, but as a means 
for finding one’s own identity, and this identity is to be recognized by others, something 
that he correctly views as important for human flourishing. Nonetheless, this is an 
individualized view of culture and a reduction of its collective qualities. The individuals in 
society interact as recognition-givers to each other, but the true values of culture is to be 
measured by its effect on individual well-being (C. Taylor 1994). From this perspective, 
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all cultures are indeed of equal value – if the way to measure a culture’s value is whether 
or not it confers psychological benefits for those who hold the culture, it makes no 
difference what the particular culture is. But when we look at culture and its consequences 
for collective behavior, things could look differently. This is why we engaged with the 
topic of maladaptation in previous chapters: Being a Shaker or being a Protestant can have 
the same emotional effect on me as an individual, supporting my claim to its recognition 
of a culture and granting them equal value. But from a collective perspective, in a hundred 
years there will most likely still be Protestants, but no Shakers, given the fact that their 
values (celibacy, joining only by voluntary conversion) put them at a disadvantage. 
So Taylor’s argument that “we are very far away from that ultimate horizon from 
which the relative worth of different cultures might be evident” (C. Taylor 1994, 73) is not 
really accurate. The worth of something in most cases is established in comparison or 
relation to something else. For example, the worth of eating a piece of chocolate or going 
to the gym can be established from various perspectives with different or equal outcomes: 
Both of these activities can trigger the release of endorphins in my brain, and if this is my 
main goal, it is indeed difficult to establish whether chocolate or the gym are be of higher 
value. On the other hand, if I am concerned with my long-term health, and the choice is 
between the endorphin-triggering activity of going for a daily run or eating a piece of 
chocolate, the daily run might objectively be the better option. It is hard to see why we 
should not use a similar approach to culture. Yes, being a Shaker might cause the same 
psychological reward than being a Protestant, so it is difficult to establish whether one has 
more value than the other. If the concern, however, is the sustainability of my particular 
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community, Protestant culture has a clear advantage over Shaker culture and is, therefore, 
from that perspective of higher value.  
This is not a small problem, because although Taylor denies the existence of any 
kind of standard against which to measure the relative value of culture, he still implores us 
to “recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but 
acknowledge their worth” (emphasis in the original C. Taylor 1994, 64). He grounds that 
appeal on the idea that “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some 
considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings” (C. 
Taylor 1994, 66). This defense of cultural equality runs into the same problem that 
Habermas encountered—namely, that a society that recognizes the value of all cultures 
needs itself to be based on a culture that would allow for such a recognition. It is surprising 
that an author like Taylor who is on the one hand a staunch defender of culture, believes 
that any society could value something as a culture neutral operation. There are parts in 
Taylor’s writing where he concedes the issue, such as this: “Just as all must have equal 
civil rights, and equal voting rights, regardless of race or culture, so all should enjoy the 
presumption that their traditional culture has value” (C. Taylor 1994, 68).  
Although most likely unintentionally, in so arguing, Taylor has smuggled Hobbes 
back in. In neatly separating between a public sphere (civil rights, equal voting rights) and 
the emotions of the private sphere (the presumption that traditional culture has value), he 
does exactly what Hobbes would do as well. Nobody denies the value any traditional 
culture might have for those who are part of it, but in the public sphere these values cannot 
override the principles of civil rights as they are established and protected by the state. So 
the state tells the people that they can believe and value whatever they want, unless it 
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becomes a threat or contradicts the values established by the state itself. Once again, there 
is nothing here that would fbe disagreeable to Hobbes. 
Taylor himself qualifies the idea of cultural neutrality in his ideal society: 
“liberalism cannot and should not claim complete cultural neutrality. Liberalism is also a 
fighting creed” (C. Taylor 1994, 62). If it is a fighting creed and cannot be neutral towards 
other cultures, Taylor goes a long way to say something much simpler: Liberalism is in 
itself a culture, and can only accept other cultures as long as their sacred values do not 
violate the sacred values of Liberalism. So idea of recognizing and valuing all cultures 
comes with a pretty significant asterisk, namely that whatever the content of these cultures, 
they cannot get equally valued they run contrary to the values of liberalism. This is a 
significant problem for the cultural approach of Taylor, because either he accepts that he 
prefers a liberal to an illiberal culture, thereby creating a very clear standard against which 
to measure cultures (i.e. the degree of individual liberty they permit), or he subscribes to 
the idea that all cultures are indeed equal, so complete neutrality would be required (which 
he rejects), or he takes the third, an Hobbesian option, which would be to allow culture as 
a form of psychological pleasure relegated to the private and individual sphere but with no 
role in the public sphere (something he is also not comfortable with).  
At the core of Taylor’s Liberalism is the role of the state as the protector of rights 
and not the imposer of obligations (C. Taylor 1997, 257–58), something that Leo Strauss 
described as follows: 
If we may call liberalism that political doctrine which regards as the 
fundamental political fact the rights, as distinguished from the duties, of 
man and which identifies the function of the state with the protection or the 
safeguarding of those rights, we must say that the founder of liberalism 
was Hobbes (L. Strauss 1965, 181–82 emphasis by me) 
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For Hobbes, human life was to be perceived as a strictly individualistic affair, and 
it is the fear that individualistic human beings have of each other that enables us to agree 
on the creation of a forceful entity that will protect us from each other: the state. But Hobbes 
did not only fear that we kill each other for material gain and the need for defense, but he 
fully realized the potential cultural sources of violence:  
the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any 
other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in 
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name 
(Hobbes 2019, KL 8958) 
 
The politics of recognition are alive and well in the writings of Hobbes, and these 
are not an invention of the 18th century. Taylor is correct when he writes that “the 
importance of recognition has been modified and intensified by the new understanding of 
individual identity that emerges at the end of the eighteenth century” (C. Taylor 1994, 28), 
but this is a change in degree and not in kind. The very fact that Thomas Hobbes was 
already writing about the matter of recognition in 1651 (the publication date of Leviathan) 
should give us pause. Taylor qualifies his statement with an emphasis on individualized 
identity that is particular to one person, so he defines the importance of culture as an 
individualistic experience. 
From this individualistic view Taylor derives his idea of human right for 
recognition of all cultures, because he has “sanitized” his concept of cultural recognition 
from the likelihood of struggle (Parekh 2000, 343). The previously quoted statement that 
“one either forbids murder or allows it” highlights this view – in an individualistic society, 
harm to the individual is under almost all circumstances a cultural taboo, so there is a much 
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broader definition of what constitutes the concept of murder. But this is not so in all 
societies, and those who supported the death penalty against Salman Rushdie – we must 
assume – were in their eyes not condoning a possible act of murder, but the justified 
punishment for an act of blasphemy. Whether or not blasphemy should be punished by 
death, or whether the criticism and ridiculing of religion should be part of a free and vibrant 
society is once again a deeply cultural question – and although compromise might be 
possible, it is doubtful that Taylor would, for example, agree with the idea that instead of 
killing a blasphemer we only put him in jail. There is a solid cultural frame that holds 
Taylor’s philosophy together, despite his unwillingness to fully commit to it.  
One of the reasons for this is that there is one part where both he and Habermas 
depart from the Hobbesian perspective. Hobbes was straight-forward in his anti-cultural 
position: Culture makes us form group identities, and conflicts between these group 
identities can lead to violence; therefore, we should rid ourselves of them altogether and 
entirely consign them to the private sphere. Habermas, Taylor and similar philosophers, I 
argue, want to bring culture back into the public sphere, but under “sanitized” conditions.  
On the one hand, this attempt must be considered, because a public sphere free of 
culture and consisting only of rational individualistic human beings is the definition of 
Hobbes’ utopia, and most likely not a real option. On the other hand, bringing back culture 
under the assumption that we can all control its effects on us individually and collectively 
by reason and rationality (in a nutshell the Habermas-Taylor suggestion), is equally hard 
to achieve. This is so because even that very specific vision needs to build on a cultural 
basis – one that values a certain definition of reason and rationality – and must be hostile 
to those cultures that contradict it. As I have pointed out before, Taylor realizes that 
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Liberalism is also a “fighting creed,” but he is rather quiet on the specifics. What makes 
this even more difficult is that a commitment to liberal values is a precondition for joining 
the public sphere, but at the same time these liberal values should include a commitment 
to affirm the values of other cultures. Denying recognition to other cultures “can be a form 
of oppression” (C. Taylor 1997, 232).  
Taylor stops short of the further reaching claims like those by Iris Young that 
“groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social 
contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized” (Young 2011, 174), but only 
marginally so. The problem with the general affirmation of cultures is, as Robert K. 
Fullinwinder writes, is this:  
Why, for example, should I respect the Southern Baptist who 
believes I am damned for not practicing his brand of religion? Why should 
I respect his belief? And why should he reciprocally respect my contempt 
for his benighted superstition? Why should Young respect fellow citizens 
in virtue of rather than in spite of their misogyny? In any society of size 
there are bound to exist groups loathsome and contemptible from our 
particular points of view. An ideal that calls for each of us to respect all 
other in virtue of their differences is otherworldly (Fullinwider 1995, 512) 
 
Even if we accept Taylor’s and Young’s assumption that not recognizing one’s 
culture is a form of oppression, might there be cases where such an oppression is justified, 
maybe even necessary? After World War Two the United States endeavored to implement 
a far-reaching strategy to reeducate and reshape German and Japanese culture through 
denazification and reeducation (F. Taylor 2012; Tent 1984; Wippich 1996), due to the 
realization that there was a strong cultural component that enabled the emergence of these 
fascist regimes. The denial of recognition to people whose identity was intertwined with 
Nazi ideology and to also deny them social equality certainly was painful for the 
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individuals in question, but to grant National Socialism affirmation and recognition 
probably would have been an even worse alternative. Similarly, slavery and its supposed 
justifications in the antebellum South were deeply intrenched in the local culture (Gross 
2000), making the US Civil War in essence a clash of cultures.  I think there is a strong 
case to be made that slavery and a culture that condones it should be oppressed, regardless 
of the degree to which it “animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of 
time.”  
To be clear, these are not theoretical strawmen that I am building up, but questions 
that go to the heart of why culture matters. If human beings were ultimately all to abide by 
a form of moral uniformity and equal values that are just waiting to come forward in all 
communities, then there would be no problem with bestowing equal recognition and even 
affirmation on all cultures. The idea that everybody shares and values equally WEIRD 
morality is what I suspect that a lot of modern and postmodern thinkers ultimately believe: 
It is hard for many of them to grasp that there are indeed people who view the world and 
how to interact with it differently from the way a Western individual in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment would (Shweder and Bourne 1984).  
But there is only moral universalism, but not moral uniformity, and the same issues 
can be handled differently from culture to culture. Sometimes these differences can coexist 
without conflict, but sometimes they cannot. As in the examples used above, a liberal 
society simply cannot bestow equal recognition on a culture that endorses the idea that 
human beings can be owned by other human beings or cultures that view women as being 
inherently inferior to men. As Brian Barry points out “we cannot simultaneously affirm 
everybody’s culture” (Barry 2002, 271). This is even put more succinctly by Peter Jones: 
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People are allowed to believe in the worth of their own culture, 
including the beliefs and values that it embodies, yet they are also required 
to believe that others’ cultures, embodying different and conflicting beliefs 
and values, are of no less worth. How can we expect people to embrace that 
absurdity? (P. Jones 1998, 45) 
 
In the end, it is once again Hobbes that provided us with the only workable method 
to give equal recognition to all cultures. Ban them entirely to the heart and soul of the 
individual and disallow any culture to seep into interpersonal relations or the public sphere, 
for the state will immediately step in and stop you. Whatever belief gives you spiritual 
fulfillment should be your own, and there is no need to have it shared with, recognized, or 
affirmed by any other person.  
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in Taylor’s way of argumentation that just 
explains conflicting beliefs away or accuses those who point them out as the real problem. 
In his contributions regarding the potential for conflict between Islamic and Western 
culture, Taylor separates culture and the symbols that represent it in order to cast the 
members of all cultures more or less as adherents to Western liberalism. Writing about the 
unease some people in non-Muslim cultures have with the practice of veiling, Taylor 
explains that  
a girl wearing a headscarf might in fact be rebelling against her 
parents and their (conservative) kind of Islam, and that others might be 
deeply pious while being utterly revolted by gender discrimination or 
violence, is lost from view (C. Taylor 2007c) 
 
That most certainly can be the case, but to reinterpret Islamic symbols of piety into 
an actual confirmation of Western liberalism and to mock those who have the audacity to 
connect Islam to  
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the stoning of adulterous women under sharia law in northern 
Nigeria, the amputation of thieves' hands in Saudi Arabia, honour killings 
of women who refuse arranged marriages in Pakistan (or even northern 
English cities like Bradford and Manchester), the willingness to justify 
suicide bombings (C. Taylor 2007c) 
 
as if there is no connection at all between Islam and certain practices is at some 
point edging right into the territory of deriving an “ought” from an “is.”  
Let me highlight this again by referring to the two examples I made previously. 
Symbols often have collectively determined meanings, something that is difficult to escape 
from even if an individual would prefer symbols to have a different meaning from the one 
perceived by the majority. Somebody who finds a swastika to be an aesthetically appealing 
symbol would most likely still refrain from displaying it openly, simply by knowing what 
kind of meaning most people intuitively and culturally would connect with it. In some 
countries this can have stronger repercussions – like fines and even jail time in Germany 
for the use of Nazi symbols – or it will be legally tolerated but be the subject to severe 
disapprobation by the majority, like in the United States. This in fact does do a great 
injustice to the individual in question, especially if he or she is sincerely only displaying 
this symbol out of an aesthetic intention.  
I would make a similar argument in the US case regarding the display of the 
Confederate flag. Most certainly not everyone who has an inclination to display this flag is 
a racist, segregationist, separatist, or white supremacist. Nonetheless, there is a perception 
of this particular symbol that connects it with these attitudes, and even if someone just likes 
it because of the way it looks, or in their mind connects it to different, more noble attitudes, 
they will not be able to avoid the perception of the majority. Once again, this can be an 
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injustice to the individual in question, but if someone chooses to use symbols that are 
intrinsically loaded with positive or negative emotions, people will intuitively reach a value 
(pre-)judgment about the person using those symbols.  
Let us recall the stories for moral dumbfounding from previous chapters, where 
people were unwilling to accept it as morally neutral if someone “is cleaning out her closet, 
and she finds her old American flag. She doesn’t want the flag anymore, so she cuts it up 
into pieces and uses the rags to clean her bathroom” (Haidt 2013, 19).  
Although the fictional story was presented in a way that made clear that this was 
done without any political, moral, or anti-American sentiment and only out of practicality, 
most of those who heard to story immediately arrived at a moral conclusion, with persons 
being interviewed saying things such as “it’s wrong to cut up the flag because a neighbor 
might see her do it, and he might be offended” (Haidt 2013, 24). Haidt and his experiment 
focused mostly on the question why an individual would make a moral judgement of an 
innocent act, but his studies also revealed that people had a key awareness how some 
members of society might react to acts that are without moral meaning for the individual 
who conducts them. So the person shredding up the US American flag for cleaning the 
bathroom, the aesthetically pleased fan of the swastika and the admirer of the Confederate 
flag could all have reasons for their actions that are the distinctly contrary from how a 
majority of their respective society would interpret them, but under the assumption that 
they know the potential consequences of their actions, they might refrain from acting upon 
them.  
Does this mean that culture infringes on the ability of an individual to fully live out 
their inner self? Absolutely, and this is not in contradiction to anything we have so far 
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established about culture in this dissertation. As I have pointed out, culture creates an 
emotional-moral web that encourages or restrains behavior that I as a completely 
autonomous and independent individual would engage in. But since this inner-self is also 
socially constructed, something that Taylor is well aware of (C. Taylor 1997, 230), there 
is not simply a tension between me and society, but a dialectic where a society’s majority 
culture in some areas emotionally restricts me and in other areas emotionally elevates me. 
As we have also discussed at great length, culture is not only operates through negative 
emotions like fear, but also through positive emotions like affirmation and recognition.  
Culture is not just intersubjective, as Taylor correctly claims (C. Taylor 1971, 27). 
And what has meaning for me is not entirely independent from what the same thing means 
for others. What is particularly befuddling in the case of Charles Taylor is that in his earlier 
writings he seems to make precisely that argument, pointing out that there 
are distinctions between different sorts of behavior such that one sort 
is considered the appropriate form for one action or context, the other for 
another action or context; e.g., doing or saying certain things amounts to 
breaking off negotiations, doing or saying other things amounts to making 
a new offer (C. Taylor 1971, 25) 
 
If within a society there should happen to be significant disagreement regarding 
what is appropriate and what is not,  
The intersubjective meanings which are the background to social 
action are often treated by political scientists under the heading 
"consensus." By this is meant convergence of beliefs on certain basic 
matters, or of attitude. But the two are not the same. Whether there is 
consensus or not, the condition of there being either one or the other is a 
certain set of common terms of reference. A society in which this was 
lacking would not be a society in the normal sense of the term, but 
several. Perhaps some multiracial or multi-tribal states approach this limit 
(C. Taylor 1971, 27 emphasis by me) 
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The Charles Taylor of 1971 got it exactly right and in line with what we know from 
psychological studies – if there is a significant difference between beliefs on certain basic 
matters and attitudes, we are not confronted with one society, but several, each created 
around its own beliefs and attitudes. To be clear, people can inhabit several cultural spaces 
at the same time, and as long as possible contradictions are small or non-existent smaller 
societies can exist and interact under the umbrella of one larger society that in itself exists 
as a consequence of certain beliefs and attitudes. Culture can have a bridging effect, for 
example when German Protestants and Catholics decided in the 19th century to subordinate 
their religious identity to a common German identity. Equally, I believe it is justified to 
argue that the United States have overall an impressive history of assimilating different 
cultures into a common American culture. There is a somewhat worrisome trend to 
describe this assimilation as a process of becoming “white” and to depict it in a rather 
negative light (Brodkin 1998; Roediger 2005, 2007). The United States experiences her 
own version of a “Hitlerization” of history, where the entirety of the political and cultural 
evolution of the United States is viewed through the prism of slavery and race-relations.65 
There is probably no greater challenge for a society than retaining cohesion if its history is 
characterized by a grave injustice of one group within that society against another. And 
there is an argument to be made that the answer to this injustice cannot simply be 
assimilation into a common culture, or, in the American case, the assimilation of an African 
American population into an Anglo-Saxon culture that was responsible for the injustice in 
 
65 In 2019 the New York Times Magazine started an article series premised on the idea that the year 
1619 and the arrival of the first African slaves is “not country's original sin, but it is more than that: It is the 
country's true origin” (https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-
slavery.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=476B3523C09D57DF61B706E7E94D14F9&gwt=pay&asset
Type=REGIWALL) 
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the first place. And we see similar challenges in Canada and Australia with its indigenous 
populations who have experienced their own suppression at the hands of a white majority.  
These historical experiences permeate Taylor’s writing and provide the backdrop 
against which we can better understand his claim that assimilation is the “cardinal sin 
against the ideal of authenticity” (C. Taylor 1994, 38). But it is also here where a problem 
with Taylor’s philosophy arises. He argues convincingly about the necessity of a society 
to allow, recognize and affirm individuals and groups authentic identity. But he fails to 
fully define what the sources of an authentic identity can be, which does come as a bit of a 
disappointment considering that one of his major works is titled “Sources of the Self” (C. 
Taylor 1992). In this elaborate and insightful work, Taylor provides us with an interesting 
genealogy of modern identity, but comes very close to the rather pessimistic idea that 
modernity no longer allows for fully authentic identities. Whether or not this is true is one 
thing, but his skepticism towards modernity paired with his concern of forced assimilation 
into a majority identity creates an almost anti-assimilationist cultural philosophy. That in 
itself is of course a defendable position, but then Taylor would have to provide us with a 
structure of how societies that consist of groups who refuse any form of assimilation can 
maintain social cohesion. Also, Taylor, Habermas and others who defend similar positions 
show a striking unawareness of the differences between the cultural recognition of groups 
and individuals. When Taylor writes that “what we are asked to recognize is the unique 
identity of this individual or group, their distinctness from everyone else” (C. Taylor 1994, 
38), he glosses over the significant issue that being recognized as a member of a group and 
being recognized as an individual is not the same thing, and that in fact these can be based 
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on very different forms of recognition. And what makes things even more complex is that 
these forms of recognition can be in conflict.  
When Taylor demands recognition of a group, he demonstrates considerable 
awareness of what this could mean for the potential individual recognition of the members 
within that group. It is a very simplistic view to assume that if the majority culture grants 
minorities recognition the members of these minorities will be freed from oppression and 
can be their authentic selves. It is equally true that group recognition will “cage-in” 
members of the minority group, and potentially entirely close off the possibility of 
assimilation into the majority culture. In Taylor’s own Canada the government has made 
great efforts to recognize the cultural autonomy and authority of its Aboriginal people, with 
the consequence of less and less assimilation and people of Aboriginal descent remaining 
locked into a culture that wrestles with social problems that surpass the situation in the rest 
of Canada (Flanagan 2000; Widdowson and Howard 2008). To point this out is not to 
ignore or deny the crimes and sins of Western colonialism in general and the Canadian case 
in particular; but to first take someone’s land and then pursue policies that make it 
increasingly difficult for members of the Aboriginal people to fully join and enjoy the 
benefits of Canadian citizenship seems to be a misguided way of making up for sins of the 
past. 
Even worse, we encounter again the conflation of culture and ethnicity, and within 
Taylor’s argument there is the idea that there can be only one authentic self for people of a 
certain heritage or that show certain physiological characteristics. But there is no evidence 
for that, and it also reveals a complete misunderstanding of what assimilation actually 
means. If a person assimilates into a culture, this means that they emotionally embrace the 
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moral matrix of the culture they join. One can think about this like the US-American patriot 
of Swedish descent who speaks of “our Constitution” even though his grandparents might 
only have arrived in the United States in the 1930s. Would anybody claim that this 
individual’s sense of identity is misguided and he suffers from false consciousness because 
his “true” allegiance should be with Carl XVI Gustaf, the reigning King of Sweden? Taylor 
is correct in emphasizing the importance of an authentic identity, but without a standard 
against which we can measure authenticity we are left with random declarations of what is 
supposedly authentic and what is not.  
I hope that in the previous chapters I have laid out a possible standard that could 
help us to define authenticity: I claim that an authentic identity is one to which an individual 
feels an intuitive emotional bond that ties him or her to a community and its values as well 
as intrinsically invested symbols, and that this identity is also recognized and reciprocated 
by other members of the community. These values and symbols can be constructed around 
ethnicity or heritage, but there is no iron law of identity that says that they have to. Cultures 
therefore can be more open to new members than others, depending on their values. This 
also offers us an additional way to measure the relative position of cultures vis-à-vis each 
other, even if we use two seemingly very different cases: Islam and being a US Citizen, for 
example, are two cultures that are more open than cultures that have skin color or tribal 
relations as a sacred core that enables membership. This does not mean that the Quran and 
the US Constitution enshrine the same principles, but that both cultures are in theory open 
to every individual that commits to them.66 Historically, people with originally vastly 
 
66 I am of course not blind to the fact that within the United States just as within religious 
communities very often additional hierarchies emerge that are defined by the ethnic characteristics of 
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different backgrounds have joined and been accepted into new cultures, and it is not at all 
clear that this process of assimilation was always negative. Without the assimilation of 
Arabic tribes into the Umma of Islam the world would have been deprived of one of 
history’s greatest civilizations, with most likely devastating consequences for humanity 
due to the loss of all the scientific and artistic inventions that were brought forth by the 
culture of Islam (Hoyland 2017). Similarly, it has most likely been beneficial for the United 
States that former members of so-called Celtic tribal culture in the South have been 
absorbed and assimilated in the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture of the North (McWhiney 
1990; Sowell 2006).  
We probably do not think about these cases as often because they do not include 
racial or ethnic differences, so an Irish Catholic becoming an American Protestant or a 
Swedish atheist becoming an American Republican, do not seem as odd to us as an 
Aboriginal Canadian becoming a Nationalist Canadian. There are multiple factors at work, 
including the willingness of the majority culture to accept attempts of assimilation, but 
from the perspective of the individual there is no evidence or argument that can 
convincingly claim that somebody born as an aboriginal Canadian cannot change their 
cultural identity and be as much authentic to themselves as they would be with their 
previous identity. The entire point of true assimilation is that the person feels and is 
accepted as a member of a new culture. If these two conditions are fulfilled it is hard to 
argue why an individual should not hold an authentic identity, even if it differs significantly 
from the identity of previous generations or members of the same ethnic group. And if 
 
supposedly equal members of the same culture. But even in that case more open cultures have a better record 
than deliberately more closed cultures.  
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there are actually multiple paths towards a truly authentic identity, should it not matter to 
us and policy makers what that the content of that identity is? The moral claim to the equal 
recognition of all cultures would only be fully justified if it would be as unalterable as 
certain other characteristics of human beings.  
If Taylor would limit his argument to the idea that equal recognition should be 
applied regardless of a person’s skin color, heritage, gender, geographical origin, or other 
immutable characteristics he would have a much stronger case. But this does not apply in 
the case of culture, because although it can involve painful emotional change and 
emancipation, in principle changing one’s culture is always a possibility. There can be a 
fruitful discussion as to the standards by which we can measure the differences of cultures 
and their consequences, but to proclaim that this is near-impossible as Taylor does is a 
flawed assumption.  
His argument for equal recognition is based on the concern that “the projection of 
an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent 
that the image is internalized” (C. Taylor 1994, 36). While this observation is correct, it is 
not a sufficient argument for equal and universal recognition. As I have pointed out before, 
there are powerful examples that can justify the projection of an inferior image. That there 
is no public affirmation for members of Neo-Nazi gangs or the Ku Klux Klan and that they 
are subject to ostracization by the majority of society serves this very purpose, that once 
this demeaning image has been internalized, members will consider changing their culture. 
Equally, the reason why many governments offer de-radicalization programs for right wing 
or Islamic extremists is because these particular cultures are not viewed as equal.  
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Nowhere in Taylor’s or Young’s writing does it occur to them that affirming 
minority cultures makes assimilation into the majority culture much more difficult. And 
cultural psychology gives us good indicators why that is the case. If we attach significant 
moral value to being a member of a group, like being part of one of the Canadian aboriginal 
groups, any individual who tries to leave these groups will automatically be stigmatized as 
a rule breaker who has violated a sacred idea, creating a strong emotional disincentive to 
leave the group. There is significant evidence that keeping people trapped between two 
cultures comes at severe psychological cost (Wexler 2006), and that well-intended cultural 
affirmation can have unintended consequences. Trying to lock people into cultural 
identities because of their heritage or skin color is not just misunderstanding assimilation, 
it ultimately is misunderstanding culture. 
The same applies to our initial example regarding the matter of veiling: Taylor is 
undoubtedly right that there is can be a plethora of individual reasons why a woman of 
Muslim faith is wearing a Burka or a Hijab, but to entirely disconnect cultural symbols 
from the contextual meaning they have for a majority of insiders and outsiders of the 
culture in question is a very ambiguous philosophical proposition. If we would take 
Taylor’s argument further, cultural symbols would lose all meaning: If wearing the Burka 
is just a different way to affirm the same values like a woman who burned her bra in the 
1960s, then we really could do without any discussion about underlying values. But veiling 
does have a particular meaning independently of what the individual who engages in it 
believes for themselves. If Taylor would have made a case for the unabridged right of an 
individual to dress as they please, that would have been one thing, but he equally demands 
recognition for what the veil symbolizes and then goes on to provide his own interpretation 
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of what it is that it symbolizes. It is worth mentioning that Taylor himself once supported 
more restrictive measures regarding public veiling (Authier 2019), and only changed his 
views recently, because he views Islamophobia as a bigger threat to societal cohesion than 
the practice of veiling.  
Ultimately Taylor seems to have such a disenchanted view of a supposedly 
disenchanted world that culture no longer is a matter of competing transcendental ideas of 
the world, but of possible compromises between individuals who fundamentally all agree 
on the rational nature of things. The good news for Taylor’s unease is that the world 
probably is not as disenchanted as he thinks, and people still cling to ideas that give their 
life meaning beyond mere material existence. The bad news is; compromise in such a world 
will be much more difficult to achieve.  
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CHAPTER VI: CULTURE AND INSTITUTIONS - THE WAY FORWARD 
We cannot finish our discussion of culture without at least taking a short glimpse 
at the matter of institutions, for it is institutions that translate ideas and identities into actual 
and sustained political realities. Additionally, institutionalism has become the major field 
to produce explanations for the economic and political success of some societies and the 
failure or decline of others. There is a growing consensus that it is not individuals that 
determine the shape of a society, but the institutions they decide to build (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012; Douglass C. North 1990, 1991; Douglass C. North, Wallis, and Weingast 
2009; Douglass C. North and Weingast 1989). Yet these institutions themselves depend on 
being seen as legitimate by the people, and regularly this legitimacy comes from the 
grounding of institutions in the intrinsic and collective values of a society (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995; E. Ostrom 2000). As numerous studies have shown, institutions are not only 
anchored in culture, they also have the ability to change culture (Greif 2006b). Prominent 
examples would be: the success of Islamic institutions in altering the tribal structures of 
Arab societies; the endorsement of democracy by the Catholic church in the 1970s and its 
transformation from being an obstacle to becoming an active promoter of democratization; 
the role of the U.S. Supreme Court with its influence based on the role of being the highest 
authority on interpreting the constitution, which is at the heart of America’s political and 
cultural identity. 
Human development beyond clans and tribes has culminated (for now) in the 
emergence of the modern state. While there is an ongoing debate about the ideal form of 
government, the view of the state as the sole form of legitimate representation and main 
bulwark against Hobbesian anarchy remains the dominant argument in political science. 
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Although there are discussions about the end of the (nation)state (Mann 1993a, 1997), the 
possibility of a world state (Wendt 2003), and the ability of transnationalism to replace 
state power in certain areas (Dingwerth 2007), the state continues to be the focus of both 
bureaucratic and organizational power as well as being invested with a level of legitimacy 
by the people that are governed by it.  
The central characteristic of the modern state was defined by Max Weber in his 
Politics as a Vocation (M. Weber 1994) as consisting in the legitimate monopoly over 
violence within a given territory. The modern state, therefore, is no longer based on kin 
and family, but on territory and new forms of social bonds between individuals. These new 
bonds were created by distinctively cultural processes, transferring legitimacy away from 
the family to institutions based on religion, traditions, and ideas. The strength of these new 
bonds was substantial enough to allow taxation and drafting into armies, and obliged 
people to live by the laws of the state. The state itself is at least in part a cultural artifact, 
and cannot be fully understood without a conceptualization of culture.  
Accepting the state as a cultural artifact, however, also entails that it can never be 
completely neutral towards cultural developments within the state. If we take the concept 
of identity in modernity seriously, the state must ensure that the anxiety of individuals 
between inner-self and social conformity does not threaten the conformity necessary to 
legitimize state institutions. Culture and its role in the formation of identities that supersede 
the loyalty to one's kin are a necessary condition for virtually any kind of state formation. 
It is no coincidence that both the birth of the modern state and the birth of modern identities 
in the West can be traced to into the 16th and 17th century. As Charles Taylor points out, 
modern identity politics starts at the time of the Protestant Reformation, with rapidly 
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increasing literacy and social mobility. (For an overview of Taylor and social mobility,  
see: Fukuyama 2006).  
In the European case, national identity became the driving force in state 
development, brought most obviously to the forefront as a consequence of the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, which historically marks the birth of the Nation State. National identity 
for elite groups, however, was a reality much earlier than the 17th century. David Cannadine 
gives us an interesting glimpse into its early stages with the following quotation from 1241 
by Frederick II, warning his fellow rulers of the threat posed by the Mongols: “Germany 
was fervent in arms, France was the mother and nurse of chivalry, Spain was warlike and 
bold, and England was fertile and protected by its fleet” (Cannadine 2011 Minute 21). 
We have similar historic cases of culture as the trigger of state formation in China, 
India, and the Middle East (see: Fukuyama 2012, for an overview). Contrary to the often 
England-centric story of institution-building (e.g. see: Douglass C. North and Weingast 
1989), different cultural backgrounds led to significantly different states: state formation 
in China was strongly secular-theoretical and lead to very centralized forms of institutions, 
whereas the sacralization of the division of labor in India’s Brahmanism led to a much less 
centralized state. The history of the state in the Arab world can almost exclusively be 
explained by the emergence of Islam, which for the first time allowed the unification of 
formerly nomadic tribes into a unified empire.  
Additionally, the longevity of institutions is connected to their cultural background 
as well, and history provides some interesting examples: a major problem of the Ottoman 
Empire was the inability to create a loyal bureaucracy, making them dependent on the 
Janissaries and the Devshirme. In this system the Ottoman Empire abducted children from 
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conquered areas in order to train and educate them to become the empires’ elite bureaucrats 
and military leaders. The need for doing so emerged because the Ottoman system was not 
as capable of overcoming the strong loyalties individuals who were supposed to work for 
the state felt towards their kin and tribe and who often acted for the benefit of tribal groups 
but not the state – Christianity, on the other hand, was much more successful in weakening 
the family bonds (Fukuyama 2012c, chap. 15).  
States and culture, therefore, do not develop in isolation from each other but are 
closely entwined from the beginning. It remains a neglected fact in contemporary political 
science that the state almost everywhere emerged out of cultural changes that enabled the 
emergence of strong and resilient ties of loyalty paralleling or even surpassing kin and 
tribal loyalties. Equally, states made significant efforts in ensuring the emotional 
connection between the state and the people over which it was supposed to rule. Charles 
Tilly argues that “war made the state, and the state made war,” but it is also true that culture 
made the state, and the state made culture. While a nascent national consciousness of 
European peoples can be traced back to the 12th century, it was an increasingly active and 
centralized state that nurtured and directed a collective consciousness that became a 
necessary condition for the legitimacy of state institutions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012).  
There is significant evidence that states engaged strongly in the creation of national 
cultures to justify their rule. Existing cultural artifacts like language and history were taken 
up in order to mold them into a national consciousness (Hobsbawm 2012; E. Weber 1976). 
The early project of modernity was also a project of creating the nation. The success and 
speed of this endeavor is quite astounding: Despite the fact that in 1789 only 12-13% of 
the population in France spoke “correct” French or that in 1860 only 2,5% of Italy’s 
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population used Italian language for everyday purposes, this tiny minority was “in a real 
sense a and therefore the [Italian] people. Nobody else was” (Hobsbawm 2012, 61). 
Similarly, Hobsbawm argues the existence of a German identity is in some respects “a 
purely cultural concept” (Hobsbawm 2012, 61). 
 
6.1 Formal and Informal Institutions  
While institutions represent formalized rules of a society, the legitimacy of these 
institutions is part of the informal realm. Aoki (M. Aoki 2001) and Boettke et al. (Boettke, 
Coyne, and Leeson 2008, 334) emphasize “the importance of informal complementary 
institutions that allow formal institutions to function in the desired manner.” 
Francis Fukuyama makes a similar point, arguing for the necessary distinction 
between formal institutions like constitutions and legal systems, and “informal norms that 
fall into the realm of culture” (Fukuyama 2012c, 531). Niall Ferguson, who champions the 
institutional approach as a historian and regularly issues “health warnings” (Ferguson 
2013, 27) with regard to cultural interpretations, admits that “institutions are, of course, in 
some sense the products of culture” (Ferguson 2011a, 10). Institutions and culture, 
therefore, are corresponding and not competing concepts. Culture shapes institutions, but 
at the same time institutions reinforce and shape culture (Greif 2006b). An example would 
be the democratic turn of the Catholic Church in the 1970s – an institution that originally 
had a troubled relationship with democracy, then moved to embracing it, allowing its 
followers to do the same (Huntington 1993; Woodberry 2012). 
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Efficient institutional arrangements can emerge spontaneously from societies (like 
Islam in the Arab world), and often they work more efficiently and with fewer negative 
externalities than “artificially” created and implemented institutions (Hay and Shleifer 
1998; Leeson 2006; E. Ostrom 1990, 2000; J. C. Scott 1999). Institutions are created in 
order to constrain and shape individual behavior via mechanics of reward and punishment, 
but also by creating social norms that define actions that are obligatory, permitted, or 
forbidden (Crawford and Ostrom 1995). As Ostrom (E. Ostrom 2000, 144) argues, the 
content of these norms varies from culture to culture and is not stable, but dynamic. The 
interplay of culture and institutions also creates certain path-dependencies, meaning that 
cultural evolution will most likely look differently from society to society, depending on 
what their “original” culture and traditions looked like (Greif 1994, 2006b; Greif, Tabellini, 
and Britain) 2010). A similar point is made by Almond and Verba (Verba 1965), who argue 
that compatibility of societies with democracy is not static, but strongly dependent on 
historical experiences.  
The disciplines of history, sociology and anthropology often focus on very specific 
geographical areas and time periods, allowing them to create thick descriptions of cultural 
backgrounds to political processes (B. Anderson 2006; Geertz 1993; James C. Scott 2009). 
Additionally, culturalists in comparative politics have to compete with the powerful 
structural and rational choice approaches in their field (Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997, 2–
8). These approaches often provide more elegant answers to questions like state formation 
(Tilly 1975) and other major developments.  
One of the reasons why culture might yet make a comeback in political science 
could be due to empirical research like Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work (Putnam 
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1993), in which he tries to show that different performances of governance in Italian 
regions can be traced back to centuries’ old differences in civic traditions. Introducing the 
term “social capital” into the discussion, Putnam succeeded in reinvigorating the 
importance of cultural questions in politics and moving it beyond civic and political 
culture. 
The concept of social capital, often defined as the degree of civic participation in 
society emerging as a byproduct of cultural norms, allowed the development of more 
quantitative research programs, comparing the state of social capital over time and in 
different countries (Ferguson 2013; Fukuyama 1996, 2000; Murray 2012; Skocpol 2004). 
The survey studies by Robert Inglehart are a central part of the study of culture in 
comparative politics (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1977, 1997) – his concept 
that mass beliefs exist and matter for democratization made culture a phenomenon that 
could be inquired beyond the usual reducibility of political processes to the individual level 
in political science.  
Putnam’s stunning success in bringing culture back onto the table (Laitin 1995) 
also resulted in new avenues of cultural research, especially with regard to the question of 
trust. Originally trying to learn from other disciplines, now historians and economists have 
now started to employ these ideas in their own research (see, for example: Akerlof and 
Kranton 2011; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Elinor Ostrom and Ahn 2003). 
Other studies in a similar direction started to formulate historical path dependencies 
that showed that the emergence of different cultural value systems can affect political 
outcomes over long periods of time (Greif 1994). In a number of his studies on Asia, Pye 
showed that authoritarianism has to be understood differently depending on the cultural 
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context (Pye 1985). Comparing the political development of China and India, Francis 
Fukuyama concludes that it is mainly cultural and historical factors that explain why China 
is much more centralized than India, and that this has to be taken into account when 
debating the prospect of democratization in the former (Fukuyama 2012c).  
Other research compared specific qualities of cultural values and how they affect 
political and economic development. One example for this is the comparison of the attitude 
towards literacy in different religions and its influence on political outcomes (Ferguson 
2011a). Most importantly, these comparative studies have helped to determine whether 
cultural factors are exogenous or endogenous, in sharpening the toolset for comparative 
politics (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 191). 
Also, the understanding of regional political developments can be better understood 
if a culture is a factor of analysis. Pakistani involvement with, and occasional support for, 
the Taliban in Afghanistan has been puzzling to many analysts, especially due to the 
continuous involvement of the Taliban in terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil. Yet this policy 
becomes more logical if one looks at the tensions between culture and ethnicity. Pakistan 
is a multiethnic state with religion as the binding glue, making it central to the country’s 
existence such that Islamic culture and not ethnic markers is the dominant factor when it 
comes to the emotional identity of the population. An ethnical awakening in Afghanistan 
that would lead to a fracturing of the country along ethnic lines could spill over into 
Pakistan and would potentially be a more existential threat to Islamabad than Taliban 
terrorism. This means that despite the uneasy relationship between Pakistan and the 
Taliban, it is in the interest of the former that Islam remains the core of Afghan identity 
and continues to trump the regional and ethnic aspirations of tribal leaders – something the 
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Taliban promise to deliver. Similarly, neighboring multi-ethnic Iran has no interest in 
ethnicity becoming a more prominent political force than it already is, preferring religion 
as the major source of identity. 
 
6.2 Towards Taking Culture Seriously Again  
Ultimately this discussion needs to answer one question: Does culture matter? Does 
the turn away from culture have any political and social relevance that makes it a topic 
worth engaging with beyond mere academic interest? I think the answer is yes, and the 
reason why culture continues to matter is due to its impact on the formation, functioning, 
and sustainability of institutions. Certainly, there are institutions that can exist and maintain 
themselves without any significant cultural underpinning, and we have addressed them 
already in this dissertation. Being a member of Amazon Prime or Sam’s Club comes with 
significant mutual benefits for both the creator of the institution and those who join it, even 
though there is not much of an emotional commitment to my membership beyond my 
economic interest. But can all institutions and the communities they serve be maintained 
by solely a mutual exchange of benefits? Are we supposed to accept and endorse human 
and civil rights not as a moral good, but as something that confers benefits upon us and 
therefore the endorsement is the rational thing to do? Being against slavery and racial 
discrimination, not as a moral imperative, but a utilitarian principle would mean: if 
egalitarian societies generate more happiness for a greater number of people, we should 
prefer it to non-egalitarian societies. This, of course, would also imply that if non-
egalitarian societies should be better in generating happiness, we should equally endorse 
them as well. 
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The problem is that happiness – despite the attempts by Bentham and others 
(Shapiro 2012, chaps. 2 and 3) – can be difficult to measure objectively, and, as social 
philosophers from Aristotle to Adam Smith have pointed out, it matters a lot what a society 
considers as sources of happiness. Culture continues to play a key role in the creation of 
emotional triggers, and what we perceive as appropriate sources of happiness, sadness, joy 
or shame depends largely on our cultural framework. The cultural framework we live in 
can be so internalized, that we no longer recognize it and take it as a given. Yet things like 
private property or equality before the law are cultural creations that have not been around 
for as long as we might think, and to take them for granted ignores the fact that they and 
other values have been the consequence of numerous cultural revolutions. (For a history of 
property rights and other economic inventions see: Screpanti and Zamagni 2005.) On the 
other hand, this should highlight the power of culture for us: we are so deeply and 
emotionally attached to some of these values that we have a difficult time understanding 
that they have not been the dominant values for every society at every point in history. As 
Charles Taylor has pointed out in his magisterial A Secular Age (C. Taylor 2007a), there 
once was a time when not-believing in a deity simply was not an option and  created a 
different value system compared to the one we have today.  Still, people believed in God 
just as strongly as we in the West believe in our secular values today. In fact, one of the 
worries that Taylor expresses is that maybe the belief in God was actually stronger than 
our belief in secular values is nowadays.  
Yet, even authors like Taylor and Connolly, who have written insightfully about 
the creation of identity and how culture matters for it nonetheless have a rather 
inconsequential view of the actual emotional commitments culture generally entails. In a 
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nutshell, their argument rests on the idea that if we realize that culture serves an emotional 
need and is therefore a means to an end, there should be no conflict or contradiction 
between different cultures since they all serve an individual emotional need. The terms 
used to describe this emotional need are often either recognition or intersubjective self-
respect, so this theorizing does not preclude the element and necessity of sociability (C. 
Taylor 1971), but it attaches a very utilitarian aspect to it. John Rawls, for example, argues 
that self-respect can be based on having one’s actions publicly affirmed by others. But 
affirmation does not have to come from the entire society but only from those who are 
already like-minded (Rawls 1999, 441). This of course would only function if these groups 
and their members would not care about what the other groups do, an argument that is 
equally Hobbesian and utilitarian. Rawls only escapes Hobbes’ need for the Leviathan, 
because all the individuals in his society prefer and share membership in a liberal 
constitutional democracy (Fiss et al. 1985, 234).  Thus, they have an inclination towards 
tolerance that makes the joining and leaving of different groups possible, and individuals 
can explore multiple ways to find self-respect and recognition. But, ultimately, he puts 
forward a Hobbesian idea: People are individualistic, and once they realize their 
individuality, culture just becomes another good to be consumed for one’s personal well-
being.  
In other words, Rawls takes an incredibly thick cultural basis – liberal constitutional 
democracy – on which he erects a concept of cultural pluralism. In his ideal society, 
everyone can believe whatever they want, as long as their core belief is of a liberal and 
individualistic nature. It is a noble vision, but it is not a culturally pluralistic one, because 
the diversity Rawls is approving of only follows after everyone has already joined and 
 
380 
 
emotionally committed to his virtues of liberalism and individualism. It would be more 
consequential to talk about 2nd degree cultural pluralism, because the 1st degree remains 
fundamentally anchored in a cultural monism that makes the 2nd degree pluralism possible. 
In the end, Rawls simply has a more complex way to restate the (in a previous chapter 
already quoted) statement by John Adams regarding the United States: that “our 
Constitution is designed only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate for 
any other” (Adams 1798). John Rawls could write that his theory is designed for an 
individualistic and tolerant people, but wholly inadequate for any other. Robert Putnam, 
who has written extensively about cultural diversity and community admits as much in his 
own analysis: 
In the short to medium run, however, immigration and ethnic 
diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital […]. In the 
medium to long run, on the other hand, successful immigrant societies 
create new forms of social solidarity and dampen the negative effects of 
diversity by constructing new, more encompassing identities. Thus, the 
central challenge for modern, diversifying societies is to create a new, 
broader sense of ‘we’ (Putnam 2007, 138–39 emphasis by me) 
 
Putnam seems to be so wedded to his idea of diversity that he doesn’t realize that 
this last sentence is in fact a contradiction in terms. If a group of people shares a common 
“we” that goes beyond economic interests and is based on social trust and emotional 
attachments (which is what Putnam means), it is no longer a diversifying but a unifying 
society that is becoming culturally more homogeneous instead of heterogeneous. Just like 
Rawls, Taylor, Habermas and many others, Putnam defends his argument for pluralism and 
diversity with an appeal to unity. Once a group of people share a sincere and intuitive “we”-
feeling in relation to each other, their diversity and differences have decreased, not 
increased. In his analysis Putnam shows empirically how a common identity increases the 
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participation of individuals in public life and how it improves the performance of 
government, a relation that has also been confirmed in studies outside the US (Rothstein 
2011).  
Western societies can easily find themselves in a situation where they have to make 
trade-offs between strong social cohesion based on a shared culture and the advantages of 
a pluralist society. This is the great paradox liberal societies face, and which also 
constitutes their greatest weakness: how can a state be purely liberal, if it prefers some 
cultural values over others? The answer to this question depends on the definition of 
liberalism and its emancipation from relativistic pluralism. Even Charles Taylor accepts 
the limits to multiculturalism and the possibility of turning liberalism into a “fighting 
creed” (C. Taylor 1994, 62). Jacob Levy gives us a glimpse into what such a creed could 
look like: 
Non-cruelty, non-humiliation, and genuine tolerance are possible if 
not always easy. Public affirmation of respect and recognition, though, 
cannot be available to all cultures simultaneously … To recognize what a 
group values in its own culture is to accept a standard by which some other 
groups fail to be worthy of respect (Levy 2000, 32). 
 
This is a clear rejection of a cultural relativism that tends “to attribute ‘equal value’ 
to all cultures … [and] destroys the very notion of value. If everything is of value, nothing 
is of value: the value loses its content” (Joppke 2004, 242). A functioning marriage 
between multiculturalism and liberalism (Kymlicka 1996) within a state can therefore only 
be achieved under the dominance of, and tolerance by, a liberal culture and liberalism as 
the central common meaning. 
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By nature, state involvement in culture oscillates between the extremes of complete 
neutrality and totalitarianism, although the later can be prevented if we take Habermas’ 
idea of the public sphere seriously. Habermas did not simply call for pluralism, but for 
pluralism in a public sphere that would serve as a space to allow for cultural evolution via 
debate and discourse under the absence of totalitarian structures. It is therefore the public 
sphere that the liberal state has to promote, not simply a dedication to pluralism per se: “an 
uncritical embrace of diversity may obscure the need to promote citizenship and the 
elements of a healthy civic life” (Macedo 2003, 6). There are inherent risks to such an 
uncritical embrace as outlined and criticized by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2000) and 
Michael Ignatieff (Ignatieff 2003, 90). Both argue that liberal societies have to develop a 
liberal consciousness that would trump the right to equal recognition of illiberal groups. 
The current institutional setup in Western democracies makes it difficult to promote 
the development of a public sphere due to its focus on uncritical pluralism and 
individualism, which due to its lack of collective identity could lead to a decay of the 
institutions themselves. The neoinstitutional economist Avner Greif argues that Western 
institutions “may have undermined themselves in the long run by creating excessive 
individualism and materialism” (Greif 2006b, 26). Michael Walzer makes similar 
arguments and calls for the active engagement of the state in reviving the public sphere 
(Walzer 1994) 
Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas, and other writers about modernity and post-
modernity are continuing the Weberian legacy of interpreting and describing the 
rationalization of the world, but they themselves remain largely caught in an instrumental 
interpretation of culture that leaves little room for the importance of psychological 
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processes. They lament the loss of authenticity of the modern world, but neither of them 
can provide us with a defense of culture that is not directly drawn from the very world they 
criticize. Culture becomes an instrument in the rational world they imagine, a world that 
supposedly lost its authenticity because of rationality (regarding Habermas see: Baxter 
1987; regarding Taylor see: C. Taylor 1992).  
By instrumental, I mean that while they accept a plurality of cultures and cultural 
interpretation of the world and its importance for human flourishing, they struggle 
considerably with the idea that people can have exclusive and ultimate emotional 
commitments to certain values. Taylor writes about the demand for universal justice and 
beneficence, claims of equality, freedom and self-rule and the avoidance of death and 
suffering (C. Taylor 1992, 495). These and other universalities across cultures have been 
well established (D. E. Brown 2004), but the particularities of what equality, freedom, and 
justice mean can differ widely. There is, in other words, a universalism of moral values, 
but no uniformity. Even within the United States there is a significant difference between 
liberals and conservatives in their interpretation of equality: For many on the right, ideal 
equality means equality of opportunity; for many on the left, it means equality of outcome 
(Sowell 2007, chap. 6). The same moral value of equality can be expressed quite 
differently, so even if all the values Taylor lists are indeed the most important ones, it will 
not change the fact that even these values can be expressed in different, sometimes 
seemingly contradictory, ways.  
This has been addressed in great detail in the first part of the dissertation, so we 
need not to go into too much detail here, but allow me to recapture one of this dissertation’s 
core findings: That similar or even the same moral values can have different cultural 
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expressions. But these expressions are often invested with strong emotional commitments 
on the individual and collective level, creating unease if we see them violated. Taylor and 
others believe that this can easily be overcome and we are able to live in a world where 
cultural differences are living side-by-side and free of conflict due to our realization that 
culture is mostly important for our own individual well-being and this function should not 
be limited just because other people have other ways of finding sources of their well-being. 
Taylor’s argument is partially Hobbesian with some modern adaptions – Hobbes, just like 
Taylor, made the case that individual fulfillment should not be limited just because it differs 
from others’ means of a fulfilling live; this is so, as long as these means do not interfere 
with the life and liberty of other individuals, and, most importantly, a stable political order 
(S. B. Smith 2016, chap. 4). 
Modern political philosophy often looks at culture like an emotional gumball 
machine, where one can get emotional satisfaction, but without the need to look at the 
deeper emotional commitments that cultures demand (see Taylor’s idea of solidarity across 
cultures: C. Taylor 2007b). Martha Nussbaum, for example, argued strongly for a 
replacement of the culture of patriotism with a culture of cosmopolitanism, since in her 
view these are easily interchangeable (M. C. Nussbaum 1994) – until she had to partially 
reverse her views later (M. C. Nussbaum 2008) and rephrased it as “globally sensitive 
patriotism.” Taylor defends cultural pluralism but once again his prescription would 
require a very low level of emotional commitment to any specific culture or identity:  
A society’s sense of solidarity can be sustained only if all of its 
different spiritual groups recreate their sense of dedication to it: if Christians 
see it as central to their Christianity, if Muslims see it as central to their 
Islam, and if the various kinds of lay philosophies see it as central to their 
philosophies” (C. Taylor 2007b).  
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To be clear, Taylor is not talking about solidarity within groups of Christians, 
Muslims, and “lay philosophers” but between members of these groups. He goes even a 
step further and argues that this should become “central” to their culture, meaning that 
solidarity with those outside of your own cultural group should become the sacred core of 
your own. Taylor, despite his claims to the contrary, does not take culture seriously as a 
social force – he puts forward an approach that is pluralist on the surface, but not in 
substance. If all cultural groups in a society are built on the same sacred core – namely 
solidarity with each other – these groups have merged into a new culture in its own right, 
constituting its own unique cultural identity and not a multicultural mosaic. Taylor’s theory 
recognizes the importance of community, but it remains anchored in a powerful 
individualism that cannot cope with the idea that people hold identities (regardless of 
religious or secular in nature) because they are loyal to some values and critical or outright 
hostile to others.  
Taylor goes to great lengths to discuss the dialectic between society and one’s inner 
self that sets the conditions to discover one’s true authentic identity, but he can never fully 
detach himself from ethnic considerations like being black or female, thereby not simply 
making a claim to the individual right for an authentic identity, but smuggling in his idea 
what that identity might be (C. Taylor 1997, chap. 12“The Politics of Recognition”).  
Habermas attempts to resolve this issue by writing that “different values are not 
mutually exclusive like different truths. So there is also no difficulty for the secular 
consciousness to recognize that an alien ethos has the same authenticity for the other and 
enjoys the same priority that one’s own ethos has for oneself” (Habermas 2005, 27). 
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Habermas is of course right that members of one culture – in his case a secular one – can 
recognize the authenticity of an alien ethos, but recognition is not the same as feeling or 
sharing this ethos. As we have already discussed, it is easier to understand alien (to use 
Habermas’ diction) values than to feel them. We made this argument before, but let us use 
a more provocative example to highlight how problematic a simply focus on recognition 
is.67 A neo-Nazi and an Amnesty International activist might have the same emotional 
commitment to their cause, meaning that participating in their meetings, pronouncing their 
creeds, and feeling emotional elevation as being part of their group is activating the same 
areas in their brains since they share the same human physiology. Maybe they can even 
relate to and understand each other’s commitment to a supposedly higher cause. But none 
of this means that they would be able to form a community together based on their values, 
because we must assume that they hold these values to be truths and see the other side as 
violators of their intrinsic values tantamount to attacks on their very group identity. 
Taylor and Habermas often avoid the question of competing emotional 
commitments by declaring something a cultural phenomenon that really is not cultural at 
all. If none of the emotional aspects we discussed in part one applies to a given issue, that 
issue most likely is only of limited or no cultural content at all. Their argument resembles 
one made by Francis Fukuyama in his treatise on identity when he argues about how the 
increasing number of exotic food options in Washington, D.C. is proof for cultural 
pluralism and benign coexistence (Fukuyama 2018, KL 1807). Despite their philosophical 
and theoretical sophistication in other areas, the actual treatment of culture by these authors 
 
67 I am using following examples on purpose to also elicit an emotional reaction from the reader. 
Regardless on which side in the examples he or she comes down on, the very fact that is difficult to remain 
emotionally indifferent to either side proves my point.  
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is astonishingly superficial and simplistic. To address Fukuyama’s culinary example: 
Different cuisines can coexist if food and its preparation are not central to the very values 
Habermas is talking about – in other words, if they have no cultural significance. A devout 
Christian will not have a profound issue with a Japanese restaurant preparing Sushi. But 
this is not because of cultural harmony and understanding, but indifference.  
What would happen if food in fact is central to the value system of a culture? In 
recent years, German police have had to break up fights and riots in public parks, where 
Muslim Germans demanded public barbecue places with grills that have not been used to 
prepare pork and German right-wing activists who insisted on preparing pork on these 
publicly available grills. In the latter case, food becomes infused with cultural values and 
the increased likelihood of clashes between those who hold these values. The potential for 
overlap as well as the potential for conflict between cultures differs based on the amount 
of contradicting values, but to argue that two sides can always approach each other with 
nothing but mutual understanding seems unlikely. Certainly, a pro-choice activist can 
understand and maybe even respect the emotional commitment of a pro-life activist and 
vice-versa, but can they really just accept each other’s position without conflict? The only 
way such a conflict can be resolved is if there is a higher, even stronger, cultural 
commitment that binds the two sides more closely together than the disagreement that 
separates them.  
This is ultimately what Habermas, Taylor, Fukuyama, and others are implying to 
varying degrees: The common commitment to rational individualism and individual liberty 
should supersede value antagonisms based on religion, ideology, or other forms of identity. 
While that assumption is not unreasonable, it is not so much about tolerance between 
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cultures as it is about replacing existing cultures with a more strongly unifying one. We 
have discussed this previously, but one example would be the case of the atheist and the 
religious American who might be feel significantly apart when it comes to certain values, 
but where the shared value of being an American and the reassurance that both sides have 
the same emotional tie to the US can create a value-bond whose connecting power is 
stronger than the antagonism borne of different values in other areas. 
History provides numerous examples about the forging of new identities through 
the re-wiring and expanding of existing emotional commitments. In its beginning, the two 
large monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, were expert at incorporating existing 
structures and transforming them so that people switched their creed but could continue 
emotionally-valuable traditions, or, in the words of a contemporary scholar: “Islam 
explicitly and discreetly affiliated itself with the traditions already in place in the region” 
(Ahmed 1992, 4). The historical importance of this should not be underestimated, because 
this was also of high political relevance. Islam managed to unify and create a common 
purpose for people who originally had nothing that tied them together, allowing them to 
build the necessary organizational structures to become an imperial power. Just like other 
empires, the Islamic ones at some point fell victim to different forms of institutional decay 
that made them increasingly unsustainable (Fukuyama 2012c, chaps. 13, 14, and 15), but 
it is hard to imagine that without Islam there would have been an empire out of Arabia in 
the first place. One can only agree with Francis Fukuyama’s observation that there  
is no clearer illustration of the importance of ideas to politics than 
the emergence of an Arab state under the prophet Muhammad. The Arab 
tribes played an utterly marginal role in world history until that point; it was 
only Muhammad’s charismatic authority that allowed them to unify and 
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project their power throughout the Middle East and North Africa 
(Fukuyama 2012, 88). 
 
The 15th century Muslim scholar Abdel Rahman Ibn Khaldun described the role of 
Islam in this process as follows:  
“When people possess the [right] insight into their affairs, nothing 
can withstand them, because their outlook is one and they share a unity of 
purpose for which they are willing to die” (quoted in: Karsh 2013, 25).  
 
But this new religion did not just spring from nowhere, and in order to gain 
legitimacy among the people it tried to convert, it had to take existing emotional 
commitments into account. It is, for example, debatable if the practice of veiling is 
originally Islamic or was in fact adopted from Persian ideas of female modesty (Ahmed 
1992, 55–56). In pre-modern times the ability of imperial states to monitor its population 
was limited, so the stronger and more sincere the commitment of a majority of the 
population was to the ideological purpose of the state, the greater  was the likelihood that 
they would be loyal and obedient subjects – not by the power of fear, but the power of 
conviction. And one way of ensuring this loyalty was to adopt existing traditions that 
people followed voluntarily and incorporated into the new creed.  
Another example would be the spread of Christianity throughout Europe during 
Medieval times. As Richard Fletcher explores in great detail, the Christianization of Europe 
was a complex process, where missionaries and representatives of the Christian faith 
connected and gradually transformed existing pagan cultures, making them part of a larger 
Christian culture (Fletcher 1999). It is no secret that Christmas and other modern church 
practices have their roots in pagan forms of worship, but this is not a sign of early 
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Christianity’s weakness or strength.  Rather, it  reflects an approach that took the existing 
emotional commitments of medieval European tribes seriously. By taking the emotional 
bonds that existed between peoples and their pagan rituals and reconnecting them to 
Christianity, the likelihood of voluntary conversion was much higher than if it had been 
done by force. Christianity’s success was not so much a matter of replacing, but instead of 
merging and rebuilding, existing identities. 
It needs to be mentioned that this cultural expansion, however, was a two-way 
street: Christianity was transformed by its interaction with Rome and central European 
tribalism, just as Islam was transformed by the peoples and areas of the Near- and Middle 
East and Central Asia. When we tell the stories of these cultural transformations we must 
be careful not to see determinism that does not exist. Islam and Christianity are successful 
examples of such transformations, but not because there is a simple step-by-step program 
that a new religion or ideology can follow in order to establish itself. There have been 
multiple additional factors in the realm of economics and politics that created the necessary 
conditions for the success of these two religions. Nonetheless, they do demonstrate the 
important role of emotional commitments in creating sustainable communities. 
The question modernity is asking is whether forms of community can be created 
and sustained without these commitments. Modernity is poses itself therefore as a 
fundamental break with the past, since it lays claim to the idea that all the benefits of 
community can be accessed rationally and cognitively, creating moral bonds between 
individuals that are not sustained by emotions, but through a process of cognitive 
rationality (DeSouza 1998). The attempt is to maintain morality not out of the instinctive 
feeling that something is right or wrong, but out of a rational and cognitive analysis that 
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something objectively is right or wrong. Habermas and other philosophers who deal with 
the question of modernity assume that morality is accessible solely be cognitive means, 
which is a highly doubtful assumption. Even if it were true, there is no reason to assume 
that accessing morality cognitively will lead to universally applicable moral ideas.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This is in a nutshell what moral foundations theory has revealed: Different ideas of 
morality can be held with equal commitment by different people and it is not as easy to 
declare one side wrong and the other right as it might seems. As Jonathan Haidt has pointed 
out in political debates, we sometimes tend to ascribe the most negative motivations to 
people who do not share our views; a closer look at the origins of these views however 
often reveals that they have the same moral ambitions we do, but attempt to reach them by 
different interpretations of the world. (He uses a good example discussing economic 
policies: Haidt 2010.) 
To put this point in less scientific terms, two people can agree that it is 28 degrees 
Celsius outside, but whether this is perceived as hot or cold depends very much on the 
individual. Similarly, two people can agree on the need for justice, fairness, equality and 
all other kinds of moral ideas, but might widely differ when it comes to the propositional 
content of these terms. The question of what is just is quite different from the statement 
justice is good, and cultural conflicts usually arose regarding the former and not the latter.  
One of the key features that emerged from the Enlightenment was the idea that 
these questions can be answered in the same fashion that one can calculate the position of 
Mars three days from now. Morality must follow some definable rules, and once these rules 
are uncovered and stripped from its cultural superstructure, we can have a moral society 
based on reason without the confusing influence of culture with its prejudices, symbols, 
and traditions. Yet the disentanglement of reason and culture proved to be much more 
difficult than expected, since overthrowing the faith of tradition itself rested on a faith in 
reason “that reason itself cannot justify” (S. B. Smith 2007, KL 208). So the struggle 
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between reason and rationality, on the one hand, and culture, on the other, seems to run in 
circles, since in order to replace traditional cultures based on religion and other beliefs the 
Enlightenment – partially intentionally, partially unintentionally – needed to create its own 
faith-based system, an Enlightenment Culture on its own. The popularity of the natural 
sciences and the application of its methods “has to some degree repressed that kind of 
historical philosophy. But what lies behind it has not changed” (Aron 2011, 103). We 
therefore must inquire into philosophical roots of the role of rationality and how it became 
such an important concept. As I tried to point out in the course of this dissertation, its 
purpose is not to discard reason and rationality and embracea thoroughly anti-
Enlightenment position, but to identify the cultural aspects of Enlightenment rationality 
and thereby justify the role of culture as an important aspect of the social sciences. The 
tensions between reason and passion and which one should be preferred are among the 
most important philosophical questions in modern political thought. My argument is that 
this discussion itself produced a unique culture that is still with us today. The 
Enlightenment and its opponents created new ways of looking at human existence, and 
neither side in the larger philosophical debate could fully escape the influence of the other. 
The very struggle of modernity is characterized by the two poles of the human condition: 
The desire to give life a metaphysical and transcendental meaning but simultaneously 
realizing that human existence might not be different from the existence of any other 
material object without a true will of its own. 
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